They are trying to make it illegal to question the results of a bad election.”

 https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2023/aug/09/donald-trump/trump-says-doj-is-trying-to-criminalize-asking-que/

The Aug. 1 federal indictment against Donald Trump over efforts to subvert 2020 election results said the former president "had a right, like every American, to speak publicly about the election" and make false claims. It says Trump also was entitled to challenge the results lawfully through recounts, audits or lawsuits. 

 Trump was indicted for his actions, not for questioning the election. 

Guest posts request

 Anyone can submit a guest post describing the impact of blogging and blogs on a personal or community level. I will post them to see how they are received and then will possibly include them in my selections from the 15 years of the Daas Torah Blog

Pseudonyms can be used. They need to be submitted within next two weeks

Haredi minister condemns family who cursed IDF soldier

 https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/375312

Construction and Housing Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf (United Torah Judaism) on Wednesday morning published a statement responding to footage showing a haredi family cursing female IDF soldiers on a train.

"Anyone who humiliates another person in public has no share in the World to Come," Goldknopf said, emphasizing that this refers to "any Jew, no matter who he is."

"Even IDF soldiers are included in this rule," he added. "I condemn this behavior, which does not represent the Torah-observant community."

R Elchonon Wasserman: An Amora had the potential right to disagree with a Tanna

from Daas Torah - translation copyrighted

Rav Elchonon Wasserman (Kovetz Shiurim Bava Basra 170a #633): Rav said that the halacha is neither that of R’ Yehuda nor of R’ Yochanon. The Rashbam said that Rav was considered a Tanna and thus could disagree with other Tanaim. However Tosfos (Kesubos) says that R’ Yochanon disagreed with this halacha and since we have a rule that in a dispute between Rav and R’ Yochacon that we rule in accord with R’ Yochanon that means that Rav is not viewed as a Tanna and thus cannot argue with Tannaim. But this presents a question. How can it be that Rav is disagreeing with the Mishna here? This question I asked my teacher R’ Chaim Brisker and he answered, “That in truth an Amora has the right to disagree with a Tanna. This that we regularly find the Talmud rejecting the views of an Amora by simply showing that a Tanna rejects it – that is because as a general rule an Amora did not disagree with a Tanna. So if the Amora only knew the view of the Tanna we assume he would not disagree with it. However where we see that an Amora explicitly disagrees with a Tanna it is possible that the final halacha is in agreement with the Amora.” : …There is a major innovation proposed by the Ramban (Bava Basra 131a). He says the Talmud brings a refutation to an Amora from a Tanna – only when the words of the Tanna are taught in the Mishna or Braissa – but if it is just quoted by the Talmud it is possible to disagree with the words of the Tanna. We also find this view recorded in the Shita Mekubetes in the name of Rabbeinu Yona, “Even though it is not normal for an Amoraim to disagree with Tannaim – but that is only when the view of the Tanna is found in a Mishna or Braissa.” This appears true from the language of Gittin (42), “This is only a quote of his views and Rava doesn’t agree with it.” Rashi explains that it is a view stated in the Talmud but was not found in a Mishna or Braisa. It would seem that the reason for this distinction is that Mishna and Braissos were redacted and approved by all the Sages of the generation… In contrast a view quoted by the Talmud simply represents view of the Tanna himself. Thus we see that the distinction is not between Tannaim and Amoraim but Mishna and Braissa versus a cited view of a Tanna…

R. S. R. Hirsch: Dangers of losing grasp of G-d's personality is worse than dangers of corporality

Rav S. R. Hirsch (Bereishis 6:6): Regarding this and similar anthropomorphic expressions of G-d, we would like to make a general remark. For so long people have philosophized all round these expressions to remove the danger of the slightest thought of any materiality or corporality of G-d that at the end one runs very nearly into the danger of losing all idea of the personality of G-d. Had that been the purpose of the Torah, those kind of expressions could easily have been avoided. But this last danger is greater than the first. The two anthropomorphic expressions here save the two essential conceptions:the freedom, the free-will of G-d and that of Man. Not for nothing doesn't say, "when G-d saw etc." The wickedness of Man was not a matter of necessity. G-d had to see it before He knew it. This expression gives us the guarantee of human free-will. And the fate that overtook mankind was not the result of physical causes which followed set laws, it was preceded by an examination by G-d and His decision; the decision itself pained the Decider. All this presupposes the personality and free-will of G-d and keeps this clear in our minds. The Raavad already, one of the most Jewish of our thinkers, is of the opinion that such consciousness of the personality of G﷓d is of much greater importance than speculating about it, as to whether this or that can be asserted of G﷓d.

Misunderstanding Rashi: Punishment of family is mida keneged mida

Just received the following nasty put down regarding a recent posting regarding the Divine punishment of those who could but don't protect the helpless against molesters and abusers (Shemos 22:21-23) There are those who have eyes and don't see and brains but fail to understand.

DF has left a new comment on your post "Rashi indicates one's children are punished for no...":

I dont think've I seen a more dishonest heading for a blog post -on a blog purportedly run by a frum man, that is - than this one. Rashi's comment has nothing to do with molestors. As a man with a hammer sees a nail everywhere, your unhealthy obsession with molesters leads you to see references to them everywhere.

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You clearly missed the point of Rashi's commentary.

Let me explain what Rashi is saying. The Torah is explicity saying that a man who allows widows and orphans to be tormented with be punished by being killed by G-d and thus his wife will become a widow and his children orphans. It is not enough that he be killed but his family must suffer too.

This is mida keneged mida. He failed to protect widows an orphans so he is punished that his wife and children suffer in the same way.That is the lesson of this verse according to Rashi.

In addition Rashi accepts the view of R' Yishmael that this verse is not limited to widows and orphans - but it includes all those who are weak and defenseless.

So what is the mida keneged mida for one who fails to protect a child from being molested? Is it enough that his wife is made into a widow and his children orphans? But how is the mida keneged mida aspect fulfilled? The punishment must be directly linked to what their father and husband failed to do.

I think it is reasonable to deduce from this Rashi that his wife and children will be put into situations that they suffer that which he failed to protect others from.

Similarly in all cases of the torment of the weak and unprotected - his family deserves suffering the indignity that he failed to protect others from.

 This is simple pshat

Shut HaRid: Basis of authority - midgets standing on giants

from Daas Torah - translation copyrighted

Shut HaRid (# 62): Whatever does not make sense to me – then even if Yehoshua ben Nun said I would not agree [Chullin 124a]. And I don’t stop myself from expressing what appears correct to me according to my limited intellect. Thus I do what it says in Tehilim (119:46), I speak regarding Your words even against kings and I am not ashamed…. Because even when it appears to me that I have successfully refuted the words of the early authorities – G﷓d forbid for me to be so arrogant to say that it is because of my superior wisdom (Koheles 2:9). Rather the reason that I can argue with the early authorities is because of the rationale provided by philosophers. I heard that a group of philosophers asked the greatest amongst them, “We acknowledge that the early scholars were wiser and more intelligent than us. But at the same time we acknowledge that we argue with their ideas and refute them in many issues and in fact our criticisms of them are correct. How could that be?” He replied to them, “Who can see farther – a midget or a giant? It is obviously a giant because his eyes are much higher than a midget. However if a midget stands on the shoulder of a giant – who can see farther? Obviously it is the midget because his eyes are now higher than the eyes of the giant. So it is with us. We are midgets riding on the shoulders of giants because we know that it is their wisdom that elevates us. Therefore our wisdom is based on their wisdom.” Thus what we say is not because we are greater than them. We can comment regarding the early scholars in a situation where we see that they disagree with each other – one permitting and the other prohibiting. So which authority should we rely on? … We can not simply say that one is greater and therefore the words of the others are refuted. Rather we must analyze all their words because they are the words of the living G﷓d. We need to debate and investigate their words to see which way the law seems to be going. That in fact is what the sages of the Mishna and Talmud did. We see the later Talmudic scholars did not refrain from disagreeing with the early scholars and to decide amongst what the early sages disagreed with each other as well as to contradict their words. We find that the Amoraim would refute a Mishna and say that it was not the halacha. The fact is the wisdom transcends the individual sage and there is no sage who is free from error. Only G﷓d is free of error.

Daas Torah: Divrei Chaim claimed heretic mislead gedolim to write that they agreed with him

One of the important and relevant problems when dealing with Daas Torah - is the reality of the possibility of Gedolim being misled by information fed to them. In an important tshuva in which the Divrei Chaim insists that ruach hakodesh of wisdom which enables gedolim in each generation to know the truth - he makes the ironic statement when his opponent asserts that in fact there are gedolim who have  written him that there is no longer any ruach hakodesh -  that these gedolim were deceived by this heretic

Divrei Chaim (Y.D. #105)... Thus we see that ruach hakodesh and the agreement with G﷓d never stopped from the sages who were deserving of this ability. This is also clear from the statement of Rav Pinchas ben Yair (Avoda Zara 20b). And this that is says in Sotah (48b) that after the days of the Prophets that ruach hakodesh was taken away – that means the ruach hakodesh of prophesy but not the ruach hakodesh of intellect and the ability to have one’s intellect be in agreement with the halacha that was given to Moshe at Sinai or Rav Avesar - that never stopped. Only a heretic denies this. And this that he claims that contemporary gedolim have written that ruach hakodesh has totally stopped – I don’t believe that such a statement would be issued by our gedolim. Who knows what this disgusting deceiver wrote them. The truth is that even in our days there is to sages of the truth - who are not influenced in the slightest by the material – ruach hakodesh as is explained in Moreh Nevuchim (2:36) and the Ramban explicitly.

Gedolim are not infallible - and this should be obvious but unfortunately is not

This is a continuation of the issue that was raised by my translation of the Divrei Chaim (Y.D. #105) in which  the Divrei Chaim asserts that gedolim were possibly mislead by someone he regards as a heretic. An objection was raised to my translation because of the concern for asserting that gedolim  might  have been deceived. Ben Torah said the Divrei Chaim means that the heretic misrepresented the gedolim and falsely claimed support from them. However the Divrei Chaim says he was a deceiver - not a liar and he didn't know what was presented to the gedolim.
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Regarding the possibility of deceiving gedolim and the fact that they are not infallible - this should be obvious. In fact this was stated by the spokesman for the Aguda - Rabbi Shafran available on Wikipedia and other places

Rabbi Avi Shafran, the spokesman for the American Hareidi organization Agudath Israel of America, explains the concept as follows:

Da'at Torah is not some Jewish equivalent to the Catholic doctrine of papal infallibility. Not only can rabbis make mistakes of judgment, there is an entire tractate of the Talmud, Horiut, predicated on the assumption that they can, that even the Sanhedrin is capable of erring, even in halachic matters.

What Da'at Torah means, simply put, is that those most imbued with Torah-knowledge and who have internalized a large degree of the perfection of values and refinement of character that the Torah idealizes are thereby rendered particularly, indeed extraordinarily, qualified to offer an authentic Jewish perspective on matters of import to Jews - just as expert doctors are those most qualified (though still fallible, to be sure) to offer medical advice.^[1]

Rabbi Bechhofer has written a fascinating article regarding the deception of gedolim concerning a forgery of the Yerushalmi.

available here
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The Talmud Yerushalmi on Kodashim

Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer, Editor Or Shmuel, Rosh Kollel, Frumi Noble Night Kollel of Hebrew Theological College.

 
It seems clear from the Rishonim that they had access to the Talmud Yerushalmi on Seder Kodashim, In the introduction to his commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states explicitly that on the first five sedarim, both the Talmud Bavli and Talmud Yerushalmi are extant. During the course of time, however, the Yerushalmi on the entire seder of Kodashim was lost, and for several hundred years no manuscript on this seder was known to exist. (See the introduction of Rabbi Mordechai Zev Segal of Lvov to the Zhitomer [1866] edition of the Talmud Yerushalmi.)

In the year 1907, however, a mysterious person suddenly appeared in Hungary, calling himself Rabbi Shlomo Yehuda Algazi-Friedlander. Rabbi Algazi-Friedlander j published what he claimed to be the Yerushalmi on tractates Chullin and Bechoros, thus instigating a battle royal amongst the Gedolei Hador. A personal account of this chapter in the history of the Talmud was written by Rabbi Yekusiel Yehuda Greenwald of Columbus, Ohio, and printed in the Sefer Hayovel of HaPardes (1953), Here is a synopsis of the story,

Daas Torah: Ramchal - knowledge obtained through ruach hakodesh is infallible

I was asked to show sources which make the claim that gedolim are infallible or at least make infallible pronouncements. There are in fact many.  Some of which I have published - such as Rav Eybshuetz's statement that the Shulchan Aruch was written with ruach hakodesh. There are two steps 1) gedolim have ruach hakodesh - from prophecy or intellect 2) knowlege obtained through ruach hakodesh is without error - is stated clearly by the Ramchal below.

Of course - this means that theoretically that gedolim can make mistakes - however it also clearly means that at least some of their statements are infallible. It is because of this claim that gedolim have ruach hakodesh - that is is considered presumption for a non-gadol to question the statements or deeds of a gadol.  It is obvious that while this is a wide spread contemporay belief - it is hand has not been universal. For example the Ravad asserted that he was correct in a halachic dispute because he had ruach hakodesh. This did not stop the Ramban and others from disagreeing with him. In fact the Chasam Sofer says that the basis of all knowledge is ruach hakodesh and that is why we make a beracha on a wise non-Jewish intellectual.

Ramchal (Mamar HaIkkarim): Below the level of prophecy there is a level known as ruach hakodesh. It  is a state in which G﷓d provides an emanation to a man’s intellect which fixes knowledge in his  mind without error and with which he is absolutely certainty.  As a consequence he knows this information totally with its causes and effects on every level. Through the inspiration of this ruach hakodesh it is possible to understand matters which are also known by ordinary human intelligence. However there is a distinct advantage of learning these matters through ruach hakodesh instead of natural intelligence. Learning through ruach hakodesh is effortless, without error and without doubts – something which is not characteristic of knowledge acquired by natural human intellect. Furthermore it is possible to obtain knowledge through ruach hakodesh that transcends the capabilities of normal human intellect e.g., hidden secrets as  well as  what will happen in the future. Another characteristic of ruach hakodesh is that the recipient is aware without any doubt that he is receiving the emanation. However, there are times when a person has a spontaneous inspiration in which he grasp fully some concept without his being aware of an emanation. This is sometimes inaccurately also called ruach hakodesh.

Rav Dessler - Daas Torah means not only total obedience but an inability to judge gedolim

from Daas Torah - translation copyrighted

Michtav M’Eliyahu (1:75): Our Sages have already told us to listen to the words of gedolim - “Even if they tell you that left is right.” Furthermore a person should not think, G﷓d forbid!, that they have certainly erred just because someone so insignificant as himself has perceived that they erred. In fact it is important to know that one’s perception of reality is totally null and void as the dust of the earth in comparison to the clarity of intellect and Divine assistance that they have. We have an important halachic principle that one beis din can not nullify the ruling of another beis din unless it is greater than the first in wisdom and number. Otherwise it is likely that that which he thought that he perceived is merely an illusion and distorted understanding of reality. This is what is meant by Daas Torah - which is an aspect of Emunas Chachomim (faith in the sages).

Chasam Sofer: Sanhedrin is not protected against error

From Daas Torah (translation copyrighted)

Chasam Sofer (Choshen Mishpat #191): The Sifri concludes, “Even if the Sanhedrin tells you that right is left… and surely if they tell you that right is right and left is left [you must obey them].” This doesn’t seem to consistent. What is the second part which starts with, “and surely”? The Zakein Mamre (rebellious judge) is asserting that what he considers right is truly “right” and that the position of the majority of the Sanhedrin is “left” i.e., false. Therefore who is to determine that the second  part is ,”and surely”? This seems to be a major difficulty. In fact, however, the clear explanation is as follows. The Zakein Mamre (rebellious judge) and his colleagues are major scholars who are in dispute with the Sanhedrin. And even though the Sanhedrin is  composed of the leading Jewish authorities - who sit in G-d’s presence in His house (i.e., the Temple) - there is no necessity that their reasoning in this matter is true. In fact it could be that the Zakein Mamre’s understanding of the Torah verse is closer to the truth than theirs is. This is so even if they are more numerous and in general sharper in their thinking. On the other hand it is possible that in fact that the Zakein Mamre and his supporters number in the tens of thousands while the Sanhedrin can not be more than 71 people. Nevertheless G﷓d has decreed we must follow the scriptural understanding of the Sanhedrin in halacha since its source is no longer in Heaven. Therefore we don’t pay attention even to bas kol (voice from Heaven) or a prophet who claims to know the halacha in Heaven. Furthermore a prophet who claims prophetic knowledge of halachic is deserving of the death penalty for this crime of being a false prophet – since G﷓d would never provide a prophet vision of a halachic question. Even when Yehoshua ben Nun forgot thousands of halachos, they weren’t restored through prophecy but rather through the legal reasoning of Ozniel ben Kenaz. Besides who knows for certain that Ozniel ben Kenaz ascertained the truth through his reasoning? The understanding of man is transient in its understanding of Biblical verses as well as the reasoning of kal v’chomer and other midos. The fact is that legal authority is because G﷓d gave the Torah according to man’s understanding in order that there shouldn’t be an every growing number of unresolved disputes – [and not because the truth was necessarily ascertained]. Therefore G﷓d made the provision that if chas v’shalom the majority of Sanhedrin erred and permitted a substance which was actually prohibited and the people ate it  – G﷓d would not count it as a sin. In other words since the Sanhedrin erred, the people did not commit a sin by eating the prohibited substance. Furthermore if the Zakein Mamre himself decided to be stringent and not eat this substance because of his original suspicions – even though in Heaven it is known that he was correct – he is deserving of death as the Rambam rules (Hilchos Maamrim 4). This punishment is deserved even if he merely refrained from eating the disputed substance. This law is very constructive in that it works to prevent unresolved disputes amongst the Jews. Consequently this Zakein Mamre should not have had the slightest concern about eating the substance that Sanhedrin had declared permitted – even if prior to the final ruling of Sanhedrin he was certain it was prohibited. Similarly if Sanhedrin declares a certain type of activity prohibited on Shabbos, he should not be concerned about his initial certainty that it was prohibited. In other words even if the Sanhedrin mistakenly tells you concerning a halacha which it is clear in Heaven [“right”] that it is the opposite of what they say [“left”]  - their ruling is in fact correct [“right”]. That is because G﷓d accepts what they do even though it is mistaken in the objective sense. However there is an alternative explanation of the Sifri. We are to believe that what the Sanhedrin is saying is true [“right”] and that they have not erred. In other words we are to believe that they have ascertained the proper understanding of what G﷓d expressed in the Torah because G﷓d gave the Torah according to their understanding. Thus we see that both side are sincerely motivated to discover the truth. However if the Sanhedrin errs in their rulings then all Jews end up erring also – but it is considered that they had been forced. However this alternative explanation assumes that G﷓d guards his pious ones from erring and thus misleading the Jewish people – since they want to do G﷓d’s will. Now we can properly explain the second part of the Sifri, “and surely they must be obeyed when they say that the truly right is right.” The explanation of the Sifri according to this alternative explanation is that even when they had erred in ascertaining what the Torah mandates, nevertheless they would have discovered what appears to them to be the truth – and G﷓d would accept the validity of their erroneous decision. And surely we are to understand that they have in fact not erred and have correctly told us what the Torah actually mandates. Thus the alternative explanation is based on the assumption that the Sanhedrin is protected from error. However this second explanation is problematic since it is asserting infallibility. In other words the second explanation is saying that by nature man is capable of error, however the sanctity of the Temple prevents it. However this seems to be a violation of Torah not being in Heaven – since even a Bas Kol and even a prophet can not make halachic decisions. Therefore it would seem that the first explanation is better. Thus the Sifri clearly means that even if the Sanhedrin errs, G﷓d will not count it as a sin and thus G﷓d is not allowing the Sanhedrin to cause the people to sin. If you study the comments of the Ramban to Torah you will understand that he is also expressing this view. So while the Sanhedrin is forgiven when it makes an honest mistake, G﷓d forbid to say that they have the power to deliberately alter even the slightest matter. Such a view is that of the Sadducees and early heretics.

Rav Ovadia Yosef: Obeying Rabbinic authority even when they are wrong?d

The Torah tells us that we must obey the Sanhedrin in the well known verse in Devarim (17:11) According to the Torah which I will teach you and the laws which they will tell you, don't turn from that which they say right or left. Rashi(Devarim 17:11) comments that this requirement to obey them is, Even if they tell you that "right" is "left" and "left" is "right" and surely if they tell you that "right" is "right" and "left" is "left". The Sifre (Devarim 154:11) modifies this a bit, Right and left - Even if it appears in your eyes that "right" is "left" and that "left" is "right" – you should obey them. Thus there is a clear requirement to obey the Sanhedrin or Rabbinic authorities even if they tell you the opposite of what is or seems to be correct.

On the other hand the Yerushalmi(Horius 1:1) states, You might think that you must obey the [Sanhedrin or Rabbinic authorities] even when they tell you that "right" is "left" and that "left" is "right" –therefore the Torah says that you are to follow after them "right and

left". Thus it is only when they tell you that "right" is "right" and "left" is "left" that you should obey them. On the surface then it seems to be simply a dispute between the Babylonian and the Yerushalmi.

However Horious (2b) states that if a person knows the truth and yet follows the mistaken ruling of the Sanhedrin he must be a korbon as an act of repentance. Thus clearly the Bavli also requires that you do what

you think is right - even against the Sanhedrin.

An interesting and persuasive explanation is given by Rav Ovadia Yosef.

Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabiah Omer Y.D. 6:7.2): … The Yerushalmi (Horious 1:1) states, that you might think even if they tell you that "right" is "left" and that "left" is "right" that they must be obeyed. Therefore the Torah says that you should only obey them if they say that "right" is "right" and "left" is "left". But this is the opposite of the Sifre [that you must obey them even if they tell you that "right" is "left" and "left" is "right"…. However according to the explanation of the Ramban (Sefer HaMitzvos Shoresh I) and those who support him [Ran Sanhedrin 87a] there is a reconciliation. According to the Ramban as long as the dissenting view has not been directly presented to the Sanhedrin [or Rabbinic authority] then he must refuse to eat that which the Sanhedrin insists is kosher. [If he eats food that he regards as unkosher because he is relying on the Sanhedrin he must bring a korbon] However once he has directly discussed the issue with the Sanhedrin and they have rejected his view [despite his best efforts] then the halacha becomes that he must obey them [even if he is still convinced he is right.] 

Chofetz Chaim: Telescope invented in his time to validate G-d's supervision

Chofetz Chaim (Shem Olam 1:24): To understand properly the significance of the telescope, it is important to know that in the previous generation faith in providence was very strong. Everybody had perfect faith that even though G﷓d dwells above, nevertheless He supervises from His lofty abode all the inhabitants of the Earth… In that generation it was not necessary to have such things as telescopes. However now, because of our many sins, we find many people who deny Providence and claim that G﷓d does not see or pay attention to what occurs in the world since He is so far away in Heaven. To counteract this false claim, G﷓d shows us clearly - by giving the inspiration to build the telescope - that even lowly man has the ability to see at the great distances from the Earth to the Heaven. So we realize that surely G﷓d has the ability to see from above to below concerning all matters… It follows from our discussion that all the scientific knowledge and technological advances that have occurred in our time - is not an indication that we are greater and more knowledgeable than previous generations. In fact it is only to validate for us the idea of Providence.