Ginas Veradim (O.H. 2:6): According to the Torah one needs to follow the majority in all matters—even though for a particular issue it is possible and even likely that the result is not true. One follows the majority even in such serious matters as marital issues which can cause mamzerim…. The Rambam’s words concerning the validity of a Sefer Torah fit in well with this. Since we are trying to ascertain the correct text, it is necessary to thoroughly examine all possible scrolls—and then follow the majority. A Torah which has been corrected to follow this majority view is considered as being the Torah which was given on Sinai. Any deviation from this “majority” text is considered completely invalid according to Torah law and it lacks the sanctity of a Sefer Torah… The scribes from the previous generations worked hard to determine an accurate text based on the principle of “majority”… Therefore, a Torah which has been corrected according to this established text should not be modified. It should be viewed as the text that was received from Sinai. Consequently, any deviation from this standard accepted text - even a small single letter - should not be used l’chatchila for public reading. It should be viewed as an ordinary Chumash as the Rambam himself writes. However if it were used for public reading then one can rely on those who are lenient and not require that the reading be done over from the beginning…
Wednesday, August 9, 2023
World of Geirim VII - Shidduchim Issues - Relationship with parents
Igros Moshe (Y.D. 2:130):
Concerning a giyores whose non-Jewish mother is sick. Should she go to her mother with her children as her mother requests?
Concerning the matter of a giyores who has been following the appropriate Jewish practices and has kept a distance from her father and mother from the time that she has converted 20 years ago even though they live in the same city. But now her mother has fallen ill and requests that she come with her children to see her because she has a great longing to see her grandchildren . Even though the giyores knows that according to the Torah there is relationship anymore with her parents, nevertheless she wants to know if it is appropriate because she has a very strong natural love to her parents and she wants to fulfill her mother's request at this time of sickness. Her rabbi wants to permit it because of the concern that she might revert to her old ways as we see that there is such a concern regarding inheritance that a decree was made that a convert inherits his non-Jewish father because of this fear (Kiddushin 17).
Answer: I agree that the halacha is as her rabbi wrote that it can be permitted but because of logic. Because it is not clear that this fear for other things can be compared to loss of money because the desire for them is not so strong. However the more appropriate reason is that they might say that the laws of Torah are not correct if she is told not to go and this is a very significant point by itself even without the concern that she might revert. We see this from the fact that the halacha is that we visit sick non-Jews for the sake of peace as well as sustain the poor non-Jews and bury their dead for the sake of peace (Gittin 61).... So it is obvious that she and her children would be going against the ways of peace of they don't visit her mother. So besides that factor the Rambam (Mamrim 5;11) states that it is prohibited for a ger to curse his non-Jewish father or hit him and not to shame him so that people won't say that the ger went from a higher religion to a lower one so he should at least not shame his father (Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 241)... So if she doesn't go to visit her sick mother with her children it will cause the mother suffering and maybe it will drive her crazy. Thus we see it is an insult to the mother if she doesn't go and it is such pain that it is like hitting and cursing her. So therefore going to her mother is not only permitted but is obligatory to comply with the wishes of her mother to come and bring her children....
R' Akiva Eiger writes that this is part of human culture.... This mean that even though it is not an explict law of the Torah that a non-Jew must honor his parents and therefore it is not an issue of coming from a higher religion to a low one nevertheless but since natural ethics requires honoring parents then it is also included in coming from a higher religion to a lower one. It is like the reason of chillul hashem if they should say that the Torah permits something that even a nonJewish knows is prohibited...
Therefore it appears in my opinion that it is like the prohibition against ingratitude that we find in agadata that G-d was very particular about this with Adam and also with the Jewish people. Therefore this is something prohibited which is the same between Jews and non-Jews... This is like we don't find explicit prohibitions on bad character traits even though they are disgusting and they incur punishment both for Jews and non-Jews....
We can conclude from this analysis that even if her mother wasn't sick it would be appropriate to go at infrequent occassions if it would appear as ingratitute if she didn't go. It is only to be with her parents on a regular basis that is prohibited even for her in order that she distance herself from them and not revert and it is surely prohibited for her children to go regularly because they might eat unkosher food. However now that her mother is sick -besides visiting for the sake of peace she is obligated to visit with her children to give some sort of honor to her mother and to avoid shaming her (Shulchan Aruch)
'... .
Step Aside, Freud: Josef Breuer Is the True Father of Modern Psychotherapy
It is notable that Breuer had been more than a collaborator to Freud, who was 14 years younger, lending him money, referring patients to his practice, and welcoming him into his home. Yale historian Peter Gay, in his biography of Freud, wrote, “His disagreeable grumbling about Breuer in the 1890s is a classic case of ingratitude, the resentment of a proud debtor against his benefactor.”
Tuesday, August 8, 2023
Expert's evaluation is like a beis din & witnesses
Igros Moshe(Y.D. 2:103): Concerning the matter of a teacher who wants to punish a student that he has warned (Makkos 8b)… Certainly a teacher needs to punish a student for that which he clearly did - but not for mere suspicions. This is also true even if the teacher thinks that there is clearly circumstantial evidence that the student committed the prohibited act. It is not permitted for any person in the world to rely on his own opinion in order to punish even the slightest – unless he has clear knowledge and witnesses. Even for a matter which is only worth pennies (peruta) it is necessary to have witnesses and surely for corporal punishment which is worth more than money. In fact the teacher’s right to punish is not any different then a beis din for which mere suspicion is irrelevant to punish. However there is an apparent contradiction found in Makkos (8b) that even though a student has learned his lesson it is still permitted to punish him? But that is only if according to the student’s ability he is able to learn more Torah than he does because he is lazy and doesn’t work hard. In such a case he can be punished even though the student in fact had learned his lesson and doesn’t waste his time. But if the student does not look deeply into the matter because of his laziness then it is appropriate to punish him. This action is based only on the evaluation of the teacher because his expertise makes this something obvious to him and it is within his competence to judge these matters and it is impossible to go to beis din to judge this matter. There are obviously other matters that occur regularly to either a rav or a teacher and his students that they judge according to their understanding without bringing in witnesses and judges. These judgments that a rav or a teacher make without testimony of witnesses before a beis din is similar to what we find in Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 35:14) that in circumstances where men don’t typically go – there is an ancient decree to believe women. And similarly a rav or a teacher and his students, it is a very common that he is forced to rely on his expert opinion alone in deciding what actions to take. Nevertheless this knowledge has to be something that is clear to him and not mere suspicions. Furthermore if there are any doubt or suspicions concerning one of his students in a matter that is improper, it is necessary to first speak to him in a way that draws him closer to Torah and keeps him away from the suspected behavior. However if it clearly known to the teacher that it is necessary for the student to be punished, then it is proper to punish him calmly and not with anger or upset….
Use of deception to get mitzvos & spiritual perfection
Shaarei Teshuva(482:2): It says in Bava Metzia (62a) that your needs come before that of other people even in a matters of life and death. This is learned by R’ Akiva in the case of two people in the desert with a single container of water from the verse of “Your brother shall live with you” - which means that his life is secondary to yours. So if this principle is true in physical issues then surely it is true in spiritual issues. (This is written in Igros Shmuel to Megila Ruth. He says that Boaz knew by ruach hakodesh that Ruth would be the ancestress of the Davidic kings and therefore he described her as a Moabite in order that she would be rejected for marriage and he could marry her and he would merit having the royal descendants. Even though it is prohibited for someone to deceive others even to take that which is rightfully his. But that prohibition is in monetary matters but not concerning mitzvos. Even though it is impossible to take a mitzva away from someone who already has obtained the rights to it such as mila, nevertheless if no one has actually claimed the mitzva yet then it is viewed as a wilderness and available to all and everyone has the obligation to perfect his soul and merit having mitzvos. We see this principle also with Yaakov and how he took the rights of the first-born and the berachos since he knew that Esav was headed to do evil and Yaakov needed them to reach spiritual perfection as is explained by the Akeidas Yitzchok…).
Public knowledge is not lashon harah
Chofetz Chaim (clall 2) goes into great detail to try and disprove the simple understanding of Bava Basra (39b)/Erachin (16a), Tosfos and the view of the Rambam. These sources seem to say that the essence of lashon harah is speaking gossip in a concealed manner - not just saying negative things about others. Thus if it is said in a way that it will become public knowledge then there is no prohibition of lashon harah. This is apparently closer to the peshat of Vayikra (19:16).
Erachin(16a): Disparaging remarks said in front of three people is not considered lashon harah. What is the reaon? Because your friend has a friend and your friend’s friend has a friend [and thus it is considered public knowledge].
Tosfos (Bava Basra 39b): Negative words about another person that are said n the presence of three people is not prohibited as lashon harah - either to say or to repeat it to others This is clarified by the statement said in Erachin (15b) There this statement is said in the context of R’ Yossi statement in which he said, “I have never said something and looked around to see who was listening.” That means he wasn’t concerned if the one he was talking about was there. [That proves that saying negative comments in the presence of three people is not considered lashon harah – Rashi].
Meiri(Shabbos 33b): Even though lashon harah is the foundation of a number of sins and something which our sages spend much effort in severely attacking – there are two conditions in which lashon harah is permitted 1) This is mentioned in Erchin (15b) that derogatory words which are said in the presence of the one being talked about are not considered lashon harah. The gemora questions this and says that lashon harah said in the presence of the one being criticized is surely impudence and lashon harah? This is explained with a statement of R’ Yose that he never said any words about another person and looked around to make sure the person wasn't there. In other words if the person speaking does not refrain from saying the negative words before the one he is speaking about – there is a leniency and this is not considered lashon harah. For example if the speaker directly complains about the other person or calls him a thief and others such negative statements in his presence – the speaker is not considered speaking lashon harah. That is because he wants the person he is criticizing to hear what he is saying. 2) This is also mentioned in Erchin (16a) that whatever is said in the presence of three people is not considered lashon harah. That is because the speaker is saying the negative things with the full desire that his views reach the person he is speaking about. That is because all matters that are known to three people is not considered concealed or a secret. Therefore the speaker is not considered to be saying lashon harah.
Rambam(Hilchos De’os 7:5): Speaking lashon harah is prohibited whether the person being spoken about is present or not. Those words which will cause harm to another person - either physically or financially when repeated by others or even if it upset him or frightens him – is considered lashon harah. If these types of words are said in the presence of three people then it can be assumed that they have become public knowledge Therefore if one of the three repeats the negative words which he had heard on another occasion – there is no prohibition of lashon harah. However this is only permitted if he did not intend to spread the news and cause it to become more known.
Altering Torah laws when they become a problem
Meiri (Sanhedrin 17a):… It is necessary that the members of Sanhedrin should be very intelligent and sharp in all matters. This is expressed by saying that a person is not appointed to the Sanhedrin unless he is a talmid chachom who knows how to declare spiritually clean that which the Torah says is spiritually impure. It seems to me that the explanation for this is that if they see problems being created by any of the Torah laws in their generation – they should be able to create new halachos and to add and subtract from the Torah for the time of the emergency and be able to find justification for their words from the Torah itself. Similarly the Gaonim wrote that according to the Talmud that the rabbanim and Gaonim have the power to create new decrees and regulations in a general or specific manner in order to remove serious problems according to what they see in their times – even with just a weak legal justification. However the great commentators have written that the Talmud has only given this power to the major transmitters of Tradition or for those who are masters of correct reasoning and clear logic. Only they have the right to remove or add or interpret. In fact this barrier is locked before the majority of people and it is only the greatest scholars of the generation who possess the great knowledge and sharpness and analytical skills necessary along with the clear cut understanding and deliberate judgment – who are permitted to do it …
Two attitudes towards mitzvos
Rav Dov Katz(Pulmos HaMusar page 337):There are two basic attitudes towards mitzvos. The first attitude is that Mitzvos are what G-d has commanded us and the only task is to know exactly what has been commanded. Therefore the sole concern is halacha and its most complete observance. The second attitude is that Mitzvos are the means that G-d has given us to self-perfection. Therefore it is critical that the Mitzvos be done in such a way that they increase perfection. This requires introspection and self understanding rather than a mechanical performance. The latter position is the foundation of the Mussar approach – the former is the foundation of the opponents of mussar. The halachasist position thus is that self-perfection is entirely the result of the proper performance of the mitzva. Therefore the only concern is study and clarification of the best way to perform the mitzva. It has no concern with investigation of the hidden aspect of man or concern with clarification of theological issues. It is not concerned with the separate focus on perfection of personality. In fact there are no specialized concerns. The only thing is doing the mitzvos according to their details in the most direct and simple way. … The concern is not on the goal of personality development or understanding of theology but to maximize Torah study and knowledge of halacha – without concern for introspection and worry about motivation. Perfection is a side consequence – not a conscious goal. In contrast the Mussar approach views mitzvos only as a means to perfection. Thus they feel that the will of G‑d is not fulfilled by merely observing mitzvos as simply the command of G‑d. But rather there must be a conscious effort to elevate the image of man and attaching oneself to spiritual and personal elevation. The foundation point of this view is to see mitzvos not as an end but as a means. It is not sufficient to merely fulfill the mitzvos in a mechanical physical way. The concern is rather with the content and the motivation of the heart, thought and emotion. The main influence is not the physical activity of the limbs – even though they don’t ignore the importance of doing mitzvos – but the personal involvement and inner arousal.
Greatest Principle of the Torah - What is it?
In my research concerning empathy and the Torah - I have come across some interesting sources. The following is evidence that the famous statement of loving your neighbor as yourself - is not viewed as empathy. The question is why is this emphasized in Shabbos (31a) where the potential convert says, "Convert me on the condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I stand on one foot. Even though it is in the negative form of "that which is hateful to you don't do it to others." It still seems that this principle is ultimately rejected even by Rabbi Akiva - after the death of his students.
In addition the Abarbanel asks if this is such a critical principle why isn't it one of the Ten Commandments?
Bereishis Rabba(24:7): … Ben Azzai said, “This is the Book of the descendants of Adam” is a great principle of the Torah. However Rabbi Akiva said, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” is even a greater principle of the Torah. [It is only] because of [Ben Azzai’s] principle a person shouldn’t say that “since I have been been embarrassed, my neighbor should also be embarrassed with me. Just as I have been debased, my neighbor should also be debased with me.” Rav Tanchuma said, “If you do so, you should know whom you have embarrassed because man has been made in the likeness of G‑d.”
בראשית רבה (כד:ז): ...בן עזאי אומר זה ספר תולדות אדם זה כלל גדול בתורה, ר"ע אומר (ויקרא יט:יח) ואהבת לרעך כמוך, זה כלל גדול בתורה, שלא תאמר הואיל ונתבזיתי יתבזה חבירי עמי הואיל ונתקללתי יתקלל חבירי עמי, א"ר תנחומא אם עשית כן דע למי אתה מבזה, בדמות אלהים עשה אותו.
I have in fact found the Torah basis for empathy - but more at a later time.
Mussar - Shaming others less competent
Berachos(3b): R’ Yehoshua ben Levi said that one should not discuss any matters in the presence of a dead person except those matters directly concerning the deceased. R’ Abba bar Kahane said that this prohibition only applies to speaking words of Torah but there is no problem to speak about mundane matters. There is an alternative version that R’ Abba bar Kahane said that the prohibition applies also to words of Torah and surely it is prohibited to speak about mundane matters.
Rabbi Shlomo Freifeld zt”l told me in the name of Rav Yitzchok Hutner zt”l that this gemora is not limited to the case of speaking in the presence of the dead. It also refers to the prohibition of speaking sophisticated Torah analysis or doing any other activity in the presence of people who don’t have the background or ability to comprehend or participate - and are therefore shamed.
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Rabbi Shlomo Freifeld zt”l told me in the name of Rav Yitzchok Hutner zt”l that this gemora is not limited to the case of speaking in the presence of the dead. It also refers to the prohibition of speaking sophisticated Torah analysis or doing any other activity in the presence of people who don’t have the background or ability to comprehend or participate - and are therefore shamed.
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:ברכות (ג:): ואמר רבי זריקא אמר רבי אמי אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי: אין אומרין בפני המת אלא דבריו של מת. אמר רבי אבא בר כהנא: לא אמרן אלא בדברי תורה, אבל מילי דעלמא לית לן בה. ואיכא דאמרי, אמר רבי אבא בר כהנא: לא אמרן אלא [אפילו] בדברי תורה, וכל שכן מילי דעלמא
Pikuach nefesh & mental health I
One of the crucial issues in reporting child abuse is whether abuse constitutes pikuach nefesh and calling the police to save a child from abuse would be permitted. It seems to be widely assumed that it is - but where are the sources?
One source is the fact that when Rav Yochanon became psychotic [Rashi] after causing his beloved student Reish Lakish to die - the Rabbis prayed that he die and he did. This indicates that a state of insanity is worse than death.
Bava Metzia (84a): One day R. Johanan was bathing in the Jordan, when Resh Lakish saw him and leapt into the Jordan after him. Said he [R. Johanan] to him, ‘Your strength should be for the Torah.’ — ‘Your beauty,’ he replied, ‘should be for women.’ ‘If you will repent,’ said he, ‘I will give you my sister [in marriage], who is more beautiful than I.’ He undertook [to repent]; then he wished to return and collect his weapons, but could not. Subsequently, [R. Johanan] taught him Bible and Mishnah, and made him into a great man. Now, one day there was a dispute in the schoolhouse [with respect to the following. Viz.,] a sword, knife, dagger, spear, hand-saw and a scythe — at what stage [of their manufacture] can they become unclean? When their manufacture is finished. And when is their manufacture finished? — R. Johanan ruled: When they are tempered in a furnace. Resh Lakish maintained: When they have been furbished in water. Said he to him: ‘A robber understands his trade.’ Said he to him, ‘And wherewith have you benefited me: there [as a robber] I was called Master, and here I am called Master.’ ‘By bringing you under the wings of the Shechinah,’ he retorted. R. Johanan therefore felt himself deeply hurt, [as a result of which] Resh Lakish fell ill. His sister [sc. R. Johanan's, the wife of Resh Lakish] came and wept before him: ‘Forgive him for the sake of my son,’ she pleaded. He replied: ‘Leave thy fatherless children. I will preserve them alive.’ ‘For the sake of my widowhood then!’ ‘And let thy widows trust in me,’ he assured her. Resh Lakish died, and R. Johanan was plunged into deep grief. Said the Rabbis, ‘Who shall go to ease his mind? Let R. Eleazar b. Pedath go, whose disquisitions are very subtle.’ So he went and sat before him; and on every dictum uttered by R. Johanan he observed: ‘There is a Baraitha which Supports you.’ ‘Are you as the son of Lakisha?’ he complained: ‘when I stated a law, the son of Lakisha used to raise twenty-four objections, to which I gave twenty-four answers, which consequently led to a fuller comprehension of the law; whilst you say, "A Baraitha has been taught which supports you:" do I not know myself that my dicta are right?’ Thus he went on rending his garments and weeping, ‘Where are you, O son of Lakisha, where are you, O son of Lakisha;’ and he cried thus until his mind was turned. Thereupon the Rabbis prayed for him, and he died.
One source is the fact that when Rav Yochanon became psychotic [Rashi] after causing his beloved student Reish Lakish to die - the Rabbis prayed that he die and he did. This indicates that a state of insanity is worse than death.
Bava Metzia (84a): One day R. Johanan was bathing in the Jordan, when Resh Lakish saw him and leapt into the Jordan after him. Said he [R. Johanan] to him, ‘Your strength should be for the Torah.’ — ‘Your beauty,’ he replied, ‘should be for women.’ ‘If you will repent,’ said he, ‘I will give you my sister [in marriage], who is more beautiful than I.’ He undertook [to repent]; then he wished to return and collect his weapons, but could not. Subsequently, [R. Johanan] taught him Bible and Mishnah, and made him into a great man. Now, one day there was a dispute in the schoolhouse [with respect to the following. Viz.,] a sword, knife, dagger, spear, hand-saw and a scythe — at what stage [of their manufacture] can they become unclean? When their manufacture is finished. And when is their manufacture finished? — R. Johanan ruled: When they are tempered in a furnace. Resh Lakish maintained: When they have been furbished in water. Said he to him: ‘A robber understands his trade.’ Said he to him, ‘And wherewith have you benefited me: there [as a robber] I was called Master, and here I am called Master.’ ‘By bringing you under the wings of the Shechinah,’ he retorted. R. Johanan therefore felt himself deeply hurt, [as a result of which] Resh Lakish fell ill. His sister [sc. R. Johanan's, the wife of Resh Lakish] came and wept before him: ‘Forgive him for the sake of my son,’ she pleaded. He replied: ‘Leave thy fatherless children. I will preserve them alive.’ ‘For the sake of my widowhood then!’ ‘And let thy widows trust in me,’ he assured her. Resh Lakish died, and R. Johanan was plunged into deep grief. Said the Rabbis, ‘Who shall go to ease his mind? Let R. Eleazar b. Pedath go, whose disquisitions are very subtle.’ So he went and sat before him; and on every dictum uttered by R. Johanan he observed: ‘There is a Baraitha which Supports you.’ ‘Are you as the son of Lakisha?’ he complained: ‘when I stated a law, the son of Lakisha used to raise twenty-four objections, to which I gave twenty-four answers, which consequently led to a fuller comprehension of the law; whilst you say, "A Baraitha has been taught which supports you:" do I not know myself that my dicta are right?’ Thus he went on rending his garments and weeping, ‘Where are you, O son of Lakisha, where are you, O son of Lakisha;’ and he cried thus until his mind was turned. Thereupon the Rabbis prayed for him, and he died.
ר"ן (נדרים מ.) אין מבקש עליו רחמים לא שיחיה ולא שימות - נראה בעיני דה"ק פעמים שצריך לבקש רחמים על החולה שימות כגון שמצטער החולה בחליו הרבה ואי אפשר לו שיחיה כדאמרינן בפרק הנושא (כתובות קד) דכיון דחזאי אמתיה דרבי דעל כמה זימנין לבית הכסא ואנח תפילין וקא מצטער אמרה יהי רצון שיכופו העליונים את התחתונים כלומר דלימות רבי ומש"ה קאמר דהמבקר חולה מועילו בתפלתו אפי' לחיות מפני שהיא תפלה יותר מועלת ומי שאינו מבקרו אין צריך לומר שאינו מועילו לחיות אלא אפי' היכא דאיכא ליה הנאה במיתה אפי' אותה זוטרתי אינו מהנהו.
Pikuach Nefesh & mental health II
Regarding the view that potential mental illness constitutes pikuach nefesh what do we do about pregnancy which carries the risk of post partum depresion & psychosis.
Igros Moshe(E.H. 1:65) Question: Concerning a woman who becomes psychotic after the birth of each of her two sons and the doctors prohibit her to become pregnant again – is it permitted for her to use contraception?… Answer: You are definitely correct that psychosis is considered dangerous – not only to herself but also to her young children. Even though her psychosis is not now concerned with causing harm, but it is possible to change so that she will want to cause harm to herself and to her children – G‑d forbid! It is impossible to guard against this. Therefore she is permitted to use contraception since she has established that she has this problem because twice she has become psychotic after giving birth and it was only with great difficulty she was cured through shock treatments. Even though the doctors have not specifically warned her about this but since the halacha is in accord with Rebbe that two times constitute a chazaka (legal presumptive condition). Therefore we have to be concerned on our own. Perhaps even if the doctors say that it is permitted to become pregnant and that it was just coincidence that she became mentally ill just prior to child birth – it is commonsense not to rely on them since she already has a chazaka from the two times she became psychotic after she gave birth. On the other hand if the doctors had said after the first birth that she became psychotic as a result of childbirth there needs to be concern about this possibility of psychosis even for the second birth even though she did not yet have a chazaka that she would become psychotic after childbirth. Nevetheless she should be allowed contraception because of the concerns of the doctors.
Igros Moshe(E.H. 1:65) Question: Concerning a woman who becomes psychotic after the birth of each of her two sons and the doctors prohibit her to become pregnant again – is it permitted for her to use contraception?… Answer: You are definitely correct that psychosis is considered dangerous – not only to herself but also to her young children. Even though her psychosis is not now concerned with causing harm, but it is possible to change so that she will want to cause harm to herself and to her children – G‑d forbid! It is impossible to guard against this. Therefore she is permitted to use contraception since she has established that she has this problem because twice she has become psychotic after giving birth and it was only with great difficulty she was cured through shock treatments. Even though the doctors have not specifically warned her about this but since the halacha is in accord with Rebbe that two times constitute a chazaka (legal presumptive condition). Therefore we have to be concerned on our own. Perhaps even if the doctors say that it is permitted to become pregnant and that it was just coincidence that she became mentally ill just prior to child birth – it is commonsense not to rely on them since she already has a chazaka from the two times she became psychotic after she gave birth. On the other hand if the doctors had said after the first birth that she became psychotic as a result of childbirth there needs to be concern about this possibility of psychosis even for the second birth even though she did not yet have a chazaka that she would become psychotic after childbirth. Nevetheless she should be allowed contraception because of the concerns of the doctors.
His'orrus (stimulation) vs. Transformation - Kelm Mussar
Someone was lamenting to her rebbitzen about the lack of his'orrus (stimulation) from the current round of speeches given this time of year. The rebbitzen responded that the concern for this time of year should not be hearing exciting or stimulating speeches - even if delivered with great wit and even if they contain profound insight - we should instead be concerned with transformation.
In Kelm they explained his'orrus as being akin to the following.
Out in the country, far from the hustle and bustle of the big cities is a tranquil cow pasture. Nothing much happens there. The cows spend their days mindlessly grazing on the grass and drinking from the quiet little stream that flows with cool water through the pasture or just enjoying the sun and gentle breezes. However every once in a while a train goes by on the nearby tracks. It blows its whistle as it goes by. During that 2 minutes that the train is visible and audible the cows interrupt their eating, lift there heads and watch it go by. When it is gone they lower their heads and return to their routine of slowly chewing the grass and drinking the water. Nothing has really changed.
In Kelm they explained his'orrus as being akin to the following.
Out in the country, far from the hustle and bustle of the big cities is a tranquil cow pasture. Nothing much happens there. The cows spend their days mindlessly grazing on the grass and drinking from the quiet little stream that flows with cool water through the pasture or just enjoying the sun and gentle breezes. However every once in a while a train goes by on the nearby tracks. It blows its whistle as it goes by. During that 2 minutes that the train is visible and audible the cows interrupt their eating, lift there heads and watch it go by. When it is gone they lower their heads and return to their routine of slowly chewing the grass and drinking the water. Nothing has really changed.
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