The laws of bittul kidushin are halachakly acceptable. Those who challenge them via arguments of fallacy by trashing the esteemed rabbis of the IBD, are themselves kofrim and apikorsim. The hypocrisy of all the rabbis who stand by idly while the agunos suffer, but when they are finally freed through the only means available to counter get refusal in today's age, where kofin oso is not legal, and suddenly find their voices in protest, is ironic indeed.
Sunday, April 11, 2021
Saturday, April 10, 2021
ADL chief demands: Fox News host Tucker Carlson must resign or be fired
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/299975
Tucker Carlson, a popular Fox News host, defended a conspiracy theory on the cable network, spurring the head of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to tweet “Tucker Must Go” and send a letter to Fox News saying he should be fired.
Appearing Thursday on “Fox News Primetime,” Carlson said Democrats are coordinating a “replacement” of current US voters with immigrants from the “Third World.”
“I know that the left and all the little gatekeepers on Twitter become literally hysterical if you use the term ‘replacement,’ if you suggest that the Democratic Party is trying to replace the current electorate, the voters now casting ballots, with new people, more obedient voters from the Third World,” Carlson said.
Need for sex education
When I mentioned this recently to a chasid, he told me the following:
His teenage daughter came home late one day from school and she said that her whole class had gotten into a heated discussion. The father asked well what was so interesting that you were discussing? She replied, "One of the girls claimed that when a man and woman get married they are allowed to touch each other. Most of the class thought that was ridiculous since it violates the rule that men can't touch women."
A teenage boy found out that not only was there a mikveh for men but that there existed a mikveh for women. He asked his parents why would women need to have a mikveh. His father explained to him with a straight face - "It is a Sefardi chumra."
Many years ago, Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky mentioned this problem to my brother and said that boys should start getting some form of education by the time they are 16. I mentioned this to the Novominsker Rebbe 20 years ago. He replied that 16 is too late, "there are boys of 8 that know more than me." This is also the subject of a pamphet written about 25 years ago by the Skulener Rebbe.
Abortion in Jewish Law
https://www.aish.com/ci/sam/48954946.html
As abortion resurfaces as a political issue in the upcoming U.S. presidential election, it is worthwhile to investigate the Jewish approach to the issue. The traditional Jewish view of abortion does not fit conveniently into any of the major "camps" in the current American abortion debate. We neither ban abortion completely, nor do we allow indiscriminate abortion "on demand."
Abortion and the Igros Moshe
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/abortion-and-the-igros-moshe/
In conclusion: Given the gravity of abortion, and the immense sanctity of life, it is incumbent upon us to consider Reb Moshe’s shita and its implications fully. We learn that abortion is generally considered murder (although a Jew is not chayav misah, unlike a goy), and is only permissible due to Rambam’s invocation of din rodef. Cases of safek rodef are not pursued, in line with the Koach Shor and the understanding that we don’t apply the din of bo b’machteres in all cases to a rodef. Cases of fetal anomaly are inapplicable, as in such cases the fetus is not a rodef. Reb Moshe rejects proofs from the Maharit and Tosafos (Niddah 44b) cited by the Tzitz Eliezer to allow abortion of a Tay Sachs fetus or in cases where the mother’s health is involved, and instead argues that abortion is only moral where the life of the mother is directly at stake, beyond any doubt.
Friday, April 9, 2021
”Victory Entebbe Was G-d’s Answer
https://mishpacha.com/inside-with-rav-shach/
During the amazing week of the Entebbe rescue all of Israel and in fact all the world was dizzy with the excitement of that incredible rescue mission. And I too was caught up in the general mood as I prepared to write my column for Maariv. But then we were told that Rav Shach wanted to speak with us. We went to him and he asked us not to write about the rescue mission. He explained to us in that conversation that the army had acted contrary to halachah because objectively they were endangering their own lives and the lives of the hostages in a seemingly impossible mission and therefore we were not permitted to praise it.
Thursday, April 8, 2021
Long-Awaited Muon Measurement Boosts Evidence for New Physics
Even if all of these efforts confirm there is new physics at work in muons, however, they will not be able to reveal what, exactly, that new physics is. The needed tool to reveal its nature may be a new collider—something many physicists are clamoring for via proposals such as the International Linear Collider and the High-Luminosity LHC. In the past few months, interest has surged around a muon collider, which multiple papers predict would guarantee physicists the ability to determine the properties of the unknown particle or force affecting the muon.
Even those who are skeptical about the significance of the new result cannot help but find a silver lining. “It is good for particle physics,” Dorigo says, “because particle physics has been dead for a little while.”
Halacha and Truth
Rav Moshe Feinstein(Igros Moshe O.H. 1 Introduction): It is correct and obligatory for the sages of the latter generations to decide halacha - even if they are not qualified according to the standards of the sages of the gemora. Therefore there is definitely a concern that their halachic determinations are not in accord with the view of Heaven. However in truth we are guided by the principle that Torah is not in Heaven. Rather it is determined according to what appears correct to the rabbi after proper study of the issue to clarify the halacha according to the Talmud, and the writings of poskim. He is to use his full abilities to seriously deliberate with fear of Heaven - in order to determine what appears to be the correct halacha. Such a psak is viewed as true and he is obligated to issue his conclusion. This obligation exists even if in fact his ruling is contrary to the halacha in Heaven. His ruling is also considered the “word of the living G‑d as long as he is convinced he is correct and it is internally consistent. He will receive reward for his rulings even if the truth is not in accord with his position. Proof for this is found in Shabbos (130a): A certain city in Israel that followed the halacha according to R’ Eliezer - even though this was not the accepted halacha - got great reward in terms of long life… Thus ruling which a rabbi is obligated to teach and receive reward for is that which he decides after studying the issue with his full ability. This obligation and receiving of reward exists even if the ruling is not in accord with the truth. This is the nature of all disputes of the rishonim and achronim concerning what is permitted and what if prohibited. As long as a universal ruling has not been determined - each rabbi can make decisions for his followers according to that which he thinks is correct - even though the objective halacha is only in accord with one of them. Both will also receive reward for their rulings. Because of this we find much dispute also in the most severe prohibitions - with variations between places that rule like the Rambam and Beis Yosef and those that rule like Tosfos and the Rema. Both of the opposing views are “the words of the living G‑d even though the actual truth as understood by Heaven is only like one of them.
Rav Moshe Feinstein(Igros Moshe Y.D. 3:92): Our Sages describe the opposing views of halachic debate as both being “the words of the living G‑d.” This means that Torah study of the diverse views of Sages inherently does not contain something which is not true. Thus the opposing views of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel are both true. This rule applies also to the disputes of R’ Eliezer and all the Tannaim and Amoraim. All of them were given from One Shepherd. Thus it was not untrue when the Heavenly Bas Kol announced that the Halacha was in accord with R’ Eliezer. His words were inherently true - even though in this world we decide practical Halacha on the basis of majority decision. Because of the inherent truth of all views of our sages, we say the blessing “Who gave to us the Torah of truth” even if we are only learning the views that have been rejected from practical Halacha such as Beis Shammai or minority opinions.
Rav Tzadok(Dover
Tzedek 4): The expression eilu v’eilu refers to the fact that …
all the aspects and parts are in fact a unity and they all are the words of the
living G‑d. However, this concept is truly beyond rational comprehension. How
is it possible that complete opposites are both true. We know that it is impossible
that truth is anything other than one. How can diverse and conflicting things
all be a unity? … Therefore, this concept of eilu v’eilu is beyond the
material intellect of man. That is also, why there is no absolutely clear
Halacha in the Oral Law that is beyond dispute - except for Halacha L’Moshe
which is not disputed as the Rambam states…
R’ Yisroel Salanter(Ohr Yisroel #30): Perhaps the reason that the Bas Kol announced that both Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel were the “words of the living G‑d” was not that a rejected opinion is not Torah (because Torah is not in Heaven and they both obviously had a tradition from Moshe at Sinai and hadn’t forgotten it). But rather so the people should not despair after seeing them dispute for three years. They might have thought that perhaps the disputing sides had slipped slightly from total objectivity and that this slight bias removed the rejected view of Beis Shammai from being considered G‑d’s Torah. Therefore, the Bas Kol informed them that the view of Beis Shammai were totally acceptable to G‑d. The debate was prolonged because each side felt strongly that their view was superior to the other. Nevertheless, even the rejected views of Beis Shammai are the “words of the living G‑d” and one who studies them is studying G‑d’s Torah.
Judaism is pro-life and all Jews should be pro-life
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/judaism-is-pro-life-and-all-jews-should-be-pro-life/
Rabbi Ruttenberg said that “Jews do not believe that fetuses have souls and, therefore, terminating a pregnancy is no crime.”
That is not true. Rabbi J. David Bleich is a foremost authority in the field of bio-ethics, professor of Talmud at the Eichanan Theological Seminary and author of Contemporary Halakhic Problems in six volumes. Rabbi Bleich writes in Vol. 1 on page 326:
“Judaism regards all forms of human life as sacred, from the formation of germ plasm in the cell of the sperm until the decomposition of the body after death. While applicable halakhot vary in an appropriate manner from stage to stage along this continuum,The article also left out the comments of the preeminent Rav Moshe Feinstein, a Haredi Orthodox rabbi and scholar considered to have been an authority on abortion in Jewish law. His remarks in the following excerpt are from “Abortion in Israel,”commentaries published in the May 1976 issue of The Jewish Observer. Rabbi Feinstein states:
“We must reinforce our sensitivity to the Divine definition of life by reviewing the halachos [Torah laws) that govern preservation of life and prohibit taking of lives. Specifically, as the Rambam declares; abortion is a type of murder and can never be permitted except when the fetus presents a danger to the mother’s life. The proposed law in Israel is not only legalized bloodshed. More than that, it is also a terrible desecration of G-d’s name.”
Is what I read about abortion and Judaism correct?
https://rabbidaniellapin.com/abortion-and-judaism/
The dreadful article you cite quotes one view by an authoritative Orthodox rabbi of the past few decades trying to “prove” the acceptability of abortion in Jewish law. This is misleading for a few reasons. Firstly, because there is no Pope in Judaism, which is to say that we have no hierarchy of ecclesiastical authority. Within the ranks of those trying to be true to God’s Torah, there will be different opinions and discussions in trying to reach the truth. Each Jew is meant to choose which Rabbinical authority he follows. You can’t go “shopping” for someone whose views you like on a specific issue. We can guarantee you that the people in the article who approve the views of this rabbi do not follow his ritual rulings in other areas.
Wednesday, April 7, 2021
GOP's Trump obsession is giving Biden an opening
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/07/politics/donald-trump-republican-politics-joe-biden/index.html
Attempting
to deflect criticism for their role in legislation that will
disproportionately make it harder for Black Americans to vote, Kemp and
other Republicans have suggested that the community is now paying an
economic price as a result of corporate activism on voting rights. The
Georgia governor said the nation should interpret MLB's move to mean
that "cancel culture and partisan activists are coming for your
business. They're coming for your game or event in your hometown, and
they're coming to cancel everything from sports to how you make a
living, and they will stop at nothing to silence all of us."
Why Gender Dysphoria Must Remain a Bar to Military Service
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/why-gender-dysphoria-must-remain-bar-military-service
What is often described as “Trump’s transgender ban” is anything but. Underreported is the fact that the policy that the Pentagon wishes to put in place—but that has been thus far been stayed by the court system—is far more permissive and evidence-based than the policy that existed for decades prior to June 2016, when President Barack Obama’s defense secretary, Ashton Carter, abruptly unveiled a new policy.
Rav Moshe Feinstein: Does lack of full observance of mitzvos invalidate conversion?
It seems that there are three views in the literature. 1) Poskim who say that anyone who goes through the ceremony and declares before beis din that he will do the mitzvos, and has mila and tevila – even if subsequently he doesn’t keep anything is still a Jew. 2) There are others who say if it is obvious from the actions and statements that he never intended to be a religious Jew and was clearly insincere the conversion was never valid. 3) Finally there is a view that conversion is conditional on subsequently observing the mitzvos. If this condition is not met then the conversion is invalid.
Igros Moshe (Y.D. 1:159): However in general the idea of conversion does not please me and I refrain from being involved in the conversion process. Not only because the halacha is not to accept them initially when they convert for the sake of marriage. But also for the reason that it is almost certain as an anon sahadi (we witness ) that she will not be accepting the obligation to do mitzvos and she is only saying the words with her mouth that she is accepting them. And without actually accepting the obligation of mitzvos - even it is only one detail, it is stately explicitly in Berchoros (30) that we are not to accept them.
This is not equivalent to the case in Shabbos (68) of someone converting while they are living entirely with non-Jews and therefore don't know about Shabbos or even the prohibition of idolatry. Nevertheless he is considered a valid convert because in that case he sincerely accepts to do all that which a Jew is obligated. That is a valid acceptance of all the mitzvos of the Torah - even though he is absolutely ignorant of the actual laws involved. This in fact is true of all converts. It is not necessary to first teach them all the mitzvos before they are accepted for conversion. Bedieved the conversion is valid without informing them of anything. This is stated clearly in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch (12). However if they don't actually accept anything they are not to be accepted since this is the essence of conversion.
In fact in the majority of cases of conversion in this country which are done for the sake of marriage, they do not accept the obligation of doing mitzvos. Even when they declar that they will keep them. It is known that they are lying because they feel that they have no obligation to be more religious then their Jewish husband who is not observant and transgresses all the laws of the Torah. However perhaps this one will be of the minority and actually accept doing the mitzvos.
Therefore I will not say anything in this particular case to you. Because there are in fact many rabbis in New York who accepte converts like these and consequently it is not for me to say that there is any prohibition in accepting these converts.
However I don't like the whole enterprise and neither did my father. But I am not saying it is prohibited. Therefore you should do what you think is best depending on how urgent you think it is.
Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah 1:160): Concerning a conversion which was done by a Conservative rabbi which did not have the proper acceptance of mitzva and the immersion in the mikve was not in the presence of a beis din but rather was observed by two women. It is obvious that this conversion has no halachic significance because the acceptance of mitzvos is a necessary condition for conversion. Even if she accepted all the mitzvos of the Torah except for one it is invalid as is stated in Bechoros (30b). Furthermore the acceptance of the obligation to keep mitzvos has to be done before three judges and failure to do so invalidates the conversion even bedieved as is stated in Shach (Y.D. 268:9). Therefore there is a basis to question the validity of the conversion – even though there are Orthodox rabbis who also accept converts [who end up not observing mitzvos]. Despite the fact that “we are witnesses” (anan sahadi) that the majority of converts do not genuinely accept the mitzvos as is proved by the way they conduct themselves after conversion. In addition she is not going to be more observant then her Jewish husband for whom she converted. She sees that he violates Shabbos as well as many other Torah prohibitions. However there is a basis for saying that a convert who doesn't observe mitzvos is nonetheless a valid convert bedieved since she said before the beis din that she accepted the obligation to observe the Torah mitzvos and it happens that sometimes such a convert truly accepts the mitzvos even though they don’t keep them afterwards. Therefore perhaps she should be considered as such a ger who does not observe the laws of the Torah after conversion. This despite the fact that it is clear to us because of her subsequent non‑observance that at the moment of conversion she did not accept the mitzvos in her heart but only said that she was accepting them. Even though I personally don’t find it reasonable for the sake of the rare individual to remove the “we are witnesses” (anan sahadi) of her subsequent behavior and to pay attention to the possibility that she was sincere in her thoughts at the time of conversion. However perhaps this is the reasoning of these Orthodox rabbis and there is some basis for their view. There is also a strong justification to assert that she is a valid ger from the fact that her husband – for whose sake she converted – does not observe Shabbos as well as many other prohibitions so that she assumed that there is not really such an obligation to observe mitzvos to be a Jew. Therefore she is like a non‑Jew who converted amongst non‑Jews which Shabbos (68a) states is a valid ger even though he still worships idols. The reason that he is a valid ger is because he has accepted upon himself to be like all the other Jews and this is considered a valid acceptance of mitzvos even though he knows nothing about the mitzvos. That is because knowledge of mitzvos is not critical to become a ger. It is only when he knows about the mitzvos and refuses to keep them that the conversion is not valid. We know this from the fact that he has no obligation to learn the entire Torah before he converts – he is only instructed in some of the mitzvos. Therefore even though the beis din told her that she must keep Shabbos, she thought that this was just merely desirable and that even if she didn’t keep Shabbos and other mitzvos she mistakenly thought that she was a good Jew. Therefore she mistakenly thought she had accepted all the mitzvos that a Jew is required in order to convert – even though this caused her not to fulfill the mitzvos. This is a possible justification to consider her to be a valid giryorus – even though she doesn’t keep all the mitzvos. It is a weak justification for those Orthodox rabbis who accept such converts so as not to view them inferior to laymen. [Despite this possible justification for a non‑observant ger to be a valid ger] nevertheless the mitzvos have to be accepted before a beis din. It is likely that the Conservative rabbis don’t do this because they don’t know the laws of conversion. In addition they are not careful to follow the law even when they know it. Consequently their conversions lack the proper acceptance of mitzvos – even of the most minimal type – which is critical for a valid conversion. In addition the Conservative beis din is invalid because they reject many fundamental principles of Judaism and transgress a number of prohibitions. Look at Choshen Mishpat (7:9) and Piskei Teshuva there in the name of R’ Akiva Eiger – that even transgressing a rabbinic law disqualifies a person from being a judge and this doesn't require an announcement. In addition it is almost a certainty that they transgress many Torah prohibitions even though witnesses have not been accepted to testify to this but it is “like we are witnesses” (anan sahadi) that anyone who is called with the debased description of Conservative is presumed to violate many prohibitions and to deny many of the fundamentals of religion. I have already explained in one teshuva that someone who is presumed to be a heretic is invalid – even without formal testimony from witnesses. This is true even for leniences. I don’t have the time to go into greater detail concerning this matter. Therefore it is quite obvious that a conversion done by a Conservative rabbi has no significance.
Igros Moshe(Y.D. 3:106): A candidate for conversion who does not want to accept a certain mitzva is he a ger bedieved?… Concerning the subject of conversion, the vast majority of them want to convert because of marriage and therefore should inherently not be accepted. However if they were accepted anyway - they are in fact valid gerim. This reservation about accepting converts for the sake of marriage is true even if they accept all the mitzvos since they did not decide to convert for the sake of Heaven. Therefore it is obvious that there is suspicion that despite the fact they stated before the beis din that they are accepting to do the mitzvos – that they are not telling the truth and they need to be examined further. This in fact is the intent of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12): When it is known that they converted for ulterior motivation, they should be treated with suspicion until that their righteous is established. That is because since they converted for ulterior motivation, they should be suspected that even though they have verbally accepted the mitzvos but not in their heart. Since there is clear reason to suspect their lack of sincerity, it is not considered a merely a possible mental reservation which has no halachic significance (devarim sheb’lev). See Tosfos (Gittin 32a) and Tosfos (Kiddushin 49b)…Therefore they are to be viewed as doubtful gerim until their righteousness is establish and then they are viewed as definite gerim. Most of the time and perhaps all of the time when a Jew wants a non‑Jew, that the Jew himself is not observant. Therefore it is not logical that the non‑Jew who is converting for the sake of a Jew will be more observant. It is as if we are witnesses that the non‑Jew is not definitely accepting the mitzvos. Therefore it requires a great deal of deliberation in the acceptance of gerim. Unfortunately due to our many sins the situation has degenerated in many places that they accept these type of gerim – even G‑d fearing rabbis – because of the pressure of congregants on them. Therefore it is very critical to fix and create protective measures to stop this great breakdown of the system. It is certain because of these problems that the rabbis of Holland made a decree that gerim would not be accepted unless all of the rabbis agreed. This type of decree is a legitimate approach to protect the Torah and mitzvos against that which can not be permitted as is stated in Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 228:28). Concerning the present case where the candidate for conversion wants to accept all the laws of the Torah but does not want to accept wearing modest clothing. She wants to wear the clothing that are worn – due to our many sins – by the average woman of this degenerate generation. The question is whether to accept her as a valid ger and if the answer is negative - what is her status if she is accepted anyway? This requires careful thought. Bechoros (30b) states that a non‑Jew who comes to accept the entire Torah except for one thing is not to be accepted. R’ Yose says that he isn’t accepted even if rejects one detail of a rabbinic halacha. The question is whether this gemora is only concerning initially whether to accept the candidate as seems from the language of the gemora or that even if he accepted – he is not a valid ger? It is certain that gerim are accepted even though they don’t know most of the laws of the Torah - because we instruct them only in some of the mitzvos. It is certain that we don’t even teach them most of the laws of Shabbos. Furthermore we find an even more extreme situation in that even if the ger doesn’t know any mitzvos he is still a valid ger. This is stated in Shabbos (68b) that a ger who converts amongst non‑Jews is liable for one chatas for all the violations on every Shabbos and prohibited blood and fat and idolatry. Thus we see that even if he isn’t instructed in a single mitzva or even the foundations of religious belief he is still a valid ger. That is because the case in the gemora concerns a person who has accepted upon himself to do all that a Jew is required to do – and that is sufficient for valid conversion. We are not concerned with the possibility that if he knew this particular mitzva he would not accept it. That is because even if it were so it is only a mental reservation which has no halachic significance. Thus informing a candidate for conversion of the nature of mitzvos is only something that is desirable, but has no halachic consequence if not done. Therefore we must say that the language of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:3) “all matters of conversion have to be in the presence of 3 fit to judge whether it is to instruct him about mitzvos or for his acceptance of mitzvos” – is not to be understood literally. That is because the point of the Shulchan Aruch is that the acceptance of mitzvos has to be in the presence of 3 but instructing him about mitzvos is not required for the validity of the conversion. The reason the Shulchan Aruch mentions instructing him in mitzvos is because that is what the beis din does concerning some of the mitzvos when he accepts the obligation to do mitzvos. That is in fact the language of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12) “and even if he is not informed of the reward and punishment of mitzvos he is still a valid ger.” This wording of the Shulchan Aruch here is also not precise because even if the candidate is not instructed at all concerning any mitzvos – as long as he accepts the obligation to do all the mitzvos that Jews are required to do – he is still a valid ger. It is only because it is typically not forgotten to instruct him in some mitzvos that the Shulchan Aruch mentions that they forgot to instruct him regarding the reward and punishment of mitzvos – because it is possible to forget this occasionally. However if they do tell him a particular mitzva or he knows about it himself since he sees Jews observing it and he says that he doesn’t accept it – that is the case that Bechoros (30b) says that he is not accepted as a ger. Therefore it is possible that in this case even if he was accepted as a ger – despite his rejection of a particular mitzva – bedieved he would still not be a valid ger. However Bechoros (30b) says that he is not to be accepted - which seems to be that he is only not accepted initially if he rejects any mitzva.Furthermore it would seem from the statement of R’ Yose in Bechoros (30b) that even if rejects a single detail of a rabbinic law he is not accepted – it would seem that since he has accepted every Torah mitzva including not to deviate from the rabbinic teachings – but at least he would be a ger according to the Torah. That is because it doesn’t make sense that the Sages would uproot the Torah level conversion - which is relevant to the validity of marriage and other matters – and to create a leniency and that this would not be mentioned openly in the gemora. Therefore we can conclude that even according to R’ Yose he is only saying not to accept them initially but if they were accepted – even if they had rejected a rabbinic law – they are still valid gerim. Furthermore they would be obligated to keep even the mitzva that they had rejected. That is because this that they did not accept it has no halachic significance to exempt them because they are make a condition against that which is written in the Torah – and therefore the condition is nullified... Therefore this woman who doesn’t want to accept to wear only modest clothing should definitely not be accepted initially. However whether she should be accepted bedieved depends on this doubt and it would seem more likely that bedieved if she was accepted that she would be a valid convert. Furthermore concerning whether to accept her initially – any conversion which is because of marriage even if she accepted the entire Torah – she should not be accepted. If so it is certainly is a major justification for the requirement that all the rabbis of Holland agree to accept her conversion – even if she accepted all the Torah laws. Nevertheless it is good that all the rabbis did not agree to accept her because of her refusal to wear modest clothing. That is because accepting her with two issues against her is much more serious than if she only had one. However there is another consideration since because of our many sins we find that Jewish women also are not careful about wearing only modest clothing – even those who are Torah observant. Therefore a non‑Jewish woman who comes to convert might think that modest clothing in only an act of piety that the rabbis are trying to impose on her more than is actually required – because she knows women who are observant and yet wear immodest clothing. And even if the rabbis tell her that it is actually prohibited and not just an act of piety – she doesn’t believe them. If so perhaps she should be viewed as converting without knowing the laws of the Torah and would be considered a valid ger according to Shabbos (68b)? This seems logical – even though I don’t have a proof for this presently. Nevertheless with all things considered it is better not to accept her because she should not be accepted anyway since the conversion is for the sake of marriage. Therefore even though people are lenient to accept converts for the sake of marriage it is not correct to be lenient in additional factors. Consequently the decree is correct and she should not be accepted.
Igros Moshe (Even ha-Ezer 4:78): Concerning a woman who was married by a Conservative rabbi - in Houston who is known to openly violate Shabbos - to a man who was born in San Salvador to a non‑Jewish woman. The Conservative rabbi there claimed that he converted her together with two local men who were open Shabbos violators because he said that no one observes Shabbos in El Salvador. It is clear that the conversion is of no significance so that even if this couple were married by an Orthodox rabbi according to the halacha it still would have no significance because he is a full non‑Jew for whom kiddushin has no halachic significance. Furthermore even if he were converted by a Torah observant beis din – since he has not observed Torah mitzvos even for a moment he has not accepted the obligation of mitzvos - this is not considered conversion. However if he was a valid ger or was a Jew from birth, the marriage by a Conservative rabbi – who is presumed to deny the foundation principles of Judaism even though we don’t actually know the person and surely here where it is known for certain that he openly violates Shabbos –has no halachic significance. Consequently we have two clear factors why the marriage has no significance and therefore she is permitted to marry another man – but not a cohen since she has had sexual relations with a non‑Jew which disqualifiers her from marrying a cohen.
Acceptance of the Mitzvot as a Requirement for Conversion
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/acceptance-mitzvot-requirement-conversion
In any event, other Rishonim have explicitly ruled that acceptance of the mitzvot is indeed an indispensable requirement for conversion. Thus writes the Shulchan Arukh:
All matters pertaining to a proselyte - informing him of the mitzvot that he may accept them, circumcision, as well as immersion – must be [performed] in the presence of three who are fit to judge and during the day. This, however, is only lekhatchila, but bedi'eved, if [the proselyte] underwent circumcision or immersion in the presence of two or at night… he is a [valid] proselyte and may marry a Jewess. This is with the exception of accepting the mitzvot, which invalidates the conversion if not performed during the day and in the presence of three [judges]. (Shulkhan Arukh 268:3)[6]
In actual practice, more recent authorities have been inclined to rule that acceptance of the mitzvot is an indispensable requirement for conversion. Rav Goren relied on this ruling even when it led to a leniency. He ruled that a certain set of siblings were not to be considered mamzerim, because their father, who claimed to be a convert, had never properly accepted the mitzvot, and so he was not a Jew.
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