https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ByprFIyvd
Former health minister set to be hit with charges of bearing false witness, fraud and breach of trust in Malka Leifer affair for allegedly trying to influence psychiatrists tasked with assessing her mental fitness
Igros Moshe (E.H. 1:79) Impotent husband. Concerning a woman who married a man and immediately after the wedding it was clear that he was totally impotent and incapable of having sexual relations at all. It was also clear that his problem existed prior to getting married since he was not able to have intercourse the night of the wedding. Furthermore there is the testimony of expert doctors who treated him with various medicine that were ineffectual that his condition is incurable and the wife is young and needs to remarry but her husband refused to divorce her and he ran away and it is impossible to obtain a get. The question is whether the marriage can be annulled because if she had known that he was impotent she would never have married him?. This issue has been thoroughly discussed in contemporary and ancient tshuvos. Some conclude that it is prohibited and some permit it theoretically but not in actuality. Others claim that it is permitted by the Torah but prohibited by the rabbis. However since this is an issue of helping an aguna the matter needs to be investigated despite the fact that I am not worthy in particular to decide between the words of our teachers. G-d should help us to not err in the halacha and we should teach the true actual halacha. It would seem clear and obvious that if the husband is incapable of intercourse -which is the basis of sexuality and it is the reason why a woman marries and that the Torah describes the absence of intercourse as affliction (Yoma 77). Tosfos (Kesubos 48) indicates that a woman marries in order to have sexual intercourse. Consequently it is clear and obvious that if the man is incapable of sexual intercourse that it is a very great defect in terms of the reason she got married and there is no need to bring proofs to this. But there is also a great proof as we see in the Ein Yitzchok (E.H. 24.6) in citing Tosfos (Yevamos 65) that if the husband is impotent he is required to divorce his wife. This is also the view of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (154) and also the Beis Yosef cites it in the name of Rashba that we force the impotent husband to divorce her since she got married to have sex. . Thus we see it is a major deficit. So even if you have a doubt that perhaps there are some women who don’t care if their husband is impotent and therefore we can not force a divorce. But perhaps this last proof shows that we can force a divorce even though we are concerned that even though most women do care about this even though there is a minority that doesn’t care. However it is more likely that the reason we can force a divorce is because all woman only marry for intercourse. And thus this is a case of mekach ta’us (mistaken transaction)to annul the marriage The reason that they say to force the divorce and don’t say the marriage is annulled is because their case was of a man who became impotent after they got married. This distinction is important regarding all serious deficits, since there are some woman who prefer marriage under almost any circumstances. Impotence is not only a major deficit but it is worse than a case such as mucha shechin (skin disease) because sex can not exist at all with it. All the Achronim agree that is a major defect and therefore it can be the basis to annul the marriage if she wasn’t aware of it before she got married and only learned of it after the marriage. Consequently after much analysis in this case of an impotent husband and it has been determined that he was this way even prior to marriage and it is impossible to obtain a get from him – she should not be an aguna and she should be permitted to remarry because of annulling the marriage (kiddushei ta’os).
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2021/04/gop-anti-protest-bills
Following the signing of a Florida “anti-riot” law that, among things, grants civil immunity to people who decide to drive their cars into protesters who are blocking a road and makes it a second-degree felony to destroy a plaque, memorial, painting, flag, or other structure commemorating historical people or events, the New York Times reports that GOP lawmakers in dozens of states have introduce anti-protest bills meant to silence people speaking out for justice. Oklahoma and Iowa, for instance, were apparently inspired by what Florida did re: basically encouraging drivers to strike protestors with their cars, and passed similar bills granting legal protections in certain situation for drivers who hit protestors supposedly blocking the street. In Indiana, a Republican proposal would ban anyone convicted of unlawful assembly from holding state employment. A Minnesota bill would bar people convicted of unlawful protesting from receiving unemployment benefits, housing assistance, and even student loans. In Kentucky, where Breonna Taylor was killed by the police inside her apartment last year, the State Senate passed a bill that would make it a crime to insult a police officer with “offensive or derisive” words or gestures that could “provoke a violent response.” (In other words, one could be charged for using words that caused a police officer to violently respond to them.) That measure would have required those arrested to be held in jail for a minimum of 48 hours, a rule that does not automatically apply to people arrested in Kentucky on charges of arson, rape, or murder. While the bill died in the statehouse, its lead sponsor, Republican State Senator Danny Carroll, said he would refile it next session.
As the Times notes, these bills are completely unnecessary given the fact that (1) last summer’s protests were overwhelmingly peaceful—96% involved no police damage or police injuries, while a report found that it was police officers or counterprotesters who often instigated violence and (2) laws already exist to punish rioting. Instead, the measures are clearly aimed at scaring people into staying silent.
There are ignorant people who claim they are relying on Rav Moshe Feinstein to annul a marriage because the husband has an incurable psychological issue. It is clear that not every personality order justifies such an approach. This can be seen clearly in one of the classic tshuvos where he annuls a marriage when it was discovered that the husband was a homosexual and he states that this applies only if the husband were exclusively homosexual.
Igros Moshe (E.H. 04:113): Concerning the present matter where the wife has discovered that her husband has had homosexual relations since we find that this is considered a major defect the marriage is a mistake also for the wife as I have explained in Igros Moshe (E.H. 1:79 and 1:180).. It is also reasonable that the fact that the husband is involved in homosexual relations - which are the worst possible abomination and most disgusting thing - it is a disgrace to the whole family. And surely it is extremely degrading to his wife that her husband prefers this disgusting intercourse rather than intercourse with his wife. Thus it is definitely a mistaken marriage. It is clear to us that no woman would be willing to marry such a disgusting, repulsive and debased man as this. Consequently if immediately after she was informed about this she left him - that if it is impossible for her to receive a divorce from him - that she should be permitted to remarry because of having a mistaken marriage. However if it is possible to obtain a divorce, it is necessary to try with all that is possible in order to obtain a kosher get. On the other hand, if he is not fully immersed in homosexuality - but only occasionally because of the influence of his lust - perhaps this should not be considered to be a mistaken marriage. So even though he is a complete rasha (wicked) - even for the sake of a single incident – there are those who mistakenly imagine that this is called a mistaken marriage. However if he is fully immersed in homosexuality - in that he gets more pleasure from homosexual intercourse than from relations with women – it is definitely a mistaken marriage. All of this is if she left him immediately when she found out. But if she remains with him even after being notified, then it is difficult to nullify the marriage. If his behavior is the result of foolishness, since this is something which is unnatural it is definitely a defect. Since it is from foolishness it is likely that there are other manifestations of foolishness. However in essence it is from wickedness and is repulsive - which also makes it a mistaken marriage.
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/304703
The riots inside the Ponevezh Yeshiva Hall in Bnei Brak have resumed, with students from the 'Jerusalem Faction' beat one of the teachers today. One of the students also spat on him.
Rabbi Aryeh Kahaneman, the son of Rosh Yeshiva Rabbi Eliezer Kahaneman, was the victim of the attack. He was taken to Tel Hashomer hospital.
The quarrel was part of a longstanding dispute between the two factions over control of the yeshiva and the division of its territory. The supporters of Rabbi Shmuel Markovitz on the one hand, nicknamed the "haters," and Rabbi Eliezer Kahaneman's rival camp, called the "terrorists" have long been at loggerheads and tensions frequently lead to violence.
https://www.kikar.co.il/390096.html
https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rJ7izd2I00#autoplay
Long-standing battle for control of Ponevezh seminary erupts into violence when mainstream faction returns after pandemic regulations lifted; two people hospitalized, including son of yeshiva dean
Police ran into violent clashes Monday night in Jerusalem’s ultra-Orthodox Mea She’arim neighborhood, with three officers suffering mild injuries.
During an initial arrest raid, a group of officers was trapped in a building after local residents barricaded them inside with chains. A suspect wanted by police tried to evade arrest the next day by dressing as a woman.
Tzitz Eliezer (13:102) Abortion because of Tay Sachs In all cases the child will die before the age of four after progressive physical and mental deterioration and there is no known treatment. There are tests that clearly establish whether the embryo has Tay Sachs. There is a well-known leniency of Rav Yaakov Emden who allows abortion within the first three months even in cases which are not life threatening to the mother It is permitted in the case of the serious condition of Tay Sachs to abort until seven months. A Jew does not get capital punishment for killing an embryo. In addition many poskim view abortion as only a rabbinic prohibition or merely a restriction for the good of society but not murder and therefore the Maharit (9:97-99) permits a Jew to do abortion when it serves the needs of the mothers health even if not life saving. In addition there is the leniency of Rav Yaakov Emden (1:43) who allows abortion in cases of great need even when it is not life saving but saves the mother from great suffering. . Therefore if there is a need because of great pain or suffering as exists in our case of Tay Sachs (and it doesn’t make a difference if the child is taken away and institutionalized until he dies.) It would appear that if there was a leniency to permit abortion in halacha because of great need of suffering this would be a classic case.. If possible the abortion should be done by a female doctor since according to the view that abortion is prohibited because of wasting seed and that prohibition doesn’t apply to women according to most poskim.
Tzitz Eliezar (14:100) Abortion leniency in cases of great need – in particular for Tay Sachs. Concerning the analysis of abortion done bythe gaon Rav Moshe Feinstein shlita., I reviewed it two or three times, and even though there is much to comment and criticize nevertheless I have decided for practical reasons not to do so and will only briefly comment on fundamental points and not with a lot of noise but in a quiet calm manner and let the reader decide between us. Regarding Tosfos (Niddah 44) which states that abortion is permitted, he takes the simplest path and declares that it is an error in the text and that it should say patur (exempt) rather than permitted. He is not bothered by Tosfos makes the statement twice that abortion is permitted and simply states that Tosfos really views abortion as prohibited because it is permitted to profane Shabbos to save its life. With all due respect Sir this is not acceptable. We are dependent on the previous generations and they struggled each one in his own way to try and establish what the intent of Tosfos (Niddah) was and how to reconcile the words. Not a single authority concluded like this easy way to declare that there was an error in the text. . I am totally amazed how he could ignore all the sources from previous generations including some close to the period of Rishonim that clearly disagree with him and furthermore don’t view abortion as murder. .
Editor’s Note: The recent publication on Torahweb.org of a letter by Yeshiva University Rosh Yeshiva Rav Hershel Schachter, shlita, criticized the work of the International Beit Din and advised all not to rely on their rulings, and for any associated rabbanim to resign. The original was printed in Hebrew and is available here: http://torahweb.org/torah/docs/ibd-machaa.html. We present a translation here, as well as a response from representatives of the organization he is addressing. The response from the International Beit Din can be found here.
It is a tremendous chutzpah that these three rabbis joined this beit din. Questions of this most serious nature—permitting a woman to remarry without a divorce—were brought to Rav Yitzchak Elchanan, after him to Rav Chaim Ozer and in our time to Rav Moshe Feinstein, all of whom were recognized as the greatest of their generations. It is forbidden for average rabbis to involve themselves in these matters because whoever does not understand the nature of marriages and divorces cannot be involved with them. In our generation, we present these questions to the few Torah scholars who have specialized in these laws and apprenticed under greats, and who therefore have a tradition about where to be lenient and where strict.
Rav) Tzvi (Hershel) Schachter, Tammuz 5775
I also agree to this objection with full force:
(Rav) Gedaliah Dov Schwartz, 21 Tammuz 5775
It is superfluous to add that there is no ruling and no judge but nonsense of fools who have appointed themselves authorities:
(Rav) Nota Tzvi Greenblatt, Memphis, 22 Tammuz 5775
The words of the above giants are clear in law and in practice, and I also join in their objection:
(Rav) Avrohom Michael Union, 26 Tammuz 5775
I also join in objecting to this brazen breach:
(Rav) Menachem Mendel Senderovitz, 3 Av 5775
Igros Moshe (C.M. 2:69) Abortion is prohibited also for the pain of the mother both for Jews and non-Jews. Tosfos (Sanhedrin 59a) states explicitly says it is obviously prohibited for Jews since whatever is prohibited to non-Jews is also prohibited to Jews and it is considered murder. .It raises the question but for a Jew it is permitted to save the mother while this is not so for a non-Jew? It answers that for a Jew it is a mitzva to kill the embryo to save the mother.while the heter of pikuach nefesh does not apply to a non-Jew We see that Tosfos views abortion as murder. While it does state twice in Tosfos (Nida 44a) that abortion is permitted. But it is obvious that is a mistake. According to the Rambam abortion is only permitted in life threateing situations prior to the baby’s head coming out because the embryo is considered a rodef. Why does he have that condition since the baby still endangers the mother even after the head comes out? The simple answer is that when the head comes out we don’t know who is the rodef since the mother endangers the child and the child endangers the mother and thus Rambam also views abortion as murder. Furthermore abortion is prohibited unless it is certain to the doctor that the mother will die otherwise and thus abortion can not be done even when it is known the baby will not live long such as in Tay Sachs even if this will greatly upset the mother. Therefore I told the religious doctors not to test for Tay Sachs Regarding the Chavis Yair which permits abortion – that is an erroneous text. Regarding the Maharit there are two contradictory tshuvos. And one of them must be a forgery and therefore the one that permits abortion should be ignored. Similarly what is stated in the Rashba about the Ramban that he performed abortions for non=Jews. That Rashba does not appear in our Rashba and also must be a forgery. Both the Tzitz Eliezar and the Seridei Aish (Noam volume 9) say that the Chavis Yair holds abortion is prohibited as I have written. I was astonished to read the analysis of the sefardi posek Rav Pealim( 1:14) who says abortion would be permitted except for the concern for prostitutes. He then notes that Tosfos (Chullin) prohibits abortion and then apparently rules that l’chatchila abortion should not be permitted though he doesn’t write that it is prohibited from Tosfos (Chullin) and Rambam. He does note the Maharit (99) that permits abortion but not Maharit (97) which prohibits abortion and thus we must conclude that the Maharit holds abortion is prohibited as I noted before and he is not a source for this halacha. The Seridei Aish improperly cites the Ramban claiming he holds abortion is not a Torah prohibition and yet it is permitted to profane the Shabbos to save it. In fact the Ramban that is cited does not say that the Torah permits abortion but only that until the head appears there is no requirement to save its life and therefore its life is not valued as that of its mother but nevertheless Shabbos can be profaned to save its life. It is thus obvious that the Ramban holds there is an obligation to save the life of the embryo and that surely there is a Torah prohibition to kill it. It is not clear how he derives the conclusion that the Ramban permits abortion and his words should not be relied upon on his view in this matter at all. In Rav Yakov Emden (1:43) I saw words that should not be said that an embryo of a mamzer can be aborted because when there was Sanhedrin, if a pregnant woman was to get capital punishment they would not wait until she gave birth to execute her. So today when there is no Sanhedrin and even if she was not sentenced to death the law of execution still exists. His words are total nonsense even though a great man wrote them but since the sentence was not passed the accused is not liable to the death penalty. Therefor anyone who kills someone today who was not sentence directly by Sanhedrin is a murder no matter what crime they committed and even if there were witnesses and warning. This that he adds that a person today who transgressed a serious crime intentionally and commits suicide it is a meritorious act. These words are absurd and no one should pay attention to them. I am writing this analysis of abortion because of the great disregard for this since many countries in the world permit abortion including the government of Israel. Since a great unknown number of babies have been aborted in modern times there is a great need to make Torah restrictions and surely not leniencies concerning the severe crime of murder. Consequently I was astonished to read a teshuva of an Israeli scholar who wrote to the director od Shaarei Tzedek Hospital in the journal Asia (13) permitting abortion for Tay Sachs after the third month he claims it is permitted since abortion is only a rabbinic prohibition according to many poskim. He cites the Maharit (99) that permits abortion without mentioning that Maharit (97) prohibits abortion. He also cites Rav Yaakov Emden as permitting when in fact he prohibits abortion with the language in case of great need it is permitted. So even if you want to claim there are justifications for leniency there are more to prohibit. He also cites Rav Pelim. He concludes to be lenient in the case of Tay Sachs and abort until seven months. . This time frame makes no sense as no one talks about it. Therefore it is clear and obvious as I have written that according the Rishonim and Poskim that abortion is prohibited as actual murder,even for mamzer and Tay Sachs. One should not err and rely on the tshuva of this chachom
.
