Rav Moshe Sternbuch told me that when dealing with child abuse - that if a rav tells you not to go to the police when it is obvious that one needs to - you should not listen to the rav but to ask another rabbi (if there is no danger to the children by the delay). A clear support for this idea of each individual needing to be responsible to do that which is obviously correct - even if told the opposite by a rabbi - is the following Ba'al HaMa'or. This broadens the obligation to use your seichel and knowledge and focus on doing the right thing. When something is a dvar mishna - clear and obvious - you can not use the excuse that an authority told you not to do the right thing. This is clearly opposed to the idea of blind obedience to authority.
Ba’al ha-Ma’or(Sanhedrin (p. 12a in the Rif:):“If you were to ask: We hold [the prevailing view] that cases of garmi (damages resulting from direct and predictable cause) are liable for court adjudication. Why then do we say that when a judge errs in something stated explicitly in a Mishnah, he simply reverses his ruling but is not responsible for any losses, even if the damage incurred by the litigant due to his error is irrevocable? [For example,] the case of the cow of Bet Menaḥem whose meat can not be returned because R. Tarfon [the judge] had already [caused it to be] fed to the dogs [by those who followed his ruling]. “The answer is: The litigant was negligent. Since the error is in that which is stated explicitly in a Mishnah, the error is obvious, and the litigant should not have relied upon him and should not have acted upon what he was told. He should have questioned [the judge] and demonstrated the error, for this was as obvious as an explicit Mishnah. Therefore it is the litigant who was negligent; the judge’s ruling is superfluous. This is what is meant by: It is as if the judge never issued the ruling; he did nothing at all [to the litigant].”[Translation Rav Nachum Rabinowitz Chakira Magazine #5]