Thursday, January 22, 2015

The Jewish concept of slavery and morality?

Moshe Ahron has asserted that slavery is immoral and always was so but that we have advanced over our ancestors who were not aware of its immorality. 
Here is what I mean. The Torah didn't create slavery. Slavery existed before the Torah was given on Har Sinai. The Torah dealt with the situation as it was - slavery already existed. The Torah improved this bad situation by regulating slavery with the goal that slavery would eventually be eradicated.
To be clear, slavery was always immoral, but slavery was never the Torah's fault, the Torah was trying to improve the situation of the slave by regulating it.
Had the Torah outlawed slavery from day one, perhaps it would have been too difficult for people to comply, so Hashem didn't do that. This is similar to the Eishes Yefas Toar, where Rashi says that the Torah couldn't prohibit marrying her as the Torah won't prohibit what people can't refrain from doing.
However as can be seen from the following sources there is no criticism of slavery in the Bible, Talmud or Rabbinic literature and the institution of slavery as described in the Torah basically ceased to exist in Talmudic times. I think a more reasonable assertion that better fits the halachic sources is that slavery is clearly immoral in our present society - but that in the ancient world it was not (especially with the conditions the Torah required compared with secular law). It is not the superiority of our moral sense over that of our ancestors but the change in society which is the critical element. 

In sum, Moshe Ahron's view is very problematic in stating that the Torah itself accepts an immoral practice. While the Rambam does states something like this - in Moreh Nevuchim regarding animal sacrifices (which contradicts his Mishna Torah) - he clearly does not say any such thing regarding slavery. Moshe Ahrons attempt to assert a similar judgment regarding divorce laws in Shulchan Aruch and Poskim is similarly flawed.

See also "Biblical Slavery and Morality"
See Hakirah - Biblical view of Slavery - Then and Now


Professor Judah Rosenthal (The Slavery Controversy and Judaism – Conservative Judaism 31:3 pages 69)

The structure of ancient society was built on slavery, and the old social order ofIsrael was no exception. The Torah, however, distinguishes itself by demanding a humane treatment of slaves. It often repeats the admonition not to forget that the Israelites were once slaves in Egypt.! It is the obligation of the master to let the slave rest on the day when he himself is resting'' and it is forbidden to maim a slave. If a master maims a slave he has to let him go free." There does not exist in all the codes of the ancient world a more humane law than the one which forbids turning over a fugitive slave to his master.  The Hammurabi Code of Laws, unlike the Torah, prescribes that a man who does not turn over a fugitive slave to his master is to be punished by death."
The Talmud, too, contains many laws demanding a humane treatment of slaves. Maimonides (Hilchos Avadim 9:8) sums up the attitude of Rabbinic Judaism towards slavery in the following words:
It is permitted to work a slave with rigor. Though such is the role, it is the quality of piety and the way of wisdom that a man be merciful and pursue justice and not make his yoke heavy upon the slave or distress him, and give him to eat and to drink of all foods and drinks.
The Sages of old were wont to let the slave partake of every dish that they themselves ate of and to give the meal of the cattle and of the slaves precedence over their own. Is it not said: As the eyes of slaves unto the hand of their master, as the eyes of a female servant unto the hand of her mistress (Psalms 123:2)?
Thus also the master should not disgrace them by hand or by word, because scriptural law has delivered them only unto slavery and not unto disgrace. Nor should he heap upon the slave oral abuse and anger, but should rather speak to him softly and listen to his claims. So, it is also explained in the good paths of Job, in which he prided himself.
Cruelty and effrontery are not frequent except with gentiles. The children of our father Abraham, however, i.e., the Israelites, upon whom the Holy One, blessed be He, bestowed the favor of the Law and laid upon them statutes and judgments, are merciful people who have mercy upon all.
Thus also it is declared by the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, which we are enjoined to imitate: And His mercies are over all His works (Psalms 145:9).
Furthermore, whoever has compassion will receive compassion, as it is said: And He will show thee mercy, and have compassion upon thee, and multiply thee (Deuteronomy 13:18).

We do not find either in the Bible or in Rabbinic literature a prohibition against slavery or a negative attitude towards slavery as a social institution. Judaism did not consider slavery a social evil nor did it consider a slave owner or slave trader to be a sinner. Slavery was accepted as part of the social order.
 

Elon, Menachem. "Human Dignity and Freedom." Encyclopaedia Judaica. Ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. 2nd ed. Vol. 9. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 585-588. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 22 Jan. 2015. Document URL

Human Dignity and Freedom in Jewish Tradition


Human dignity and freedom are fundamental values of the Torah and the rabbinic literature. The Torah states that man was created "in the image of God": "And God created man in his image; in the image of God He created him" (Gen. 1:27). Respect for the Divine image in man serves as an important source in the Torah for the preservation of human dignity. The Torah states the following concerning a person who has sinned and is liable to the death penalty: "If a man is guilty of a capital offense and is put to death, and you hang him on a tree, you must not let his corpse remain on the stake overnight, but must bury him the same day. For an impaled body is an affront to God and you shall not defile the land which the Lord your God is giving you to possess" (Deut. 21:22–23). The Sages expound these verses: R. Meir asks – what is the meaning of the words "an impaled body is an affront to God"? This can be likened to two identical twin brothers, one of whom became king over the entire world while the other went out to pursue highway robbery. After a while, the latter was caught and crucified, and passersby seeing the body said "the king himself has been crucified!" This is the meaning of the words: "for an impaled body is an affront to God."

 The principle of human dignity even requires respecting the dignity of criminal offenders. The Torah imposes a penalty on a person who steals an ox and later slaughters or sells it, in the amount of five times the value of the ox, while for stealing a sheep under similar circumstances, one is required to pay only four times its value (Ex. 21:37). The difference between the fine imposed for stealing an ox and that for stealing a sheep is explained by the Sages as follows: "R. Johanan b. Zakkai states: The Holy One blessed be He is mindful of the dignity of mankind. For [stealing] an ox, which walks on its [own] feet, the payment is fivefold; for [stealing] a sheep, which has to be carried on one's shoulders, the payment is fourfold" (Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Mishpatim 13). The difference between the fines stems from the sense of shame suffered by the thief in the case of the stolen sheep, which is usually carried away on his shoulders. Hence, the Torah was more lenient in the case of stealing a sheep than with stealing an ox, in which case the thief can simply lead the ox to his home and need not demean himself by carrying it on his shoulders.< The origin of human rights in Judaism lies in the fundamental notion of man's creation in the image of God. This basic axiom is the origin, not only of a person's right to dignity and freedom, but also of man's duty to protect his own dignity and freedom. This principle is given clear expression in a fundamental rule stated by the amora Rav: "A worker can withdraw from service even in the middle of the working day… for it is written (Lev. 25:55): 'for the children of Israel are My slaves [i.e., whom I took out of the land of Egypt'] – and not slaves to other slaves" (BK 116b; BM 10a). According to this law, an employee who hired himself out for an entire working day may withdraw his agreement in the middle of the day (and in such case only receives payment for the time he worked – see *Labor Law ), by virtue of the principle that a person's obligation to work for another person, even if he agreed to do so out of his own volition, constitutes a violation of that person's freedom, and a type of slavery. The principle that a person's subservience to God requires that he not be subservient to another human being receives expression in the principle of the Hebrew slave.

According to the Torah, a person may be compelled to work for another individual if he is convicted of theft and is unable to pay his fine, or if he is in a state of absolute poverty and sells himself to another person. In both these cases, his term of service is limited to a maximum of six years, and the goal of this period, during which the slave's employer owes numerous duties towards his slave, is to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender, who would otherwise remain homeless, as an alternative to imprisonment or remaining on the streets without a roof over his head. According to the Torah, a slave who refused to go free at the end of his term would have his ear pierced by his master using an awl, and would thereafter remain a perpetual slave to his master (Ex. 21:6). The Sages questioned the underlying principle behind this commandment of piercing the slave's ear: "R. Johanan b. Zakkai was asked by his disciples: Why, of all limbs, was the ear [of the slave who refused to go free] chosen to be pierced? He replied: 'The ear that heard at Mount Sinai: "You shall have no other gods but for Me" (Ex. 20:2), and rejected the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, and in its stead accepted the yoke of a human being; the ear that heard at Mount Sinai (Lev. ad. loc.) "for unto Me the children of Israel are servants" and yet this person went and acquired for himself another master; therefore, let his ear come and be pierced because he disregarded that which his ear heard'" (TJ Kid. 1.2).

The slave is punished for having waived his right to freedom. Perpetual enslavement to another person involves a kind of idolatry. As explained by the aforesaid words of the Sages, the first commandment states: "I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt out of the house of slavery. You shall have no other gods but Me" (Ex. ad loc.). This commandment exhorts a person to be free, and he cannot release himself from this obligation, neither in favor of an idol, nor in favor of another human being. The slave, the worker and the master, are all servants of God, before whom all creatures are equal. Therefore no person is entitled to be the slave of another person, when the latter himself is merely a servant of God. Even this institution of a Hebrew slave, which is in essence an act of hire for a limited period for the purposes of rehabilitation, has not been practiced, according to all opinions, for close to two thousand years, and this too is compatible Page 587

16 comments :

  1. If 'Perpetual enslavement to another person involves a kind of idolatry.' what about non-Jewish slaves? As I understand, they were held for life.

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  2. There are two types of "eh-ved" in the Torah. Eved ivri is not what we would call a "slave" today. It is more a type of indentured servant. While an eved cna'ani is a true slave.
    The laws pertaining to the two types of eved are extremely different. However, discussions of this sort tend to blur (sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes intentionally, I suspect) the distinction between them.

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  3. Isn't it possible that R’ Hirsch quoted in the linked post agrees with me?

    First I will quote it from your previous post and then I will analyze it.

    Rav S. R. Hirsch (Shemos 12:44): The consideration of certain circumstances is necessary, correctly to understand the fact that the Torah presupposes and allows the possession and purchase of slaves from abroad to a nation itself just released from slavery. No Jew could make any other human being into a slave. He could only acquire by purchase people who, by then universally accepted international law, were already slaves. But this transference into the property of a Jew was the one and only salvation for anybody who, according to the prevailing laws of the nations, was stamped as a slave. The terribly sad experiences of even the last century (Union, Jamaica 1865) teach us how completely unprotected and liable to the most inhuman treatment was the slave who in accordance with the national law was not emancipated, and even when emancipated, wherever he was, looked upon as still belonging to the slave class, or as a freed slave."

    According to R’ Hirsch, a Jew could never turn a free person into a slave. He seems to regard slavery as inherently immoral, because if it is moral why not turn a free person into a slave. A Jew can only get a slave by purchasing someone who is already a slave, because it is better for the slave to be owned by a Jew who will follow the Torah's regulations, than to be owned by a Gentile in the wild west. However, it is possible that even according to R’ Hirsch, for the Jew to continue possessing a bought slave would be immoral. But the people at the time would not be willing to listen to a commandment to free the slaves, so the Torah couldn't force what society was not up to. If the Torah would have required a Jew to free the Gentile slave, then the slave would have remained in the possession of a Gentile in the wild west. After all, a Jew is not going to pay money to buy the slave if he was required to immediately free him. So at the end of the day, it was better for the slave that the Torah allowed the immorality of a Jew owning a slave.

    On your previous post, in the comment section, Mike explains this:

    “Does Torah define the ideal, Godly society, or does it teach us how to live a Godly life in any society? Because if the latter, it must necessarily provide rules for the treatment of slaves in a slave holding society. Of course, the Torah is a mixture of both elements. There is no command to have a slave holding society, so one need not even infer that the Torah sees positive value in the institution--it provides regulations for where it exists.”

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  4. By the way, Menachem Elon is referring to an Eved Ivri, while I was referring to an Eved Knani. The Eved Ivri is less objectionable because if society can imprison someone as punishment for theft, they could also require him to work for someone as punishment and to pay back what he owed.

    Thanks, for the Hakirah article, i will read it later today.

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  5. Could someone help me with this?
    In the old days, how did one differentiate between kidnapping which is a violation of the Seven Mitzvos Bnei Noach, and slavery that was permissible?
    If John Doe grabbed a free person named "Greg" and forced him to work on his farm as a slave, was that kidnapping (forbidden) or slavery (permitted)?
    It seems according to R' Hirsch (quoted in the linked post), that it would be kidnapping, but if Donald buys the kidnapped person from John Doe, and uses him as a slave, then according to R' Hirsch, Donald is doing the permissible activity of slavery.
    Do I have this right? This seems a little strange.

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  6. Worse than slavery. And supported by your tax dollars. Immoral by any sane standard of morality.

    No. Not the public school system. But you're close.

    Prison.

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  7. Can we say that slavery was always a less than ideal condition for a human being?

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  8. both types are addressed in the various sources I cited

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  9. An eved k'naani becomes a member of klal Yisrael. In a spiritual sense, certainly, he gains thereby.

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  10. Daas Torah wrote "I think a more reasonable assertion that better fits the halachic sources is that slavery is clearly immoral in our present society - but that in the ancient world it was not"

    Even if we follow your idea, we could say the same thing about the distribution of assets in the event of a divorce. In the past if was moral for a woman to receive 0% of assets, but that would be “clearly immoral in our present society”.



    Either way, we could arrive at the same conclusion.

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  11. Daas Torah,


    If you agree that kidnapping is immoral, then slavery is immoral. There is no difference, except that kidnapping is stage 1 and slavery is stage 2.

    According to you, If John Doe grabbed a free person and forced him to work on his farm as a slave, it would be kidnapping, but if Donald buys the kidnapped person from John Doe, and uses him as a slave, then that would be okay as slavery? Does that make any sense?

    If I grab your pen, then I am stealing. If I hand your pen to someone else, could that person keep it? Or does he have to give it back to you?

    Keep in mind, in ancient times a person didn't become a slave as punishment for a crime, the regular slavery was when the strong enslaved the weak who weren't part of their tribe or allies.

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  12. @Moshe Ahron - you seem to be forgetting an elementary fact. Halacha is not determined simply because the wife wants it nor simply because the husband want it. It isn't determined by a single rav. You need to have some sort of consensus of poskim.

    That consensus doesn't exist at present.

    If the poskim decide that we should now pasken like the Rambam and beat any husband who wont give a Get on deman - I have no problem with that. I do have a problem of rabbis ignoing the accepted halacha because they don't like it.

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  13. Daas Torah wrote "If the poskim decide that we should now pasken like the Rambam and beat any husband who wont give a Get on demand - I have no problem with that."

    I think very highly of you for having this outlook. I am happy that you have certain views on divorce only because you feel compelled to based on your understanding of halacha. And I am happy that you do care that woman shouldn't be destroyed in the process.

    I am disappointed in some other people who have over the years commented on this blog, who in their advocating "halacha" they are just opportunists. Like Rabbi Reiss mentioned. These people might not be so careful with every halacha, but they are so angry about the violation of arkaos!
    And they are also so insistent on the halacha that all the money belongs to the husband! These are the only halachos that they are medakdek in! They never got so angry about any other halacha!


    To be clear, I don't think any of the current commenters fall into this latter category, but we had some in the old days.


    Have a good Shabbas!

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  14. Here is my take how I understand the mechanics of acquiring avodim legitimately. Kenaan was cursed to become as "eved avodim yihye le'echov", thereby, the concept of slave was born. Since stealing was banned for Bnei Noach as in the Sheva Mitzvot, it can be acquired legitimately in one of two ways. Either the person sold himself to be a slave or he was conquered in a war, as we learn from "Chelek Kechelek" and from Vayhi bimei Amrofel and the exchanges that went forth at the time. Eliezer eved Avraham most likely sold himself to Avraham. The logic behind it might be, when war is declared it is an issue of habo lehorgech hashkem lehorgo and if you were quick enough to capture him alive, the spoils of war belongs to the captor.

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  15. While
    the Rambam does states something like this - in Moreh Nevuchim
    regarding animal sacrifices (which contradicts his Mishna Torah) - he
    clearly does not say any such thing regarding slavery.


    So far as I know, the Rambam discusses korbanos In two places in Moreh Nevuchim -- vol. 3, chaps. 32 & 46. In neither place does he describe them as "immoral." Chas v'sholom.

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  16. Cannibalizing!
    *New and *Improved and *Revised! Read all about it!!!

    Here
    is my take how I understand the mechanics of acquiring avodim legitimately.
    Kenaan was cursed to become as "eved avodim yihye le'echov", thereby, the
    concept of slavery was born. Since stealing was banned for Bnei Noach as in the
    Sheva Mitzvot, a slave can be acquired legitimately in one of two ways. Either
    the person sold himself to be a slave or he was captured in war, as we learn
    from "Chelek Kechelek" and from Vayhi bimei Amrofel and the exchanges that went
    forth at the time. Eliezer eved Avraham most likely sold himself to Avraham. The
    logic behind it might be, when war is declared it is an issue of habo lehorgech
    hashkem lehorgo and if you were quick enough on your toes to subdue and capture
    him alive, as the saying goes 'the spoils of war belongs to the captor'. The
    slave then can also be sold if the captor so chooses. Not so, when Greg was
    illegally and unlawfully Kidnapped whether by John Doe or Epstein & Wolmark
    and bought by Donald. That is called FENCING, and Halacha bans it under Machzik
    yedei ovrei aveira. Taking it one step further as in the case of Epstein &
    Wolmark or any other aka Kol dealim Gvar Goon Squad to Kidnap for purposes
    of "kofin oso ad sheyomar rotze ani" can never be applied, since all the while
    he is a captive, nothing can be attributed as mirtzono hatov. Indeed, The whole
    captivity is an aveira bechiyuv miso, and anything extracted under such
    circumstances and undue duress, e.g to sell his house, write over his life
    savings, or relinquish his partner in life, such as GIVING up his wife that
    comitted herself to a life of wifely obligations of which he acquired with a
    "Kinyan beKessef", all against his best wishes, is null and void. Having said
    that, you can never interpret that as - beating the "seor shebeisa that is
    meakev" out of him-, so as to say that truly down deep he wants to be compliant
    to the Mitzvos. Not so fast my dear friend, Sofo mochiach al tchiloso, the fact
    that he is Kidnapped and captured, he is under duress, undue force and influence
    of these RESHAIM y,s,v.is called an OINESS. Therefore, whatever transaction he
    performs can never hold, not to mention that there is NO mitzvah to begin with.
    Indeed it is an AVEIRA habo beAVEIRA. Especially In cases where there was no
    protocol of having a Beit Din to hear the other side of the story, so he
    should be able to defend himself, to verify whether the truth has been told,
    and THEN and only THEN to pasken a CHIYUV GET IF and WHEN it is truly called
    for. More so, shall we reward such actions? That would only be a Chote Veniskar.
    When there comes up a clan of RESHAIM calling themselves a Beis Din taking BIG
    BUCKS UPFRONT for something that never existed and never happened that is
    SHOCHAD MIDEORAYSA par excellence. In such a circumstance, not only the present
    case is null and void, but everything and ALL that has been comitted in prior
    by such bandits is null and void. SHOMU SHAMAYIM!!! How in the world can KAHAL
    AM VeEIDA turn a blind eye to such atrocities, they are more SODOMITES than the
    SEDOIMIM themselves. One more example before we go, if you kidnap Joe Shmoe, and
    force him to be makdish nechosov, or make him sign a bill of sale to Donald
    McRonald while screaming 'Okay' 'Okay', under any civil law or under Das Moshe
    VeYisroel it is not Okay! These Ganiffs, Rotzchim, Achzorim, Chamsonim,
    Mentschen Fressers, and Terrorists must be dealt with together with the
    Machzikei yedei ovrei aveira, hen bedinei Odom, vehen bedinei Shamayim, vehen
    bedinei dinei Demalchusse dinei, execute "kaasher zomam laasos", lock them up
    for life and throw away the key. Kappish?!!!
    Shelo yishama od shod veshever beYisroel. I hope
    this helps.

    ReplyDelete

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