R' Herzfeld's "heter" to publicly embarrass Aaron Friedman

In the course of investigating the question of using emotional abuse for educational purposes and chastisement, I came across this essay on the internet by Rabbi Shmuel Herzfeld. Besides directly addressing the issue - it also involves an issue which has been hotly debated on this blog - the demands of Tamar Epstein that her husband Aaron Friedman give her a Get. It is important to note that Rabbi Herzfeld nowhere establishes that a man whose wife demands a Get - simply because she doesn't want to be married to him - has a right to a Get. This case apparently does not even have the status  ma'os alei (the thought of being with him disgusts me) and therefore according to the vast majority of poskim there is absolutely no obligation for the husband to give a Get and surely no one has the right to pressure him. According to the traditional understanding of these issues she does not even have the status of Aguna.  In spite of this failure of showing the applicability of his halachic analysis and source to the Friedman Epstein case he asserts : "So from the perspective of Jewish law the matter is clear: If a person is not giving his wife a Get and is using it as leverage, one can (and depending on the circumstances, should) embarrass him publicly even to the point of threatening his livelihood. "His quote from Rav Herschel Schachter is likewise problematic. He has posted the full letter on the interenet here - When is it permitted to publicly embarrass someone publicly?   I have provided links to other examples of his thinking here: Open Letter to House Ethics Committe against Aaron Friedman          Why being gay is not immoral  Why boss has right to fire him for not giving get

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And yet, all this being the case the rabbis tell us that under certain conditions one must embarrass another person publicly. [...]

In other words, the Sefer Hachinuch draws a distinction between a personal sin where one should refrain from embarrassing a person, and a sin between man and God where one is obligated to embarrass the sinner.[...]

The Minchat Chinuch comments on this as follows:

“The distinction that Maimonides and Sefer Hachinuch draw between sins against a fellow man and –where it is prohibited to embarrass and shame someone publicly—and between sins between man and God—where we do shame people publicly—is specifically between two people.  That is if one sins against another person, then the person who is wronged should not embarrass the other person publicly, as it is better for him to forgive the sin.  However (when a third party is involved) if one sees that a member of the community is sinning by hurting another person then one may shame him.  Indeed the prophets used to shame people publicly for sins that were committed against fellow men.  The books of the prophets are filled with these examples.  It is just the wronged person himself who is prohibited to shame the other person and who is encouraged to forgive.”

In other words the Minchat Chinuch is teaching us that if we are a third party that is witness to a wrong being done against a person the laws of embarrassing someone publicly do not apply.

Now we must be very, very careful before applying these laws and acting upon them.  The potential for a misreading of the law, of the situation and of our own intentions is very great.  And of course, the potential damage to another and to our own spiritual well being is enormous and should cause us to shudder in fear before intentionally embarrassing someone in public.  

However, at times we are compelled to do so.There is a biblical injunction “lo taamod al dam rei-ekhah,” do not stand by the blood of your brother.  This injunction requires us to not be passive bystanders in the world.  When a person is being hurt or attacked, if we say, “we will sit this one out; it doesn’t affect me personally,” then we are directly violating a biblical commandment.

And while this injunction is true in general it is even truer as it relates specifically to a Get.

Recently the following question was posed to the Erz Hemdah Institute, a scholarly academy in the land of Israel.  Someone asked about a man who was not giving his wife a Get and was then being shunned by the rabbi.  The questioner wrote: 

“I question whether our rabbi has the halachic right to treat him so harshly.” 

This was the answer of the Erez Hemda Institute(Living the Halachic Process, 2007):  “One of the people who we are most required to help…is an aguna.  At different times and place in history, religious courts had the ability to physically coerce a stubborn husband to give a get, when a get was mandated in the most clear-cut manner…In cases that are a little less clear-cut a harchaka d’Rabbeinu Tam can be employed.  This is a painful form of publicly shunning the husband, not only in shul but also in commercial and public settings.”

This position is codified in the Rema’s gloss on the Shulchan Aruch where he writes (Even Ha-Ezer 154): “In any circumstance where we cannot force the husband to give Get by beating him or excommunicating him, we can nevertheless tell people not to do business with him or to do any favor for him in the world (she lo laasot lo shum tovah or lisah ve-litten immo).

So from the perspective of Jewish law the matter is clear: If a person is not giving his wife a Get and is using it as leverage, one can (and depending on the circumstances, should) embarrass him publicly even to the point of threatening his livelihood.  

While this is never a pleasant thing to do; it is also not pleasant to live with the pain of not being able to remarry or go out on a date by virtue of the fact that you are being chained to a recalcitrant spouse.

Although, the halacha is clear I still felt trepidation in this area.  Perhaps I was misreading the sources or perhaps there were other factors that I did not consider.  So I personally discussed this case with Rav Hershel Schachter, a leading authority at Yeshiva University, who is directly involved in this exact case.  He encouraged me to continue on this path.  I specifically asked Rav Schachter if I should let all of Aharon’s colleagues on the Hill know about his behavior and he said, “yes.”

Subsequent to our conversation, Rav Schachter wrote a psak on this matter where he wrote: “Limnoa mei-habaal she-lo ye-agen et ishto—inyan zeh eino tzarikh pesak beit din, upeshita desaggi behoraat chacham, to work to prevent the husband from chaining his wife—this matter does not require a ruling from a Beit Din, and it is obvious that all that is required is a ruling from a single Torah scholar.”  He further noted that the great Rabbi Akiva Eiger also ruled that if we know a man is planning on making his wife an Agunah we can even throw him into jail on the Shabbat itself.  So in this case specifically it is appropriate to convince Aharon to give a Get.

The Halakhah on this matter is clear: Aharon should give the Get immediately and not hold it as leverage.  Until he does that it is permissible to embarrass him into doing so.

Of course, at the end of the day it is not just Aharon who is embarrassed publicly.  The New York Times article did not just embarrass Aharon, it also embarrassed the Torah; it is a Chilul Hashem to see such behavior being conducted under the auspices of the Torah.

But that is not the fault of the New York Times.  That is the fault of our own community for not being strong enough in this area.  

Aharon still has many supporters who are encouraging him in his recalcitrance either explicitly or implicitly through smoke screens and redirected, irrelevant complaints about his ex-wife.  And so Tamar Epstein’s status as an Agunah continues, and for that we should all be embarrassed.

Verbal abuse is prohibited only if the person is helpless

updated Feb 11: This Chinuch says 1) that verbal abuse is only prohibited for those things for which a person is vulnerable and can't protect himself. It is not clear why he adds that phrase since it should be sufficient to say that it is prohibited to cause pain to others. [This is also mentioned by Shevet HaLevi (8:309.5): Thelanguage of the Chinuch (#338) is that “one should not say to a Jew words which cause him pain and anguish and that he doesn’t have the ability to defend himself against them.” There is some implication in this that if the person does have the power to defend himself against these words - then there is no Torah prohibition against them. Perhaps that means that if in most cases the words don’t cause hurt and anguish – they would be permitted according to the Torah. However not all cases are identical in this matter.] 2) Then he says the basis of this mitzva is that disputes are bad. However this is not the same thing as saying that hurting people is wrong. 3) He then says that the prohibition is only for frum people and thus not prohibited against children except as an act of piety. If we are prohibited to hurt someone why should it make a difference who the person is? [See Minchas Chinuch] 4) He also says that he assumes that a person has the right to defend himself against insults and learns this from the law of rodef. Why isn't this explicitly taught in the Talmud? The case of rodef is explicitly only dealing with a threat to life - not to dignity. 5) Finally he underminds the assertion that there is a right to self-defense against insult by saying our Sages said that ideally one should not respond to insult.

Chinuch(#338): It is prohibited to verbally torment any Jew. In other words it is prohibited to say to a Jew any words that cause him pains and torments him and he has no power to help himself. This is explicitly stated in Bava Metzia (58b): What is prohibited? If he is a baal teshuva you should not say to him, “Remember your old deeds.” If a person is seriously ill you should not speak to him in the manner that Job’s comrades spoke to him saying that the illness was obviously because he had sinned. If you see a donkey driver who is looking for grain you should not give him advice to go to a certain person when you know that he doesn’t sell grain. You should also not ask a merchant for the price of an object when you have no intent of purchasing it. All these actions are included in the prohibition of Vayikra (25:17), A person should not torment his people.

The essence of this mitzva is obvious. It is to prove peace in society. Peace is critically important in order for blessing to exist in the world while disputes and conflict are harmful. There are man curses and impediments that are the result of disputes.

Concerning the details of this mitzva there are a number of prohibitions and many cautions which our Sages have warned use in this matter to avoid causing pain to others in any way and not to embarrass them. They were very concerned about this prohibition as can be seen from the fact that they said that one should not examine merchandise if they don’t have money to buy it.

It is proper to be careful that not even an inference can be made from your words that would insult another. That is because the Torah has placed great emphasis that one should not verbally hurt others since this is something very harmful to the hearts of people. In fact there are many people who care more about being hurt verbally than being harmed monetarily. Our Sages say that wronging another with words is worse than harming them financially since only in the prohibition of  verbal tormenting does the Torah say  “and you shall fear your G‑d” (Vayikra 25:17). 

It is not possible to write all the cases of verbal abuse which cause pain to people. However everyone is required to avoid verbally paining other according to what he sees. That is because G‑d knows all of a man’s actions and everything which he intends because man only knows the externals which he can see while G‑d sees what is in the heart. [Shmuel I 16:7] Our Sages have written many medrashim to teach us the correct way to act. The main description of this law is in the fourth chapter of Bava Metzia.

The mitzva is applicable in all places and all times and applies equally to men and women. And even with children it is proper to be careful not to pain them with words too much – except in that which is greatly needed to teach them proper behavior. Even for a man’s own sons and daughters and household members. He who is gentle with them so as not to cause them anguish in these matters will find a life, blessing and honor. On the other hand if he transgresses this prohibition there is no punishment of flogging because there is no physical action. Nonetheless he should realize how many lashes can be administered without a physical whip by G‑d who commanded this mitzva.

However it would seem that despite the fact that verbal abuse of others is prohibited, one should not conclude that if one Jew came and wickedly verbally inflicted pain on another Jew that the victim should not answer him. That is because it is impossible that a person should be like a stone which has no one to turn it over. Furthermore if the victim remains silent it would imply that he agrees with the insults. In truth the Torah does not command that a man be like a stone which remains silent in the face of those who insult him as he would in the face of those who bless him. Rather the Torah commands us to stay far away from this type of behavior and not to initiate quarrels and insult people. If he is not a quarrelsome person he will be saved from insults. That is because one who doesn’t get into fights is generally not insulted by others except by total fools - and one should not pay attention to fools.

And if perhaps a slanderer will force us to reply to his words, it is proper for a wise man to reply to him in  dignified and pleasant manner and not to get very angry. That is because anger dwells in the bosom of a fools (Koheles 7:9). He should excuse himself to those who hear the slander about him and place the burden on the slanderer. This is the way the refined people in society conduct themselves.

We learn that it is permitted to answer a fool apparently from the fact that a person is permitted to kill a robber who has broken into his home. That is because there is absolutely no doubt that a person is not obligated to tolerate harm from another but rather has the right to defend himself. Likewise concerning verbal abuse which contains cunning and deceit, he is permitted to save himself with every manner with which it is necessary to save himself.

Nevertheless there are certain people whose piety is so elevated that they would not want to accept this ruling that one can respond to someone who is verbally abusing them. That is because they are afraid that they might become angry and would over respond to the abuser. Concerning these pious people our Sages (Shabbos 88b) said, “They are insulted but they do not respond with humiliation. They hear themselves being disgraced and yet don’t reply. Concerning them it is written in Shoftim (5:31), And those that love You, are like the sun going forth in its might.”

Verbal abusers mistakenly feel superior to Jewish victim - Alshech

The Alshech gets into the theology/psychology of the prohibition against verbal abuse. He notes that one does not torment another person unless the other is viewed as being inferior. He explains that that is why the prohibition describes the other as being "with him".  He also notes that we have no way of knowing who is superior or inferior in this world - it will only be revealed in the World to Come. He thus advises to always view others as superior. He also states this is not a prohibition against abusing a person but to prevent abuse against G-d since the soul of people is part of G-d.

Alshech (Vayikra 25:17): Our Sages (Bava Metzia 58b) understood this verse to be referring to the prohibition of hurting others with words. For example not to tell a baal teshuva, “remember your previous deeds.” Or to tell a person suffering from illness that if he was truly righteous he wouldn’t be sick. The attribution of our Sages of this verse to verbal abuse and the previous verse (Vayikra 25:14) to deception with land – solves the question about why there are two verses dealing with deception. ... 

As regards the literal meaning of the verse, it cautions not to torment another person with words. The person who is being cautioned views himself as man who is as important as all other men or as the men in the Bible - in contrast to the other man who he is ridiculing and embarrassing and tormenting with words. The Torah says that when you abuse others you view yourself as a greater tzadik than he and you deserve being able to call to the L‑rd your G‑d - but in fact you are mistaken. That is what is meant by, “And don’t abuse your fellow man...” You should not view yourself as important but not the other person. In fact however relative to Me your fellow and comrade is a man who is equal to you in value. That is the meaning of do not abuse “a man and his fellow” in this verse. Because if you consider the other as your fellow (amiso) that means that you view him as equal to you. However if you mistakenly view that you have a closer relations to G‑d – you will find that is not so. That is because He is as much your G‑d as He is his G‑d. Which mortal man can know who is better before G‑d – this one or that one or whether both are equally good?

Another issue is that the verse seems to be prohibiting verbally tormenting another because it degrades the honor of his fellow man. But that can’t be the correct understanding because the verse ends with the statement that “you should fear G‑d.” That indicates that verbally abusing another is prohibited because degrading the honor of men degrades G‑d’s honor. That is because G‑d is in fact the G‑d of both of them - because his fellow’s soul is a part of G‑d just as his soul is. Thus G‑d is saying, You are degrading that aspect of your fellow man which is part of Me and therefore you are despising Me since I am as much your G‑d as I am his. This is an important lesson. A person should not view himself as better than another as it says in Job (3:19), The small and great are there and the servant is free from his master.  This lesson is also expressed in Pesachim (50a) where it says that we live in an upside down world. That which is actually superior is viewed as lowly and that which is actually lowly is viewed as superior. That means that the true importance of things will only become apparent in the World to Come. Because G‑d alone knows everyone’s true status and only there will He reveal every man’s correct position.  This is the meaning of Job (3:19), The small and great are there and the servant is free from his master.  In other words whether a person is small in value or great will only be seen in the World to Come. In contrast in this world there is no way to know who is superior and who is inferior. We will also find in the World to Come that a servant who is more free (i.e. superior) than his master because he is judged by his deeds. That is the implication of the mem (“from his master” in Job 3:19). This is also implied in Esther (1:19), “And let the king give her royal position to another who is better than she.” Thus friends find praiseworthy and look up to one of the perfected men who never met a man that he didn’t honor and didn’t view as better than him. The reasoning behind this is that if the other is younger than me that means he must have committed less sins. If he is older than me then that means he has accomplished more. If he is more knowledgeable than me then he has more merit. If I am more knowledgeable, I view that I have done more things wrong then he since he has less awareness then I regarding sin. This approach of seeing that all men are superior to you can be extended to all aspects of a person.

Therefore Rabbi Levitas of Yavneh has noted that our Sages (Avos 4:4) warned, Be exceeding careful to be humble before every person since the hope of man is  worms. Therefore a man you view all others as being better than he is as we mentioned. This is the opposite attitude of one who verbally torments others. According to our approach we need to examine why this statement in Avos (4:4) said m’od m’od (exceedingly). Also we need to examine why it says that the “hope of man is worms?” The term “hope” is only correctly applied to that which a person hopes and longs for. What kind of man desires worms? It should have simply said that end of man is worms. Furthermore why is the term man enosh instead of adam or ish?

Now we know that for personality traits there is nothing better than moderation and therefore the avoidance of extremes is preferred by intelligent people. Thus it is reasonable to assume that this is  also true for the attribute of humility. However this conclusion is contrary to what we find in the Torah which states (Bamidbar 12:3) , “The man Moshe was very humble from all mankind.” Consequently it is important to investigate why G‑d chose the extreme trait to praise Moshe? Rabbi Levitas apparently understood the expression m’od m’od (exceedingly) to mean the strongest degree possible of humility. Don’t raise an objection from moderation because we see that our Sages said the hope of man is worm. Because what the Sages meant was that a person should desire to be a worm. The term m’od m’od is applied not only to humility but also to how insignificant he is.

We know that there are a number of words that refer to man  - ish, gever, enosh and the most lowly description is enosh. It is only used to describe a person who is not good as is well known. There is also no more negative attribute describing a person than conceit. We see that the most negative characteristic of man (Tehilim 101:5) e.g., the one which most conflicts with G‑d - is pride. G‑d says that He can not exist together in the world with a person who is conceited (Sotah 5a). If so than this is the description of man as enosh. Therefore our Sages tell us that we need to be humble because if we aren’t humble then we will eventually become the type of man called enosh and not one of the others. If you become man as enosh  - then you will desire and hope for the worm. We know that a person who is totally not good and is described as enosh  will not be able to find peace after death until his flesh decays in his grave. Therefore before the worm start to come to him he will strongly desire and hope when will the worm come to him and consume his flesh in order that he finds peace.

Emotional abuse in Jewish sources I: Reish Lakish

In order to understand the issue of emotional abuse - and how to respond and innoculate for it, it is also necessary to see examples of abuse and how it was dealt with in Jewish sources. This is the first of a series. I would appreciate your respectful comments.

A classic case is the relationship between Reish Lakish and his rebbe Rav Yochanon. The gemora relates how Rav Yochanon saved Reish Lakish from being a bandit leader and made him into an outstanding talmid chachom. They became study parters and their debates are cited frequently in the Talmud.  However we see that Rav Yochachon also destroyed Reish Lakish and this ultimately brought about his own death.

Bava Metzia (84a): One day R. Johanan was bathing in the Jordan, when Resh Lakish saw him and leapt into the Jordan after him. Said he [R. Johanan] to him, ‘Your strength should be for the Torah.’ — ‘Your beauty,’ he replied, ‘should be for women.’ ‘If you will repent,’ said he, ‘I will give you my sister [in marriage], who is more beautiful than I.’ He undertook [to repent]; then he wished to return and collect his weapons, but could not. Subsequently, [R. Johanan] taught him Bible and Mishnah, and made him into a great man. Now, one day there was a dispute in the schoolhouse [with respect to the following. Viz.,] a sword, knife, dagger, spear, hand-saw and a scythe — at what stage [of their manufacture] can they become unclean? When their manufacture is finished. And when is their manufacture finished? — R. Johanan ruled: When they are tempered in a furnace. Resh Lakish maintained: When they have been furbished in water. Said he to him: ‘A robber understands his trade.’16 Said he to him, ‘And wherewith have you benefited me: there [as a robber] I was called Master, and here I am called Master.’ ‘By bringing you under the wings of the Shechinah,’ he retorted. R. Johanan therefore felt himself deeply hurt, [as a result of which] Resh Lakish fell ill. His sister [sc. R. Johanan's, the wife of Resh Lakish] came and wept before him: ‘Forgive him for the sake of my son,’ she pleaded. He replied: ‘Leave thy fatherless children. I will preserve them alive. ‘For the sake of my widowhood then!’ ‘And let thy widows trust in me,’ he assured her. Resh Lakish died, and R. Johanan was plunged into deep grief. Said the Rabbis, ‘Who shall go to ease his mind? Let R. Eleazar b. Pedath go, whose disquisitions are very subtle.’ So he went and sat before him; and on every dictum uttered by R. Johanan he observed: ‘There is a Baraitha which Supports you.’ ‘Are you as the son of Lakisha?’ he complained: ‘when I stated a law, the son of Lakisha used to raise twenty-four objections, to which I gave twenty-four answers, which consequently led to a fuller comprehension of the law; whilst you say, "A Baraitha has been taught which supports you:" do I not know myself that my dicta are right?’ Thus he went on rending his garments and weeping, ‘Where are you, O son of Lakisha, where are you, O son of Lakisha;’ and he cried thus until his mind was turned. Thereupon the Rabbis prayed for him, and he died.
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Etz Yosef: (Bava Metzia 84a): [Rabbi Yochanon said]a robber understands his trade - because when Reish Lakish was a thief he saw that the shine on the sword was the final stage of its processing. That is because a sword in the hand of thieves serves to intimidate and frighten the victim so he shouldn’t resist and therefore it is the shine on the sword which intimidates and frightens. Rabbi Yochanon did not intend with this statement to insult Reish Lakish and to remind him of his past. Rabbi Yochanon simply mentioned this to the students of the yeshiva   to explain why Reish Lakish’s view was correct since he had more experience in these matters then Rabbi Yochanon did. However Reish Lakish thought that Rabbi Yochanon intended to torment him and to insult him by saying that since he was a thief he was an expert about the tools used by thieves. As a result of the mistaken perception of an insult Reish Lakish replied, “Why do you insult me?” In other words he used the word hona’ah - the word used in the Torah prohibition against tormenting and insulting others. He thus stated, “Why are you verbally abusing me because even when I was a thief I was given respect that is as great as I get now as a talmid chachom. Because even then I was called master (rabbi) of the thieves as I am called master (rabbi) of the yeshiva. The reason that I repented my evil ways was not because of honor but for the sake of Heaven. Therefore it is prohibited for you to speak this way to me and mention my past deeds to me.” Unfortunately Rabbi Yochanon misunderstood his words and though he was saying, “What benefit (hana’ah) have you provided me.... That is why Rabbi Yochanon replied, “The pleasure that I provided you is the fact I brought you under the wings of the Divine Presence (i.e., observe the Torah). Thus Rabbi Yochanon was upset when he thought he heard Reish Lakish say “what benefit have you given me” (when he actually said, “Why are you verbally abusing me.”) That is because saying “what benefit have you given me” indicated that Reish Lakish didn’t value Torah or the fact that he had been brought under the wings of the Divine Presence.

Gittin (90a): What is pritzus for wife - Different views

Gittin (90a): It was taught: Rabbi Meir used to say, Just as there are different views regarding food so there are regarding treatment of their wives. For example there are men that if a fly fell into their cup there would remove the fly but not drink from it. This was the attitude of Papus ben Yehudah who used to lock his wife in the house before leaving it. There are other men that if a fly fell into their cup they would remove the fly and then drink from the cup. This is the normal attitude of most men who do not mind if their wife talks with her brothers and relatives. However there are men that if a fly fell in their soup would squash it and eat it. This is the conduct of an evil man [who is not bothered] when he sees his wife go out with her hair unfastened and weave cloth in public with her with her armpits uncovered and bathe with men. Does she literally bathe with men? [No!] Rather it means that she bathes in the same place as the men. If she acts in this manner then it is a mitzva from the Torah to divorce her as Devarim (24:1) says, And he found something disgusting about her (ervas davar) and he divorces her and sends her from his house and she marries another man.

Rashi (Gittin 90a): Just as there are different attitudes towards food - people have different attitudes in their sensitivity to food and drink. There are people who are delicate and are disgusted with their food because of some very minor issue and there are others who are not so delicate. There are also those who aren’t bothered by any disgusting thing that happens to their food. In a similar manner we find differences of attitudes towards the lack of modesty in one’s wife.. There are those who do not tolerate the slightest degree of immodesty (pritzus) and there are those who are not so strict while others are not concerned with her immodesty at all. Papus ben Yehuda, the husband of Miriam Magdela, when he left his house he would lock her in the house so that she would not speak to any man. This attitude is not acceptable as we see that it caused hatred between them and she ended up committing adultery.

Emotional abuse: Producing overly fragile children

One of the consequences of my recently being threatened by criminal charges if I didn't remove certain postings - was that I was directed to someone who has much experience dealing with the Israeli police. After this askan gave me some good advice, the conversation turned to identifying the important concerns of our society. He said after I had already written a book on the topic of sexual abuse - he felt that the next major issue I should address is emotional abuse. He deals with children who go off the derech in the chareidi society in Israel. He said while there definitely are abusive parents - his main concern was the abuse that occurs in the school system - especially from well meaning staff that are not properly trained and who fail to treat the students with proper respect and dignity.

I have discussed this with a number of other people since and they agree that this is an important issue to clarify and try and correct. Consequently I have added this on to my daily research and writing as well as discussions with Dr  Shulem. Hopefully in a year or two I will have book on the subject.

My preliminary research however indicates that it is not simply that there are adults who are causing emotional damage to children. It is clear that in the last 10 years - there has been a tremendous reorientation in society in the direction of protecting children from upset and failure. There are psychologists and social workers everywhere who are pointing out how the children are being hurt and how we must change the nature of society to prevent that hurt.

What seems to lost in the mad rush not to cause pain - is that the children are being made more vulnerable to pain and that people are viewing a pain free existence as an entitlement.

So in addition to investigating what is the dynamic of abuse. I am also investigating the question of this change in attitude of society - even the traditional chareidi society - towards removing all unpleasant experiences and not exposing a child to failure or trauma of any sort.

This issue was recently raised by the Rabbi Manis Friedman tapes about abuse. Rabbi Manis is clearly a caring individual - but he was saying that we need to get past the abuse. The victim needs to be concerned about the future not the pain of the past. Even though I didn't like the way he said it - he was correct. 

There is much evidence that therapy for trauma does not help and in fact exacerbates the trauma by constantly focusing on it. There is much evidence that perhaps 50% of people are not seriously traumatized by horrific experiences. This observation led Dr. Viktor Frankl to develop logotherapy.

In short, we have two ways to approach emotional trauma. We can search ways to remove trauma from our children's lifes or we can teach them to deal with trauma and failure as part of normal existence. In other words we can either bullet proof our children or we can try and create a trauma free environment.

Rav Sternbuch: Child's education vs honoring father?

Rav Sternbuch (Teshuvos v' Hanhagos 2:449): Question: A son wants to move to Israel but this will be detrimental to his father and he will lose the mitzva of honoring his parents. Answer: The mitzva of settling Israel is a dispute among poskim. Even though it is clearly a mitzva to dwell in the holy land of Israel, nevertheless some say it is only when the person is able to experience the holiness and thus is elevated by the experience. However someone who is not assured of spiritual elevation but just wants to go to Israel to be free of the burden of golus   - then going to Israel is not considered a mitzva according to this view. [see what I wrote in Teshuvos v' Hanhagos (1:900). However concerning the present case, we see in Kiddushin (31b) that living in Israel seems to be equal to the mitzva of honoring parents. In this case where the son is actively involved in honoring his father and wants to move to Israel - perhaps it is not correct because of the principle that one who is involved in doing a mitzva is exempt from doing another and thus it would be prohibited for him to leave his father. Furthermore in the present case where he already is involved in the mitzva of honoring his father he should continue doing it and therefore it would be prohibited for him to move to Israel and to stop the mitzva that he has already started.

However if he claims that in Israel he will be able to better raise his children in Torah then since there is nothing comparable to the mitzva of education children - then it would take precedence over honoring his parents. That is the Torah law because nothing is comparable to the education of children because their entire future is dependent upon it.

Therefore it is necessary to carefully investigate whether the parents truly need his help. In such a case it would be prohibited to leave them and stop the mitzva of honoring parents. It would be  prohibited in such a case to stop the mitzva for the sake of living in Israel. However if he must settle in Israel for the sake of educating his children - then he should definitely move because the mitzva of educating his children takes precedence because there is nothing comparable to it. In particular here in South Africa where the Chareidi education for either boys or girls is not as good as what he can get in Israel in the religious communities. (Look at V'Yoel Moshe of the Satmar Rebbe where he says astounding things in the name of major poskim that one should not leave a mitzva in order to settle in Israel. That means not to make aliyah  when it means nullifying even such mitzvos as providing hospitality to guests so surely not when it means nullifying honoring of parents.)

In contrast if the situation is that the parents are not dependent on him - but rather it is nicer for them that he live nearby but that they won't be overwhelmed if he leaves and they will quickly adapt to his absence - then he should move to Israel because of the superiority of education for his children compared to what South Africa has to offer. However this is only if he can find a proper community in Israel as well as a livelihood (See what I wrote in 1:900 on this topic). This is what I think the general rules are in this matter. In reality it is necessary for everyone who faces this decision to seek advice from gedolim and tzadikim and through their advice they will be successful.

Corporality: Rambam's inconsistent views

There is no question that the Rambam is strongly against the belief that G-d has any physicality.

Third principle of faith Commentary to Mishna (Sanhedrin 10:3)... 3) G‑d is not a physical entity and has no physical attributes such as a body or physical power… All the physical description found in the Bible such as walking or standing, sitting or speaking are only metaphors and are not meant literally but are metaphors. Our sages described this as “The Torah speaks in the idiom of man.”

Rambam (Hilchos Teshuva 3:6–8,14): [6] These are the people that have no portion in the World to Come but are cut off and lost and judged for eternity because of their great wickedness and sins: .... [7] Minim are those who say G‑d doesn’t exist, or that the world has no ruler, or that it has a ruler but there are two or more divine entities, or that there is one divinity but that he has a body and physical attributes...

Rambam (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:9): If so, what is the meaning of the expressions employed by the Torah: "Below His feet" [Exodus 24:10], "Written by the finger of God" [ibid. 31:18], "God's hand" [ibid. 9:3], "God's eyes" [Genesis 38:7], "God's ears" [Numbers 11:1], and the like?

All these [expressions were used] to relate to human thought processes which know only corporeal imagery, for the Torah speaks in the language of man. They are only descriptive terms, as [apparent from Deuteronomy 32:41]: "I will whet My lightning sword." Does He have a sword? Does He need a sword to kill? Rather, this is metaphoric imagery. [Similarly,] all [such expressions] are metaphoric imagery.

A proof of this concept: One prophet says that he saw the Holy One, blessed be He, "clothed in snow white" [Daniel 7:9], and another envisioned Him [coming] "with crimson garments from Batzra" [Isaiah 63:1]. Moses, our teacher, himself envisioned Him at the [Red] Sea as a mighty man, waging war, and, at Mount Sinai, [saw Him] as the leader of a congregation, wrapped [in a tallit].

This shows that He has no image or form. All these are merely expressions of prophetic vision and imagery and the truth of this concept cannot be grasped or comprehended by human thought. This is what the verse [Job 11:7] states: "Can you find the comprehension of God? Can you find the ultimate bounds of the Almighty?"

In addition, according to Rav Chaim, the Rambam does not allow for a mistaken belief in physicality. The only way you get the World to Come is by not having a belief in physicality.

Rav Elchonon Wasserman(Explanations of Agados #2): The view of the Rambam is that a person who believes G‑d is physical is a heretic. The Raavad commented: “There are greater and better people than the Rambam who erred in this issue because of mistakenly accepting the literal meaning of verses and agada.” I heard in the name of Rav Chaim Brisker that the Rambam views that there is no such thing as inadvertent heresy. Irrespective of how a person arrives at a mistaken belief, the fact is that he believes something which is heretical. Furthermore, it is impossible to be a member of the Jewish people without proper faith. Rav Chaim used to say that “a nebach apikorus (mistaken heretic) is also a heretic.” It would appear that he must be correct since all heretic and idol worshippers are mistaken. Obviously there is no one more mistaken than one who sacrifices his son for idol worship and yet he is subject to capital punishment. However, this approach is problematic since a baby also doesn’t have proper faith and yet he is part of the Jewish people. Furthermore, a person who was denied proper education (tinok shenishbah) is allowed to bring a sacrifice to atone  -  without being labeled as a heretic (Shabbos 68b). Thus from these two cases it would seem that the Torah exempts an unwitting error also in the realm of beliefs? This can be answered by what we mentioned previously  -  the foundation principles of faith are obvious and no intelligent person could accept heretical beliefs. It is only because a person wants to reject his obligations to G‑d that he rationalizes that religious beliefs are not correct. Therefore, there is no such thing as an inadvertent heretical belief. On the other hand, if a person doesn’t intend to rebel against religion but mistakenly thinks something sinful is permitted by the Torah  -  then this is truly inadvertent. Perhaps this is what the Raavad meant that the person erred “because of misunderstanding verses and agada.” In other words, the person erred not because he wanted to reject religion but because he mistakenly accepted the literal meaning of religious texts. Thus, the Raavad would classify him as someone who mistakenly says a sin is permitted according to the Torah and therefore inadvertent heresy does exist… The Rambam on the other hand seems to feel that one could not err in thinking that G‑d has a body and that if he was serious about his religion it would be obvious to him that the texts cannot be taken literally…

And yet we see below an acknowledgement that the average man can't have a belief in a non-physical G-d. In fact the Rambam acknowledges that the use by the Torah itself of physical descriptions is an acknowledgement of the need for some physicality. So does that mean that all those who can't grasp the non-physical nature of G-d have no portion in the World To Come?

Moreh Nevuchim (1:26): You, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes in itself all the various kinds of interpretation connected with our subject. It runs thus:

 "The Torah speaks according to the language of man," that is to say, expressions, which can easily be comprehended and understood by all, are applied to the Creator. Hence the description of God by attributes implying corporeality, in order to express His existence: because the multitude of people do not easily conceive existence unless in connection with a body, and that which is not a body nor connected with a body has for them no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of perfection, is likewise attributed to God, as expressing that He is perfect in every respect, and that no imperfection or deficiency whatever is found in Him. But there is not attributed to God anything which the multitude consider a defect or want; thus He is never represented as eating, drinking, sleeping, being ill, using violence, and the like. Whatever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a state of perfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state of perfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God, what we consider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the highest degree of imperfection. If, however, men were to think that those human perfections were absent in God, they would consider Him as imperfect. 

You are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishing characteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them in their progress towards perfection. As they require food and drink to supply animal waste, so they require locomotion, in order to approach that which is good for them and in harmony with their nature, and to escape from what is injurious and contrary to their nature. It makes, in fact, no difference whether we ascribe to God eating and drinking or locomotion; but according to human modes of expression, that is to say, according to common notions, eating and drinking would be an imperfection in God, while motion would not, in spite of the fact that the necessity of locomotion is the result of some want. Furthermore, it has been clearly proved, that everything which moves is corporeal and divisible; it will be shown below that God is incorporeal and that He can have no locomotion; nor can rest be ascribed to Him; for rest can only be applied to that which also moves. All expressions, however, which imply the various modes of movement in living beings, are employed with regard to God in the manner we have described and in the same way as life is ascribed to Him: although motion is an accident pertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt that, without corporeality, expressions like the following could not be imagined: "to descend, to ascend, to walk, to place, to stand, to surround, to sit, to dwell, to depart, to enter, to pass, etc.

It would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this subject, were it not for the mass of the people, who are accustomed to such ideas. It has been necessary to expatiate on the subject, as we have attempted, for the benefit of those who are anxious to acquire perfection, to remove from them such notions as have grown up with them from the days of youth.

Eilu v' Eilu: No disputes in the Talmud, Agada or Kabbala - Rav Dessler

One of the important issues when having a discussion is understanding the dynamics of what is going on. A particularly critical issue is understanding what it means when two different views are expressed concerning a particular issue. In other words what is a disagreement? Does it mean that only one side can be true and perhaps both are mistaken? Or is it merely a question of perspective or the parameters that are being disputed but that they are in essential agreement? Especially amongst kabbalists and those influenced by kabbala - the operating assumption is that there are no mutually exclusive views expressed in Aggada, kabbala or even gemora - as Rav Dessler expresses below and elsewhere. 

However I once had an extended discussion with with Rav Yaakov Weinberg - Rosh Yeshiva of  Ner Yisroel concerning this issue. I mentioned another statement by Rav Dessler who said that the disagreements are simply the result of perspective. Just as a piece of paper if viewed from the edge - is very thin while if viewed face on it is very expansive - so it is with apparent disagreements because we accept the concept of eilu v'eilu. Rav Weinberg - who was a talmid of Rav Hutner - looked at me in astonishment. "You can't tell me that an intelligent person would say such a thing". When I noted that most people that  I know accept this as true he responded, "Then words have no meaning!" It was clear he did not accept such a view.

Shomer Emunim HaKadmon(Second Introduction First Principle):… Included in our faith (emuna) is to believe in all the words of the Talmudic Sages – even if some of their words appear unlikely and against the laws of nature. We are to ascribe the problem to our understanding and not them. That is because all their words were said with ruach hakodesh that was within them. Therefore all those who ridicule any aspect of their words is severely punished as we see in Eiruvin (21b), Gittin (57a), “All those who ridicule the words of the Sages are punished in Hell in boiling excrement.” Bava Basra (75a) relates that a certain student ridiculed words of the Sages [and was turned into a heap of bones]. And this prohibition also applies in the case of midrashim where there is a dispute between the Sages. That is because there is nothing in the words of the Sages that is insignificant or meaningless. All that they say is true (eilu v’eilu) and therefore both sides are saying something of value… For example Rav and Shmuel have a dispute in Berachos (61a). One says that Eve was attached to Adam (like Siamese twins) while the other said she was simply an insignificant appendage like a tail. In fact both views are true from different perspectives as we know from the teachings of the Arizal. This is the way it is for all other matters which two Sages disagree – both sides are true and correct depending on the place and time or world and perspective. You should know that even those matters mentioned in the Talmud which appear to be unnecessary or imprecise – that is simply not true. In fact these matters have esoteric meaning or important allusions…  

Michtav M’Eliyahu (3:353): Concerning the dispute in Berachos (34b) whether a tzadik is greater than a baal teshuva… In truth, disputes are not relevant except concerning the practical Halacha. Concerning Torah matters such as theoretical Halacha there is in fact no dispute. Our sages describe this as eilu v’eilu—both positions are G‑d’s words. In other words, both positions are expressions of truth and are both true…. Concerning the dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel—in the future the practical Halacha will be in accord with Beis Shamai even though it is now in accord with Beis Hillel. Their dispute involved which perspective to view the situation. They did not disagree as to the consequences of each perspective but simply which perspective was best for serving G‑d. It is stated openly in the Tikunei Zohar that there is no dispute concerning Agada and Kabbala. A similar statement was made by the Gra (Even Shleima) concerning Moshiach. There are two aspects of Moshiach. One is an extremely public manifestation of spirituality—Moshiach ben Dovid. The second is merely the freedom from being oppressed by the nations—Moshiach ben Yosef. Therefore, the apparent contradictory statements of our sages concerning Moshiach are the result of talking about the dual nature of Moshiach. At first glance, this explanation seems astounding and inconsistent with the language used in the Talmud. … “And this disagrees with Shmuel”… Therefore, we are forced to admit our explanation that in fact there are two distinct aspects of the redemption… Therefore, the language of “disagree” simply means separate and distinct from each other.

Tzitz Eliezar: Sex change by surgery - halachically valid

The following was written in the context of the significance of organ transplants for altering a person's identity and spritual/psychological nature. It is important to note this teshuva doesn't address the question whether sex change operations are permitted or whether they are viewed as prohibited because of castration or sterilization or other considerations. In addition there are strong objection from other poskim whether sex change operations are valid. (Rav Moshe Feinstein held that no change in sexual identity results from surgery.)

Tzitz Eliezar(10:25.26):  It is necessary to seriously examine the question of identity in a case where a major organic change has been made in the body itself – for example a change from being a male to being a female or the reverse. According to what I have heard - and this has also been publicized by various newspaper columnists - these types of operations are offered today in special rare circumstances. In these cases in which the body is drastically changed, surgery truly creates many halachic questions regarding the establishment of identity and true status. Let me mention here what I saw in Zichron Bris  L’Rishonim (simon 5) written by Rav Yaakov Hagozer.... In the course of a long discussion discussing tumtum, androgynous and other major physical changes in the body- he quotes from Yad Ne’man (Y.D. 64b) [published 1804] regarding a respected talmid chachom from Jerusalem who wrote about a number of  cases where a woman became a man. He also explained that there is really no great difference between male and female genitals except that one is external and the other is internal (meaning that a woman has internally a foreskin and testes even though they are not like the testes of a man)... Given that reality, the author discussed his uncertainty whether the woman who has changed into a man is obligated in mila or whether she is exempt. He concludes that she is exempt since the verse for the mitzva of mila says to circumcise the “male foreskin”. This implies that circumcision is only required if a person is born a male but not someone who was born a female and became a male.... Similarly I saw in the sefer Yosef es Achiv (3:5) by Rabbi Yosef Pilaggi that he asks, “Whether a woman who led a normal married life for a number of years and then became a man - requires a divorce because she was his wife? Or perhaps no Get is required because she is no longer a woman but a man? He answers that it seems that she doesn’t need a Get because she is no longer a woman and the Get states that the husband is giving the Get to a woman who is his wife. The Get also states that it allows her to marry another man... and it obviously is not allowed for a man to marry another man... It would seem in my humble opinion that there is no need for a Get if his wife has fully become a man...It would also seem that in a case of a man who was originally a woman that he should not say the beracha ‘who has not made me a woman’ because he was in fact born a woman...instead he should say ‘who has changed me into a man.’...” ... In addition to the question whether the wife who has become a man needs a divorce from her husband, there is the question of when the husband becomes a woman whether the wife needs a divorce? (There was a famous case like this a number of years ago in one of the large European countries). In addition Rav Abulafia has raised questions regarding the status if the sex change is reversed and he becomes a man again? While thinking about this it occurred to me to relate this question to the Terumas HaDeshen (pesakim #102) concerning the wife of Eliyahu or the wife of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi – whether they could marry another man. He noted that the significance of the question concerns other cases in the future. The Terumas HaDeshen answers that only the wife of another man is prohibited to marry without a Get and not the wife of an angel who is a completely spiritual being without a physical body. See also Mahari Assad (E.H. 4) who explains the Terumas HaDeshen... that even though there was a valid marriage Eliyahu’s wife could remarry without a divorce... Then also in our case we can say that only the wife of a man is prohibited to others and not the wife of a woman. So even though there was a valid marriage, nevertheless the marriage dissolves by itself when it becomes a case of being the wife of a woman....So perhaps we can say that since marriage to an angel is invalid, therefore when Eliyahu became an angel the marriage dissolved by itself - so since marriage to another woman is invalid when her husband becomes a woman the marriage dissolves by itself. Furthermore concerning the issue raised by Rabbi Abulafia where the change reverses itself, we find a comparable analysis in the Birchei Yosef (E.H 17) where a man who died became alive again by a miracles - such as happened to the wife of Rav Zeira. Do we say that when he regained life, it was a new life or perhaps it simply revealed that his death was not really death? He wanted to answer based on a Yerushalmi ... however this is not a clear proof and this is thoroughly discussed in the Otzer HaPoskim - including the distinction as to whether the man was buried or not. However, everyone agrees that these serious questions raised by sex change are only for after the change and are not retroactive..

Unity of G-d vs belief in His physicality - Rav Tzadok

This is a very fascinating essay dealing with understanding the mitzva of yichud Hashem and the difference between a philosophical understanding and the kabbalistic one. He then relates this difference to differing concepts of Divine Providence (hashgocha protis). This leads into a discussion of teaching kabbala and why it was permitted to publish the Zohar and other kabbalistic works.

Rav Tzadok (Sefer Zichronos - Mitzva of Yichud HaShem): There is a positive commandment concerning the unity of G-d. This is learned from the verse (Devarim 6): Hear O Israel the L-rd our G-d the L-rd is One. The explanation of this “hearing” is understanding. This idea is explained in Chovas Halevavos (Shaar HaYichud) that one does not fulfill his religious obligation by merely reciting with his mouth that G-d is unitary while in his heart he doesn’t truly view G-d as truly one. The Rambam includes in this mitzva of unity the obligation to accept that G-d has no body or physicality and that He has no material aspects.  Similarly we find that the Chovas Halevavos explains that the faith in G-d’s unity means that a person knows how to distinguish between true unity and a transient one. The Rambam(Hilchos Teshuva 3:7) writes: Five are classified as heretics, Those who say the world is without a ruler, or that there are two or that there is a single deity but that that He has a body and physical form or that He is not alone in being the first and creator of everything else. [The Raavad understands this to mean a belief in pre-existing matter] or one who treats stars or other entities as intermediaries to G-d.

However in my opinion – concerning the avoidance of ascribing physicality to G-d – there is a different specific prohibition and it should be counted as a separate negative commandment. The prohibition against physicality is found in Devarim (4:15): One should be exceedingly careful in realizing that G-d has no form… It is  well known (Eiruvin 96) that the language of “taking care” means an actual Torah prohibition…. This particular verse is not a prohibition against making images but rather a prohibition concerning thinking or believing that G-d has some type of physical form….

This issue of avoiding attributing physicality to G-d is discussed in great deal by the sages of earlier generations in their writings. In fact one of the prime reason that the Rambam wrote the Moreh Nevuchim was because of this issue. The reason this is such a concern is that the literal understanding of many verses and discussions found in Agada seems to indicate that G-d does have some physical characteristics. It is especially needed in the middle ages because many observant Jews believed that G-d was actually physical. Others, while rejecting the idea of a fully physical G-d, nevertheless, viewed that He was made of light or wind or other lesser physical material – which still violates the prohibition of physicality. This is discussed in detail by the Rambam’s son – Avraham – in his letter defending his father’s Moreh Nevuchim. There he says that whoever believes even this lesser type of phsyciality is a heretic and has no portion in the World to Come. In this he is simply expressing the views of his father – the Rambam. … In contrast, while the Ramban and Raavad agree that it is a sin to believe that G-d has any physicality – but since it is easy to err in this matter because of the language of the Bible and Agada – such believers are not considered heretics. They disagree with the Sefer Ikkarim (1:2) who asserts that an honest mistake in this matter is not considered a sin at all.

On the other hand, the Tashbatz(Ohev Mishpat 9) asserts that one who naively believes in G-d’s physicality – is nevertheless considered an idol worshipper albeit in purity. Recanti (Parshas Yisro) also asserts that who ever invalidates one of the attributes of G-d even in thought is included in the category of idol worshippers. In other words, Recanti asserts that who ever separates the aspects of G-d and treats them as distinct entities is violating the prohibition against physicality and also the requirement to believe in G-d’s unity. This is discussed in detail in the Rambam (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 2:10) and also Moreh Nevuchim. One is not even to imagine some image of G-d…<

In sum, all this concern to avoid ascribing physicality to G-d is specifically connected to the prohibition (Devarim 4:15). It includes not only ascribing any physicality but also to separate His attributes, believe in secondary manifestations, or even that the world is eternal or that matter is eternal. Belief in secondary manifestations of G-d is incompatible with monotheism. Similarly belief in eternal matter is belief in a power other than G-d since it has existed as long as G-d and must of necessity be distinct from G-d.

In contrast to these authorities, I believe that Chazal had a different understanding of the mitzva of Yichud. Even the Rambam (Sefer Mitzvos Positive Command #2) describes Yichud as the acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven (in contrast to what he said before). We also see this different understanding in Berachos(13b): “Once a person has accepted G-d’s dominion above and below and in the four directions of the compass – nothing else is required.” We see clearly from these sources that Yichud is not meditation about the nature of G-d Himself. In other words it is not concerned with whether a person believes that G-d has subdivisions or changes – which was the understanding of the mitzva of Yichud expressed by the Chovas HaLevavos, Rambam and the others previously cited. These matters which they describe as the mitzva of Yichud really are already covered by the commandment found in Devarim (4:15). Their understanding of Yichud is not related to G-d’s dominion over the world which is part of the alternative concept of Yichud.

In truth those who have a philosophical concept of Yichud - focused on divorcing G-d of all physicality - run into another problem. They end up denying Divine Providence, the concept of reward & punishment, the ability to influence G-d by prayer and good deeds. In other words they end up with a heretical position. And even some of the most pious of the earlier eras as well as their gedolim were attracted to philosophical analysis of these issues. Consequently some of them came to reject that Providence applies all creation and they insisted that it only applied to man. Such an understanding of Providence is against Chazal as found in Yerushalmi (Shevi’is 9:1) and Bereishis Rabbah(79:6) which state that, “Even a bird will not be caught unless it is decreed in Heaven.” Ironically these great men - who thought that through their analysis would come to the true understanding of Yichud – in fact came to the opposite. That is because it is the opposite of Yichud to think that some aspect of creation can be separate from G-d and can exist without His constant Providence. Therefore even though they acknowledged that G-d created everything and that His Providence applies to things in general, nevertheless this is not genuine Yichud. That is because they believed that after creation something which interferes with the Yichud of creation with G-d. [to be continued]

Zohar was not originally in the form we have today

 This is an attempt to properly manage the outpouring of major hashkofa questions that have appeared in the comments section of the post regarding the Arizal and the Gra. I am taking one of the questions there with my response.
http://daattorah.blogspot.co.il/2013/01/part-i-gra-arizal-disagreed-r-michael.html

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EmesLeYaacovJanuary 10, 2013 3:26 PM

Chevra,

I don't think anyone is denying that there existed in ancient times some type of "Kabbalistic" Torah (Chagiga 11b).

But the real issue is - we are being told by R. Tzadok and other Kabbalah supporters that the sefer Zohar has a "mesora".

CAN ANY ZOHAR SUPPORTERS PLEASE ADDRESS THIS QUESTION?

In which authentic seforim or documents did ANY of the major Rishonim such as Rambam, Rashi, Rosh, Ramban, Rif etc. ever write that:

1) A Kabbalistic sefer known as the Zohar existed at the time of the Rishonim, or else had existed in ancient times
2) The sefer Zohar was authored by R. Shimon Bar Yochai or other ancient rabbinic authorities
3) The sefer Zohar was accurately and completely transmitted from the ancient rabbis to the time of the Rishonim

Please cite the exact sources where Rishonim mentioned Nos. 1, 2, or 3 above. Simply claiming that a Rishon recognized some type of "Kabbalah" is not an intellectually honest answer to my question.

If the Zohar supporters cannot provide valid answers to questions 1-3 above, how can they possibly argue that the Zohar represents "mesora"?

================================

I responded with the following:

@emes l'yaakov you are simply repeated a rather tired argument. It might enlighten you to read Prof Moshe Idel's Introduction to Kabbalah: New Perspectives (Yale UP 1988). There he contrasts Gershon Sholem's obsession with texts as the necessary basis for the study of kabbala while Idel argues that Kabbala is not primarily text based but Oral. Oral transmission is the foundation of the Oral Torah - which includes obviously kabbala. 

Even though there are prohibition of writing the Oral Torah - this was bypassed out of necessity. We are the people of the book - a Muslim designation - not by nature. The switch between an Oral transmission to a written one - especially with advances in technology such as the printing press or computers with databases - has created major difficulties. The accelerated growth of material which needs to be known is primarily a result of this written culture. With an Oral Transmission there are refinements, evolution and forgotting - just as there is with the human mind.

An example of what I am saying was stated by Rav Moshe Chagiz - one of the major zealot's and opponent of the Ramchal.   Mishnas Chachomim 232-234

Rav Moshe Chagiz (Mishnas Chochomim #332): Included in the proper requirements for love of one’s companions is to accept the truth from anyone who says it. The truth is clear that the editor and arranger of the holy Zohar was definitely a great man. He obtained material in written form. He then merited from Heaven to redact and publish it’s  exalted and sublime wisdom according to the order of the Torah. However this redaction and publication of the book which we have today, that is called the Zohar, was not  Heaven forfend  organized  by Rav Shimon bar Yochai or Rabbi Abba. It is a serious mistake to belive such a thing which blatently foolish. A similar mistaken belief is the belief that the Talmud that we have today is exactly that which Avraham had. This mistaken belief is something which should not even occur to G-d’s people who are Avraham’s direct descendants. We – thank G‑d - know how the Oral Torah developed  and how it was transmitted to us by oral transmission from Moshe who received it from G‑d. Mishnas Chochomim #333): And this that our Sages say that Avraham fulfilled the entire Torah even eiruv tavshilin  - it is not to be taken literally but only in the manner that I wrote in my first introduction to Eilu haMizvos. While it is true that everything was revealed to Avraham as our Sages learned from Bereishis (18:17), And G‑d said, How can I conceal from Avraham what I am about to do?... but we need to shut the mouths of critics who think we are fools and idiots who believe everything. Similarly, G‑d forfend that this wise and understanding people should understand literally the statement of our Sages (Berachos 5a), The verse “And I will give you the Tablets” refers to the Ten Commandments while “Torah” is refering to the Five Books of Moses, “And mitzvos” is referring to the Mishna, “which I have written” is referring to the Prophets and Writings , “to teach them” is referring to the Talmud – that this teaches us that all of this was given to Moshe on Mt. Sinai. It is clearly false to say that our Sages meant to tell us that Moshe received all of this the way we have it written down today.That is because prior to Rabbi Yehuda haNassi the entire Oral Torah was prohibited to put in written form. Consequently it is obvious that G‑d transmitted the Oral Torah (Mishna and Gemora) to Moshe not in written form. Rather it was only orally that G‑d revealed to him every generation and its authorities as well as all that which the diligent student would ask in the future. The majority of that transmission is that we remains and exists amongst us that has been validated,  certified and established so that there is no basis for us to question it. All of this I have already written in the Introduction I mentioned before. Mishnas Chochomim #334): And so it is with this awesome composition – the Zohar. There is no basis to question that the essence of the words as they are – came from the mouth of the Rashbi and his colleagues. Therefore whoever raises doubts about it is no different than one who raises doubts about G‑d. Nonetheless the one who redacted it made the connections  and continuity as he saw fit as is clear from the selection of the Zohar that I presented before in section 329.  
Mishnas Chochomim #329):Zohar (2:190b):’ “When they came into his presence R. Simeon at once saw from their faces that something was troubling them. He said to them: ‘Enter, my holy children! Come, O ye beloved sons of the King! Come, my cherished and dearly loved ones, ye who love one another!’-for R. Abba once said that Companions who love not one another pass away from the world before their time. All the Companions in the time of R. Simeon loved one another with heart and soul, and therefore in his generation the secrets were revealed; for he was wont to say that students of the Holy Torah who do not love one another cause a departure from the right path, and what is even more serious, cause a blemish in the very Torah itself, for the Torah is the essence of love, brotherhood, and truth. Abraham loved Isaac, and Isaac loved Abraham. They embraced one another; and Jacob was held by both in love and fellowship, intermingling their spirits each with each. Therefore members of the fellowship follow that example in order not to cause any blemish in the Torah.  As we have said, R. Simeon, having observed a certain sign in the faces of the newcomers, welcomed them with words of love; and they answered him saying, ‘Of a truth the spirit of prophecy rests upon the Holy Lamp, and so we should have known”.’... we see from this that even though all the words of this selection are true, it clearly indicates that the Zohar we have was only composed some time after the lifetime of Rav Shimon Bar Yochai by means of someone else who used his own mind to determine its form.

Rav Sternbuch:Taking care of senile ex- wife?

Teshuvos v'Hanhagos (5:316): A woman who has Alzheimer's  and her husband wants to divorce her.

Question: Regarding a woman who has Alzheimer's and the husband wants a normal married life and even though they have children - he is not able to live without a healthy wife. Therefore he was given permission to marry a second wife after he deposited a get and kesuba with beis din and guaranteed support for his first wife. However he feels pity for his first wife and wants with the agreement of his second wife to take care of his first wife when she needs it and to deal with her medical issues. Thus the question is since he has married a second wife and thus the first wife is prohibited to him - is it prohibited for him to have yichud and physical contact with her? Answer: It would seem that since it is prohibited for him to have two wife and therefore sexual relations with the first wife is prohibited it should also be prohibited for him to touch her as is explained in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 615), It is prohibited on Yom Kippur to have sexual relations and therefore it is prohibited to touch one's wife as if she were Niddah. However a distinction can clearly be made since on Yom Kippur there is concern that he will have desire for his wife and therefore if he touches her then he might transgress and have sexual relations. However in the present case one can argue that because of his wife's condition she is not capable of sexual relations and in addition he has a healthy wife that he will be thinking about. Therefore perhaps there is no basis to be concerned about sexual relations?

 We see that Rabbi Akiva Eiger (#44) cites the Tzemach Tzedek [hakadmon #67] that it is obvious that if the first wife is cured that beis din will force him to divorce her in order that he should not have two wives. Rabbi Akiva Eiger finds this conclusion questionable and asks what is the justification for this psak since the first wife was his original wife and he married the second women with rabbinic permission. According to his words that in a case where the wife becomes senile and he then marries a second wife legally then he should be able to keep both wives. That is because Rabbeinu Gershom did not prohibit such a situation and therfore he would be permitted to have two wives.

However Otzer HaPoskim (vol 1 page 18) brings the words of the great poskim that disagree with Rabbi Akiva Eiger and insist that the husband can not have two wives and therefore he must divorce the first wife as soon as she recovers. It seems that the reason for this is that Rabbeinu Gershom made his prohibition against having two wives to avoid conflict and arguments. Thus the problem is that the second wife is likely to claim that the husband is interested only in the first wife and not her. Therefore the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom is still applicable that it is prohibited to have two wives. Consequently it seems that the cherem of Rabbeinu Gershom prohibits sexual relations  with the sick first wife but would not prohibit yichud. Concerning hugging and kissing my opinion is that it should be prohibited - not because the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom but because it is likely to cause lust. And thought about sin is worse than the sin. Therefore the husband should make an agreement with the second wife and receive her permission to visit his first wife and to deal with her needs and medical treatment when needed. However if the first wife is a Niddah it is not permitted except if there is no one else and it is not done in an affectionate manner.

However it is necesssary to clarfiy what is the basis for abrogating the cherem of Rabbeinu Gershom when his wife is sick with Alzheimer's.  Because even according to those authorities who allow what is prohibited by Rabbeinu Gershom when the wife is insane even when the husband has fulfilled the mitzvoa of having children - is because they are concerned with his sexual thoughts. That doesn't apply so much in the present case. The husband is already in his sixties and she is living quietly with him in their home. But she is senile and doesn't know what is going on. Therefore he wants to divorce her and marry another woman so that he have a healthy wife who can take care of him and he can fulfil the mitzva of sexual relations.

However I am concerned about the issue of chilul HaShem that people will say that his first wife was with him all this time and took care of him and now when she is old and sick and can not do anything for him he is throwing her  out and taking another wife.  I am also concerned that if he is permitted to take a second wife - even in these unique circumstances - it will cause a breakdown of the observance of the prohibition of Rabbeinu Gershom. Therefore the matter needs to be considered carefully by great poskim. I personally would not agree to allow him to remarry. However this needs to be throughly thought through and perhaps if he is permitted to take care of her and he does so then there wouldn't be a chilul haShem. This require further careful thought..

Maharal - pilpul without understanding text - stupifies

Maharal( Nesivos HaTorah #5): [from my sefer Daas Torah] Woe to the embarrassment and degradation that we have changed our way of learning Torah from previous generations. This change is entirely because people say they need to sharpen themselves with subtle textual analyses (pilpul). Even if there was such a need, our Sages (Berachos 63b) have said: You should first learn the text and thoroughly familiarize yourself with it before deep analysis is done…. Therefore, if analysis is to be done on the text - it is still a precondition that the text be learned. The analysis that is done today purely for sharpness - without mastering the text - in fact stupefies with utter nonsense. We see what this “sharpness” is and what it is producing. Typically, one would expect young students to be learning and mastering many tractates before marriage. However now when a student marries he has mastered nothing. This is because they are learning Tosfos - which was meant as a supplement to the gemora. They should in fact be acquiring the gemora itself first. The reason for the focus on Tosfos is simply because it was printed on the page of the gemora. If the Rosh or other halachic commentaries had been printed there instead, they would be learning Halacha instead… What is the need for the young student to be involved in subtle textual analysis in the same way as the mature student? The consequence of this misplaced focus is that the students do not achieve mastery of Halacha. If you try explaining to the students’ fathers that they should be learning Halacha and not Tosfos, they react as if you were trying to convince them that their children should stop learning Torah! This is because all the father is concerned about is that his child has a reputation as a sharp mind - rather than that he learns Torah properly…