Divorce simply because you don't like your spouse - is very recent

Some of the comments dealing with marriage and divorce indicate that it is really primitive and disgusting that a person simply can't leave a marriage because they want to.Whether it is because they fell in love with someone else or because they find their present spouse boring or maybe even embarrassing. That there must be something seriously wrong with halacha because it doesn't acknowledge that the individual is the most important concern - and not the stablity of marriage, society or family. The following is from the Cambridge Brief History of Divorce which indicates these ideas reflect societies views only in the last 30 years. While it is specifically about England - it reflects changes that were happening in the Western World.

============================

[...] Way back in the days of yore, when the church was more powerful than the monarch, marriage was a church institution and so divorce was also the preserve of the church. Marriage was for life and divorce exceedingly rare, although the church would occasionally grant a divorce “a mensa et thoro” which enabled people to live apart if there had been significant cruelty, but not to remarry. (Henry VIII, of course, did whatever he wanted.) In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it was possible to get a divorce granted by Act of Parliament, but such an option was only open to the rich. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 was the first divorce law of general application.

The 1857 Act introduced divorce through the court. Men were able to “petition the court” for a divorce on the basis of their wife’s adultery, which would have to be proved, as would the absence of any collusion or condonation of that adultery. Women who wanted to divorce their husbands needed also to prove an aggravating factor of the adultery, such as rape or incest. The High Court in London was the only place to get your divorce, and proceedings were held in open court, enabling society to be scandalised by the personal details revealed during the process.

The huge social changes in England during and following the First World War, particularly for the role of women in society, led to divorce law reform as it did to reforms in other areas. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 put men and women on an equal footing for the first time, enabling either spouse to petition the court for a divorce on the basis of their spouse’s adultery. The requirement to prove the deed and the absence of collusion remained, as did the procedural requirements. In 1937 another Matrimonial Causes Act introduced three more options for unhappy spouses to take to court, and so it became possible to divorce on the grounds of cruelty, desertion and incurable insanity as well as adultery. These were termed “matrimonial offences”. As before, each allegation needed to be proved by the petitioner’s oral evidence. At this stage, parliament also introduced a bar to divorcing in the first three years of marriage.

The Second World War brought about another period of great social change, and a start to the modern era of life as we know it now. Marriages broke down under the strain of war, or its after-effects, in numbers never before experienced and at all levels of society. The church and the government became increasingly concerned that the divorce laws were no longer fit for purpose – unhappy couples would arrange for one spouse to book into a hotel at the seaside for a weekend to commit the adultery necessary for them to divorce. A Royal Commission in the 1950s could not decide the best way forward, and in the mid-1960’s the Archbishop of Canterbury took up the baton. His office prepared a report demanding reform of the law to ensure that people could obtain a divorce if they could show the breakdown of their marriage, and the government set the Law Commission to research the most appropriate way to modernise the divorce laws. This process gestated the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which although now consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 still contains the divorce law we are subject to today.

Like a great deal of social policy legislation, the Divorce Reform Act 1969 was a compromise. It enabled either party to seek a divorce on the basis of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, as the Archbishop wanted in the 1960s, but requires that the breakdown be proved by evidence of one of five “facts”: adultery, behaviour, desertion, or separation for 2 years and the other party’s consent to a divorce or separation for five years. You can see that although this Act removed the concept of a matrimonial offence, the old 1937 grounds of cruelty (now termed “unreasonable behaviour”) and desertion in essence remained. However, the big advance in 1969 was that there is no “fault” as such involved in petitions based on 2 or 5 years’ separation. Procedurally there were also changes: it was possible for the first time to get a divorce through the local county court rather than coming to the High Court in London. During the 1970s, courts developed the “special procedure” of divorce-on-paper that still represents the way things are done in the vast majority of divorces.

Kesuba's purpose is to prevent divorce not to provide financial security

In the previous post about pitzu'im (divorce settlement) it was asserted or implied by various commentators that the kesuba was instituted to provide financial security for the wife in case of divorce. In fact, the sources I have seen give it no such role. According to the Talmud (Kesubas 11a) the kesuba was instituted to make divorce difficult - for both the husband and wife. It is viewed as a device of social control over marriage. A rebellious wife loses her kesuba. A rebellious husband must add to the kesuba. There is mention in the Talmud of major rabbis who didn't divorce a difficult spouse simply because they couldn't afford to pay the kesuba. The focus of rabbinic concern was solely to create pressure that the couple remained married - not that the wife shouldn't be penniless if she was divorced. The fear was that a woman might fall in love with another man and want to leave the marriage. The loss of her kesuba was motivation not to focus on being in love but to have a stable marriage. If she declared that she found her husband disgusting and wanted out of the marriage - the divorce was only given if she accepted the loss of her kesuba and the husband agreed to the divorce. Permanence of marriage not personal happiness is clearly the main concern of the Rabbis. In fact I don't know of any rabbinic sources regarding the financial security of the divorced wife until recent times when the issue of pitzu'im (divorce settlement) was raised. Today there is concern - in the secular justice system - for a variety of payments to ensure that the wife is not penniless and that she get an equitable share of the couple's wealth as well as child support. This modern secular concern clashes with halacha. Any sources to the contrary would be greatly appreciated.

Justice Menchem Elon states the following in Principles of Jewish Law

The ketubbah was instituted for the purpose of protecting the woman, "so that he shall not regard it as easy to divorce her" (Ket. 11 a; Yev. 89a; Maim. Ishut 10:7), i.e., in order to render it difficult for the husband to divorce his wife by obliging him to pay her, in the event of a divorce, the sum mentioned in the ketubbah, which generally exceeded the sum due to her according to law. As this is the object of the ketubbah, some auth­orities are of the opinion that since the herem of Rabbenu Gershom, which prohibited the divorce of a wife against her will, the same object is achieved in any event; it is therefore argued - on the analogy of Ketubbot 54a concerning the ravished woman who is thereafter married by her ravisher and, according to pentateuchal law, cannot be divorced - that there is no longer any need for a ketubbah to be written. However it has remained the halakhah that a ketubbah is to be written (Rema EH 66:3, concl.).

Rabbis Broyde and Reiss have a good article on  JLaw

[...] the purpose of the ketubah was to mandate payments in cases of divorce high enough so that a man would not hastily divorce his wife. Payments of $25, $100, or even $1,000 hardly accomplish this talmudic mandate. Consistent with this notion, it is noteworthy that Rabbi Feinstein dismissed the European practice which was to evaluate the ketubah at 75 rubles because this sum would be laughably small nowadays.

What then is the purpose of the Ketubah in cases of divorce after the ban on polygamy and unilateral no-fault divorce? Rabbi Moshe Isserless (Ramo) provides a very important answer.

He states in the beginning of his discussion of the laws of ketubah:

See Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 177:3 where it states  that in a situation where one only may divorce with the consent of the woman, one does not need a ketubah. Thus, nowadays, in our countries, where we do not divorce against the will of the wife because of the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, as explained in Even Haezer 119, it is possible to be lenient and not write a ketubah at all; but this is not the custom and one should not change it

[...]

However, no one argues with the basic economic assertion of the Ramo: The purpose of the Ketubah written to impose a cost on the husband for divorce — so that he should not divorce her rashly — has become moot; this basic purpose has been overtaken by the ban of Rabbenu Gershom which simply prohibited that which the Talmudic Sages sought to discourage. The ketubah neither establishes nor effects nor modifies any economic rights in cases of divorce without fault in places where Cherem deRabbenu Gershom is accepted. In situations where Cherem deRabbenu Gershom is not applicable due to misconduct, fault is always found, and no ketubah payment is thus mandated by Jewish law.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros  Moshe E. H. 4:91): The value of the ketubah is not known to rabbis and decisors of Jewish law, or rabbinical court judges; indeed we have not examined this matter intensely as for all matter of divorce it has no practical ramifications, since it is impossible for the man to divorce against the will of the woman, [the economics of] divorce are dependent on who desires to be divorce, and who thus provides a large sum of money as they wish to give or receive a divorce.

Rav Shteinman against anti iPhone poster campaign

Kikar Shabbat

המלחמה באייפונים: בחודש האחרון מופצים ברחבי השכונות בריכוזים החרדיים שלטים כנגד השימוש ב"אייפון ודומיו".

תחת הכותרת: "אין כניסה לבעלי אייפון ודומיו", מחולקים הכרזות לידי תלמודי התורה שתולים אותם במרפסות הבתים, במקרים רבים אף ללא ידיעת הוריהם.

כעת מתברר כי דעתם של רבים מגדולי הדור אינה נוחה מאותו קמפיין לוחמני המנסה לדחוק לשולי המחנה רבים וטובים בקרב הציבור החרדי....

להפתעתו, השיב לו מרן הגראי"ל כי "עלינו ללמוד מאבות האומה היהודית". ראש הישיבה הוסיף והסביר כי "אברהם אבינו הכניס אליו לאוהל, לביתו, אפילו עובדי עבודה זרה, אלא שרק ביקש מהם לשטוף את ידיהם ולנגבם מאותם גילולים".

הגראי"ל המשיך ואמר כי "לא מצאנו שתלה שלט על ביתו שאין כניסה לבעלי עבודה זרה".

השואל ההמום הבין את המסר והבהיר כי לא יתלה את השלט בביתו.

Pitzu'im (divorce settlement) - Rav Eliashiv vs Rav Shlomo Karelitz

Update 9/3/13 Purpose of kesuba is not financial security
In the various discussions about divorce - it has been repeatedly said that anyone who gets more than the Torah prescribes is a thief. According to the Talmudic law a wife is entitled only to get her Kesuba and assets she brought into the marriage. Thus it is claimed that if the wife ends up being given various additional payments such child maintenance or division of assets, it is claimed that this is against Jewish law and show a clear influence of feminist agenda. (But it isn't so simple.)

I am now reading Justice Menachem Elon's "The Status of Women" where he discusses the issue of marriage settlement (pitzuim) in Israel developed in Israeli in the 1940's, the wife inheriting the husband, and daughter inheriting her father. The legitimacy of the payments decreed by the rabbanut was a point of strong contention between Rav Eliashiv and Rav Karelitz - and obviously others. I also want to discuss the machlokes between Rabbeinu Tam and other Rishonim as to whether post talmudic authorities have the right to modify Talmuidic laws regarding marriage and divorce e.g.,  get me'usa.

This is also related to the question of whether a husband can legally and morally use his right to grant the divorce in order to pressure his wife for large sums of money and/or favorable custody rights. Likewise can a wife use her right to refuse a get to pressure her husband for large sums of money and/or favorable custody rights.

In sum, I want to clarify what exactly is the halacha according to the Talmud in these areas and what subsequent takkanos were made concerning these matters. I want to explore also the power of post-Talmudic rabbonim to change Talmudic halacha. Finally even if it is one's legal right to use a get as leverage - is it moral.

Update: Divorce payments follow local minhag - do decrees of the rabbanut determine minhag?

שולחן ערוך (אבן העזר הלכות כתובות סימן סו יא) ץ  

הנושא אשה, סתם, כותב לפי המנהג. וכן היא שפסקה להכניס, נותנת כפי מנהג המדינה. הגה: ומה שהאשה מכנסת לבעלה, הן מעות הן בגדים, ומקבלן עליו והן באחריותו נקרא נדוניא בכל מקום, ואינה נגבית אלא עם הכתובה; אבל לשאר דברים אין דינו ככתובה, וכמו שיתבאר לקמן. ויש מקומות שהחתן מוסיף לה בנדונייתא, וכותב יותר ממה שקבל, והולכין בזה אחר המנהג (כל הנ"ל בטור). ומן הסתם אחריות הנדוניא עליו כנכסי צאן ברזל, אבל אם ירצה להניח לה ברשותה ושלא לקבל אחריות עליהם, הרשות בידו. וע"ל ריש סי' צ"ג וק' עוד מאלו הדינים. כשהאב קיים ומשיא בתו, כותבים: ודין הנדוניא דהנעלת ליה מבי אביה; וכשאין האב קיים, כותבין: מבי נשא (מרדכי פרק ב"מ בשם ר"ת). מיהו אם שינה, לית לן בה (תשובת ר"ש משנץ). בכתובת גרושה כותבין: מתרכתא, כדי שידעו שהיא גרושה ואסורה לכהנים (פסקי מהרא"י סימן נ'). וכשבאה לגבות כתובתה, מגבין לה מה שבכתובתה לפי מנהג המדינה. הגה: ואם היא אומרת שהוסיף לה יותר מן המנהג, צריכה להביא ראייה לדבריה; אבל אם יש בידה שטר כתובה שאינו מקוים, או שאחד מן העדים הוא פסול, אף על פי שמראה התנאים שביניהם שהוצרך להוסיף לה, אינה גובאת אלא כמנהג. (פסקי מהרא"י סימן פ"ט). וע"ל סי' ק' סעיף ה'. ובכל אלו הדברים וכיוצא בהן, מנהג המדינה הוא עיקר, ועל פיו דנין, והוא שיהיה אותו המנהג פשוט בכל המדינה. הגה: מיהו אם רוצה להתנות ולפחות לאשתו מן המנהג, הרשות בידו (מהרי"ל סימן ע"ו), ובלבד שלא יפחות ממה שתקנו רבנן. ונראה לי דוקא שהתנה כן בשעה שעשה השידוכים, אבל אם עשו שידוכים סתם, ושעבדו עצמן בקנסות, צריך לכתוב לפי המנהג ולא יוכל לשנות (דברי הרב וכן משמע במהרי"ל). ויש מקומות שנוהגים לכתוב כל הכתובות בשוה, אפילו לא הכניסה לו כלום, ואם ירצה מוסיף לה, ואם ירצה לפחות לה היא כותבת לו: כך וכך קבלתי על כתובתי; וכן נוהגין במדינות אלו.

update From the Principles of Jewish Law by Menachem Elon page 423

In the State of Israel. In terms of the Rabbinical Courts Juridiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713 -1953, matters of marriage and divorce between Jews, citizens or residents of the state, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts, which jurisdiction extends to any matter connected with the suit for divorce, including main tenance for the wife and for the children of the couple (sec. 3(1 )). Divorce for Jews is performed in accordance with Jewish law (sec. 2). In applying the halakhah the rabbinical courts have introduced an important innovation, namely the award of monetary compensation to a wife who is being divorced; this is done even when the divorce is not specifically attributable to the fault of the husband, but the court, after close scru tiny of all the facts, is persuaded that the situation prevailing between the parties does not, objectively speaking, allow for the continuation of their marriage. In this event, the court, upon the husband's demand that his wife be obliged to accept a get, will customarily oblige the former to pay a monetary or equivalent compensation to his wife - in addition to her ketubbah - in return for her willingness to accpet the get (OPO 51-55; POR 1:137). The extent of the compensation is determined by the court, having regard to all the circumstances, including the financial position of the parties and their respective contributions to the state of their assets.

=====================

update 9/2/2013 From השקדן (biography of Rav Eliashiv page 167-168): Regarding the differing views of Rav Shlomo Karelitz and Rav Eliashiv regarding post talmudic decrees. Rav Karelitz viewed them as non-existent and if it required a payment of money he viewed it as theft. Rav Eliashiv viewed them as binding.

מענין לענין - על חילוקי דעות משמעותיים ועקרוניים בין הגרי"ש [אלישיב] להגרשש"ק[רליץ] - שניתן ללמוד מהם על הבדלי גישותיהם, ואשר כמובן לא העיבו  במאומה על הידידות וההערכה ההדדית שהיתה כולה בתורה:

הרה"ר (בשנים מוקדמות) קבעה תוספת על חיוב אב במזונות בניו הקטנים,  שעל פי הדין אין לאב חיוב מעל גיל וי שנים, כי אם מדין צדקה. (דהיינו שאם  האב במצב שאין להטיל עליו חיוב לתת צדקה, אין חוב המזונות של ילדיו  הגדולים עליו). התקנה הכללית שניתנה לכלל בתי הדין בארץ ישראל היתה  שהחיוב הבסיסי (ולא כדין צדקה) יעמוד בעינו עד גיל ט"ו.

בבדיקה מעמיקה ועקבית של פסקי דיני בתי הדין הרבים שהתפרסמו  בספרי הפד"ר ועוד, נמצא הבדל מהותי וחד משמעי בין אלו שנידונו ונפסקו  בהרכב שהשתתף בו הגרי"ש, ובין אלו מהרכב שבהשתתפות הגרשש"ק. בעוד  לדעת הגרי"ש התקנה הזו תקפה לחלוטין, וכך פסק לאורך כל השנים; נראה  כי לפי הגרשש"ק לא חל שום שינוי כלשהו מההלכה הכתובה בשו"ע, והוא  מתעלם מהתקנה כלא היתה.

ומענין זה לענין נוסף אך דומה.

בתי הדין הנהיגו להטיל את שיעור חיובי האב לזון את בניו על פי מדידת עושרו. (לא נמצאה כזו תקנה מפורשת, וכנראה זה השרשת בבתי הדין בתקופה מאוחרת, אולי בהשפעת עקרון הפסיקה של בתי השמפט החילוניים בנושא זה ).

על זה מתבטא הקרש"ש קרליץ (במכתב תורני לגרש"ב ורנר) נדפס ב"משפטי שלמה" חלק ב':

"... הרי אשר לפי זה אין מקום לכאורה לחייב את  האב במזונות בניו כדי מחסורו כו' מדין צדקה, מאחר שחיובו של ביה"ד היא כפיה גמורה להוציא ממון ממנו ...

לפי דעתי הוא חשש גזילה ואין ראיה ממה שיש בתי דין כאלה שמחייבים...

וכמו שראיתי מודפס בפסקי הדין שבתי הדין נוהגים לפסוק פצויים לאשה כשמתגרשת וכמובן אף בסירובו של הבעל לתת ולדעתי זה גזילה גמורה..."

 
 In contrast Rav Eliashiv view regarding the binding nature of post Talmudic decrees is cited in the psak below Psak regarding pitzuim - Rav Eliashiv's view

==========================

וכן לא מצאנו שבתי דין אחרים בארץ ובחו"ל שאינם שייכים למערכת בתי הדין הרבניים מחייבים פיצויי גירושין, שיסודם ממון. כך שניתן לומר שמנהג זו אינו פשוט בין כל הדיינים, אדרבא רובם של הדיינים לא מתנהגים ליתן פיצויים לאשה בעת גרושיה, שתובעת אותם על יסוד טענות לזכויות ממוניות, על כן אין במנהג זה כח ליצור חיוב על בעל ליתן פיצויים וצריך לדון בתביעת פיצויים אלו על פי הדין.

פניתי לכבוד מרן הגאון הרב י.ש. אלישיב שליט"א לשמוע דעתו ביחס לפיצוי גרושין והשיב לי, שכאשר מדובר בפיצויים שמטרתם להביא את האשה להסכים להתגרש יש מקום לנהוג לחייב הבעל ליתן לאשה בנוסף לכתובתה תוספת כפיצויים [זה מתאים לסוג א' של פיצויי גרושין כפי שנבאר לעיל] אולם תביעת פיצוים המתבססת על זכויות ממוניות הקשורות לתרומתה של האשה לממון ורכוש הבעל בחיים המשותפים [זה מתאים לסוג ב' של פיצויים בשעת גרושין כפי שנבאר לעיל] קבע מרן שליט"א שאין לנהוג כך בבית הדין לחייב הבעל בתביעת פיצויים מסוג זה.

עמדה זו משתקפת מכמה פסקי דין של ביה"ד הגדול שכבוד מרן הרב שליט"א היה יו"ר ההרכב או חבר בהרכב [עיין פד"ר ח"ו, ע' 257 פד"ר ח"ז ע' 111, פד"ר ח"ח ע' 36 פד"ר ח"ט ע' 65].
 

 [to be continued]


Israeli judge orders brother to pay divorce settlement

Israeli judge orders wife to pay for refusing to accept get

Even violent and sex offenders released early by L.A. County Jail

L.A. Times   More jail inmates in Los Angeles County are being set free after serving only a fraction of their sentences because of budget problems and a space crunch caused by an influx of offenders now serving their terms in county jails rather than state prisons.

The releases are benefiting even inmates sentenced to jail for violence and sex crimes, with those offenders released after serving as little as 40% of the time they were meant to spend behind bars, according to Sheriff's Department records obtained by The Times under the California Public Records Act.[...]

In February, the department cut the terms for men and women incarcerated for more serious crimes, such as assault with a deadly weapon and child molestation, from 65% to 40% of their remaining jail time, according to department figures.

Divorce in Israel: Problem of agunah from spiteful husbands

LA Times   After four years of marriage, Tamar Tessler filed for divorce, taking her infant daughter and embarking on what she hoped would be a new chapter of her life.

Today that daughter is 36 years old — and Tessler is still awaiting the divorce.

Her husband long ago moved to America, said the 61-year-old retired nurse. But under Israeli law, she remains trapped in a defunct marriage that her husband won't allow to end. She can't legally remarry, was obligated as his spouse to repay some of his debts, and lost out on tax breaks for single mothers even though she raised their daughter alone.

Tessler is one of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Israeli women caught in legal and social limbo because of a law that leaves matters of divorce for all Jewish citizens in the hands of a government-funded religious court.

The court, consisting of a panel of rabbis, bases its decisions on the customs of Orthodox Judaism. The rulings apply to all Jewish Israelis, whether they are Orthodox, Conservative or Reform, observant or secular. And their authority even extends to those who married abroad in civil ceremonies that were registered in Israel. Divorce for non-Jews is handled by their own religious institutions.

Under the court's interpretation of Jewish religious law, a husband's, or wife's, consent is necessary to end a marriage. As has been the case for centuries, a Jewish divorce is not final in Israel until men deliver handwritten divorce decrees into the cupped hands of the women, who then must hold the paper aloft. A rabbi tears the document, called a get, into pieces, which are then filed for record-keeping.

The rabbis can order a reluctant spouse, usually a man, to grant the divorce, and Israel's parliament is considering a bill to expand the court's power to apply pressure. But if a spouse refuses to undertake the religious rite, the court says, it doesn't have the power to dissolve the marriage.

Rabbis have upheld the need for consent even in cases where a man has abused his wife, disappeared, lied about his sexuality or molested their children. [...]

Baal Keri on Yom Kippur - sign of righteousness?

The following is a puzzling gemora regarding Yom Kippur and determining personal righteousness. I have added Rashi, Mishna Berura and Magen Avraham - and I still find it difficult. There is also a Levush on this gemora which I am working on. This gemora is clearly meant to be understood and clarify important issues of Yom Kippur, righteous and sexuality. It parallels BM 83b where R' Eliezer ben R' Shimon cut out fat from his body to determine if whether he made the right decision to become police chief for the Romans [which is the source that  secular mandated reporting law must be obeyed.]

Yoma (88a): A tanna recited befor R' Nachman, "One who experiences a seminal emission [inadvertently – Rashi] on the day  of Yom Kippur, all his sins will be forgiven." But is that true since a braissa states, "All his sins are arranged before him?" What does this expression "arranged before him mean?" [It doesn't mean in order that he will be punished] but rather so that he will be forgiven. In the School of R' Yishmael it was taught, One who experiences a seminal emission on the  day of Yom Kippur should worry the entire year [that he will be punished]. However if he survives the year, he is assured that he is deserving of the World to Come. R' Nachman bar Yitzchok explained [why it is a sign of blessing]. The entire world is being deprived and yet he experiences satiation. When R' Dimi came he said, he will have a long live, thrive and have many children.(Yoma 88a): If he has a seminal emission – inadvertently. All his sins are forgiven - it is a favorable sign that indicates he will have many children and long life. He should worry the entire year -  that the emission is a sign that his fast is not accepted since he is experiencing satiation. This is like a servant who pours a cup for his master who throws it in his face. However if he survives the year and doesn't die – then he possesses good deeds that are protecting him and thus he is deserving of the World to Come. Because you should know that the entire world is deprived of sexual relations while he is sexually satisfied and is not sexual deprived though not through his intent. Nevertheless if he survives the year that shows that he is completely righteous (tzadik gamur). His life is magnified – the one who has the emission on Yom Kippur is  deserving of long life. He will multiply and become many – he will have children and grandchildren. As is alluded to in Yeshaya (53:10), you will see seed (seminal emission or children) and long life.

Mishna Berura(651.3): If he has a seminal emission he should worry the whole year [for punishment]. Because perhaps his fasting was not accepted because G‑d is showing him that He doesn't desire his sexual abstention. Look at the Achronim who write that concern for punishment is only if the seminal emission was not because of excessive eating or drinking or sexual fantasy etc. However if it is known that it resulted from sexual fantasy or other causes – even though this is a great sin – nevertheless he does not have to worry that he might be be punished with death. That is because he himself has caused the seminal emission to happen and the fact that he survived the year doesn't carry the assurance that he will get the World to Come. It is mentioned in seforim that the principle way to atone for failing to stop seminal emission is that he should strengthen himself - from that point on for the rest of his life – in Torah study. The merit of Torah will protect him. This is mentioned in Tanchuma. "If a man sinned and he deserves death at the hand of heaven – what should he do so that he continue living? If he typically learned one chapter, he should now learn two chapters. If he typically learned one page of gemora he should learn two pages. [ The medrash says that if he doesn't know how to learn he should at least give charity and do kindness – and this will allow him to live....  ] The basic reason for Torah study is in order to know what to do. Therefore our Sages say that f a person learns and he doesn't fulfill  his halachic obligations then it is better that he was never created. In addition his failure to observe the mitzvos means that the Torah study will not be able to protect him from punishment - chas v'shalom

Mishna Berura(615:4): If he survives the whole he is assured that he will get the World to Come – Because surely he has many merits that protect him from harm and he will have long life as it says in Yeshaya (53:10)... It is therefore appropriate for him to give praise and thanks that he has been given life from Heaven [Korban Nesanel 77. See also what he says in the name of the Arizal.]

Magen Avraham(6:15:3): If he survives the whole years he is assured that he will get the World to Come. His survival for a year after a seminal emission on Yom Kippur indicates that he apparently is a tzadik and therefore did not need to afflict himself on Yom Kippur.

Compromise allows Eida leader to climb down from absurd confrontation with Rav Sternbuch

JPost   The two leaders of warring factions within the radical ultra-Orthodox Eda Haredit communal movement have agreed on a compromise which will allow construction work at a building site in Beit Shemesh to continue unhindered.

Rabbi Yitzhak Tuviah Weiss, the head of the Eda, and Rabbi Moshe Shternboch, the second in the leadership structure, have agreed that a new inspector will be appointed who will be responsible for overseeing any concerns regarding graves at the site.

A bitter and at times violent confrontation which has lasted for more than two years arose around the Goloventzitz residential project, due to the objections of the Atra Kadisha organization, tied to Weiss, which protests and campaigns against construction which could damage Jewish graves. [...]

Under the terms of the agreement, the inspector, Rabbi Eliyahu Rosen – a rabbinical judge from the rabbinical court of senior haredi leader Rabbi Nissim Karelitz – will oversee the opening and inspection of any caves or pits at the site by a team of experts to check if any graves are within them, and if so, to check if they are Jewish graves or not. [...]

Teacher gets 30 days in jail for raping 14 year old student

LA Times       A Montana judge has come under fire after handing down a 30-day sentence to a former high school teacher convicted of raping a 14-year-old student and for making statements in court that the victim was "older than her chronological age" and "as much in control of the situation" as her teacher.

Outrage is particularly sharp in Billings, where the crime took place, because the girl committed suicide in 2010, just shy of her 17th birthday, as the criminal case was pending. A protest was planned for Thursday, and organizers have called on Montana District Judge G. Todd Baugh to resign.

The uproar began Monday when Baugh sentenced Stacey Dean Rambold, 54, to 15 years in prison on one count of sexual intercourse without consent, but then suspended all but 31 days and gave him credit for one day served. Prosecutors had asked for 20 years in prison, with 10 years suspended.

Baugh said that after reviewing statements made by the girl before her death, he concluded that she was a troubled youth. He then made the controversial remarks, including that he thought the girl had been "as much in control of the situation" as Rambold. The girl's mother, Auliea Hanlon, was in the courtroom and screamed at the judge before storming out, according to the Associated Press.

Sexual abuse in New Square Special Report from TV News 12

Westchester News 12   NEW SQUARE - A shroud of secrecy surrounds the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community of New Square. Many of the residents shun the outside world and keep to themselves. 

However, a sex abuse victim from the community has spoken exclusively to News 12.

Yossi, who prefers to use only his first name, says he wants to speak out about his ordeal in the hope that other victims of abuse will come forward.

Yossi claims that Herschel Taubenfeld, a teacher in his community, inappropriately touched him three times a week for four months.

The teen asked for help from the head rabbis of New Square who had just set up their own sex crimes unit called the VAAD. The agency told him to see a therapist.

Two months later, Yossi reported the abuse to the Ramapo police. He says that his friends stopped talking to him and treated him like he didn't exist.

Kosher Get Deposited but rejected by NY State Judge

For illustration only

Guest post: The following was sent to me anonymously:

A NY Judge has rejected a Get deposited in a valid Bais Din as fulfilling the requirements of the NY Get Law on the grounds that the Bais Din insisted that the Get only be given over in accordance with Halochoh to ensure the validity of the Get. The Bais Din ordered the female Plaintiff to be tzias dina and leave arko’oys in order to receive the get as required by Shulchan Oruch. The Plaintiff refused.

The judge claimed that since the Get was not unconditional, it was not a valid Get and ordered that a “Glatt Kosher” Get be issued. Thus is despite the fact that “Glatt” only applies to “shechted” meat, and refers to the smoothness of the lungs.

The Plaintiff’s lawyer insisted in forcing the Defendant to go to one of the many “hired gun” mercenary type, for profit, purported “botei din” in the NY area (the Bobover) in order to consider settling the case which the Plaintiff has deliberately dragged on for many years in order to destroy the Defendant financially as well as prevent him proper access to his children.

The Judge furthermore warned the Defendant through his lawyer “off the record” (so that there would be no proof of the threats in advance of any trial and any due process occurring) that if the matter did go to trial if another Get was not issued, the judge would see to it that the Defendant’s visitation would be reduced but reasons totally unrelated to the Get would be created in order to reduce likelihood of this being overturned on appeal. The Defendant would have to pay additional money as maintenance to the Plaintiff since he was preventing the remarriage of the Plaintiff.

For fear of retribution, the parties involved shall remain anonymous.

1. Is this not against the constitution in terms of separation of church and state?

2. Is this not Stalinist behavior in terms of punishing someone even before the case and the 

3. Defendant’s arguments have been heard? Is the Defendant not at least entitled to a fair trial

4. Do not Rav Elyashiv zt”l, Rav Menashe Klein, Rav Moshe Sternbuch and even the Aguda and every other posek with some inkling of yiras shomayim hold that this will produce an invalid get me’useh?

=======================

Update [8/26/2013 D.T.] Here are some quotes from Rabbi Chaim Malinowitz' critique of the New York State Get Bill from JLaw   Update 8/27/13 Rabbi Michael Broyde's response

In the view of this writer, the problems with the New York State Get Bill are so many and varied, that the wonder is not the opposition it has met, but rather that it has any support whatsoever. Many contend that the Jewish community is immeasurably better off without the bill than with it since, as we shall see, the bill represents a dangerous time-bomb to the validity of many Gittin. Hence, ultimately, it endangers the sanctity of the Jewish family. In addition, ironically, the bill may actually be counterproductive. The halachic process, which, under most circumstances solves Igun problems when followed through, is undercut by "solutions" such as these. By encouraging people to avoid a Bet Din and avoid having to justify their demands by the standards of halacha, it only helps frustrate Rabbanim and Rabbinic Judges who seek halachic solutions. It teaches litigants to ignore the Bet Din process and rulings and, indeed, to second-guess them. The overwhelming majority of Igun cases, after all, are solved -- by rabbinic leadership along with community pressure. If the public is taught by well-meaning and not-so-well-meaning activists that the halachic route is to be avoided and ignored, then although there may be a few agunot helped by (one hopes) valid Gittin, there will be many many more who find their problems compounded. 

Apart from the bill's flaws with respect to the validity of Gittin, there are three other anti-halachic effects. In the opinion of this writer, these effects are so manifest, so incontrovertible, that it is mystifying that any Orthodox Rabbi, much less any rabbinic institution, can be in favor of it. 

 I. The first basic flaw in the Get Bill is that it is intended to aid in procuring a Get -- even if there is no reason according to Jewish law to assume a Get to be appropriate.[...] 

 II. Furthermore, resorting to the secular courts to resolve disputes is strictly forbidden in Jewish Law.14 This transgression is described by the Shulchan Aruch as akin to blasphemy and "taking up arms" against the Torah.15 The Rashba16 warns against confusing this prohibition with the dictum Dina D'malchuta Dina ("the law of the land is law").17 Even if both parties agree to go, and in fact stipulate in writing that they will utilize the civil court system, it remams forbidden by halacha.18[...] 

III. As we have noted, the prohibition of resorting to the secular courts holds true even if every court action happens to follow all the rules of the Shulchan Aruch. If there are any differences, the additional issue of out-and-out theft arises, if the courts award money or privileges to either party.21 (Even in circumstances where one had received permission from a Bet Din to "use the courts" one is prohibited from keeing any monies he is not entitled to according to halacha.) The Get Bill encourages a woman to use the civil courts to set rates of maintenance and "equitable distribution despite the fact that she might not be entitled to that money according to Jewish law. [...]

Conservative & Reform Jews find High Holidays boring

Tablet Magazine   High Holiday services are a slog. OK, not at every synagogue, not all the time, not for everybody. But it’s true widely and often enough that most of you are nodding to yourselves. Granted, services aren’t meant to entertain us every minute. But which of the 613 commandments prescribe boredom? [...]

The rabbis themselves bear much of the responsibility. Year after unchanging year, they guide their flocks through the long hours of often-stilted liturgy without explaining what’s being recited, how it’s relevant, or where a segment begins or ends. Congregants turn page after page, parroting passages aloud as instructed, sitting and standing (and standing … and standing)—with few people knowing why. One chant runs into the next, often sung by a polished-but-formal choir whose high-church timbre can be distancing. Many in the pews eagerly await the rabbi’s sermon because it’s likely the one respite from predictability. Yes, some people feel moved at moments, but for what proportion of the 15-to-18-hour marathon? Indeed, one prominent rabbi told me he wouldn’t attend his own services if he weren’t running them; another told me he brings a good novel. [...]

On the High Holidays, large numbers of American Reform and Conservative Jews are inert spectators, expecting clergy to sprinkle atonement like fairy dust. Except for those raised with rigorous Jewish instruction (the Orthodox clearly operate in a separate sphere, often immersed from the womb in text), most of us have never taken the time to study the mahzor, nor could we explain the holidays’ origins. How many Jews do you know who could explain, for instance, how the shofar relates to the Binding of Isaac? Or how Yom Kippur connects directly to Mount Sinai? Some think it’s too late to learn, some can’t imagine how they’d find a teacher, many simply don’t rate it important enough to pursue. Most seem to rationalize the minimal investment, saying, “I bought my ticket, went to shul, confessed my mistakes, and vowed to do better. Dayenu.” [...]

Iron Dome has curbed Palestinian terror attacks

Time Magazine

No tour of Middle East conflict zones could be complete without a stop at Sderot, an Israeli town of 24,000 that stands uncomfortably close to the Gaza Strip. The rain of rockets out of the Palestinian enclave has made Sderot famous for two things: the thickness of its roofs (even bus stops have reinforced concrete tops); and the collection of crumpled missiles arrayed in racks behind the police station. As a visiting VIP in 2008, U.S. Senator Barack Obama dutifully inspected what the machine shops of Islamic Jihad and Hamas fashioned from lengths of pipe and scrap metal. Low-tech doesn’t begin to cover it. [...]

Back to the Beersheba wedding. The revelry appears to carry on oblivious to the wail of air-raid sirens competing with the DJ (that song in the background is “Sunday Morning” by Maroon 5). If Israelis no longer scramble to shelters, then Iron Dome really has changed the dynamic. It’s not yet at that point; schools still close when the rockets fly, and parents stay home from work. But Rafael’s head of research and development, who began work on Iron Dome even before the government thought to ask for it, tells TIME that its overarching accomplishment is that it can break the pernicious cycle of escalation that can lead to things like invasions. The batteries can liberate Israel’s elected leaders from the public pressure that comes with mass casualties. “The big success of Iron Dome is not how many missiles we intercept,” says Roni Potasman, the executive vice president for R&D. “The main success is what happened in the decisionmaking civilian population environment. The quiet time. Clausewitz used to say the mission of the military is to provide the time for the decisionmakers to decide. Now, if out of 500 missiles, 10 of them get by and cause casualties, a school or kindergarten, then this is a whole different story.” [...]

MK Dov Lipman interviewed by Rabbi Yair Hoffman

Five Towns Jewish Times   Recently, MK Dov Lipman gave an interview with Arutz Sheva after a “peace talk meeting” sponsored by the Geneva Initiative. He said that some of the Arabs he had spoken to who had themselves served time in Israeli jails. They said that they had had conversations with their jailers and grew to better understand the Israeli side. “I am not saying that they turned into saints, but something happened to them.” MK Lipman agreed to answer further questions about his thoughts for the Five Towns Jewish Times with Rabbi Yair Hoffman.

YH: The first question is: Did the interview you gave Arutz Sheva truly reflect your thinking here that you think most of the prisoners did change significantly by their incarceration? Do you really think that there is a sort of charata here? What percentage roughly do you think are really changed? Most of us believe, au contraire, that they become more entrenched in their thinking and justify even further what they have done. This is particularly the case when they are given a hero’s welcome..

DL: I never said most of the prisoners change I said there are prisoners who change. It is not a question of charata – they now understand our side better and truly seek peace. What people who have not sat with former prisoners believe is irrelevant to me. I also thought so until I met them and spent three days with them. People who have not met them can think what they want but it is based on speculation and not based on facts on the ground.

YH:Speaking with people who have innocent blood on their hands and are not remorseful about it but profess a desire for genuine peace – shouldn’t this be a non-starter? The current Germany was built by dealing with non-Nazis such as Adenauer and the like – not non-repentant Nazis.. If you are not remorseful about the idea of killing innocents, how can we be partners in peace? Isn’t it just, at best, a temporary solution – and, therefore not in Israel’s best interests? [...]