Unity of G-d vs belief in His physicality - Rav Tzadok

This is a very fascinating essay dealing with understanding the mitzva of yichud Hashem and the difference between a philosophical understanding and the kabbalistic one. He then relates this difference to differing concepts of Divine Providence (hashgocha protis). This leads into a discussion of teaching kabbala and why it was permitted to publish the Zohar and other kabbalistic works.

Rav Tzadok (Sefer Zichronos - Mitzva of Yichud HaShem): There is a positive commandment concerning the unity of G-d. This is learned from the verse (Devarim 6): Hear O Israel the L-rd our G-d the L-rd is One. The explanation of this “hearing” is understanding. This idea is explained in Chovas Halevavos (Shaar HaYichud) that one does not fulfill his religious obligation by merely reciting with his mouth that G-d is unitary while in his heart he doesn’t truly view G-d as truly one. The Rambam includes in this mitzva of unity the obligation to accept that G-d has no body or physicality and that He has no material aspects.  Similarly we find that the Chovas Halevavos explains that the faith in G-d’s unity means that a person knows how to distinguish between true unity and a transient one. The Rambam(Hilchos Teshuva 3:7) writes: Five are classified as heretics, Those who say the world is without a ruler, or that there are two or that there is a single deity but that that He has a body and physical form or that He is not alone in being the first and creator of everything else. [The Raavad understands this to mean a belief in pre-existing matter] or one who treats stars or other entities as intermediaries to G-d.

However in my opinion – concerning the avoidance of ascribing physicality to G-d – there is a different specific prohibition and it should be counted as a separate negative commandment. The prohibition against physicality is found in Devarim (4:15): One should be exceedingly careful in realizing that G-d has no form… It is  well known (Eiruvin 96) that the language of “taking care” means an actual Torah prohibition…. This particular verse is not a prohibition against making images but rather a prohibition concerning thinking or believing that G-d has some type of physical form….

This issue of avoiding attributing physicality to G-d is discussed in great deal by the sages of earlier generations in their writings. In fact one of the prime reason that the Rambam wrote the Moreh Nevuchim was because of this issue. The reason this is such a concern is that the literal understanding of many verses and discussions found in Agada seems to indicate that G-d does have some physical characteristics. It is especially needed in the middle ages because many observant Jews believed that G-d was actually physical. Others, while rejecting the idea of a fully physical G-d, nevertheless, viewed that He was made of light or wind or other lesser physical material – which still violates the prohibition of physicality. This is discussed in detail by the Rambam’s son – Avraham – in his letter defending his father’s Moreh Nevuchim. There he says that whoever believes even this lesser type of phsyciality is a heretic and has no portion in the World to Come. In this he is simply expressing the views of his father – the Rambam. … In contrast, while the Ramban and Raavad agree that it is a sin to believe that G-d has any physicality – but since it is easy to err in this matter because of the language of the Bible and Agada – such believers are not considered heretics. They disagree with the Sefer Ikkarim (1:2) who asserts that an honest mistake in this matter is not considered a sin at all.

On the other hand, the Tashbatz(Ohev Mishpat 9) asserts that one who naively believes in G-d’s physicality – is nevertheless considered an idol worshipper albeit in purity. Recanti (Parshas Yisro) also asserts that who ever invalidates one of the attributes of G-d even in thought is included in the category of idol worshippers. In other words, Recanti asserts that who ever separates the aspects of G-d and treats them as distinct entities is violating the prohibition against physicality and also the requirement to believe in G-d’s unity. This is discussed in detail in the Rambam (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 2:10) and also Moreh Nevuchim. One is not even to imagine some image of G-d…<

In sum, all this concern to avoid ascribing physicality to G-d is specifically connected to the prohibition (Devarim 4:15). It includes not only ascribing any physicality but also to separate His attributes, believe in secondary manifestations, or even that the world is eternal or that matter is eternal. Belief in secondary manifestations of G-d is incompatible with monotheism. Similarly belief in eternal matter is belief in a power other than G-d since it has existed as long as G-d and must of necessity be distinct from G-d.

In contrast to these authorities, I believe that Chazal had a different understanding of the mitzva of Yichud. Even the Rambam (Sefer Mitzvos Positive Command #2) describes Yichud as the acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven (in contrast to what he said before). We also see this different understanding in Berachos(13b): “Once a person has accepted G-d’s dominion above and below and in the four directions of the compass – nothing else is required.” We see clearly from these sources that Yichud is not meditation about the nature of G-d Himself. In other words it is not concerned with whether a person believes that G-d has subdivisions or changes – which was the understanding of the mitzva of Yichud expressed by the Chovas HaLevavos, Rambam and the others previously cited. These matters which they describe as the mitzva of Yichud really are already covered by the commandment found in Devarim (4:15). Their understanding of Yichud is not related to G-d’s dominion over the world which is part of the alternative concept of Yichud.

In truth those who have a philosophical concept of Yichud - focused on divorcing G-d of all physicality - run into another problem. They end up denying Divine Providence, the concept of reward & punishment, the ability to influence G-d by prayer and good deeds. In other words they end up with a heretical position. And even some of the most pious of the earlier eras as well as their gedolim were attracted to philosophical analysis of these issues. Consequently some of them came to reject that Providence applies all creation and they insisted that it only applied to man. Such an understanding of Providence is against Chazal as found in Yerushalmi (Shevi’is 9:1) and Bereishis Rabbah(79:6) which state that, “Even a bird will not be caught unless it is decreed in Heaven.” Ironically these great men - who thought that through their analysis would come to the true understanding of Yichud – in fact came to the opposite. That is because it is the opposite of Yichud to think that some aspect of creation can be separate from G-d and can exist without His constant Providence. Therefore even though they acknowledged that G-d created everything and that His Providence applies to things in general, nevertheless this is not genuine Yichud. That is because they believed that after creation something which interferes with the Yichud of creation with G-d. [to be continued]