Belief required that Rashbi wrote Zohar? - Prof Marc Shapiro

Dr. Marc Shapiro just notified me of two article he wrote regarding the Zohar. One for Seforim Blog  Seforim Blog  as well as a well researched article which he said I could publish here. They address the issues of what is known about the history  and authority of the Zohar as well as whether it is required to believe that the Zohar was written by the Rashbi.

  Rashbi wrote the Zohar - required belief? 

Concerning the Zohar and Other Matters

 https://seforimblog.com/2012/08/concerning-zohar-and-other-matters/?print=print

In the article I cited Bruriah Hutner-David who brings the following proof that R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes rejected the traditional authorship of the Zohar: In order to show that the Targum to Ecclesiastes should be dated to the geonic period, Chajes notes that while the angel Raziel is mentioned in this Targum, he is not mentioned in talmudic literature. Hutner-David notes that Raziel is mentioned in the Zohar, a fact that Chajes was presumably aware of, meaning that he was hinting that the Zohar is also a late work.

This is important information, as Emden confesses that his attack against the Zohar was only designed to pull the wool out from under the Sabbatians, whose ideology was linked to the Zohar. The man who wrote to Or Torah, not knowing anything about Rosenberg, asked for help from the readers. He tried to locate the book Tzur Devash quoted by Rosenberg, but was unable.

the following paragraph  appears in an essay by R. Aryeh Kaplan

One of the first things I discovered was that it was written some 20 years after Rabbi Yitzchok investigated the Zohar. He openly, and clearly and unambiguously states that the Zohar was written by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. This is something not known to historians, and this is the first time I am discussing it in a public forum. But the fact is that the one person who is historically known to have investigated the authenticity of the Zohar at the time it was first published, unambiguously came to the conclusion that it was an ancient work written by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai.

Scientists Find There's Usually a Telltale Sign the Day Before a Heart Attack

 https://news.yahoo.com/scientists-theres-usually-telltale-sign-142836467.html

Women tend to have shortness of breath, while men experience chest pain, according to the researchers who published their findings in the journal Lancet Digital Health.

Judge decries Trump’s reference to Scottsboro Boys case during federal court proceedings

 https://news.yahoo.com/judge-decries-trump-reference-scottsboro-192631937.html

Retired California Superior Court Judge LaDoris Hazzard Cordell told CNN that comparing the Scottsboro Boys case to Trump’s was “stunningly stupid” and “ridiculous.”

“If you want to alienate a judge in the case, this was exactly what to do,” he added, the network reported. “A female judge, a Black judge, and to talk about that case and compare it to Trump’s case was absurd.”

Authority - Making up sources

One of the major problems of relying on authorities is the problem of false or made up sources

The Chasam Sofer once had a problem of a local rabbi making claims which he said falsely in the name of the Chasam Sofer

The Chasam Sofer said to him, "I dont care if you cite my views in your name but I do mind if you say your views in my name."

Rav Hillel Zacks (Grandson of Chofets Chaim said most stories about the Chofetz Chaim are not true.

http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2014/06/stories-of-gedolim-are-often-fabricated.html

Rav Moshe complained about things falsely attributed to him. In fact one of the main consequences of my Yad Moshe index was the increased accuracy of citations by Rabbis.

Igros Moshe (OH 4: 31 page 46)

"Many things are said in my name that I didn't say"

The Satmar Rebbe opposed the creation of Chassidic tales to reinforce views of Theology and halacha

As noted elsewhere stories are made up about famous Rabbis to "prove" certain views.

http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2013/09/a-tzadik-is-born-because-of-clothes.html

Pesachim (112a): [R’ Akiva told R’ Shimon bar Yochai]: If you want to be strangled be hanged on a tall tree.

Rashi (Pesachim 112a): Be hanged on a tall tree - ascribe your views to a great authority

Stories of gedolim are often fabricated for inspiration

 Originally published 6/14 - relevant to the current discussion of the Chofetz Chaim's Dybuk.

Rav Hillel Zaks (Mishpacha – "Living the Legend" page 55 June 2, 2014): Rebbetzin Faiga Chaya Zaks was once quoted as having said that 85 percent of the stories told about her father aren't reliable. In response, Rav Hillel and his brother Rav Yaakov Yehoshua asked, "How could di Mamme have said that? It's surely over 90 percent?!" 

In the family, the biography written by Rav Moshe Meir Yoshor is considered the most reliable of all that's been written about the Chofetz Chaim, in part because it was done during his lifetime. Reb Yisroel Meir once left a certain work on the Chofetz Chaim on the table just to see Rav Hillel's reaction to it. 

"You know, the writer of this book is afraid to face me," Rav Hillel remarked. 

"What's wrong with it?" Reb Yisroel Meir's wife asked. 

"Let me show you," said Rav Hillel. Opening to a random page, he read out loud a story about a Radin bochur who went to take leave of the Chofetz Chaim before going home, The Chofetz Chaim looked at him and said, "Is that the way a ben Torah looks when he goes home?" At that, he went into the back and came out with a jacket to replace the torn one the bochur was wearing. 

"Now, what do you think," Rav Hillel said. "The Chofetz Chaim had a rack of clothes in the back and said, 'You know, you look like a 45 regular'? The only part of the story that could be true is that somebody came in to say goodbye to him." 

Twenty-two years ago, Rav Hillel, Rav Yaakov Yehoshua, and Rav Yisroel Meir sat shivah in Yerushalayim for their mother. A visitor sat down in the front and said, "I know for certain that the Chofetz Chaim had a ramp in his house, which he'd practice running up and down in anticipation of the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash." 

Just then, the brothers heard someone in the back of the room say with obvious dry humor, "Mir dacht zich az der salon fun der Chofetz Chaim iz nit gevehn azoy groys ... [I don't think the Chofetz Chaim's living room was that big]." 

It was the voice of Rav Avraham Yehoshua Soloveitchik.
======== update  6/20/2014

Rav Nosson Kaminetsky (Making of a Godol page xx):  (In composing this book, I have generally accepted as authentic stories about earlier generations even when they were not conveyed by my father or some other unusually reliable individual. I was reluctant, of course, to rely on reports that emanated from people whom I considered unable to judge events properly, but I did not suspect anyone of prevaricating intentionally. Similarly, unless the writer was blatantly' tendentious, I assumed that printed facts were credible. (I have this faith in people despite a report by R' Velvel Kercerg that Rebbitzen Feigel Zaks, the Chafetz-Chaim's youngest daughter, told him, "Eighty percent of what they tell about [my father] is not true." I cannot help but assume that in order to bring out bluntly the idea that not everything told about R' Yisrael-Meir Kagan, author of Chafetz Chaim, is true, his daughter exaggerated the percentage of untruths.)

Rav Nosson Kaminetsky(Making of a Godol page xxv): R' Mordkhai Schwab, however, had a negative view of "storytelling" when he told me, "The Satmarer Rav, R' Yoilish Teitelbaum, never told stories because he said, 'You cannot educate through lies - sheker].'" R' Mordkhai agreed with R' Yoilish in reference to stories intended to glorify their principals while dehumanizing them. R' Yoilish echoed a statement by R' Yehoshua'-Yoseph Preil, Rav of the Lithuanian town of Krok. In a 5656 (1896) review of Toldos Yisroel of Zev Ya'avetz, published a year earlier in Warsaw, R' Preil set down the following ethic: "To create stories that never happened and present them as facts for the sake of teaching morals - woe is to the musar precept built on as brittle a foundation as a lie! '' Even hasidim, the celebrated story tellers who are more suspect than others in creating legends about their leaders (from whom the Satmarer Rav was evidently trying to distance himself by his statement), are careful in separating fact from fiction. I was told by R' Shimon Deutchy that he had asked the Lubavitcher Rebbe, R' Menahem-Mendel Schneerson, whether when writing about the arrest and release of his father-in-law, R' Yoseph-Yitzhaq Schneerson, he should mention or omit the fact that R' Yoseph-Yitzhaq's secretary, R' Hayyim Lieberman, was arrested and released with him. (R' Lieberman was opposed to R' Menahem-Mendel's ascendancy to the Lubavitch throne and did not recognize him as Rebbe after he assumed the position.) R' Menahem-Mendel responded, "History must be written   [true to its truth]" - and explained his redundancy: "This includes not polishing up any word.  Also Pulmus HaMussar  (The Musar Controversy), a book about the dispute in the late 5650's (1890's) in which most of the great Torah figures came out publicly against the Musar movement. The author, Musar adherent R' Dov Katz, tells how "many opinions were heard" by him "that we should avoid the entire affair "; but "several Musar personalities" including R' Yehiel-Yankev Weinberg and R' Hatzqel Sarna insisted not only that he should write about the controversy, but - as R' Sarna put it - that "he set down in writing the full affair without omitting any detail, be what it may." 

Today books are our true teachers - not people

Steipler (Piskei Teshuvos vol 4 age 435:): ...In Orchos Rabbeinu (2:112) the Steipler is quoted as saying that the mitzva of greeting one’s teacher on Yom Tov is only relevant at a time when the Torah was learned orally and the student had acquired most of his Torah learning from his teacher. However in modern times since people learn Torah from gemora and other seforim – the concept of a master teacher is not relevant and therefore there is no obligation to great one’s teacher on Yom Tov. This that a person acquires a method of learning does not give his teacher a special status because it is possible for him to acquire this on his own. Furthermore who knows if the method he was taught was true. There is no obligation to greet a teacher who is not a master teacher on Yom Tov. This that we learn the halacha from the Shunamite woman because she greeted Elisha on Yom Tov - even though it is not relevant that say that he was her master teacher – is because Elisha was the teacher of all Jews and therefore everyone was required to greet him.

Dan l'chaf zechus - What is the obligation to judge favorably?

update - point 5 Chofetz Chaim

One of the major issues when making decisions about other people is the well known principle of dan l'chaf zechus (to judge people favorably). What does that mean and what are the parameters. In this post - I will gradually add up the elements to give a full picture of what is involved. 

1) Firstly what is the source of this principle? While it does state the principle in Avos (1:6) "Appoint a teacher for yourself, acquire a companion and judge all men favorably" - this is not the source of the principle - but it seems to be advice. The actual source of the principle is learned in Shevuos (30a) from Vayikra (19:15) - the verse immediately preceding the prohibition of lashon harah. The end of the verse says "With righteousness you shall judge others" 

Shevuos (30a): Our Rabbis taught: In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour: that one should not sit, and the other stand; one speak all that he wishes, and the other bidden to be brief. Another interpretation: In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour: judge thy neighbour in the scale of merit.

2) There is an obvious problem - as Rav S. R. Hirsch points out. If this verse is referring to judgment in court - it is not dealing with interpersonal relationships. And yet the gemora seems to learn both from the same verse!

The Meiri seems to be the only one who simply says that the verse is about beis din and dan lchaf zechus is merely an asmachta.

Meiri (Shavuos 30b): Even though the majority of what I have written are laws learned directly from the Vayikra (19:15) "b'tzedek tisphot amisecha" [which are laws of beis din] there is also something which is learned indirectly from this verse by asmachta and allusions. That is the principle that a person should judge others favorably giving them the benefit of the doubt (l'kaf zecus) when the case can legitimately be understood in two opposing ways and the only way to decide between them is to rely on what is reasonable. ...

3) The next question is what exactly are the details? The Rambam makes a number of  different statements. For example he clearly indicates it is a desirable personality trait - but not a mitzva in these two places where he doesn't mention an obligation.

Rambam(Sefer haMitzvos 177):... Aside from the laws dealing with beis din, it is also learned from this verse of B'Tzedek that it is proper to judge his fellow man as innocent and not to understand his deeds and words other than being good.

Rambam(Hilchos De'os 5:7):A talmid chachom should have the midos that he does not scream and yell when he is talking to other like a bull or wild animal....and he should judge all men as being innocent and speak of their praise and not degrade them at all. He should love peace and pursue peace...

 However in Avos he makes distinctions based on the type of person - it is no longer "all men"- but judgments of innocence are an act of piety - not obligation. He does however omit the average person and lists 1) unknown person 2) tzadik 3) rasha.

Rambam(Avos 1:6): Judge all people as innocent. This means that if there is a man that you don't know whether he is righteous or wicked and you see him do something or say something that can be interpreted either as good or bad – you should understand it as good and not bad. However if you know the person to be an established tzadik and his deeds are good and he apparently does something that is bad and only by using a far fetched explanation can it be justified – then it is proper to assume that in fact it was good and do not suspect him of evil.... On the other hand a person well established as evil then it is best to avoid such a person and not to believe he is capable of doing anything good – if there is anyway of interpreting it as evil behavior. So if the person is not known to you and his deeds have not been determined to be good or bad – then it is necessary as an act of piety to judge him favorably.

However here in Mishneh Torah the Rambam again states all people

Rambam(Sanhedrin 23:10): When litigants are before the beis din they should be viewed as wicked and with the presumption that both sides are lying and judgments should be based on what seems correct. However when the trial is over and the litigants leave beis din they should be viewed by the judges as righteous people since they have accepted the judgmet of the court. And all people should be judged as innocent.

It would thus seem that the Rambam views dan l'chaf zechus as a principle of midos rather than halachic obligation.

That apparently is the view also of Rabbeinu Yonah for the average person. Viewing the tzadik as innoncent, however, is obligatory unless the evidence is unequivocal.

Rabbeinu Yonah(Shaarei Teshuva 3:218): A person who says something or does something and it is possible to judge his words or his actions either as being good or bad. If he is a G-d fearing man then truth demands that he be judged favorably even if his words or actions are reasonably closer and inclined to being bad.

And if he is of the average class of men, who guard themselves from sinning, but who occasionally succumb. then it is appropriate to cast aside the doubt and decide in favor of his worthiness. As our Sages of blessed memory have said, "One who adjudges his friend as worthy will himself be adjudged worthy by God" (Shabbath 127b). This is a positive commandment of the Torah, as it is said, "In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor" (Leviticus 19: 15). And if the deed points to the side of incrimination, let it be doubtful in your eyes, and do not decide it in favor of incrimination.

But if most of the man's deeds are evil. or if you have established that the fear of God is not present in his heart. incline his deeds and his words to the side of incrimination. as it is said, "The righteous one considereth the house of the wicked, overthrowing the wicked to their ruin" (Proverbs 21 : 12). We have already interpreted this verse.

Thus it is only for the gadol/tzadik/talmid chachom is one obliged to believe - even reasonable - not not conclusive evidence of wrong doing.

4) However many poskim say that we don't have such people in our times. This is discussed by Minchas Yitzchok (3:112) and stated clearly by the Chavis Ya'ir (#62) and others.

5) All of the above however is only if no one might be hurt be assuming innocence. What is the halacha if there is a possibility of assuming innocence or assuming  that the person did teshuva - but if that judgment is mistaken someone might be hurt?  Clearly it changes the priorities.

Rabbi Dovid Castle [To Live among Friends] notes (page 790) If a teacher was caught child molesting, you should not give him the benefit of the doubt and decide that he probably will not do it anymore. That would be at the expense of others. Similarly if  someone has a history of violent behavior or mental illness, when it comes to shidduchim, you may not hide such information and give him the benefit of the doubt about his future behavior. If someone is suspected of swindling people you should not give him the benefit of the doubt and suggest to someone else to go into business with him. We should not over-emphasize our obligation not to speak lashon hara in situations where we are obliged to speak.

7) Chofetz Chaim strongly disagrees that dan lchaf zechus is only midos chassidus for the average person. He says that is a misunderstanding of the Rambam. Problem is that if the Rambam (Avos 1:6) is talking about the case of an unknown person which is midos chassidus - why doesn't the Rambam mention the normal case? Furthermore Rabbeinu Yonah's language also indicates  that it is midos chassidus for the average person - while he says it is a Torah obligation only for the Tzadik.

Chofetz Chaim  (Essen 3 Be'er Mayim Chaim 3): My good reader, don't try to refute my understanding by saying that the Rambam definitely disagreed with Rabbeinu Yonah, the Semag and the Semaj – and  held that "judging favorably" is only a proper personality trait but not a Torah mitzva. Don't insist that the Rambam held that judging favorably is only a good personality trait and not a Torah obligation based on the fact that the Rambam wrote at the end of his comment to Avos (1:6) that it was only midos chassidus (piety). That is in fact a mistaken understanding of the Rambam's view. The Rambam (Avos 1:6) there is only referring to the case where it is unknown whether the person is righteous or evil. In such a case it is clear that I have no obligation from the Torah to judge him favorably and if I do so it is only a good personality trait – not a Torah obligation. This also explains the Rambam (Hilchos De'os 5:7) where he says it is one of the characteristics of the talmid chachom to judge favorably. The clear inference is that is only a sign of good personality and is not obligatory. But the answer is that (Hilchos De'os 5:7) is also only describing the case of an unknown person.

In the text of the Chofetz Chaim (Essen 3) I quoted the language of Avos (1:6) "Judge everyone favorably" which seems to mean that everyone – even those who are strangers. In fact however it is only a Torah obligation in the case where we know the person is not evil but is an average person.  Proof for this understanding comes from the Rambam himself in Sefer HaMitzvos (177) who explicitly states, "Included in this verse (Yakira 19:15) is also the obligation to judge his friends (chaver) favorably. The clear implication of the word "obligation" is that we are dealing with the case when all men are obligated in this mitzva (not just talmidei chachomim) - since the 613 mitzvos the Rambam is describing applies to all Jews. We can see that our explanation is true from the Rambam in Avos (1:6) and in Hilchos De'os (5:7), that we mentioned above which mentions midos, simply says to "judge all men favorably"   - even if they are strangers. In contrast Shavuos (30a) and Sefer Mitzvos (177) which are describing the Torah obligation of the verse "With righteousness judge your fellow" say "judge your friends favorably". The word "friends" implies that you recognize that he isn't a wicked person.

"ג'ק סגל" במעצר: ריאיון המתלוננת נגד הרב החרדי שהתחזה ותקף נשים

Clarification of R. Ovadiah Yosef's position

Today Kevod Torato ha-Rav critiqued Rav Gestetner regarding ma'eese alai (in a reprint from several years ago) at http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/05/summary-halochot-on-mous-olay-and.html . However, I feel that, be-mechilat Kevod Torat'kha, this critique contains a misrepresentation of R. Ovadiah Yosef, a misrepresentation that originates with R. Michael Broyde at https://traditiononline.org/the-1992-new-york-get-law/ , text accompanying footnote 27. For there, Rabbi Broyde claims that R. Ovadiah Yosef, Teshuvot Yabi'a Omer, III, Even ha-Ezer nos. 18-20 allows coercion of the husband in many cases of ma'eese alai. No, unfortunately, with all due respect to Rabbi Broyde, that is a serious misreading of Yabi'a Omer. To understand this better, please see footnote 39 and accompanying text of my prenup essay at https://www.scribd.com/document/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements . Namely, as I elucidate there, Yabi'a Omer is addressing an extremely narrow case of a Yemenite lady who was forced under threat of physical violence to accept kiddushin from her Yemenite "groom", and soon after this charade-of-a-wedding, she ran away. So, the whole marriage never halakhically took place altogether [for a lady can only receive kiddushin by her free consent, as per the Gemara, Kiddushin 2b]. Still, rather than let the lady walk out without a get [which me-ikar ha-din would be the halakhah], Yabi'a Omer is a little extra-machamir to say "you're both Yemenites, so even according to the so-called groom who claims that a marriage took place [which it really did not], the groom should also accept to be punished with jail as the Rambam holds is appropriate until he writes a get." Now what happened? Rabbi Broyde saw this teshuvah and distorted it (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) as communicating "the Yabi'a Omer allows coercing husbands in many cases of ma'eese alai". So while Rabbi J. David Bleich [in his repudiation of Rabbi Broyde at https://traditiononline.org/communications-86/ ] did not specifically respond to this distortion of Rabbi Broyde, I do respond to this distortion in my prenup essay [so as to illustrate that Rabbi Bleich's repudiation of Rabbi Broyde is correct], and I point out that two volumes later, in Teshuvot Yabi'a Omer, V, Even ha-Ezer no. 14, R. Ovadiah Yosef forbids charging mezonot to a recalcitrant husband even in a case of ma'eese alai, since that would constitute coercion. [So, evidently, the general approach of R. Ovadiah Yosef is to forbid coercion (whether incarceration or financial) in a case of ma'eese alai, with the Yemenite groom from two volumes earlier representing a special exception that has no bearing on any case that would ever arise in New York state.] I feel that Kevod Torato ha-Rav must correct this for the sake of halakhic honesty.

Thank you,

Shalom C. Spira

Malka Leifer sentenced to 15 years in prison

 https://www.australianjewishnews.com/malka-leifer-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison/

Malka Leifer has been sentenced to 15 years in prison, with a non-parole period of eleven-and-a-half years. With time already served being taken into account, she could be released in 2029.

Who is the mysterious ‘Jake Segal,’ who tricked women into sex?

 https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-756071

“Jake Segal” is the alter ego of Rabbi Yosef Paryzer. Paryzer is a foreign citizen in his 30s who worked at Yeshivat Ohr Yerushalayim as a lecturer for first-year students. The Anglo-centric yeshiva reportedly fired Paryzer upon hearing the news about him and removed his profile from their website. His short biography described him as in “high demand from other yeshivos” and as an alumnus of New York’s Yeshiva Darchei Torah and Jerusalem’s Yeshiva Kodshim.

House Republicans barrel toward Biden impeachment inquiry — but some hesitate

 https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4172166-house-republicans-biden-impeachment-inquiry/

“I think before we move on to [an] impeachment inquiry, we should … there should be a direct link to the president in some evidence,” Rep. Don Bacon (R-Neb.) told The Hill in an interview. “We should have some clear evidence of a high crime or misdemeanor, not just assuming there may be one. I think we need to have more concrete evidence to go down that path.”

Request for guest posts

Anyone interested in writing a guest post about my blog that I would include in my selected posts book? 

Critical constructive comments are also welcome!