Philosophy

Derech Emunah (2:303): You should know that the majority of philosophy came to us from Aristotle who was a Jew from a Jewish family in Jerusalem from the tribe of Benyamin…He gave us and taught us much more than what he learned from us.

Kuzari (2:66): Shlomo spoke with Divine power and his great intellect and natural talents concerning all types of knowledge. From the ends of the earth, people came to him to hear his knowledge and to transmit it to the world - even as far as India. In truth the root of all wisdom and its principles was copied from the Jews - first by the Chaldeans and afterwards the Persians and Medes. Afterwards this knowledge went to the Greeks and Romans. However, because these events are distant in time and the many intermediaries in the process it has not been mentioned in the books of science and wisdom that it was taken originally from the Jews. These books mention only that they originated in Greek and Roman sources. …

Rabbeinu Bachya (Bamidbar 18:29): It is well known that philosophical understanding is not of fundamental importance for us since it is only from intellectual analysis… The wise of Israel base themselves on the words of our Sages who were the scholars of truth which was learned from the prophets. They are the ones who know everything according to its truth.

Ralbag (Milchemes HaShem 1:14): You should know that we do not adopt theological views that are incompatible with the Torah. In fact, in general the conclusions of philosophical thought are not accepted if they contradict our faith. Whenever we find such contradictions, we should assume that it is the result of our shortcomings. Therefore, one should not alter his religious beliefs because of apparent conflicts with philosophical arguments. That is our practice also when we see that our religious faith requires views that differ from what is determined solely on the basis of reason. This approach is obligatory for all religious people. Because if the door were open to reject those aspects of religion that were in apparent conflict with what is taught by pure reason  -  then religion would be finished and its benefits would disappear from the members of the faith. Then there would be major disputes and confusion amongst the members of the religion because of the lack of faith. This would produce major harm that could not be ignored. It should be understood that this point applies to everything discussed in this book. In other words, if it appears to any member of the faith that reason requires believing something which contradicts any aspect of the accepted religious beliefs, he should abandon the conclusions of reason and continue with his religious beliefs. He should attribute his inability to reconcile religion and reason to human inadequacies.

Rambam (Letter to Ibn Tibbon): Aristotle reached the highest level of intellect that man is capable of without the aid of the Divine influence which leads to prophecy for which there is no higher stage.

Rashba (Commentary to Agada Bava Basra 74b pp. 102-106):  You should know that when one of our pious Torah sages reads the words of the philosophers, it is possible that he might agree with them. Even if he finds contradictions between Biblical verses and the philosophers, he can explain those verses in a manner that conforms to philosophy. In other words he can view the verses as metaphoric and not literal - since he isn’t rejecting anything learned from prophecy and he isn’t discarding any mitzvos by doing so.  However when it comes to matters concerning Biblical verses or our Tradition that are widely accepted by our Sages as literally true – then the sage will insist on understanding them literally according to our Tradition. He will do this even though he knows that the philosophers strongly reject such a literal understanding. For example, the belief that the dead will be literally resurrected is not unequivocally found in Biblical verse. It is seems reasonable that all the relevant verses might be explainable as being allegorical e.g., such as those in Yechezkeil (Chapter 36). Nevertheless such a metaphorical approach is rejected by the sage in favor of the literal one because our Tradition insists that these verses be taken literally. In such cases, the sage acknowledges that the widely accepted traditional understanding takes precedent over the philosophical rationalist view. He readily admits in such conflicts that we do not pay attention to rational analysis which goes against our Tradition because the wisdom of G d is beyond our intellectual grasp. Of necessity in every instance that we have a clear Tradition from our ancestors, we cannot reject this Tradition – unless it is established that the traditional understanding is impossible – G d forbid! Why should we destroy our Tradition since we know that it would not have become wide spread except for the fact that it has been received generation after generation all the way back to Moshe or the Prophets… Consequently while we need to acknowledge that many verses in Bible are allegorical, nonetheless we need to accept the truth that some verses are describing actual miracles and that G-d has the ability to change nature according to His wishes…. Therefore when our Tradition requires a literal understanding why should it be discarded just because it is against a rationalistic philosophical understanding? … 

Rav Elchonon Wasserman (Kovetz Shiurim 2 46:9): It is true that you find that some of the classic sources permit the study of philosophy. In fact, the Chovas HaLevavos apparently views the study of philosophy as a mitzva. He bases himself on the verse You should know the G d of your father (that faith should be based on knowledge. Those who disagree assert that the mitzva of faith is belief based on the tradition we have from our ancestors rather than from philosophical analyses. However, on the practical level today the dispute is irrelevant since it is obvious that even according to those who permit philosophical analyses it is only when harmful consequences are not common. That is relevant only for those people who are high level Torah scholars and whose religious views guide their intellectual activities and who are so solidly committed that all the winds in the world won’t alter their views. It is only for such people that it is said that there is a mitzva to clarify their faith through philosophical analyses. However, not for lesser people such as ourselves who are in great danger to be influenced and led to error. One should never deliberately place himself in a dangerous place. Furthermore, you should recall that the mitzva of faith starts at the age of 13 for a boy and 12 for a girl. Can you conceive that the Torah would obligate everyone from child to adult, youngster and women to be philosophers like Aristotle? G d doesn’t cause impossible dilemmas for people. It is clear that those who permit or obligate philosophy are only referring to unique individuals who are not found at all in our time.

Rema (#7): I am more concerned with avoiding independent study of Kabbala than with studying philosophy. That is because there is a greater danger in erring in Kabbala than philosophy as we see from the warning of the Ramban in his introduction to his commentary to the Torah.

Rema (Toras HaOlah 3:4): And R’ Moshe Butreal wrote in his commentary to Sefer Yetzira that the wisdom of Kabbala is the wisdom of philosophy but expressed in a different language… The way of Kabbala is itself the way of true and reliable philosophy.