One of the difficult issues in dealing with abuse is the issue of rodef (pursuer) and the associated issue of self-defense. Rodef has acquired a problematic status because Rabin's assassin used the concept as justification for killing Rabin.
1) Is rodef a commonsense expression of the right to self-defense or is it a special halacha which we would only have because of a Torah verse and Chazal's explanation.
2) Does the status of rodef require a beis din or can anyone make the decision (extra-judiciarly) and consequently kill or maim someone who is a threat?
3) Does rodef require a clear and present danger or is it enough for a reasonable person to suspect that his life is at stake.
4) Can anyone stop a rodef or is it only permitted for the potential victim.
5) A pregnant woman who is having a difficult birth which endangers her life is allowed to kill the baby - but only until it's head comes out. At that point the baby is no longer considered a rodef - but Heaven is. What is the distinction?
6) If abuse doesn't cause the victim to commit suicide or involve a sin punished by kares or death - is the abuser still a rodef and thus can be killed or maimed if that is the only way to stop him?
7) Does it matter which of the sources the law of rodef is derived 1) Rape of a betrothed maiden (Sanhedrin 73a). 2) Burglar breaking into one's home (Sanhedrin 72b). 3) Don't stand idly by the blood of your brother (Vayikra 19:16) 4) Two men who are fighting (Devarim 25:11). 5) Difficult labor (Shulchan Aruch 425:2) 6) Commonsense- self defense.
8) Does the threat have to be direct or can it be indirect?
9) If the rodef model is used - can the abuser only be threatened before committing abuse - or even afterwards.
10) What is the difference between viewing abuse as rodef and viewing it a threat to public welfare?
11) Is the status of rodef severely limited by the laws of modern secular society? For example can anyone maim or kill someone trying to commit rape [of a man woman or child] according to secular law?
Dear Dt, Obviously I don't have an answer for all questions, but ,let's see the discussion about this:
ReplyDelete1) Is a special halacha that we have by TSBP to protect the pursuee for his life of for a erva relationship violation, *even at the expense of the life of the pursuer"!
2) bepashtus it does not require beis din permisssion, but whenever a person is in *immediate* danger one must act to defend himself/friend who is life danger,
3) Have to look at sources for this. But you must defined "clear present" "reasonable person to suspect"' because they are two extremes and there may be a middle case in between "safek hashakul of danger" more than "suspect".
4) anyone can and should stop the nirdaf.
The question may be: is he allowed to kill if he can stop the rodef via another way that does not terminate his life: it appears that for an outsider who protects the nirdaf, he must choose an avenue that does not end the life of the rodef; but the nirdaf himself may kill the rodef but it may depend if he has to take *immediate* action or he can take his time to protect himself.
6) It appears at the surface that he is not a rodef in that sense, but since he attacks a person physically and mentally one protect himself and his friend by informing him to authorities.
7) don't know for sure, but lichora if it is defined as a rodef it should make a diffence.
8) I have to check but i beleive that even if it's indirect (like a massur who is allowed to be killed because he informs to others who will kill an inidivudal ) and also svoro says that here being that the logic is the hatzala of the nirdaf for his life or avera of arayot) it does not matter how it is done.
9) Lichorah only *before*. but in our case (molestation) and many other cases where the person is a recidivist criminal it is always "before".
10) WE had a ruling by Rav Halberstam that it differs whether a child can inform his paretns: if it is a rodef it is a mitzva upon all; if it is only to protect the person of abused it does not to permit a child to inform on his parents,
hatzlacha
ReplyDeletethe previous messages were by roni
ReplyDeleteReb Chaim Brisker (Hilchos Rotzeach 1:9): “It is a negative commandment [Devarim 25:12] not to have mercy on the soul of the rodef.... It would appear that the Rambam’s understanding of this halacha of killing the unborn baby to save the mother is based on the law of killing the rodef in order to save the nirdaf (victim). His fundamental principle is that the life of the rodef is sacrificed because of the pikuach nefesh (life saving) of the victim. This is stated in Sanhedrin (74a): R’ Yonasan ben Shmuel said that a rodef who is trying to kill someone and it is possible to stop him by maiming one of his limbs but he is killed instead – the one who killed the rodef is himself executed for his actions. We see from this the sole justification for killing the rodef is to save the victim. So even though we have a universal rule that “one life is not terminated for the sake of another life” – it is different in the case of rodef because the Torah tells us that the case of rodef is an exception to the rule. The Torah verse that the Rambam refers to that tells us that rodef is an exception is Devarim (22:12): Do not have mercy on the soul of the rodef. In other words the verse tells us that in this case of rodef we don’t apply the rule that ‘one life is not terminated for the sake of another life.” Therefore the life of the rodef is sacrificed [to save the life of the victim]. We have an additional question. Is this Torah directive to make an exception to the rule and to sacrifice the life of the rodef in order to save the life of the victim an expression of the general rule to save life or perhaps is it is unique and limited to the specific Torah directive to sacrifice the life of the rodef. In other words perhaps it has nothing to do with the general principle of pikuach nefesh (life saving)? It would appear that the latter alternative is correct and the sacrificing of the life of the rodef is not related to the general principle of pikuach nefesh. We conclude this because the gemora (Sanhedrin 72b) learns the law of rodef from the Bereishis (9:6): “One who kills a man, he should also be killed.” We see from this that the law of rodef obviously applies also in the case of nonJews since that is what this verse is describing. Similarly we find that the law of rodef applies to nonJew in Sanhedrin (57b) and Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 9)… In contrast we do not find that the law of pikuach nefesh applies to nonJews. So we must conclude that it is solely because of the Torah verse that a pursued person is saved with the life of his pursuer. This is not true in the case of pikuach nefesh and as mentioned it applies to nonJews also and it is included in their laws. Furthermore we learn the din of a pursuer (rodef) after another to kill him from the case of pursuing another for rape (Sanhedrin 73a) where it is learned from the verse “there is no one to save her.” This case is not relevant to the general case of pikuach nefesh. Thus we see that the law of rodef is a totally separate law from life saving – whether it is stopping a murderer or a rapist.
ReplyDeleteFor anybody who is interested, may be Rabbi Fruend will not have to travel so far to bring back lost Jews. Rav Eidensohn, have you seen this?
ReplyDeletehttp://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1249418656478&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Just one question;
ReplyDeleteMay one kill a Jew in order to save the life of a non Jew that he/she is pursuing?
In other words perhaps it has nothing to do with the general principle of pikuach nefesh (life saving)?
ReplyDeleteI think you did not mean to exclude that the purpose of the halacho of rodef to protect the nirdaf's life. Because the main motive of rodef is the protection of the nirdaf's life. The question that he is asking is: is that halacho (to save thenirdaf) connected with the general halocho of saving nefesh or is a very specific halocho to save him from a rodef. He decides for the latter.נה יסוד דין הריגת הרודף הלא הוא מדין הצלת הנרדף, ועיקרו הוא שנפש הרודף נדחה מפני פקוח נפשו של הנרדף, וכדתניא בסנהדרין דף ע"ד [ע"א] ריב"ש אומר רודף שהיה רודף אחר חברו להרגו ויכול להצילו באחד מאבריו ולא הציל נהרג עליו, הרי דכל ההריגה של רודף היא רק להציל את הנרדף, אלא דהלא בכל מקום אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש והכא ברודף הוי גזירת הכתוב דנפשו נדחה, והרי זהו הלאו שכתב הרמב"ם שלא לחוס על נפש הרודף, ר"ל דלא נדון בזה לומר שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, אלא כך הוא הגזירת הכתוב שנפש הרודף נדחה. אלא דאכתי יש להסתפק, אם כל הגזירת הכתוב דרודף הוא רק בעצמו של הרודף שידחה בפני פקוח נפשו של הנרדף, אבל עיקר ההצלה של הנרדף היא משום דין פקוח נפש של כל התורה כולה, או דנימא דגם עיקר ההצלה של הנרדף היא מהך גזירת הכתוב של רודף, והוא דין הצלה בפני עצמו של נרדף, מלבד דין פקוח נפש של כל התורה, וצ"
או דנימא דגם עיקר ההצלה של הנרדף היא מהך גזירת הכתוב של רודף, והוא דין הצלה בפני עצמו של נרדף, מלבד דין פקוח נפש של כל התורה, וצ"ע.
Roni wrote:
ReplyDeleteI think you did not mean to exclude that the purpose of the halacho of rodef to protect the nirdaf's life. Because the main motive of rodef is the protection of the nirdaf's life.
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Actually according to Rashi and others it is save the rodef from sinning.
Rashi(Sanhedrin 73a): A rodef can be stopped by killing him – Any person can be killed in order to save him from sinning. This is learned from verses. However if he is running after an animal – for bestiality or he wants to serve idols or transgress Shabbos and surely all crimes punishable by kerisus or capitable punishment – which don’t involve prohibited sex – he can not be stopped by killing him. He can only be killed to stop him from crimes involving prohibited sex and which cause degradation and debasement to the victim such as if he pursues a male for homoxexual relations or he pursues a betrothed maiden. Nevetheless the case of a person who want to kill another is stated openly in the Torah. So why does the mishna use an example of bestiality as not being a case of rodef? It is because it is similar to the prohibited sexual relations with people. The mishna also mentions idolatry as not being a case of rodef is because you might that it can be learned from a kal v’chomer and you might think that Shabbos violators can be learned from a gezera shava.
Rashi(Sanhedrin 73a): If he has already begun the rape she is not saved by killing him – because the justification for killing him according to the verse is the fact that he will degrade her by rape. Thus in those cases where it is not considered a degradation [no punishment of death or kerisus or if he is already liable to the punishments by starting the rape] she is not rescued by killing him.
Blogger Daas Torah said...
ReplyDeleteRoni wrote:
I think you did not mean to exclude that the purpose of the halacho of rodef to protect the nirdaf's life. Because the main motive of rodef is the protection of the nirdaf's life.
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DT: " Actually according to Rashi and others it is save the rodef from sinning.
1) WE were talking about the rambam,
2) It's not pashut that Rashi means that the *only* reason for law of rodef is save from sinning, as the two rashi's one after another seem to imply that there are two motifs!
רש"י מסכת סנהדרין דף עג עמוד א
בנפשן - ניתנו ליהרג לכל אדם כדי להצילן מן העבירה, ומקראי נפקי.
This is the first Rashi that implies what you say,
But next RAshi seems to implty that it has also to do with saving the person from an injustice done to him:
אבל הרודף אחר בהמה - לרבעה, והרוצה לעבוד עבודה זרה, ולחלל שבת, וכל שכן שאר כריתות ומיתות בית דין שאינן עריות, דלא ניתן להצילו בנפשו אלא מדבר שהוא ערוה ויש בה קלון ופגם לנרדף, כגון זכר ונערה המארוסה, ... ונקט נמי עבודה זרה משום דסלקא דעתך אמינא תיתי בקל וחומר כדלקמן, ושבת נמי תיתי
That the issue of lehatziloh benafsho is to save from something that is kalon and pgam to the nirdaf!
In addition the hecherch of Rav Chayim "screams" out lekuleh almah: You have the halaocho like the opiinion that you could only kill the rodef if you cannot save the nirdaf through another means; were you to save him through another means you are not allowed to the rodef. this is Rav chayim proof in the beggining of the discussion that the "ikkar" of law of rodef is "hatzalat haniraf"
to be contniued
(ב) והנה ברש"י סנהדרין שם פירש משעת העראה קרי לה נבעלה ואיפגמה במקצת ושוב אין מצילין אותה בגמ"ב בנפשו וקנסא לא מיחייבי אלא בגמ"ב כו' עכ"ל ומבואר מפרש"י דבשעת העראה מצילין אותה בנפשו של רודף ולמש"כ צ"ע דהא בשעת העראה שכבר א"א להצילה מפגם א"כ אין עליה עוד דין רודף ונראה מפרש"י דבעת גמר הרדיפה הרציחה או הפגם יש לו דין רודף אע"פ שאי אפשר עוד להצילה ורק לאחר שכבר הרג או פגם אין לו דין רודף....נראה בשי' רש"י דלהכי גם בעת הפגם והרציחה הוי רודף דהותר דמו מצד העונש של רדיפתו שנתחייב מיתה בלי ב"ד של כ"ג ומיתתו ביד כל אדם רק אחרי שהרג ואחרי שפגם פסק מאתו דין מיתה ביד כל אדם אבל בעת הפגם והרציחה יש עליו עונש מיתה אע"פ שאי אפשר להציל את הנרדף, ולפי"ז יש ברודף שני דינים להציל את הנרדף בדמו של רודף גם בקטן ובעובר דלאו מטעם עונש וגם בבר עונש מחויב מיתה גם מצד הדין כ"ז שלא כלה רדיפתו לגמרי, אע"פ שאי אפשר להציל את הנרדף.
continued
ReplyDeleteand "Vehadvarim atikim and discussed by many Roshey Yeshviot.
Let me quote Rav Chayim Oizer GRodzenski what he writes about Rashi trhat he holds that there are two motifs for this halacho (he cites a different rashi to prove that there is an issue of punishment for the sin):
שו"ת אחיעזר חלק א - אבן העזר סימן יח
(ב) והנה ברש"י סנהדרין שם פירש משעת העראה קרי לה נבעלה ואיפגמה במקצת ושוב אין מצילין אותה בגמ"ב בנפשו וקנסא לא מיחייבי אלא בגמ"ב כו' עכ"ל ומבואר מפרש"י דבשעת העראה מצילין אותה בנפשו של רודף ולמש"כ צ"ע דהא בשעת העראה שכבר א"א להצילה מפגם א"כ אין עליה עוד דין רודף ונראה מפרש"י דבעת גמר הרדיפה הרציחה או הפגם יש לו דין רודף אע"פ שאי אפשר עוד להצילה ורק לאחר שכבר הרג או פגם אין לו דין רודף ולכאורה יש להוכיח כן מסנהדרין ע"ד ואם אסון יהי' ונתת נפש תחת נפש ואפ"ה אמר רחמנא ואם לא יהי' אסון ענוש יענש דאי אמרת יכול להצילו באחד מאבריו נמי ניתן להצילו בנפשו היכי משכח"ל דיענש כו' והא חיוב דמי ולדות הוא על גמר הכאה והרציחה ואז אזיל לי' דין רודף, אלא דבאמת אין ראי' מזה דהא דמשני דהוי מיתה לזה ותשלומין לזה ע"כ דאין זה רודף מצד האשה דהא כ' התוס' בב"ק דאע"ג דדמי ולדות לבעל מ"מ כיון דהוי גוף אחד חשוב מיתה ותשלומין לאחד, ועכצ"ל דאין זה רודף מצד האשה שלא נתכוין לה אלא דהוי רודף משום שנתכוין לאחר מצד האחר וא"כ בשעה שמכה את האשה לא הוי רודף למי שנתכוין אע"כ צ"ל דמיירי דבשעה שזרק הברזל או החץ נתכוין לאחר ונפל על האשה דבכה"ג על מעשה זריקתו הוי רודף ובמעשה זו נפטר מקלבד"מ =מקים ליה בדרבה מיניה= כדין רודף וכמש"כ התוס' בב"ק כ"ב דעל מעשה אחת בא ונפטר או דצ"ל דכל שלא הפיק זממו הוי רודף גם עכשיו לגבי האחר למי שנתכוין ומוכיח ר"י בן שאול מזה דביכול להצילו באחד מאבריו לא הוי רודף, ונראה בשי' רש"י דלהכי גם בעת הפגם והרציחה הוי רודף דהותר דמו מצד העונש של רדיפתו שנתחייב מיתה בלי ב"ד של כ"ג ומיתתו ביד כל אדם רק אחרי שהרג ואחרי שפגם פסק מאתו דין מיתה ביד כל אדם אבל בעת הפגם והרציחה יש עליו עונש מיתה אע"פ שאי אפשר להציל את הנרדף, ולפי"ז יש ברודף שני דינים להציל את הנרדף בדמו של רודף גם בקטן ובעובר דלאו מטעם עונש וגם בבר עונש מחויב מיתה גם מצד הדין כ"ז שלא כלה רדיפתו לגמרי, אע"פ שאי אפשר להציל את הנרדף.
RCOG says in Rashi that there are two dinim: 1) to save the blood of nirdaf, therefore one kills the rodef even when he is minor or a fetus (Even though one may argue that there is no room for punishing (or maybe not the severity of an act of "sin" especially by the case of fetus), 2) and then a second reason to give a punisment as long as the action of redifa did not complete entirely.
ReplyDeleteBut it needs clarification: why punisihing only before he (finishes the act) if reason is "punishment", 2) why if he able to save him through another of limbs he is prohibited from killing?
it would seem that the issue is saving from "pgam" affected during the actual murder or degradation. Iow: it is not so much the idea of saving him from a "sin" per se; but saving from a terrible degradation that is an inherent part of this sin.
Roni wrote:
ReplyDeleteDT: " Actually according to Rashi and others it is save the rodef from sinning.
1) WE were talking about the rambam,
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DT wrote:
Rambam (Commentary to Sanhedrin 8:7): Concerning someone who is trying to commit any sexual sins punishable by kares or death – he can be saved from sinning by killing him.
Tosfos (Sanhedrin 73a): He is saved with his life – the apparent meaning of this is that the victim is saved by killing the rodef (pursuer). But it is not possible to explain it in that way in the case of one who pursues an animal for bestiality and similar cases. Therefore it seems that the explanation is that the pursuer is killed to save him from sinning. However this does not fit with the case of the rape of a betrothed maiden where is says that she is saved by killing the pursuer
Tosefta (Sanhedrin 11:5): 9) A robber who breaks into a house – if he broke in so that he could kill then can be saved from sin with his life. However if the robber only came to steal money – he is not saved from sin with his life. If there is a doubt whether he came to kill or to steal – he is not saved from sin with his life…11) One who peruses after a male [for homosexual relations] whether it is in the house or field – he is saved from sin by killing him. If he is running after a betrothed maiden whether in the house or field – he is to be saved from sin by killing him. If he is running after a betrothed maiden or after any of the prohibited sexual relations mentioned in the Torah – he is to be saved from sin by killing him. However if he pursues a widow and he is the cohen gadol or he pursues a divorce or chalutza and he is an ordinary cohen – he is not to be saved from sin by killing him. If she has already been raped, he is not saved from sin by killing him.
Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 73a): Mishna: These are those that are saved – from sinning by killing them. This can also be explained, as these are those who are saved from their pursuer by killing their attacker…
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This is the fundamental question of how to read the mishna (Sanhedrin 73a)- who is saved. The mishna can be and is understood that the victim is saved with the life of the rodef or the rodef is saved from sin with his own life.
Roni your comments are serving to illustrate the apparent condradictions in the din of rodef.
ReplyDelete1) Is it a limited din to save the rodef from sin - but only if it is a sin involving kares or death and one that involves a pagam in the victim? Or as some tannaic sources there is no need for a victim to be classified at a rodef.
2) Is it the principle of self-defense?
3) Is it a punishment that is administered by the public instead of beis din?
4) Is it a metzius that the person who commmits these types of crimes is not considered alive (he has no blood) so that killing him is nothing
5) But if you kill him when he can be stopped by a lesser measure than you are conisidered a murderer - but can be killed by beis din (Rambam).
the more I look into this din the more confusing it becomes.
You can add
ReplyDelete1) can a shoteh be a rodef?
2) does the threat have to be imminent? (if the fetus is for sure going to be a threat, but not for a few months, are you allowed to kill it now)
Not Brisk said...
ReplyDeleteYou can add
1) can a shoteh be a rodef?
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If he is trying to kill someone it is obvious that he can be killed since he is no different that an unborn baby that can be killed if it threatens his mother.
On the other hand if he is pursuing to rape - then if you hold the fundamental concern is saving him from sin - then you have a question. But if you hold that the concern is saving the victim - then it is also obvious that he can be killed.