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Wednesday, July 27, 2022

Another rabbi ignores halacha: "Withholding a Gett: Unjewish and Evil "

Update: Please read this lenient teshuva. I will be adding others which clearly indicate the complexity of the matter. Contrary to what Rabbi Brackman writes - that it is a clear cut moral issue - Rav Yosef says it is justified for some cases and some times in history - especially when there is a reasonable possibility that she will commit adultery. That is the view of the Tzitz Eliezar also. Other contemporary poskim don't accept the view that the husband can be forced to give a get to save her from committing adultery [to be continued]

Update Jan 17: Rav Sternbuch states that if it is clear to the beis din that there are objective reasons why the woman can't stand her husband and they paskened that the husband should give a Get - he says it is cruel and sinful for the husband to not divorce his wife out of spite and hatred. This is clearly not saying that a woman has the right to leave the marriage for any reason and that the husband must give a get immediately when the Get is request as R Brackman mistakenly states. If the husband is refusing to give a Get because issues have not been resolved - and not because of cruelty and spite - Rav Sternbuch,. Rav Ovadiah Yosef and Rav Eliashiv are not condemning such a person.

Force husband to prevent wife from committing adultery - not as a right to get on demand or because it is immoral to withhold a Get and only if he is objectively repulsive

Rav Ovadiya Yosef (Yabiya Omer 8:2.2): In previous generations the husband was given permission to take an additional wife if his first wife was declared to a moredes (rebellious wife). The first wife would remain an agunah for the rest of her life until she became an old lady with white hair as punishment for rebelling against her husband. An example of this is found in Shut Mishpat v’ Tzedaka b’Yaakov (2:36).... Similar cases are  found in other Achronim. Nevertheless our contemporary society has weakened and there is now a strong possibility that the agunah will deviate from religious observance because of her aguna status. This is a dissolute generation and people do not obey authority. And if the woman makes up her mind later to accept the get from her husband there is a clear concern that her husband will refuse to give her a get out of spite because he is already married to another woman and it is impossible to force him to give a get to his first wife and therefore she will just reject religion and go on a bad path. Because she is still married however, any children she subsequently has with another man will increase the number of mamzerim in the world. A possible solution is that before he can remarry he needs permission from the beis din and thus it is relatively easy to use that to influence him to deposit a get for his first wife with beis din. Only when he has deposited a get then can we give him permission to remarry according to halacha. After I thought of this, I saw that Rav Masas wrote in  his sefer Tevuos Shemesh (E.H. 30), “Even though in all the seforim of the Achronim concerning previous rabbinic courts (beis din), the beis din ruled that in the case of moredes she remained an agunah her entire life until she became an old lady with grey hair and the husband was allowed to marry another woman if he wanted – without first divorcing her. This was a common ruling and the first wife remained unable to remarry until the day that she died. However this approach was appropriate in previous generations when the spirit of Judaism permeated the people and there was no one who would dare do a serious sin – in particular not to openly transgress the serious sexual sins. But it is no longer true true in our day which to our great sorrow the spirit of individual freedom has become dominant and faith has weakened. We no longer have the power to have people properly comply with religious rulings and there is a great concern that people will go off the path of religious observance. There is no question that all our rabbis acknowledge that all efforts need to be made to have the get deposited with beis din...He concludes his words by saying that in the year 1950, all the rabbis of Morocco gather together and they made a decree through the official rabbinical confederation – that no man could remarry until he divorced his first wife who was a moredes and had declared that she couldn’t stand living with him (ma’os alei). This decree was accepted and it became a regular occurrence for the beis din to rule accordingly. This get that the husband was required to give before remarrying was not considered get me’usa ( a coerced get). That is because he had the choice of not remarrying and therefore he didn’t have to give the get. However with a moredes who simply wanted to afflict him and torture him and consequently refused to accept the get – there was no choice but to require that the get be deposited in beis din as we mentioned before....Click link for rest of the teshuva

See Rav Ovadia Yosef 3:20


Rav Ovadiya Yosef (Yabia Omer E.H. 3:18.13) : And in truth even according to the view of the poskim who hold that one does not force the husband to give a get when she claims ma'us alei, nevertheless there is a view that says there is a mitzva for the husband to divorce her and surely when there is a concern that because of the delay in get a get she will go off the derech. As we find in Shita Mekubetes (Kesubos 64)," Rabbeinu Yona wrote, "Even though we don't force a man to give a get when the wife says he is ma'us alei (disgusting to me) - that is only referring to forcing him by beating him with staffs. However beis din informs him that he has a mitzva to divorce her and they advise him to divorce her. And if he doesn't not in fact divorce her then this is a case of when a person transgresses the words of the rabbis that it is permitted to call him a sinner. However Rabbeinu Tam disagreed and said that even this we don't say to him but if he should come to ask whether he should divorce her without her getting the kesuba then beis din gives him the advice that he should divorce her immediately." Furthermore the Rema (Y.D. 248:20) writes that when the wife says ma'us alei the husband is obligated to divorce her. The Taz notes that the Rema here is only reporting the view of the Rambam but the Rema's true view is recorded in E.H. 77 where he doesn't mention that the husband should be forced to divorce her. But according to what we have said the words of the Rema (Y.D. 248.20) has a solid basis and that is the words of Rabbeinu Yonah. This is also noted by my friend the Tzitz Eliezar (5:26.4) based on the Noda B'Yehuda Kama (YD 68) who brings the words of the Rema as halacha l'maaseh and foundation principle. He notes that there is a basis to utilize this view at times of need according to the specific facts and needs of the time and appropriateness - depending on the evaluation of the beis din. I also say that in contemporary society with the degradation of the generations in free countries where every man does what he thinks is correct and there is a great increase in arrogance in the world and experience has taught that when a woman leaves her husband with the claim of ma'us alei and she is in limbo without receiving a get - that she will go and live with other men without the slightest shame or sense of embarrassment. As a result there is an increase in mamzerim in the world. In such a case we say that their degradation is to their benefit. This is expressed by the Ramban (Kesubos 63b), "Chas V'Shalom I am not arguing against the decree of the Gaonim to force him to divorce his wife and not only that but I strongly criticize those who say that it is not correct to follow their decrees but only the law as stated in the Talmud. In fact it is correct to listen to the Gaonim and to follow their decrees. Nevertheless now it is best to be very concern not to follow their decree because it has been abrogated because of the immorality of the generation." In other words in the time of the Ramban, even though women then had the brazenness to claim ma'us alei but they did not reach the extreme of chutpza to live with another man without receiving a get as we find in our days. But in the days before Moshiach as we are in now it is extremely relevant to considering returning to the decree of the Gaonim. And this is surely true when she is young and there is a real concern that she will go off the derech and there isn't much chance that she will return to her husband. Therefore it would appear that those who want to do something to force the husband to give a get have a solid basis for that decision. That is because the concerns that existed at the time of the Gaonim that the woman might go off the derech have returned. [In the time of the Gaonim the concern was that the woman would convert to Christianity for Islam rather than face end her days as an aguna]. Thus we see that whether the get should be forced or not is dependent on the particular time and era. And thus I have seen the gedol hador - Rav Chaim Palaggi in his Chaim v'Shalom (2:35) where he writes regarding forcing the husband that the view of a number of poskim including the Beis Yosef that the husband should not be forced to give a get. He writes, "Nevertheless according to everyone agrees that the woman is not forced to live with the husband. Therefore after a year or two after the time that they have separated from each other it would appear that he should be forced to divorce her. That is because there are two factors.  The man is not able to exist without a wife and the wife herself is not able to be without a husband. And this is surely true where she is young that we have to be concerned for disastrous results when she is chained as an aguna. Just look at how lenient the poskim are concerning preventing agunos in particular when she is young until they even go the extreme of relying on a minority opinion.  And surely the obligation lies on every dayan to be lenient is this manner in order to avoid trouble for both the man and the woman." Rav Chaim Palaggi is a great tree that one can rely on and surely in our day. And it is the same thing in cases where it is possible to combine various disputes of the poskim besides the claim of ma'us alei to be lenient. Also study Chaim V' Shalom (2:112), If there is a dispute between a husband and wife and the wife wants to be divorced and the husband refuses - one should establish a limited time for the matter to be resolved. And if we wait until 18 months  and we have despaired of reconciliation and it appears to beis din that there is nothing more than can be done for the marriage - they should separate the couple and force the husband to give a get until he proclaim,I want to give it.All of this that I have written is for the honor of G-d and His Torah." It is possible that Rav Palaggi is not talking about forcing with clubs but rather just calling him a sinner or similar techniques which is in accord with the view of Rabbeinu Yona and the Rema which we mentioned before.


Husband is not forced to give get when wife demands one- even if wife might commit adultery

Rav Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvos 174): Question: We are dealing with a case in which it apparently has been shown that the wife hates her husband – heart and soul – because of his behavior which is simply abnormal. The woman therefore has the claim of ma’us alei with a clear basis. This couple has lived separately for over 6 years. The question is whether the beis din will comply with the request of the wife and require him to give her a get. Answer: Even if you grant that this woman has the status of one who says ma’us alei with a clear justification, that in itself does not require that the husband give her a get. Look at Shut HaRashba (# 135 - attributed to Ramban), Question: When a woman claims ma’us alei... is the husband obligated to divorce her....? Answer: ... You should know that she is not able to force her husband to divorce her since  a woman goes out of the marriage sometimes according to her desires and sometimes not according to her desires. On the other hand the man only leaves the marriage only when he want to leave it... From all these you see that when a woman claims ma’us alei we do not force the husband to give a divorce... Even though the Rambam writes that when a woman says ma’us alei the husband is forced to divorce her – the Rambam is not correct in this matter... Concerning the kesuba and dowry that she brought him – according to the din she does not lose anything unless she insists on being a moredes for 12 months and all these 12 months she is not forced... However if she remains a moredes for 12 months and her husband wants to divorce her – she loses everything.... That is her din when her husband divorces her according to his wishes after 12 months. But if the desire to divorce comes from her – as we said before – he is not forced to divorce her. The words of the Rashba imply not only is the husband not forced to divorce her when she claims ma’us alei but that he has no obligation to give her a get! This is also apparent from the words of Tosfos(Kesubos 63).... Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 77:2): If she says that he disgusts me and I can not have relations with him – if the husband wants to divorce her she does not get any money from the Kesuba at all. Rema (E.H. 77:2)... All of this is only when she doesn’t give a reason and justification for her words as to why she finds him repulsive. But if she does give a reason for her words... And we don’t force him to divorce her  nor do we force her to remain with him. And if you want to claim that he must divorce her – it is obvious that since we don’t force her to remain with him then of necessity that there can’t be an obligation of the husband to give her a get. It is the same thing.

update Jan 17


Rav Sternbuch(5:345): Question:  A woman who has been separated from her husband for a number of years and she claims ma’us alei and there is a clear basis for this claim which has been verified. It is clear that there is no chance that they will reconcile. The husband is close to one of the chassidic rebbes who gives him great honor.  The beis din has met with the couple  many times and is firmly convinced that there is no possibility of reconciliation. Therefore they asked the husband to give his wife a get. However the husband has acted cruelly and refused. Even though I am presently traveling but since this is an emergency situation I will answer briefly.  You should know that many of the Rishonim including the Rambam and Rashi ruled that in a case of ma’us alei we force the husband to give a get. And some say that we force the get because of a decree of the Geonim. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri as well as other Rishonim disagreed and they held that a get can not be forced in a case of ma’us alei. The Rosh writes (43:6) that since there is a major dispute as to what the halacha is we don’t stick our heads between the great mountains. He also writes that whoever is lenient and forces a get results in an increase in mamzerim. The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 77:2) also says not to force the get. So even  though we agree that the halacha is that the get can not be forced when there is a claim of ma’us alei, nevertheless such a husband should not be given honor. Therefore it is necessary to inform the rebbe who is honoring him that he is giving the husband help to torment his wife which is a severe sin.

However prior to putting pressure on him through the rebbe, this the couple should be given 12 months during which efforts should be made to convince them to reconcile and expert marriage therapists should be used to deal with their issues. However when the beis din is convinced that there is no chance that they will reconcile and they paskened that it it appropriate for him to divorce his wife and not leave her an agunah – and nevertheless the husband refuses to divorce her. If we see there is no hope that he will give her a get – then his rebbe should be contacted and requested to stop honoring him. If he will listen to daas Torah he will not lose anything and one who observes mitzva will not know harm.

Rav Sternbuch (4:301): Question: I received a question from America where -  due to our many sins - it is common that women rebel against their husbands and afterwards go to secular courts - Gd forbid! The secular court makes a judgment in her favor - through coercion and not in accord with the law of the Torah. The judgment  obligates the husband to pay very high support payments and carries a penalty of prison for failure to comply. In addition she is typically awarded custody of the children. The husband is asking for a heter of meah rabbonim to be able to remarry without giving her a get since she is a moredes and has transgressed the religious laws. On the other hand she claims that the heter of meah rabbonim is not relevant since she in fact is willing to accept the get. She also claims that there are rabbis who support her position. So she wants to benefit twice by obtaining a get according to the Torah and also a judgment from civil court which steals money from from her husband even after the get. Answer: In my humble opinion there is no validity to her claims and therefore the husband should be given a heter so he can marry another woman. The only limitation is that he needs to deposit the get with beis din as is the established practice. The reason for this is complex. 1) first of all since they are coercing him financially not in accord with the halacha regarding the support payments which are much higher than the halacha - that constitutes theft. Thus the get itself is a forced get. The gedolei poskim are worried about get me'usa. Thus the get is not actually valid and we have the problem that she is still a married woman who thinks she can remarry. Therefore it is necessary to exempt him from all financial obligations that were done against his will in order that the get itself be valid. Furthermore if the wife refuses to go to beis din, then that itself gives her the halachic status of moredes as is clear from Divrei Chaim (E.H. 51) and he cites the Chavas Daas who ruled that a woman who refused to go to beis din  was a moredes and the gedolim agreed with him. ... According to this if she goes with him  only to beis din then he is obligated to give her a get. However when she goes to secular court in addition to make monetary claims - she is not able hold on to both sides. In other words she can't go to the secular court with monetary claims and at the same demand that he give her a get in beis din. If she forces him to accept the rulings of the secular court in marriage matters he has no obligation to give her a get. We need to state in addition that the essence of the Decree of Rabbeinu Gershom was for the benefit of the wife.  However this benefit is only available when she doesn't abrogate her halachic obligations. But in the present case she has created serious devastation in the marriage in that she has rebelled against him and went to secular court where she received excessive judgements concerning maintenance and also the custody of the children. Her husband must give her a get in beis din so that she can remarry. So in the case of moredes the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom which was meant to benefit women was not intended and the husband can remarry with the heter of 100 Rabbis and he deposits the get with beis din until the judgment of the secular court is nullified. When that happens- if he has not yet remarried - then it is prohibited for him to do so until he gives his first wife a get.

In reality your question is a local issue of America and it is the job of American rabbis to decide. However my view is in agreement with the rabbis there who permit the husband to remarry without any difficulty and he needs to deposit a get with beis din. But when the judgment of the secular courts has been nullified then it is prohibited for the husband to remarry until he has properly divorced the first wife.

You should be aware that we are obligated to fight against her going to secular courts and we prevent her from remarrying if she does and if the get is given under these circumstances there is a suspicion that it was coerced (me'usa). Nevertheless in a case where she claims she can't stand him (ma'us alei) and there is no reason to believe they can be reconciled and the man is simply being cruel to her and is being spiteful by not to giving her a divorce - then even though it is prohibited for us to exert any force- G-d forbid! - nevertheless it is correct to notify the husband that the view of many of the gedolim (e.g., Rambam, Ravad, Behag, Rashbam, Rashi etc) is that he is sinning and they would encourage him to give her a get. Because even these poskim are concerned about creating [an invalid get] which would leave her as a married woman even bedieved - so G-d forbid that we should use any type of coercion. Regarding the issue of tormenting her and leaving her an aguna - it is correct for him to be concerned for her claim that she finds him revolting (ma'os alei) and it is prohibited for him to leave her as an aguna - even if she is not correct. But we are not to coerce him G-d forbid with any type of coercion that would possibly bring about a get me'usa. Rather [once we have informed him that it is wrong for him to withhold the get] he needs to come the the realization himself that he must conduct himself like a descendant of Avraham and the verse says that the ways of Torah are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace and that he will find happiness with someone else.

All of this we need to explain to the husband. That leaving her as an aguna is a transgression of a severe sin of onas  devarim - not to torment his wife. That refusing to divorce her serves no purpose except to get revenge against her. He doesn't want to live with her and he shouldn't think her life is worthless and he should be fully aware that in Heaven there is judgment and there is a Judge. He should also be informed that to many of the early gedolim it is correct even to force him to divorce. Unfortunately there are many beis dins that when they see that the husband doesn't want to divorce his wife they simply remain silent. But that is not acceptable. They must inform him that he is unjustifiably tormenting her and this is not correct. This of course is assuming that the beis din is convinced that there is no hope for reconciliation....
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Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos v'Hanhagos 1:389): Question: A woman has suffered for a number of years from her husband who refuses to divorce her - how can he be forced to give a get?  

Answer: It is an established halacha that if the wife refuses to live with her husband because she claims he is disgusting to her (ma'os alei) that it is impossible to force him to divorce her. This is explicitly stated by the Rema (E.H. 77:3). And even if it has been a number of years that they have separated and he is being spiteful and cruel in refusing to divorce her it is clearly stated by the Teshuvos haRosh (43:6) that if we force him to give the get there is the concern that it is a get me'usa and therefore invalid and it only serves to increase mamzerim. However while it is stated in the Rema (E.H. 154:21) that nidoi (cherem) is considered force and is prohibited, nevertheless he says it is permitted to decree that no Jew should do him a favor or should do business with him or even to circumcize his sons or to bury them - until he divorces his wife. But the Pischei Teshuva (E.H. 154:30) says there these shunnings (harhakos) are equivalent to nidoi (cherem) and are not permitted to be imposed today and the only recourse is to tell him that it is permitted to call him a sinner  and he says it is best to be strict according to this opinion. This is agreed to by the Chazon Ish (E.H. 105:12). He concludes in the name of the Rashba that it is not permitted to humiliate the husband or to torment him - examine this well.

However it appears that what is prohibited is to humiliate him and to shun him in a manner similar to cherem - i.e, not to do business with him and not to do him a favor - and that is not done today. (Chazon Ish understands the Pischei Teshuva differently). But when he is not actively humiliated but that he is only not given honors for example he is notified that he will not receive an aliyah in his shul or any other shul and that he will not be allowed to be the shliach tzibor - then this is not like cherem at all even though it causes some humiliation. The only pressure permitted is that he should know that the community does not approve of his conduct of being cruel to his wife - but this is not called force at all.
I recall witnessing an incident involving Rav Yechiel Weinberg (Seridei Aish) concerning a husband who spitefully refused to divorce his wife after a number of years and he directed that it be known and publicized that this husband was not to get an aliya in the shul. That is in accord with what I have written that this type of pressure is not called force. It is also done here in Yerushalayim to publicize notices in the street that a particular person is a sinner and has made his wife an aguna. In my opinion 1) if she has solid justification for her desire to be divorced then it would be possible and appropriate to force him  actively with humiliations to give her a get. We learn from Kesubos (71a) if it is clear that he hates her then he is obligated to divorce her. 2) On the other hand if there is no apparent reason for her being repelled by him we can distance him.  I am inclined to permit humiliation in such cases but it is necessary for beis din first to be very careful and thorough in evaluating the situation as to whether it is appropriate. Similarly one should not spare any efforts to encourage that she live with him when she requests a divorce and there is no clear reason except she says she doesn't like him. 3) But if there is a clear reason - then even if we don't force him with a beating we are accustomed to be lenient to pressure him with notices  in shuls as I mentioned above.

This that the wife creates pressure with the claim that he is tormenting her and she can not stand the situation any more and that she is ready to go to "rabbis" who are lenient in divorce - that is still not justification for us to make rulings against the Torah. The ways of G-d are hidden and some suffer physically while other suffering financially and some suffer in their marriage. We need to hope to G-d that the end of suffering has arrived and that he will divorce her. On the other hand, to force him with high payments for food or to humiliate him when it is not permitted - it doesn't help because this pressure only produces a get me'usa - G-d forbid - which has no validity. But concerning cruelty and spite which is characteristic of Sedom - only Heaven can punish him.


Yachin uVoaz(1:124):[15th Century Algeria] You should know that there are two different types of moredes and they have different laws. There is a moredes who despises her husband and she asserts that he is disgusting to her. On the other hand there is a moredes who says she wants her husband but she wants to torment him In the case of ma'us alei the view of the Rambam is that the husband is forced to divorce her immediately and he learns this from a deduction from the gemora as the Rosh writes. The Rambam states in Hilchos Ishus  (14:8) that if a wife refuses sexual relations that the husband is forced to give a a get since she is not like a prisoner who can be forced to have relations with someone she hates. However there has long been an outcry against the ruling of the Rambam by all the commentators and poskim such as Rabbein Tam, Ramban, Rosh, Rashba and many others. They agree concerning forcing the husband to divorce. Whoever forces the husband to divorce in accordance to the ruling of the Rambam increases mamzerim in the world. And they reject the view of the Rambam with clear proofs from the Talmud as the Rosh does. And many proofs are brought to refute and reject the words of the Rambam. And even the Magid Mishna who normally devotes  himself in all places to justify the words of the Rambam and to firmly establish their validity with clear proofs - in this case he refutes the Rambam and goes into detail with proofs to contradict the Rambam's reasoning and to reject it. It is unnecessary to repeat them here. The halachic view that has become univeral is that one does not force the husband to give a get when she claim ma'us alei and we do not rely on the ruling of the Rambam nor others who agree with him in this matter. And furthermore that even if the halacha was in accord with the Rambam it would be correct to make a protective fence in this matter to prevent immorality amongst the woman because of the degradation of the contemporary generation. Because woman have become haughty and arrogant in their immorality. We are therefore concerned that a wife might have become interested in another man and she wants to discard her husband by declaring he is disgusting to me (ma'us alei). If it became known that that would be sufficient to have her husband forced to give her a get then it would surely cause problems. But in fact the Rambam is not the halacha because of the proofs that the opponents of the Rambam bring [And even in Algeria where they always follow the Rambam there are three exceptions and this is one of them and not those who agree with the Rambam...]. However I saw in the Rosh who writes that if in fact the psak of the Rambam was followed and the woman was divorced by force and she remarried - we don't force her leave the second marriage. However many others disagree with the Rosh and they say that if she remarries after a forced get - she must leave the second marriage.
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update: added my rebuttal in yellow

 I don't have time now to write a rebuttal of this article. Hopefully next week - but I thought it would be helpful to read this well written - though mistaken - piece. One of the comments summarizes the problem well.

Rivka Gornall Leiner · Top Commenter · Graphologist and Counselor at Self-Employed
Adds nothing but one more snowball in the avanche of one sided articles written by those who sleep quietly while female get refusal, child alienation, false abuse accusations, monetary extortion (on both sides) and cruelty play out because of the woman's spite or greed. This might help your rabbi points in feminist pc Denver but it ignores reality.
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Times of Israel    by Rabbi Levi Brackman

In my fourteen years of practicing as a rabbi I have been asked numerous times to offer counsel and support to couples in failing marriages. Despite the fact that it takes two to tango, often the breakdown of a marriage is more the fault of one party than the other. Yet, no matter how the marriage ends and who is at fault, if the husband does not actively agree to give a Gett (Jewish religious divorce) immediately after the wife requests it he is always in the wrong no matter what.

Why? That is clearly not the view of the Torah. See Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 77:2-3). So what is meant by wrong no matter what? Does that mean that the husband should not request marriage counseling first? Does that mean a mistaken belief that the Torah requires a Get on demand? What if the wife takes the kids and moves to another state. He is simply supposed to give a Get and forget about his children? Or perhaps it mean that if all issues are settled, the is no basis for reconciliation and yet the husband out of spite refuses to give a Get that he is wrong? If it is the latter than I agree totally but if the former conditions - I disagree strongly.

From a religious perspective, the Torah is very protective about the feelings and dignity of women — even more so than that of men. The Talmud warns men to never hurt their spouses feelings and or cause them to weep. It cautions men to be exceedingly careful about their spouses dignity and honor (Baba Metzia, 59a) and to respect and honor them more than they honor themselves (Yevamot, 62b, Maimonides, Ishut, 15:19). These guidelines are based on Biblical sources and have been codified into Jewish law. Furthermore the Talmud tells us that in matters of worldly and household affairs the women’s opinion takes precedence to that of the man’s (Baba Metzia, ibid).

Yes it is true that the Torah is concerned out not hurting the feelings of others - especially one's wife. But the sources cited are not dealing with divorce - but rather the conditions for a viable marriage. Similarly it is well known that there are a variety of laws about not hurting other people's feelings. However there are also laws that require criticizing others as well as saying bad things about them - even if it hurts there feelings. We don't refrain from telling others not to steal because it might hurt their feelings. We don't refrain from punishing murderers - even though it hurts them and embarrasses their family. Chastisement is a mitzva as is loving your fellow man.  One can not legitimately claim  that the Torah categorically prohibits hurting the feeling of others - especially one's wife. If Rabbi Brackman has sources for doing so - I would appreciate see them. Like most things in life - the various Torah obligations need to be prioritized and balanced.

Clearly a man who refuses his wife’s request to give a religious bill of divorce for any period of time after it is made clear that from her perspective the marriage is over, is contravening these extremely serious sections of Jewish law in the most grievous manner possible. But refusing to give a Gett is also the mark of a man who lacks basic human empathy and common decency.[...]

The above statement is not supported by the gemora, Shulchan Aruch or poskim. As noted above - I would appreciate sources for what seems to be a declaration that the concern for a wife's feeling is more important than all the other Torah obligations and Torah rights that a person has as well as the welfare of her children. That simply is not so.

Some men hide behind Jewish law as a reason not to give a Gett. They argue that all aspects of the divorce needs to be settled before they are Halachicly (according to Jewish law) allowed to give the Gett. They then proceed to make any settlement as difficult as possible, allowing them to continue their abusive and controlling behavior. Tragically there are some Jewish courts that allow men to behave this way. Happily, however, most of the larger reputable Jewish courts will not allow narcissistic men to use religion as a tool to further abuse and blackmail their wives. The most obnoxious Gett refusers, however, seem to avoid reputable Jewish courts. As pernicious, are men who tell their wife, who is desperate for a divorce, that they “want to work on their marriage” and therefore won’t give a Gett. Again this ploy won’t work at most reputable Jewish courts.

Is Rabbi Brackman claiming that insistence that all aspects be settled before giving a get is not the halacha or is he saying that the halacha is unfair to women for requiring this? Or is he saying that women view this halachic fact as giving an unfair advantage to the men? Is he saying that some men take advantage of this halacha or that the wife often claims that they are - even when there are legitimate reasons not to. Again he is describing a complex situation in very simplistic terms and in addition is totally ignoring the possibility that there are sometimes legitimate reasons for continuing negotiations - even if it makes the wife unhappy. In fact it is clear from Rabbi Brackman's writing that he views the woman as inevitably the victim and the man the bully. That is simply an inaccurate picture and biased description. Likewise he fails to note that some courts are biased against men - and that men try to avoid using such courts - even though women prefer them. [...] 

Thus, in Judaism when a man refuses to give his wife a Gett he is taking away her most basic human right — her freedom to live and be who she wants to be. The moment the wife decides she no longer wants to be married to her husband human empathy and common decency dictates that he must let her free. By finding excuses for not doing so he is controlling her in a manner that contravenes every aspect of her basic human rights. There is only one apt description for that type of behavior — pure evil.
Rabbi Brackman's idiosyncratic understanding of get is well expressed  "in Judaism when a man refuses to give his wife a Get he is taking away her most basic human right — her freedom to live and be who she wants to be." He is conflating Judaism with secular values.  He does not show that the Torah requires Get on demand and in fact it doesn't. Obviously such a fact bothers Rabbi Brackman.
Western man places freedom to do whatever he/she wants as the highest values - but it clearly is not a Jewish values. I would like to see him present a source which says that Judaism says that man's most basic right is freedom to live and be who she wants to be. Judaism takes away the right of a married woman to commit adultery, of males to have sexual relations with males, of Jews marrying non-Jews etc etc. Why doesn't Rabbi Brackman explicitly acknowledge that the values of Judaism as defined by halacha and hashkofa - are simply not adequate for him.
In the final analysis, the refusal to give a Gett by a husband, for any reason, will cause pain to his wife and therefore is not only contrary to the spirit of Judaism it contravenes the letter of the law as well. But beyond that it is a terrible desecration of G-d’s name because it in essence is just another example of the cynical use of religion to hurt and control another human being. Tragically this is yet another case of women being especially disadvantaged in this regard. [...]

 The above statement as a categorically statement is false as is clear from the gemora, Shulchan Aruch and poskim.

As the Halachic Prenup, which ensures substantial monetary penalties for not giving a Gett, becomes more popular this problem will hopefully become a thing of the past. But until that happens there are still women who are chained and suffering and it is up to you and me to do all we can to ensure that their evil tormentors do not get away with it.

He fails to note that in the Chareidi world the prenup is understood to be an example of financial pressure and thus is problematic as Get Me'usa. If his intent is to proclaim that only the Modern Orthodox understanding of halacha is legitimate - then he should say so instead of giving the clear but false impression that all Orthodox poskim agree with his view
===============================

Finally Rabbi Brackman posted a statement on Facebook criticizing those such as myself who have a "mistaken" understanding because we don't agree with his views concerning Get. 

He fails to note that such disagreement is not just that of the simple people such as myself - but is in fact the normative view of poskim through the ages as I have shown in many posts on my blog [just search for term "get me'sua" (or "get meusa" or "forced get") in the archives.

https://www.facebook.com/levi.brackman/posts/10205684977302618
There we go, it was bound to happen, Daniel Eidensohn, in his Daas Torah blog read my article and characterized it as a "well written - though mistaken - piece" and me as a "rabbi ignores halacha." I wonder what part is mistaken or against Halacha?
Perhaps the line that: "The Torah is very protective about the feelings and dignity of women — even more so than that of men."
Perhaps he thinks this is a mistake: "Refusing to give a Gett is also the mark of a man who lacks basic human empathy and common decency"?
Or maybe he disagrees with this: "the refusal to give a Gett by a husband, for any reason, will cause pain to his wife and therefore is not only contrary to the spirit of Judaism it contravenes the letter of the law as well."
He probably disagrees with the general idea that men should not be allowed to use the Get to further control and intimidate their wives.
Whatever it is he disagree with, the fact that his opinion is shared by so many of his circle is deeply troubling. What on earth is wrong with these people. It boggles the mind.

Saturday, February 25, 2017

Greenblatt-Kaminetsky Heter: Is Tamar considered as if she was forced to marry her second husband?

Received the following letter from Rabbi Shalom Spira concerning the Friedman-Epstein disaster. I am not convinced however that Tamar should be assumed not to be fully aware of the opposition to the Greenblatt-Kaminetsky heter and therefore I don't think she should be considered forced. [See a previous discussion of this issue Daas Torah - A Refutation of a proposed Heter]





Shalom Aleikhem R. Daniel Eidensohn, shlit"a,
I wept as I read your moving essay today regarding the agunah tragedy in Philadelphia.
http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2017/02/aharon-friedman-is-free-to-remarry.html
You will also recall that you generously showcased my prenup agreement on a past occasion, thereby highlighting (what is in my opinion) the optimal way to prophylactically prevent agunah tragedies:
http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/01/prenuptial-agreementrabbi-shalom-spira.html  
Accordingly, I just wanted to present a possible solution to Ms. Epstein's tragic plight, since (though I have no personal knowledge of the Philadelphia community) I am distantly spiritually related to one of its poskim. Namely, my semikhah (a copy of which is presently appended) is from the late R. Joshua H. Shmidman, zatza"l, whose son (presently carbon copied) is the Mara de-Atra of the Lower Merion Synagogue.  
My impression is that, [...], it appears that Ms. Epstein is anoosah, having honestly thought she was acted correctly, as per the derashah on "ha-adam bi-shevuah" (Leviticus 5:4) presented by the Gemara, Shevu'ot 26a. That derashah exculpates people who become confused by honest emotions beyond their control. Or Zaru'a. Hilkhot Yibbum ve-Kiddushin no. 637, employs this very derashah to exonerate from all sacrificial liability a gentleman who waits the statutory three months of clarification after his (apparently) childless brother died to wed the widow through levirate marriage, and then some time later discovers that the widow had been pregnant all along from her original husband, with the fetus being concealed. Since the brother acted in good faith, his unlawful incest is deemed to be anoose, not shogeg. 
Therefore, I would argue that Ms. Epstein has been anoosah until now, honestly believing that she was following a legitimate heter, and she should be allowed to return to her original husband, and not be asurah la-ba'al as would normally be the case for an adulterous lady.  [And I am sure an appropriate replacement shiddukh can be found for the second husband, who in fact no longer appears to be a husband altogether, if your refutation of the heter is accurate.] If matters would be explained to all the principals of the case in this manner, it may be possible to convince them to return to Beth Din as early as tomorrow, thereby bringing about a productive resolution. 
Thank you and best wishes,
Shalom Spira
Montreal, Canada

Thursday, May 12, 2016

Where is Torah Justice for Frum Divorced Fathers?


Guest post by Menachem B.

"Do not pervert justice" (Leviticus 19:15). 

"The judge who perverts justice is called an unjust person, hateful and detested, doomed to destruction, and an abomination." (Rashi on Leviticus 19:15).

"Orthodox" Feminist activists often love to proclaim their support for alleged "Justice" and "Gender Equality" in regards to Jewish women.  

But the double standards and hypocrisy of the Orthodox Feminist activists are blatant. 

If one examines the marriage/divorce policies of these activists, it is clear they are not promoting halachic divorce practices or halachic justice. 

Rather the Orthodox Feminist activists are promoting blatant double standards of female power, privilege, and control over males. 

The double standards promoted by these activists are in fact major causes of the alleged "agunot crisis" that the Orthodox Feminist activists constantly protest! 

Here are some critical questions that need to be asked to the Orthodox Feminist activists:

1. ANTI-MALE PRENUPS: Why does the standard US Modern Orthodox prenup empower a Jewish wife to force a Jewish divorce on her husband for any reason using massive financial penalties, while Jewish husbands are not allowed any such option of forcing a Jewish divorce on their wives?

2. FEMALE GET REFUSAL ALLOWED: Why does the JOFA Guide to Jewish Divorce explicitly allow female Get refusal under some circumstances, while Get refusal by Jewish husbands is adamantly opposed by Orthodox Feminist activists who characterize it as evil, cruel, and unacceptable? 

3. FAKE SEIRUVIM AGAINST MEN: Why are alleged "seiruvim" against Jewish men constantly publicized on Orthodox Feminist websites (such as the ORA and Jewish Press sites), even when the husbands are in compliance with halacha? 

4. SEIRUVIM AGAINST WOMEN IGNORED: Why are valid seiruvim against Jewish women very rarely or else never publicized in the Orthodox Feminist media, even when the women have committed major violations of halacha? 

5. PROTESTS ONLY AGAINST MEN: Why are alleged male Get refusers (including men compliant with halacha) often subjected to protests, public shaming, sanctions, etc. by Orthodox Feminist activists (such as ORA), while female Get refusers, female halacha violators, female mosrim, and female parental alienators are almost never subjected to any protests, public shaming, or sanctions? 

6. ONLY HUSBANDS MUST CONCEDE: In typical divorce conflicts, why do the Orthodox Feminist "rabbis" and activists demand that the husband comply with his wife's demands, including demands for a Get, while almost never demanding that the wife reciprocate by respecting the husband's halachic rights, including respecting the husband's rights to parent his children?

7. EVERY WIFE AN INNOCENT AGUNAH: Why do Orthodox Feminist "rabbis", activists, and media often rush to label any woman in a divorce conflict as an innocent oppressed "agunah" worthy of public support, regardless of her halachic compliance, regardless of her halachic right to a Get, and regardless of any severe transgressions she committed against her husband?  

8. EVERY HUSBAND GUILTY: Why do Orthodox Feminist "rabbis", activists and media, when discussing divorce conflicts, often misrepresent halacha and facts to portray Jewish husbands as evil oppressors of their wives?

9. ANNULMENTS FOR WOMEN ONLY ALLOWED: Why do Orthodox Feminist "rabbis" and activists often extend full recognition to halachically invalid "marriage annulments" obtained by Jewish women, while usually refusing to recognize halachically valid heter meah rabbanim obtained by Jewish men?

10. CRUEL TREATMENT OF FATHERS IGNORED: Why do Orthodox Feminist "rabbis" and activists almost completely ignore the desperate plight of divorced Jewish fathers, many of whom are virtual agunim who have been alienated from or denied access to their children, or were financially crushed in non-Jewish courts, or were booted out of their homes on fake domestic violence charges? 

Its time to start focusing some significant efforts on restoring halachic justice and halachic rights for frum divorced fathers. 



Without halachic rights for Jewish men it may be impossible to preserve Jewish families and resolve the agunot-agunim problems.

Saturday, September 1, 2018

Response to R. Shmuel Kamenetzky on the Methodology of Resolving Cases of Iggun by Rav Shalom C. Spira

   Procedural Summary by yadmoshe on Scribd

https://www.scribd.com/document/387494357/Response-to-R-Shmuel-Kamenetzkyhttps://www.scribd.com/document/387494357/Response-to-R-Shmuel-Kamenetzky
https://www.scribd.com/document/387494357/Response-to-R-Shmuel-Kamenetzky#from_embed


                                                Response to R. Shmuel Kamenetzky
on the Methodology of Resolving Cases of Iggun
                                                            Shalom C. Spira
                                                            12 Menachem Av, 5778

                                                            INTRODUCTION

            The Ha-Ma’or journal of Shevat-Adar 5776, p. 35, contains a letter to the editor by R. Shmuel Tsarch followed by an article by R. Shmuel Yehudah Leib Landesman – both of Monsey, New York, USA – both professing that a certain [anonymous] agunah case cannot be resolved on the basis of mekach ta‘ut to nullify the original kiddushin, and instead that the wife remains married to her original husband.[1] Because neither R. Tsarch nor R. Landesman identify the principals of the case, it is impossible to draw any practical conclusion from their contribution to Ha-Ma’or. On the other hand, R. Landesman’s article appears almost verbatim in the quarterly Kovetz Ginat Veradim published by “disciples and chassidim of Satmar” (R. Binyamin Berkovitz, ed.).[2] That Kovetz Ginat Veradim includes several other articles devoted to the same case, and which identify the principals of the case as Ms. Tamar Epstein vs. Mr. Aharon Friedman.
To that effect, in a documented telephone conversation, R. Shmuel Kamenetzky – member of the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of the Agudath Israel of America – elucidates his personal understanding of the case of Epstein vs. Friedman.[3] Namely, R. Kamenetzky points to the fact that R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt ruled that the original kiddushin between Epstein and Friedman were nullified by virtue of mekach ta‘ut (mistaken acquisition) occasioned by the husband’s mental illness. Accordingly, continues R. Kamenetzky, despite that fact that R. David Feinstein – also a member of the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of the Agudath Israel of America – ruled (quite the contrary) that the original kiddushin between Epstein and Friedman still remains, nevertheless the opinion of R. Greenblatt is sufficiently authoritative to exempt R. Kamenetzky from any obligation to intervene. Similarly, R. Shalom Kamenetzky (son of R. Shmuel Kamenetzky) has written that he spoke with his father R. Shmuel Kamanetzky, and that R. Shmuel Kamenetzky responded “kedai Ha-Rav Rabbeinu Nota shlit”a li-smokh alav le-hatir ishah zu mi-kavlei iggunah,” viz. R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt is sufficiently authoritative that we can rely upon him to rescue this lady from her agunah situation.[4]
In the following essay, this writer will analyze R. Shmuel Kamenetzky’s methodology, hypothesizing that – be-mechilat Kevod Torato – R. Kamenetzky’s methodology might be based on an innocent misinterpretation of a responsum of R. Moshe Feinstein, an innocent misinterpretation that was generated by three writers prior to R. Kamenetzky: R. Yom Tov ha-Levi Schwartz, R. Isaac Liebes and R. Michael J. Broyde.
This student undertakes the enterprise by announcing in advance two caveats, as follows. Firstly, already three year ago, this author published an essay containing a footnote recognizing both Ms. Epstein and Mr. Friedman as tzaddikim gemurim to whose credit redounds that their case has caused an expansion of Torah study, analogous to the comment of Rashi to Numbers 27:5.[5] That certainly remains the case now three years later. Accordingly, both Ms. Epstein and Mr. Friedman are hereby honoured by the publication of the present essay. Secondly, in no way is there any disrespect (chas ve-chalilah) intended toward R. Shmuel Kamenetzky by the present essay. On the contrary, this student is already on the record as honouring and congratulating R. Shmuel Kamenetzky for rescuing brain dead patients,[6] and – regarding that particular issue of brain death – this is true even though it conflicts with the position of R. David Feinstein.[7] Nevertheless, the Epstein vs. Friedman case may hypothetically be different, because R. Feivel Cohen [viz. R. Shmuel Kamenetzky’s partner in fulfilling the mitzvah of rescuing brain dead patients] himself published a responsum stating that Ms. Epstein remains married to Mr. Friedman.[8] In other words, whereas in the case of brain death it was R. Cohen and R. Kamenetzky vs. R. David Feinstein, in the case of mekach ta‘ut it is R. Cohen and R. David Feinstein vs. R. Kamenetzky.

A.    THE RESPONSUM OF IGGEROT MOSHEH

In a series of sequential responsa, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, nos. 98-103 addresses the conundrum of a married lady who has been instructed by her physicians that she cannot allow her inner ear to be moistened with water, such that the only way she can safely immerse in a mikveh is with a vasaline-coated cotton plug. R. Feinstein recognizes the gravity of the problem in the opening paragraph of his analysis by remarking that if no halakhic license is found to allow this lady to immerse with the earplug, then the lady will remain an “agunah,” viz. unable to return to shelom bayit with her husband. Fortuitously, R. Feinstein is able to proceed to argue that the lady may indeed permissibly immerse with the earplug, thus rescuing shelom bayit between husband and wife.
As posthumously chronicled by R. Moshe David Tendler,[9] R. Feinstein’s earplug responsum/responsa[10] (written during the years 5694-5695 when R. Feinstein resided in Luban) was/were[11] at odds with the countervailing responsum of R. Yechezkel Abramsky (who then resided in Slutzk). Accordingly, the report goes, these competing responsa of R. Feinstein and R. Abramsky were sent to R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky for adjudication. R. Grodzinsky concurred with R. Feinstein, and added the compliment that R. Feinstein had formulated an analysis more brilliant than that of which he [R. Grodzinsky] was personally capable.[12]
Of key interest within those responsa of R. Feinstein is the following passage in Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101, found on p.186 of that volume of Iggerot Mosheh:

“And regarding that which my beloved friend wrote [in protest against me] ‘how are we authorized to rely on chiddushim – like these that I clarified – for a practical [halakhic] purpose, especially when it contradicts certain Acharonim?’ Behold I say [in response]: has there been an end and a limit to the Torah, chas ve-chalilah, that we can only rule based on that which is found in books, and when questions materialize that are not found in books we will not adjudicate them even when it is within our hands to adjudicate them? Certainly, in my humble opinion, it is forbidden to say so, because certainly “He will aggrandize Torah” [(Isaiah 60:21)] now, also, in our time. And [so] it is obligatory for everyone in whose hands is the capacity to adjudicate every law that comes before him according to his ability with rigorous investigation and interrogation in Shas and poskim with straightforward understanding and with correct proofs, even when it is a new law that is not addressed in the books. And even regarding a law found in the books, certainly the [halakhic] decisor must also understand it and adjudicate with his knowledge before he rules, and not to rule simply because it is found [printed in the books] as such, for such would constitute the equivalent of issuing a halakhic ruling from a Mishnah [without genuine comprehension of Gemara and apprenticeship of senior decisors], concerning which it is stated that the [so-called] ‘Tanna’im’ destroy the world, [referring not to actual Tanna’im but rather to pseudo-scholars] who issue halakhic rulings based on the Mishnah alone, [as explained] in Sotah 22a, see there in Rashi’s commentary. And even if [a qualified halakhic authority’s] ruling is against certain geniuses from our rabbis the Acharonim, what of it, behold certainly even we are authorized to argue on the Acharonim, and sometimes even on a few Rishonim, when there are correct proofs and [where] the principle [can be upheld] with correct reasons, and regarding this kind of situation [the Sages of the Gemara] said ‘a judge has only what his eyes see,’ as elucidated in Bava Batra 131a, see there in Rashbam, so long as it is not against the famous poskim, the masters of the Shulchan Arukh who are accepted in all our countries, and regarding this kind of situation it is stated [in the Gemara, Chullin 7a] ‘a place was left for me to be aggrandized’, and like the majority of the responsa of Acharonim that adjudicate with chiddushim a number of laws for practical [halakhic] purposes. Howbeit, he [the qualified halakhic authority of our era] may not be arrogant in decision-making, and he must avoid [decision-making] wherever possible, but in a place of great necessity, and all the more so in a case of iggun like this case, for sure even we are obligated to issue a ruling, [even] if it only seems to us [correct] to permit, and it is forbidden for us to be [excessively] humble and to chain a daughter of Israel or to cause a stumbling block with prohibitions or even to just cause [gratuitous] loss of the money of Israel. And see Gittin 56a [which records Rabbi Yochanan as remarking] ‘the humility of Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulus destroyed our Beit ha-Mikdash,’ which is [a] difficult [statement]; why does he [Rabbi Yochanan] say ‘the humility of’? How is this relevant to humility? And see in Maharatz Chiyot a correct matter [of insight on this Gemara]. And [so] this [case of immersing with the cotton plug] is literally of the same nature, and we are required to issue a halakhic decision even in a practical sense when it appears to us with proofs and with straightforward understanding, and especially in a place of iggun like this, and to rescue from a stumbling block like this.”

  In employing the term iggun in this passage – just as in employing the term agunah in the opening paragraph of the first responsum – R. Feinstein is obviously deviating from the classic terminology of agunah/iggun. The classic terminology of agunah/iggun refers to a lady who seeks to remarry but is unable to do so, either because her long missing husband cannot be proven dead, or because her long estranged husband refuses to grant a get. Here, by contradistinction, R. Feinstein uses the term agunah/iggun in a fundamentally different way. Here, both the husband and wife are on the same wavelength; both husband and wife seek to return to shelom bayit, but there is a ritual question of Hilkhot Mikva’ot that is interfering with that quest. The iggun or “chaining” is the hindrance from the wife returning to her own husband and the husband returning to his own wife, as they both reciprocally seek.
As students of R. Feinstein, we can readily grasp why this case of aguanh/iggun – where the husband and wife are both on the same wavelength, and it is simply a question of ritual prohibition that is hindering their return to shelom bayit – should be markedly different than the classic case of agunah/iggun where the wife seeks to be freed from her original husband without that husband’s expressed consent. When the husband and wife are both on the same wavelength and the problem involves a halakhic question of ritual prohibition, one can sometimes argue that a minority view among the poskim to be lenient is sufficiently authoritative to serve as a basis for reliance in a time of duress (she‘at ha-dechak), as per the Gemara, Niddah 6b that “Rabbi Elazar is worthy for reliance in a time of duress.”[13] By contradistinction, in the classic case of agunah/iggun, when there is a contest between wife vs. husband, under no circumstances can one rely on a minority view among the poskim to [ostensibly] “rescue” the wife from her agunah condition. After all, the same way there is a she‘at ha-dechak for the wife, there is a countervailing she‘at ha-dechak for the husband.  Indeed, this principle is included within the Torah commandment “thou shall not favour a pauper in his dispute [with another litigant]” (Exodus 23:3). Viz., although the pauper is in a state of distress, the countervailing litigant is also in a state of distress, and so we cannot invoke Niddah 6b to favour one litigant over the other. Ergo, R. Feinstein never intended that his words in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 would apply to the classic agunah/iggun scenario.

B.    CRITIQUE BY MA‘ANEH LA-IGGEROT

In 5734, four decades after R. Moshe Feinstein originally composed his earplug responsa [presented in the previous section], R. Yom Tov ha-Levi Schwarz published Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot, a wide-ranging critique of numerous responsa of R. Feinstein.[14] To that effect, R. Schwarz, Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot nos. 122-124, challenges R. Feinstein’s earplug analysis. Interestingly, R. Schwarz actually concurs with R. Feinstein’s practical conclusion that the lady may indeed immerse in the mikveh; R. Schwarz’ only grievance against R. Feinstein is that he argues on the academic methodology of how to reach that same conclusion. [R. Schwarz does not relate to R. Grodzinsky’s reported congratulatory remarks for R. Feinstein’s responsum/responsa.[15]]
In Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot no. 123, R. Schwarz specifically targets the passage in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 where R. Feinstein allows resolving iggun problems using novel reasoning (viz. the same passage translated in full in Section A above). R. Schwarz remonstrates by citing R. Ezekiel Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 75, who addresses a case of a lady where a question has arisen that she might have accidentally received kiddushin, thereby potentially rendering her an agunah. R. Landau responds by enumerating seven (sic!) independent reasons why there was no kiddushin in this particular case. R. Landau concludes his responsum with the declaration: “And based on these seven heterim, even if a problem will be found with one of them, in any event based on the others – and how much more so with the combination of them all – this betulah is permitted, and behold she is an unmarried betulah as she was before, and is permitted [to marry] any gentleman.” Ergo, argues R. Schwarz, we see from Noda bi-Yehudah that – contrary to R. Feinstein – we cannot resolve agunah problems based on novel reasoning, but rather only based on solid, time-honoured, unassailable reasoning.
R. Schwarz then continues his attack on R. Feinstein by citing a subsequent responsum of R. Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 129, which address a case of a contested get. There [in a mathematically similar manner], R. Landau enumerates seven (sic!) independent reasons to validate the get, and concludes with the declaration:

“In the end of the matter, when all is considered, this lady is completely divorced, and she is permitted to marry any gentleman she wishes except a kohen. However, although her permission is clear for me, I do not want others to rely on me unless his honour, my father-in-law, the great genius, our master and teacher, Rabbi Yosef, chief rabbi and yeshivah teacher of Posen will agree with this heter, and likewise his honour the rabbi who is mesader[16] [will agree with this heter]. And then the lady can marry without someone protesting. And anyone who subsequently will question the validity of the get will know that the net of fence of Rabbeinu Tam [who pronounced an ostracism on those who gratuitously question the validity of gittin] is spread under his feet. And therefore everyone should be careful and listen to voice of halakhic decisors.”

So we see, argues R. Schwarz, that even with seven independent reasons to permit an agunah, in this latest case R. Landau refused to allow others to rely on his responsum unless two other Gedolim would agree in advance. Thus, continues R. Schwarz, once again contrary to R. Feinstein, we cannot resolve agunah problems based on novel reasoning, but rather only based on solid, time-honoured, unassailable reasoning.
R. Schwarz then proceeds to attack R. Feinstein from two different responsa published within Teshuvot Rabbi Akiva Eger, Vol. 1. In the first, viz. no. 105, final paragraph, R. Akiva Eger writes “we are orphans of orphans, [such that] because of a question we are not capable of overriding the words of the Rishonim whose waters we drink.” In the second, viz. no. 117, a response of R. Meir Posner to R. Akiva Eger, R. Posner writes: “This is my humble opinion [to be lenient]. However, it is nevertheless not intended for practice, for I am not worthy to argue on the Tzemach Tzedek [who is strict].” Ergo, claims R. Schwarz, we see from the words of R. Akiva Eger and R. Meir Posner – yet again contrary to R. Feinstein – that we cannot resolve agunah problems based on novel reasoning, but rather only based on solid, time-honoured, unassailable reasoning.
Alas, R. Schwarz has misunderstood R. Feinstein’s invocation of the terminology agunah/iggun in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101. As we saw above, Section A, R. Feinstein never claimed that one can resolve classic agunah/iggun scenarios based on novel reasoning. Rather, R. Feinstein employed novel reasoning to address the case of a husband and wife who are both on the same wavelength and who both wish to return to shelom bayit yet are being hindered by a ritual prohibition. Thus, neither of R. Landau’s responsa (which grapple with classic agunah/iggun problems, where there is a contest between wife vs. husband) are relevant to R. Feinstein’s fact pattern. Likewise, R. Meir Posner’s responsum (which grapples with a classic agunah/iggun problem, where there is a contest between wife vs. husband) is not relevant to R. Feinstein’s fact pattern.
At the same time, a more formidable difficulty with R. Feinstein is posed by the responsum of R. Akiva Eger cited by R. Schwarz, because R. Akiva Eger does not address the classic agunah/iggun scenario. Nevertheless, it seems to this student that even here – with some degree of careful distinction-drawing – we can rescue it with R. Feinstein by positing that R. Akiva Eger addresses a special case which is different than R. Feinstein’s focus. Namely, R. Akiva Eger addresses a situation where a question had arisen based on flimsy testimony that perhaps a lady had committed adultery such that perhaps a child subsequently born to her would be a mamzer. Regarding this special case, R. Akiva Eger is answering that since there is a Teshuvat ha-Rashba [what R. Akiva Eger calls “the words of the Rishonim whose waters we drink”] which is lenient to uphold the innocence of the wife and hence the legitimacy of the born child, here we are required to follow the traditional approach of Rashba, and we are forbidden to innovate a stringency [contrary to Rashba] to delegitimize the newborn son. On this exceptional case described by Rashba and R. Akiva Eger, R. Feinstein never intended to argue. In other words, granted that novel reasoning can indeed sometimes be appropriate in reaching halakhic conclusions regarding ritual prohibitions [as explained above, Section A], nevertheless R. Feinstein will be forced to concede that this is not so if the novel reasoning will delegitimize a newborn child as a mamzer contrary to the traditional approach of one of the Rishonim [such as Teshuvot ha-Rashba].
  In summary, then, R. Schwarz misunderstood R. Feinstein’s invocation of the terminology agunah/iggun in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101, such that R. Feinstein is not contradicted by the two responsa of R. Landau and the one responsum  sources that R. Schwarz marshals. Furthermore, while the responsum of R. Akiva Eger cited by R. Schwarz poses a greater difficulty against R. Feinstein, even there we can answer on behalf of R. Feinstein that he will not agree to employ novel reasoning when it delegitimizes a child as a mamzer contrary to the traditional approach of one of the Rishonim [such as Teshuvot ha-Rashba].

C. RESPONSUM OF BEIT AVI

            As we saw in the previous section, in 5734, Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot misinterpreted a responsum of R. Feinstein as claiming that classic agunah/iggun problems can be resolved on the basis of novel reasoning. In the following section, we will argue that the same misinterpretation of R. Feinstein was propagated a decade later, in 5745, with the publication of Teshuvot Beit Avi Vol. 4, by R. Yitzchak Isaac Liebes.
            R. Liebes, Teshuvot Beit Avi IV, no. 169, addresses the question of whether a get granted by a husband to avoid money being seized by a secular judge is a valid get.[17] R. Liebes acknowledges that the majority of Rishonim consider financial coercion to be coercion that would disqualify a get, but also points to a minority of Rishonim – viz. Rabbeinu Yerucham and possibly also Tashbetz – whom R. Liebes claims do not consider financial coercion to be coercion.[18] Therefore, continues R. Liebes, because the agunah/iggun crisis in the USA is an emergency, in a time of emergency we can rely on the minority opinion of Rabbeinu Yerucham [and possibly also Tashbetz] to validate the get.
            While R. Liebes does not reference R. Feinstein ever in this responsum, it would appear that R. Liebes’ argument is essentially predicated upon a misunderstanding of R. Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah no. 101 – the very same misunderstanding that had first been propagated by Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot. Namely, R. Liebes erroneously believes that R. Feinstein ruled that one can rely on a minority view to resolve a classic agunah/iggun scenario which classifies as a she‘at ha-dechak. Alas, R. Feinstein never intended such, and was only addressing a case of mikveh immersion. By contradistinction, when it comes to the classic agunah/iggun scenario, the same way there is a she‘at ha-dechak for the wife, so too there is a countervailing she‘at ha-dechak for the husband, such that Exodus 23:3 prohibits us from arbitrarily favouring the wife, as already explained above, Section A.
            Quite possibly, R. Liebes corrects for his own misunderstanding [of R. Feinstein] by adding two key limitations on R. Liebes’ own responsum: (a) R. Liebes will only validate the financially coerced get where a qualified Beth Din had previously ruled that the husband is obligated to deliver a get to the wife, and (b) even then, R. Liebes considers his responsum to only be theoretical until “two rabbis who are outstanding in halakhic decision-making who names are renowned will concur with me.” Nevertheless, even with these stated two limitations, the publication of R. Liebes’ fourth volume of Beit Avi may have reinforced the misperception of Iggerot Mosheh first professed by Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot.

D. ARTICLE BY RABBI BROYDE

            Three decades after the publication of the responsum of Beit Avi [analyzed in the previous section], R. Michael J. Broyde published an article “Plonit v. Ploni: The Get from the Man in a Permanent Vegetative State” in akirah Vol. 18 (Winter 2014). R. Broyde carefully introduces his article – which argues to validate a get from a PVS husband in a particular situation – with the caveat (p. 60) that “the author considers his English analysis tentative, as the literature continues to grow.” R. Broyde’s caveat would prove prescient, because several months later R. J. David Bleich would publish a countervailing article “The Get of efat” in Tradition 48:1 (Spring 2015), arguing to disqualify the same get.[19] [A comprehensive survey of the overall debate between R. Broyde vs. R. Bleich is beyond the scope of the present essay.]
            As a postscript to R. Broyde’s own article (p. 88), R. Broyde cites a letter of R. Moshe Mordekhai Farbstein in response to the Beth Din that arranged the get from a PVS husband. The letter reads as follows, as excellently translated by R. Broyde:

“It appears that you did not understand the purpose of my public statement on the matter. The intent was not to discuss the halakhic details with you but to express my anguish and protest on the great wrong of the three rabbinical judges who are not among the leading scholars of our generation and arrogantly decided to rely on their own judgment to permit a married woman [to marry another man] in a way that none of our great rabbis have ever done, and to publicize the matter only after the fact. Realize that even great leaders of the generation, like R. Akiva Eger, and others, did not rely on themselves–they made their rulings conditional on the approval of other Torah authorities. Before you actually issued the get, you should have written your conclusions and reasoning, and sent them to some of the leading halakhic authorities of the generation for approval.”[20]

            Then, as a counter-response to R. Farbstein, R. Broyde (p. 89) posits that “it is clear that R. Farbstein’s view is not the only view on such serious questions, and that R. Moshe Feinstein adopted a more liberal view of who is qualified to voice an opinion as a matter of normative halakhah in cases of iggun.” As evidence of this, R. Broyde cites Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 [presented in Section A of this essay], inferring from R. Feinstein that novel reasoning can indeed be employed to resolve classic agunah/iggun scenarios.
Alas, like his predecessors Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot and Beit Avi, R. Broyde (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has misunderstood R. Feinstein. Iggerot Mosheh refers to using novel reasoning to resolve a ritual prohibition where the wife and husband are both on the same wavelength and wish to return to shelom bayit. At no time does Iggerot Mosheh intend to employ novel reasoning to resolve a classic agunah/iggun situation involving a contest between wife vs. husband. [Hence, we can appreciate the cogency of R. Farbstein’s letter regarding the PVS get, as well as the cogency of R. Bleich’s subsequently published article arguing to disqualify the same get.[21]]
           
E. CUMULATIVE SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO EPSTEIN VS. FRIEDMAN

            We have seen in the previous three sections that Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot, Beit Avi and R. Broyde all misunderstood Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 as authorizing novel reasoning to resolve classic agunah/iggun scenarios. In fact, Iggerot Mosheh never intended this. Accordingly, we might hypothesize that when R. Shmuel Kamenetzky commented that R. Greenblatt is a sufficiently great authority for leniency in freeing Ms. Epstein from her iggun, R. Kamenetzky (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) may have been innocently misled by the above misinterpretation of those three scholars in how they read Iggerot Mosheh.           
            Indeed, addressing the case of Epstein vs. Friedman, R. Landesman (sec. 10 of his article) seems to comment to a parallel effect, as follows:

“One who examines the responsa of the great respondents in all the generations will find conclusively that even rabbis or batei din of great Ge’onim did not allow themselves to rely upon their own reasoning in laws of this nature, but rather only issued permissive rulings after the other giants of the generation concurred with them.”

            In a footnote to substantiate his thesis, R. Landesman points to the examples of Teshuvot Maharsham III, no. 16; VI, no. 159; and VIII, no. 133.
Admittedly, R. Landesman himself (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has a chequered record on matters of gittin ve-kiddushin. On the one hand, R. Landesman opposition to R. Jacob Kamenetzky’s hypothetically proposed prenup was a demonstration of good judgement by R. Landesman, which paved the way for this student’s diamond-polished edition which corrected R. Jacob Kamenetzky’s oversight.[22] On the other hand, R. Landesman’s service as a Dayan on the Beth Din that granted R. Aryeh Malkiel Kotler a heter me’ah Rabbanim might benefit from correction [and this notwithstanding the fact that R. Kotler (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has himself since been promoted to the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of Agudath Israel of America] – the correction for which has already been outlined in a footnote in a previous essay of this student.[23] Ergo, just because R. Landesman renders a judgement on gittin ve-kiddushin, it does not mean it is automatically normative. [Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not.] But the cited responsa of Maharsham do prima facie appear to methodologically support R. Landesman regarding Epstein vs. Friedman. Likewise, R. Landesman prima facie seems to be methodologically supported [regarding Epstein vs. Friedman] by the two responsa of R. Landau and the one responsum of R. Posner cited by R. Schwarz [presented above, Section B].
In the end, it is not the place of this student [who lacks ordination in Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat, and hence in matters of adjudicating mekach ta‘ut] to offer a verdict on Epstein vs. Friedman. In the hypothetical event that the halakhah follows the position of R. Cohen and R. David Feinstein that there was no mekach ta‘ut, it may also be hypothetically plausible to argue that the righteous Ms. Epstein has been anoosah pursuant to the Gemara, Shevu‘ot 26a,[24] for she was following the Beth Din of R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt in good conscience, and thus she should be allowed to return to shelom bayit with her righteous original husband Mr. Friedman.[25] As for the righteous second husband, since the RCA now converts 3 times as many ladies as gentlemen,[26] there should be no hypothetical difficulty swiftly finding him an excellent replacement shiddukh. Thus, all the righteous protagonists in this episode can be honoured and live happily ever after. Obviously, a practical question of this nature should optimally be referred to posek ha-dor, R. J. David Bleich. Until then, this unworthy student is satisfied that the present essay has clarified the meaning of Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 regarding the methodology of resolving cases of iggun.
   



[1]

[2] I am grateful to R. Daniel Eidensohn and R. David Eidensohn for bringing this Kovetz Ginat Veradim to my attention.

[3]

[4]
[5] See Shalom C. Spira, “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” footnote 3 (of that essay), available at . 

[6] See Shalom C. Spira, “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” available at . Whereas R. Shmuel Kamenetzky is not explicitly identified by name in that essay, it is well known that R. Shmuel Kamenetzky [together with R. Feivel Cohen] asked R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Joseph Shalom Eliashiv to issue a statement on 18 Menachem Av, 5751 that considers brain dead patients to be potentially alive. See R. David Shabtai, Defining the Moment: Understanding Brain Death in Halakhah (Shoresh Press, 2012), pp. 309-310.

[7] See “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit., footnote 217 (of that essay) and accompanying text.

[8] <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/01/rav-feivel-cohen-rules-heter-is.html> Furthermore, as can be seen there, R, Cohen’s ruling is countersigned by R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller. This writer [who presently resides in Montreal, Canada] recalls how in early 5766, when R. Yonatan Binyamin Weiss (of Bnei Brak) immigrated to Canada and was formally “crowned” at a reception (se‘udat hakhtarah) in honour of his being appointed as a Dayan on the Beth Din of the Jewish Community Council of Montreal, a videotape containing congratulatory remarks by R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller was played in order to demonstrate that R. Weiss is worthy to serve the Montreal community. Thus, R. Miller seems to be entitled to an opinion on matters of this nature (-were it not so, R. Miller’s endorsement of R. Weiss would be meaningless).

[9] R. Moshe David Tendler, Responsa of Rav Moshe Feinstein: Translation and Commentary (KTAV Publishing, 1996), p. 6.

[10] It is not clear from R. Tendler’s report whether the reference is to R. Feinstein’s initial responsum alone (i.e. Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 98) or to all of R. Feinstein’s sequential responsa on the same topic (i.e. Yoreh De‘ah I, nos. 98-103). For this reason, the main text presently adored by the footnotes is careful to specify “responsum/responsa”, in order to accommodate both hypothetical possibilities.

[11] See supra, note 10.

[12] Cf., however, the alternate version of this episode posthumously recounted by R. Shimon Finkelman, Reb Moshe: The Life and Ideals of HaGaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Mesorah Publications, revised and expanded edition, 2011), p. 61, which does not identify the subject of dispute between R. Feinstein vs. R. Abramsky, and which instead claims that the dispute occurred during “the five years from 1925 to 1930” [corresponding to 5684/5-5689/90 on the Jewish calendar], in which case it could not have chronologically coincided with the composition of Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, nos. 98-103. It is unclear to this student whether this discrepancy between R. Tendler vs. R. Finkelman is due to a typographical error on R. Finkelman’s part (be-mechilat Kevod Torato), or due to other considerations.

[13] See R. Ovadiah Yosef, Teshuvot Yabi‘a Omer X, Yoreh De‘ah no. 43, for an elucidation of the parameters when this principle may be employed.
[14] <http://www.israel613.com/books/MEANE_IGROT-H.pdf>

[15] See also R. Simchah Bunim Lazerson, Shulchan Shelomoh, Erkei Refu’ah III (Jerusalem, 5766), pp. 12-13, who cites R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as allowing a lady with a cotton earplug to immerse in the mikveh (at least under certain circumstances). Neither R. Feinstein nor R. Schwarz nor R. Grodzinsky are cited there as having preceded R. Auerbach on this matter.

[16] Presumably, R. Landau means the future rabbi who will serve as the mesader kiddushin when the lady attempts to remarry. [It is also hypothetically possible, though much less likely, that R. Landau means the rabbi who was mesader the contested get.]

[17] As already mentioned in the main text, the Beit Avi volume in which this responsum appears was published in 5745 (corresponding on the secular calendar to 1984/5), several years before the 1992 New York Get Law was legislated. Furthermore, even the subsequent Beit Avi volume (i.e. Vol. 5) published by R. Liebes – the very final volume that R. Liebes would ever publish in his physical lifetime – was published in 5750 (corresponding on the secular calendar to 1989/1990), a couple of years prior to the legislation of the 1992 New York Get Law. Thus, at no time did R. Liebes ever publish any responsum halakhah le-ma‘aseh validating gittin granted as a consequence of the 1992 New York Get Law.
  Nevertheless, because the issues that R. Liebes raises are conceptually relevant to the future 1992 New York Get Law, some have attempted to argue that R. Liebes’ responsum in Beit Avi IV, no. 169 de facto validates gittin granted following the future passage of the 1992 New York Get Law. That attempted argument is refuted by this student in “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” available at .

[18] See, however, “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op. cit., Section B (of that essay), for evidence that even Rabbeinu Yerucham and Tashbetz might consider financial coercion to constitute coercion which would disqualify a get.

[19] R. Bleich’s article would benefit from two typographical corrections. On p. 36, the reference in footnote 9 should read “Yated Ne’eman, 19 Sivan 5774” (not 5744). On p. 75, the reference in line 5 should read “Tosafot, Zevaim 2b” (not 2a).
More conceptually, an objection can be raised against the distinction R. Bleich (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) draws on pp. 60-61 between patients who are mentally ill due to physiological reasons vs. due to trauma. R. Bleich writes that “physiological illness is curable by medication; destroyed neural tissue is irreplaceable.” Yet, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah II, no. 146, p. 248, right-hand column, lines 12-18, surmises that patients who are mentally ill – even due to destroyed neural tissue by trauma – might be healed through medical therapy that has not yet been discovered, as well as through prayer. [How paradoxically ironic, then, that R. Feinstein takes a more optimistic approach to the prognosis of mentally ill patients than R. Bleich, when in fact – on the matter of defining brain death – it is R. Bleich who is more optimistic (in the sense that he deems brain dead patients to be alive) than R. Feinstein (who – according to a substantial school of reporters within the oral record – deems brain dead patients to be dead; see “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit.)] In any event, this more conceptual objection to R. Bleich’s article does not necessarily detract from R. Bleich’s overall thesis to disqualify the PVS get. After all, R. Bleich’s thesis is based on nine distinct sfekot le-chumra (tabulated on pp. 101-102 of his article). The conceptual objection that this student is raising would negate only one of those nine sfekot le-chumra (viz. safek le-chumra no. 6 on R. Bleich’s list).

[20] In a footnote adorning his translation [-the same translation which has been adapted, with appropriate credit given to R. Broyde, in the main text of the present essay], R. Broyde remarks:

“Of course, R. Farbstein’s criticism presumes that R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg’s approbation was inauthentic. But if R. Goldberg’s approval was in fact validly given (or not completely retracted; see previous note), then criticism of the judges for failing to consult with any gedolim is inapt.”

               Alas, R. Broyde (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has not read R. Farbstein’s letter with sufficient care. R. Farbstein did not criticize the judges for failing to consult with any gedolim. Rather, R. Farbstein criticized the judges for failing to consult with a number of gedolim [-in the original Hebrew, itself cited by R. Broyde in his article, R. Farbstein’s expression is “kamah ve-khamah mi-gedolei ha-poskim she-bi-zmanenu.”] Thus, even consulting with R. Goldberg alone would not satisfy R. Farbstein.

[21] A comprehensive survey of the overall debate between R. Broyde vs. R. Bleich is beyond the scope of this essay. However, if one were to hypothetically accept R. Bleich’s conclusion, then one would have to grapple with an urgent bioethical problem that R. Broyde raises in his article. Viz., R. Broyde (p.83) quotes the suggestion of R. Yitzchak Yosef that medical attention be withdrawn from the PVS husband so that he can die and the agunah be freed. Now, R. Broyde – refusing to authorize such passive euthanasia – infers from R. Yosef’s passive euthanasia suggestion that it is actually a benefit to the PVS husband for us to deliver a get on his behalf to his agunah wife, so that no one will actually contemplate following R. Yosef’s passive euthanasia proposal. Since, however, R. Bleich rejects in principle [contrary to R. Broyde] the possibility of a get in this situation, if one were to hypothetically accept R. Bleich conclusion, then one would then need to grapple that we are left with R. Yosef’s proposal for passive euthanasia. Should R. Yosef’s proposal then be followed?
It seems to this student that the answer has already been provided by R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer XVIII, no.19. Viz., R. Waldenberg rules that heroic medical measures must be employed to resuscitate a PVS patient, even though this will prolong the agunah plight of his wife, concluding as follows:

“…It is clear, therefore, that since to resuscitate him is encompassed within piku’ach nefesh, that one cannot take into account in this case that which on the other side the lady will continue through this [resuscitation] to be an agunah many years, with all the pain and suffering and sympathy for her travail, because piku’acḥ nefesh overrides everything, and it is incumbent upon her to accept the judgement of Heaven with love.”

               In truth, R. Waldenberg’s words require qualification. One certainly cannot demand of the agunah wife herself to resuscitate (or otherwise provide medical care for) her PVS husband with her own hands. After all, her doing so [thereby prolonging her husband’s life, thereby ipso facto prolonging her own agunah status] imposes intense emotional suffering upon herself, and she could plausibly argue that she is not required to endure such suffering in order to fulfill the mitzvah of piku’ach nefesh. As R. J. David Bleich, Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah III (KTAV Publishing, 2000), pp. 171-175 demonstrates, no bystander is required to experience suffering worth more that the entire value of his/her wealth in order to fulfill the mitzvah of piku’ach nefesh. The agunah wife is thus entitled to say, “I can’t be expected to impose such iggun suffering upon myself by prolonging my PVS husband’s life. I would be willing more than all of my wealth to be freed from my iggun.” By contradistinction, all other bystanders (not being the agunah wife) experience no such suffering in resuscitating (and/or medically treating) the PVS husband [or at least they cannot be said to be experiencing suffering the magnitude of which exceeds their entire wealth], and so those other bystanders are indeed obligated to resuscitate and/or medically treat the PVS husband by virtue of piku’ach nefesh.
This paradox, viz. the fact that the wife is exempt from saving her husband’s life but that no one else is, raises an intriguing corollary question. Would the wife be halakhically allowed to use force (e.g. a mandatory police-enforced DNR order) to prevent all other bystanders from saving her husband’s life, thereby optimizing her chances of being freed from her agunah status? At first glance, one might creatively justify such a course of action, pursuant to the following precedent. Shakh on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 163, se‘if katan 18 [as elaborated by Gilyon Yad Avraham to Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De‘ah 157:1] rules (together with several other poskim) – based on the Gemara, Yevamot 79a – that when a Jew is captured by a gentile ruler, then he/she can rescue himself even though it will cause the gentile ruler to capture someone else in his/her place. So, if a wife is trapped in functionally dead marriage to a PVS patient, one could creatively argue that Shakh et al. authorize the wife to free herself by using force to prevent anyone from saving her husband’s life. Nevertheless, this creative argument – while praiseworthy in an academic sense for expanding the horizons of our Torah study – is unsuccessful halakhah le-ma‘aseh. This is because, as explained by Shalom C. Spira and Mark A. Wainberg, “HIV Vaccine Triage: Halakhic Considerations,” Jewish Law Annual XX (2013), pp. 237-243, Shakh et al.’s approach is disputed by Rema to Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen Mishpat 388:2 and other poskim. Thus, the principle that safek de-Oraita le-chumra dictates that the agunah wife may not follow Shakh et al. in practice.

[22] See “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op. cit., footnote 85 (of that essay).
It may be noted that neither R. Jacob Kamenetzky nor any other mesader kiddushin has ever attempted to employ the original draft of the prenup, such that no mishap actually arose from R. Jacob Kamenetzky’s oversight. [N.B. According to the testimony of R. J. David Bleich, personally recounted to this student in a telephone conversation, R. Jacob Kamenetzky did not concur with R. Landesman’s objection, calling the objection “gibberish.” However, this student humbly disagrees with R. Jacob Kamenetzky, and does believe that R. Landesman’s objection is appropriate, for the reasoning explained in the aforementioned footnote 85 of “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op. cit.]

[23] See “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit., footnote 238 (of that essay).

[24] That Gemara expounds upon Leviticus 5:4 to exculpate a person who becomes confused by honest emotions beyond his/her control. Or Zaru'a, Hilkhot Yibbum ve-Kiddushin no. 637, employs this very exposition to exonerate from all sacrificial liability a gentleman who waits the statutory three months of clarification after his (apparently) childless brother died to wed the widow through levirate marriage, and then some time later discovers that the widow had been pregnant all along from her original husband, with the fetus being concealed. Since the brother acted in good faith, his unlawful incest is deemed to be anoose (an innocent accident for which no atonement is required), as opposed to shogeg (an inadvertent transgression for which atonement is required). 

[25] Indeed, if this is hypothetically the case, then it is a mitzvah to encourage this practical solution. After all, the Gemara, Yoma 9a-b, derives from I Samuel 2:22 that because Chofni and Pinchas (the two kohanim officiating at Shiloh, sons of the High Priest) delayed from bringing shelom bayit between wives and husbands, Scripture regards Chofni and Pinchas as though they (chas ve-chalilah) committed gilui arayot. [See also R. Yitzchak Zilberstein, Chashukei Chemed al Mesekhet Ketubot (5767), pp. 349-351, who rules that a person is obligated to spend up to a fifth of his wealth in order to fulfill the mitzvah of bringing peace between a husband and wife.]

[26] See Shalom C. Spira, “A Census of Sherbrooke Street for Purposes of Hilkhot Eiruvin,” footnote 4 (of that essay), available at .