Dan l'chaf zechus - What is the obligation to judge favorably?

update - point 5 Chofetz Chaim

One of the major issues when making decisions about other people is the well known principle of dan l'chaf zechus (to judge people favorably). What does that mean and what are the parameters. In this post - I will gradually add up the elements to give a full picture of what is involved. 

1) Firstly what is the source of this principle? While it does state the principle in Avos (1:6) "Appoint a teacher for yourself, acquire a companion and judge all men favorably" - this is not the source of the principle - but it seems to be advice. The actual source of the principle is learned in Shevuos (30a) from Vayikra (19:15) - the verse immediately preceding the prohibition of lashon harah. The end of the verse says "With righteousness you shall judge others" 

Shevuos (30a): Our Rabbis taught: In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour: that one should not sit, and the other stand; one speak all that he wishes, and the other bidden to be brief. Another interpretation: In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour: judge thy neighbour in the scale of merit.

2) There is an obvious problem - as Rav S. R. Hirsch points out. If this verse is referring to judgment in court - it is not dealing with interpersonal relationships. And yet the gemora seems to learn both from the same verse!

The Meiri seems to be the only one who simply says that the verse is about beis din and dan lchaf zechus is merely an asmachta.

Meiri (Shavuos 30b): Even though the majority of what I have written are laws learned directly from the Vayikra (19:15) "b'tzedek tisphot amisecha" [which are laws of beis din] there is also something which is learned indirectly from this verse by asmachta and allusions. That is the principle that a person should judge others favorably giving them the benefit of the doubt (l'kaf zecus) when the case can legitimately be understood in two opposing ways and the only way to decide between them is to rely on what is reasonable. ...

3) The next question is what exactly are the details? The Rambam makes a number of  different statements. For example he clearly indicates it is a desirable personality trait - but not a mitzva in these two places where he doesn't mention an obligation.

Rambam(Sefer haMitzvos 177):... Aside from the laws dealing with beis din, it is also learned from this verse of B'Tzedek that it is proper to judge his fellow man as innocent and not to understand his deeds and words other than being good.

Rambam(Hilchos De'os 5:7):A talmid chachom should have the midos that he does not scream and yell when he is talking to other like a bull or wild animal....and he should judge all men as being innocent and speak of their praise and not degrade them at all. He should love peace and pursue peace...

 However in Avos he makes distinctions based on the type of person - it is no longer "all men"- but judgments of innocence are an act of piety - not obligation. He does however omit the average person and lists 1) unknown person 2) tzadik 3) rasha.

Rambam(Avos 1:6): Judge all people as innocent. This means that if there is a man that you don't know whether he is righteous or wicked and you see him do something or say something that can be interpreted either as good or bad – you should understand it as good and not bad. However if you know the person to be an established tzadik and his deeds are good and he apparently does something that is bad and only by using a far fetched explanation can it be justified – then it is proper to assume that in fact it was good and do not suspect him of evil.... On the other hand a person well established as evil then it is best to avoid such a person and not to believe he is capable of doing anything good – if there is anyway of interpreting it as evil behavior. So if the person is not known to you and his deeds have not been determined to be good or bad – then it is necessary as an act of piety to judge him favorably.

However here in Mishneh Torah the Rambam again states all people

Rambam(Sanhedrin 23:10): When litigants are before the beis din they should be viewed as wicked and with the presumption that both sides are lying and judgments should be based on what seems correct. However when the trial is over and the litigants leave beis din they should be viewed by the judges as righteous people since they have accepted the judgmet of the court. And all people should be judged as innocent.

It would thus seem that the Rambam views dan l'chaf zechus as a principle of midos rather than halachic obligation.

That apparently is the view also of Rabbeinu Yonah for the average person. Viewing the tzadik as innoncent, however, is obligatory unless the evidence is unequivocal.

Rabbeinu Yonah(Shaarei Teshuva 3:218): A person who says something or does something and it is possible to judge his words or his actions either as being good or bad. If he is a G-d fearing man then truth demands that he be judged favorably even if his words or actions are reasonably closer and inclined to being bad.

And if he is of the average class of men, who guard themselves from sinning, but who occasionally succumb. then it is appropriate to cast aside the doubt and decide in favor of his worthiness. As our Sages of blessed memory have said, "One who adjudges his friend as worthy will himself be adjudged worthy by God" (Shabbath 127b). This is a positive commandment of the Torah, as it is said, "In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor" (Leviticus 19: 15). And if the deed points to the side of incrimination, let it be doubtful in your eyes, and do not decide it in favor of incrimination.

But if most of the man's deeds are evil. or if you have established that the fear of God is not present in his heart. incline his deeds and his words to the side of incrimination. as it is said, "The righteous one considereth the house of the wicked, overthrowing the wicked to their ruin" (Proverbs 21 : 12). We have already interpreted this verse.

Thus it is only for the gadol/tzadik/talmid chachom is one obliged to believe - even reasonable - not not conclusive evidence of wrong doing.

4) However many poskim say that we don't have such people in our times. This is discussed by Minchas Yitzchok (3:112) and stated clearly by the Chavis Ya'ir (#62) and others.

5) All of the above however is only if no one might be hurt be assuming innocence. What is the halacha if there is a possibility of assuming innocence or assuming  that the person did teshuva - but if that judgment is mistaken someone might be hurt?  Clearly it changes the priorities.

Rabbi Dovid Castle [To Live among Friends] notes (page 790) If a teacher was caught child molesting, you should not give him the benefit of the doubt and decide that he probably will not do it anymore. That would be at the expense of others. Similarly if  someone has a history of violent behavior or mental illness, when it comes to shidduchim, you may not hide such information and give him the benefit of the doubt about his future behavior. If someone is suspected of swindling people you should not give him the benefit of the doubt and suggest to someone else to go into business with him. We should not over-emphasize our obligation not to speak lashon hara in situations where we are obliged to speak.

7) Chofetz Chaim strongly disagrees that dan lchaf zechus is only midos chassidus for the average person. He says that is a misunderstanding of the Rambam. Problem is that if the Rambam (Avos 1:6) is talking about the case of an unknown person which is midos chassidus - why doesn't the Rambam mention the normal case? Furthermore Rabbeinu Yonah's language also indicates  that it is midos chassidus for the average person - while he says it is a Torah obligation only for the Tzadik.

Chofetz Chaim  (Essen 3 Be'er Mayim Chaim 3): My good reader, don't try to refute my understanding by saying that the Rambam definitely disagreed with Rabbeinu Yonah, the Semag and the Semaj – and  held that "judging favorably" is only a proper personality trait but not a Torah mitzva. Don't insist that the Rambam held that judging favorably is only a good personality trait and not a Torah obligation based on the fact that the Rambam wrote at the end of his comment to Avos (1:6) that it was only midos chassidus (piety). That is in fact a mistaken understanding of the Rambam's view. The Rambam (Avos 1:6) there is only referring to the case where it is unknown whether the person is righteous or evil. In such a case it is clear that I have no obligation from the Torah to judge him favorably and if I do so it is only a good personality trait – not a Torah obligation. This also explains the Rambam (Hilchos De'os 5:7) where he says it is one of the characteristics of the talmid chachom to judge favorably. The clear inference is that is only a sign of good personality and is not obligatory. But the answer is that (Hilchos De'os 5:7) is also only describing the case of an unknown person.

In the text of the Chofetz Chaim (Essen 3) I quoted the language of Avos (1:6) "Judge everyone favorably" which seems to mean that everyone – even those who are strangers. In fact however it is only a Torah obligation in the case where we know the person is not evil but is an average person.  Proof for this understanding comes from the Rambam himself in Sefer HaMitzvos (177) who explicitly states, "Included in this verse (Yakira 19:15) is also the obligation to judge his friends (chaver) favorably. The clear implication of the word "obligation" is that we are dealing with the case when all men are obligated in this mitzva (not just talmidei chachomim) - since the 613 mitzvos the Rambam is describing applies to all Jews. We can see that our explanation is true from the Rambam in Avos (1:6) and in Hilchos De'os (5:7), that we mentioned above which mentions midos, simply says to "judge all men favorably"   - even if they are strangers. In contrast Shavuos (30a) and Sefer Mitzvos (177) which are describing the Torah obligation of the verse "With righteousness judge your fellow" say "judge your friends favorably". The word "friends" implies that you recognize that he isn't a wicked person.