Get Me'usa: An apparent contradiction between Igros Moshe and Tendler's Mesoras Moshe

I have raised the issue of the usefulness and reliability of Tendler's recently published Mesoras Moshe as a source of knowing Rav Moshe Feinstein's views. Mesores Moshe: What is it?   [see also Review of Mesoras Moshe by Rabbi Hoffman]  Rabbi Shmuel Fuerst writes in his haskoma to Mesoras Moshe that he went over the material to make sure that there was nothing that contradicted the Igros Moshe [something I found rather strange]. However in spite of Rabbi Fuerst's efforts I found something of importance that seems to be an apparent contradiction that has serious consequences. I would appreciate it if someone can explain why my understanding is incorrect.

The issue is, What type of pressure invalidates a get and produces a get me'usa? In the following teshuva from the Igros Moshe (vol 7), Rav Moshe clearly states that pressure that is done for punishment such as financial pressure, jail or beating is unacceptable. However in contrast pressure caused by a bribe to give a get rather than punishment is acceptable. Similarly a promise of help to get the husband out of jail on an unrelated charge is a legitimate way of motivating the giving of a get - but punishing with jail for not giving a get is not acceptable. Even conditioning the giving of a civil divorce on the giving of a get is acceptable because it is viewed as a benefit that he can choose to forgo. 

In sum in the Igros Moshe he says that punishment produces a get me'usa while reward or bribe does not. In apparent contrast in Mesoras Moshe he is alleged to have said, if the husband is tortured to do something he really doesn't want to do by beating or imprisonment in a jail where he will be beaten or killed - then it is invalid as ge me'usa. However all other types of coercion -  if he can withstand the pressure and not give a get unless he wants to - then it is not a get me'usa. There are significant differences between these two sources as what type of pressure can be used. According to the Mesoras Moshe it should be permitted to publicly embarrass the husband as ORA is doing. While according to the Igros Moshe it would clearly be wrong. The Igros Moshe is also in accord with the use of harchas of Rabbeinu Tam while the Mesoras Moshe is definitely not.

The translations of both the Igros Moshe and the Mesoras Moshe are mine and can not be used without my written permission.

=================

Igros Moshe( E.H. 4:106): This that there is an effort being made to pass a law in the state legislature that whenever a Jew becomes divorced in a secular court he is also obligated to give his wife a valid get in beis din – this is definitely a very major accomplishment. Such a law does not constitute an illegal coerced get (get me’usa) because of the involvement of non‑Jews. That is because the husband has the free will not to divorce his wife according to the secular law. It is only because he wants to obtain a secular divorce in order to be exempt from the financial obligations of his wife and that he will be able to legally marry another woman – and the secular government will not give it to him unless he has given a valid get to his first wife. Therefore he is giving the get of his own free‑will. This is exactly equivalent to one who doesn’t want to give his wife a get but when they give him thousands of shekel – suddenly he becomes willing to give it. This is not considered coerced (me’usa) since he has the free will to decide whether desire for the money is more important to him than the desire not to give the get.  It is a daily occurrence amongst the Jewish people that a husband is given this choice.

The coercion which invalidates a get is when he is beaten or imprisoned or given some other affliction in order that she be given the get. Such cases are considered that he is being forced to give the get – only then is it in invalid. Similarly even in the case of financial pressure in a case where the government obligates him to pay as a punishment for not giving the get is considered as a get given with financial coercion because he doesn’t want to lose the money. An additional case is if someone takes a large sum of money from the husband and refuses to return it unless he gives a divorce – is also considered to be illegal coercion. [See the Shulchan Aruch E.H. 134.4 in the Rema and Pischei Teshuva (E.H. 134.11)] In contrast if the husband is given money to motivate him to want to give the get – it is obvious that this is not considered coercion and it is a daily occurrence. So this concern for obtaining a benefit is exactly the same thing as giving a get in order to obtain a civil divorce. Even if he is imprisoned for a different matter and the wife has someone who is willing to intervene to obtain his freedom on the condition that he give her a get – this is not considered that he was coerced to give a get. That is because the cause of his suffering was not caused by his not giving a get – but because of an unrelated matter. The giving of the get only provides a remedy for removing the suffering. Therefore a get given to stop suffering from an unrelated matter is considered to be total free-will. This is quite simple and logical. This is a valid get even in a situation where he has no obligation to divorce her. [...]

===============

Mesoras Moshe (Even HaEzer #133 page 440): ... Rav Moshe was asked ... Is it permitted to force a disgusting and criminal husband to divorce his wife by beating him as some are accustomed to do. Rav Moshe replied that a get given as the result of a beating is a get me'usa and it is prohibited to do such. However all other types of pressure are permitted to do since the husband has a true choice concerning what he wants. In other words when he can decide that he would rather not lose money or kavod [that is not considered a get me'usa]. In contrast regarding torture even though he doesn't wnat to give a get but it is impossible for them to handle the pain. We see this in the statement of Chazal, "That if Chananya, Mishal and Ezarya were beaten" [Thus torture produces a get me'usa]. [in a footnote it states] ( And he viewed that only a beating given by beis din was legitimate but that which was given by laymen it is not clear that the consideration that a person really wants to listen to the chachomim applies). I then asked Rav Moshe when prison is considered to be torture [and thus would produce an invalid get]. He replied that in Europe there is no question that it would invalidate the get since it was such a horrible place that involved torture and possibly death... However  here in America perhaps there are types of jail that are not so horrible [and thus would not invalidate the get]

Then I asked Rav Moshe if the husband was beaten but no one told him that the beating would stop if he agreed to divorce his wife but rather he was simply told "you think you can handle this torture. Perhaps now you understand the torture you have caused your wife by making her an aguna" and then stop the beating. If he gives the divorce after this without mentioning the beating..." Rav Moshe laughed and said that maybe the would be valid under these circumstances since the husband isn't t explicitly giving the get because of the beating it would not be considered a get me'usa. However in terms of actually poskening that way Rav Moshe did not want to take the responsibility for such a psak. He said, "Practically speaking it would be impossible for me to permit such an action."

Rav Sternbuch: The nature of the prohibition of not accepting lashon harah

Guest Post: 1) The following is a teshuva from R Sternbuch, my translation, which  R Eidenhsohn  has graciously agreed to print. I was excited to find this Teshuva because it addresses a basic question I've had for a long time: How can we be told whether to believe a story -don't we do so automatically based on whether we think it makes sense?
2)I found this Teshuva particularly hard to translate as it seemed highly repetitive and I'm not completely certain of R Sternbuch's conclusion. (Where exactly do you draw the line between chazakah and reality?)
3)I have opted for a somewhat freer translation. Readers who can do so, are obviously advised to consult the original teshuva

Teshuvos v'Hanhagos 1:555):
A question regarding accepting Lashon Harah {Henceforth LH}

The holy Chafetz Chaim zt"l in Hilchos lashon hara (6:10) rules that it's forbidden to accept LH that one heard on his friend- rather he must assume that the guy  remains with his status of not having sinned. Nevertheless, one may take precautions and it's necessary to investigate and clarify, however he must not have even a doubt in his heart- as the guy retains his presumed innocence {Chazakah}

And his words are very difficult: are people angels that when he hears from someone he trusts and who does not hate the guy he's speaking about and therefore the listener suspects in his heart that it might be true how can we say that this is an issur of accepting LH?  Now, of course he may not harm the person spoken about at all based on hearsay, but in his heart he's going to have doubts that the report may be true! And it is hard to even imagine that he 'suspects' only in order to investigate but in truth he has no real doubt.- the law of chazakah itself leaves us unsure of the reality, just Halacha dictates to act as if the previous status remains! But it's never been ruled that even in one's heart it's prohibited to be in doubt of the true reality! But rather we have a doubt what the true reality is, and the presumption of innocence (chezkas kashrus) doesn't decide on this.

I likewise saw in the sefer Pe'as Sadcha (from RSD Munk zt"l) #29 that he reported that he asked the Chazon Ish zt"l about this and he replied "who can behave like that- this [the halacha regarding LH] is just lomdus". And he means as we said before that it's impossible to behave like this and the torah was not given to angels.

Therefore, it appears that that the Chafetz Chaim's intent was that since when one who hears LH,it's human nature to believe the reporter, especially if he's a reliable person, and it therefore becomes a full blown doubt by him that the LH may be true. And on this the opinion of the holy Chafetz Chaim is that he must know that the rules of the torah require that he presume everyone innocent-  just that the halachah is that he is permitted to suspect- and as a precaution against something that's likely to cause him harm if the report is true. But, beyond this, it is definitely prohibited to tell others or cause the person in question any pain or the like. And this doubt that is permitted here to act on,  is for himself to doubt the guy's innocence despite the general rule of chezkas kashrus,  and to act as if the rumor might be true; but in his heart he needs to know clearly that the guy keeps his chezkas kashrus and therefore the LH report is false {Sheker}- and the torah was not given to angels.

In any case, we are commanded to "judge everyone favorably" - to find a mitigating factor {be melamed zechus} as much as possible. And there is no limit to how many mitigating factors one can find- as well as to entertain that the teller did not see what happened exactly or all the details and therefore did not relate all that was involved etc

And the primary prohibition of LH is that after one has heard the gossip, he should not change the way he relates to guy he heard about at all, and  that as relates to the guy he does not  suspect him of anything, even if he cannot be an angel who it would be clear to, as we have said. 

תשובות והנהגות כרך א

  סימן תקנה

שאלה: באיסור קבלת לשון הרע וגדרה 

הקדוש בעל "חפץ חיים" זצ"ל בהלכות לשון הרע (כלל ו' סעיף י') פוסק שאסור לקבל לשה"ר ששמע רע על חבירו רק יש להעמידו על חזקתו שאין בו עולה, ומ"מ למיחש מיהת בעי לברר וליזהר, אבל אין לו עוד אפילו ספק בלבבו כל זמן שיש חזקה. 

ודבריו תמוהין מאד, אטו בני אדם מלאכי השרת הם, וכששומע מאדם מהימן שאינו שונאו וחושש בלבו, היאך נימא שזהו איסור קבלת לשון הרע, ונהי דאי אפשר לו לנגוע בחבירו כמלא נימא על סמך שמועה, מ"מ בלבו מסתפק שמא השמועה נכונה, וקשה אפילו לצייר שחושש רק כדי לברר אבל באמת אין אצלו אפילו חשש, והלוא מדין חזקה גופא נשאר ספק רק הלכה לנהוג כמקודם, ומעולם לא נפסק בחזקה שגם בלב אסור להסתפק כלל, ועכ"פ יש כאן ספק במציאות והחזקת כשרות לא מכרעת על זה. 

וכן ראיתי בספר "פאת שדך" (מהגר"ש מונק זצ"ל) סי' כ"ט מביא ששאל מהחזו"א זצ"ל והשיב "מי יכול לעמוד בזה אין זה אלא לומדות" וכוונתו כנ"ל שהרי אי אפשר לעמוד בזה ולא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת. ולכן נראה בכוונת הח"ח דכששומע לשה"ר הלוא טבע האדם הוא להאמין למספר ובפרט אם הוא אדם נאמן, ונעשה לו עכ"פ ספק גמור, ולזה דעת הקדוש החפץ חיים שצריך לידע שדין התורה הוא להעמיד כל אחד בחזקתו והרי הוא בחזקת כשרות, ורק הלכה היא שמותר לחשוש וכחששא לענין זהירות מדבר שעלול ליגרם לו נזק אם השמועה היתה נכונה, ומלבד זהירות זה האיסור בתורת ודאי לספר לאחרים או לצערו וכדומה, וחששא זו שהותר בזה היא שלעצמו חושש שלא כדין חזקת כשרות, אלא כאילו כן האמת, אבל בלבו צריך לידע ברור שחזקתו בכשרות, ולכן סיפור הלשה"ר הוא שקר, ולא ניתנה התורה למלאכי השרת. ובכל אופן מצווים אנו "בצדק תשפוט עמיתך" ללמד זכות כפי האפשר ואין גבול עד כמה אפשר ללמד זכות, וגם לצדד שההוא לא ראה בדקדוק או את כל הפרטים ולא סיפר או יודע כל הנסיבות וכו'. 

ועיקר איסור קבלת לשון הרע הוא לאחר השמיעה שלא ישתנה אצלו היחס לחבירו כלל, וליהוי כאילו לא שמע, שלגבי חבירו אינו חושש כלל, אף אם לעצמו אינו כמלאכי השרת שברור לו, וכמ"ש. 

Lesson for Shavuos: Your spiritual (& physical life) comes before that of others

One of the most important lessons about spirituality I learned from  Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach because of the following Shaarei Teshuva. Everybody knows the gemora (BM 62a) that when there are two people in the desert with only one container of water - that you don't sacrifice your life by giving your water to the other person. Similarly the mitzva of "loving your fellow as yourself - the commentaries note that it can't be understood literally since your life comes first. 

When I read the following while indexing the Mishna Berura (Yad Yisroel) I was puzzled. How could it be that if there is a spiritual opportunity that you can not give it up to help another person? After all doesn't the Chofetz Chaim say that serving G-d with all your might means that you must be prepared to sacrifice that which is most precious to you. Therefore if you are Talmid Chachom you should be prepared to sacrifice your learning for the sake of serving G-d?

The lesson mentioned below for Shavuos is that Boaz did not want to sacrifice the spiritual opportunity to be the ancestor of Dovid HaMelech and therefore concealed the importance of marrying Ruth. Similarly Yaakov didn't want to miss the opportunity to be the ancestor of the Jewish people and therefore he bought it from a starving Esav with food - instead of simply feeding him.

I asked Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach why in the case of the prisoners with one kazayis of matzoh they have to fight over it and one can not simply allow the other to take it?

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach answered:. If you possess the matzoh you can give it to another person. However if neither of you have the mitzva - then you have to strive to obtain it. The reasoning is simple. By not making an effort but simply passively letting the other take the mitzva you are showing a contempt for the mitzva. You are showing that it really doesn't mean anything to you. However once you have the mitzva - then the giving the other person the opportunity does not show a disrespect for the mitzva.

Bottom line: The Torah(Devarim 1:17) says that one should not withdraw when confronted by any man. That means if you know the halacha - you can not refuse to pasken. You can not pretend you don't know the halacha. Nor can you refuse to question your teachers because they are so much superior to you (Sanhedrin 6b).  Similarly, one can not be shy and  humble when it comes to acquiring Torah learning or doing mitzvos. (See Mishna Berura in simon 1).

Shaarei Teshuva (482:1-2) The Beis Yehudah asks when two people are in prison or in the desert and there is only enough matzo for one of them to fulfill the mitzva – who has priority? He answers that whoever is stronger gets the matzo. But this answer doesn't seem correct because then the matzo would be considered stolen from the other party and thus not able to used for the mitzva. … Apparently then the Beis Yehuda's case must be in the case where the matzo is ownerless. This would thus be no different than other situations where somebody acquires something from hefker such as leket shicha and peah….You take precedent over everyone else – even concerning something which is needed to live…. In the case of two people in the desert, the halacha is that it is prohibited to give up your portion of water to save the other – even if both die because of this. If this is true concerning material things than it is surely true concerning spiritual issues. The commentary to Megilas Ruth - Igros Shemuel -  comes to a similar conclusion. Boaz referred to Ruth as a Moabitess when he is talking to one who has the first right to marry her. He did this because he knew with his ruach hakodesh that Ruth was destined to be the ancestress of the royal family of Dovid. He wanted to frighten the person away from marrying Ruth so that he himself could marry her and thus be the ancestor to this great lineage. Even though it is prohibited to deceive someone to get their possessions, that is only when dealing with material possessions – but not mitzvos. Even though it is prohibited to take mitzvos from others such as mila, nevertheless wherever the other has not actually obtained the mitzva it is like the ownerless desert which can be taken by anyone. Everyone is commanded to perfect his soul and to acquire mitzvos.  This can also be seen with Yaakov concerning the rights of the first-born. Yaakov knew that Esav was driven to do evil and that he needed the rights of the first born to perfect himself. … Therefore if they have the matzo in partnership, if one overcomes the other than it doesn't help for the mitzva since it is stolen. However there still remains the possibility that there is a partial mitzva done with less than the minimum quantity (i.e., chatzi shiur) according to the Ritva . According to this possibility than each one should hold onto his half and achieve a partial mitzva and neither would be allowed to give up his part to allow the other to fulfill the complete mitzva and he would lose the mitzva entirely. But it would seem even according to the Ritva it would be better to cast lots. Then the person who won would achieve the complete mitzva but the loser would still achieve reward for the mitzva since he was responsible for the other being able to fulfill the mitzva completely. This would be comparable to the Yissachor Zevulen relationship….because the complete mitzva is very much greater that the reward for a partial mitzva. And when it is done complete by means of another he merits and causes his brother to merit with him and it is not considered as giving up the mitzva since he is doing this by means of the lottery. Similarly if he gives to his portion to the other willingly it would also seem that there is nothing wrong since this causes that the mitzva be done fully. This would surely hold true according those who posken that there is no mitzva at all for chatzi shiur… Thus one who voluntarily gives up his portion to enable the other one to fulfill the mitzva properly gets reward with him and it is considered as if he did the mitzva in its entirety by himself…

Making of a Godol: Rav Shimon Shkop stayed at YU in order to emulate Rav Yisroel Salanter

In researching the issue of what the Seridei Aish meant that Mussar was a frum Haskala - Rav Triebetz pointed out a passage in his father-in-laws sefer Making of a Godol. This passage indicates that there was more to the frum haskala then personal spiritual growth and yiras shamayim. page 1100-1101

 =================

In fact, R' Shimon shunned the advice of both R' Chaim-Ozer Grodzensky and the Chafetz-Chaim to resign from his 5689 [1929] post as Rosh Yeshiva of the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary [RIETS] in New York because he was sure R' Yisrael would have ordered him to keep it. He left the position after half a year only because of family reasons.'" It should be added that when R' Shimon had decided to stay in America, he also did not consider the feelings of his talmidim in Europe, who were heartbroken when they heard that their master would remain in the United States; see Shkop Book  which records R' Yisrael-Zev Gustman's recollection, to wit, "I remember that there were bahurim who sat down on the ground and cried when they heard that R' Shimon was not planning to return to Grodno." R' Shimon obviously intended to emulate what R' Yisrael Salanter did in the last third of his life - that is, to leave the established Torah environment of Russia and function in Western Europe (and relegate visiting Russia to sporadic occasions only). The Salanter had gone to German communities and Paris because, according to Etkes Book o, "he was essentially drawn (there) by the challenge of restoring traditional values and modes of behavior"P. Katz Iq is more dramatic when it writes, "R' Yisrael had a greater design: he was not satisfied with his accom-plishments in Russia. His aspirations encompassed distant worlds and his eyes wandered vast stretches to strengthen Fear of G-d everywhere, and to inject the spirit of Musar, in which he saw the salvation of Judaism, into all corners of the House of Israel. His first glance fell on nearby Germany, where Reform ruled in all its force and swept away every vestige of Judaism. Assimilation was spreading with gigantic steps and soon no remnant of the House of Israel would remain. R' Yisrael moved to Germany and undertook to halt this deterioration and strew the Dew of Resurrection on Judaism [there]." R' Shimon, too, was drawn to the spiritual challenge that America posed in the interwar years . Also cf. The CCL which asserts about the Chafetz-Chaim that "in a certain sense, (he) considered R' Yisrael his mentor and guide in life" - as R' Epstein asserted in regard to R' Shimon Shkop. (R' Mordkhai Karlinsky, who studied under R' Shimon in Yeshivath Rabbenu Yitzhaq Elhanan, related  that R' Shkop, his rosh yeshiva at the time, told him when he left to return to Europe that he considered America the future home of Torah and would gladly have taken a post in another yeshiva had there been one available - at that time, Yeshiva Torah Vodaath consisted of only an elementary level. This is consistent with R' Zelig Epstein's statement that R' Shkop was following a Salanterian stance in remaining in America.

Kinder Arois: The price we pay to keep our children innocent

Guest Post by R' Mordechai Schiller  Reprinted with permission from  Hamodia Tuesday, May 14, 2013 written as a response to this|    ה' סיון תשע"ג

Years ago, at a tisch in Amshinov in Yerushalayim, a friend saw me drying my hands on my handkerchief. He pointed to the towel hanging by the sink and said, “S’iz gantz triken — It’s pretty dry.”

I answered, “I’m superstitious. I still believe in germ theory.”

He looked more through me than at me and said, “The first people to die in the Warsaw Ghetto were the ones who weren’t used to germs.”

David Phillip Vetter was born with severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID). The disease disabled his immune system. Any exposure to germs would kill him. He lived from 1971 to 1984 — in a totally sterile environment.

It was a time when there was still such a thing as privacy. And, respecting the family’s privacy, the media never mentioned his last name. They simply called him the “bubble boy.”

I was deeply disturbed by “DEBATE: Photos of Tragedies: An important message or an unbearable burden?” We all have a natural need to protect ourselves. Even more so, to protect our children. But do we really need to turn our children into “bubble boys” to protect them from all possible “calamities that may come into the world?”

When we wrap our children in sterile bubble pack, we run a grave risk. Of course we want them to always be b’simchah. But life — real life — is more than just simchos. And they need to be able to deal with that.

I am not a psychologist. And I am not a rabbi. However, I am a father and a grandfather. So I can speak from experience. Yes, the photo on the cover of Hamodia that week was jarring. It was meant to be. But it was far from a sensationalist gimmick. If your child is too fragile, by all means, handle with care. Put the paper away — along with your Eichah and Kinos.

We all know that at Yizkor, they give a klap in shul and call out, “Kinder arois —Children out!”

A first reaction would be that the mourning and crying is too much for children to handle. On second thought, halevai people still cried by Yizkor. 

But I digress. It’s not only the children who leave. It’s anyone who still has parents. And the reasons brought down for the minhag are related to ayin hara, not to protecting the children from seeing the sorrow of their elders. No one sends children out of the shul on Tishah B’Av.

A Chassid once came to the Kotzker Rebbe, zy”a and complained bitterly, “I can’t take it anymore. Everything I hear, everything I read…. It’s just like Shlomo Hamelech says in Koheles: “Yosif daas, yosif mach’ov — the more you know, the more you suffer!”

The Kotzker answered, “Krenken zolst di; abi vissen zolst di — Suffer; as long as you know!”

Knowledge and feeling bring pain. So does learning to walk or to struggle over a Tosafos. But it’s worth it. Don’t deprive our children of learning to feel for others. It hurts, but it’s worth it.

Seridei Aish:Need to apologize to maskilim who fought against hypocrisy

The following letter of the Seridei Aish was sent to me by Prof Marc Shapiro. It is from the Otzer HaChochma in the section of שאלות ותשובות של רבני הדור

It is a strong condemnation of the hypocrisy of the religious community and an acknowledgement of desirablity of the efforts of the maskilim to improving society by reducing hypocrisy.

בטיהר רוחני קיום עמנו

ב"ה עש"ק וירא, תשי"ג מונטרע

לידידי מכבובדי הרח"מ והסופר הגדול

מהרש"ז שרגאי שליט"א

שלו' וברכת רפואה שלמה ומהירה

הצטערתי לשמוע שכ"ת כבר עזב את מונטרע מבלי שנפרדנו בברכה כנהוג ומבלי שנתנה לי ההזדמנות לשוח בענינים העומדים ברומו של עולמנו. דבר אחד מעיק על לבי: הירידה המוסרית בתוכנו והסבלנות המופרזה ביחס אל הרמאות המצטבעת בצבע של חסידות ודאגה לעלבונה של תורה. הרמאות מתגברת והולכת. היא עובדת בערמה ובחוצפה ומלעיגה לתמימות המאמינים להם. אלמלי ניתנה רשות לגלות את ערמתם וערמימותם של הרמאים הצבועים הי' העולם נבהל ומשתומם ; אבל הרמאים מפילים את מוראם ופחדם על הכל בכלי נשק של רכילות, עלילת עלילות, מלשינות והלבנת פנים מחוצפה. ויש שרואים ומציצים בין החרכים אבל הם "נכבשים" ע"י חנופה וחלוקת כבוד מזויפת. ובין כך וכך הרמאות מצליחה ובהצלחתה היא מרעילה את האויר וגורמת ליאוש שיתגבר מתוך הכרה כי כן מנהגו של עולם : צדיק ורע לו ורשע וטוב לו. ברי לי כי בטהר רוחנית ובהרמת הגובה המוסרי תלוי' שאלת קיים עמנו וקיום מדינתנו, אלו המדקדקים ,בדיני כשרות, שעטנז, מנהגי ביה"כ וכדומה ועוברים בגליו ובשאט על עיקרי המסר והנימוס האנושי גורמים לריחוק בני הדור מן הדת וקיום מצוותי'. הצרה הגדולה ביותר היא שהעסקנות לשם הרבצת התורה ולשם שמירת הדת נעשתה מקור לפרנסה ולסולם המוליך לדרגא חברותיה גבוהה. יש בתוכנו אנשים שרק בעזרת עסקנות זו זכו לשם ולפרסום. הרגשה שהעולם מתחשב עמהם מפיחה בהם יצר המלחמה. אנו צריכים להשתטח על קברי "המשכילים" שלחמו נגד הצבועים ולבקש סליחתם על פגיעתנו בכבודם. הם לחמו בעד האמת שלהם בחרוף נפש. עכשיו כל אדם רוצה להיות מקובל על הבירות ומשלימים עם החנפים, ועם השוררים עזי-הפנים, ועם חאדמו"רים הקטנים שאין להם בעולמם ולא כלום. נרד לטמיון ח"ו אם לא נתעורר מעפר השקר וההנופה.

שבתא טבא גם לבניו

יחיאל יעקב וויינברג

Seridei Aish: Why were religious Jews attracted to Haskala?

 Continuing the investigation into the expression of "frum haskala" that was used by the Seridei Aish for the Mussar movement. In the following letter he describes the miserable life most lived in the ghetto and why Haskala was viewed as a desirable alternative - even though it meant religious compromises and rejection. I just added a comparable quote from Rav S. R. Hirsch's 19 Letters

Seridei Aish (Volume IV page 366 translated by Rabbi Eliyahu Meir Klugman in Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch page 16). The ghetto stood for hundreds of years and produced men of  great stature, righteous people, who devoted their energies to  Torah study and mitzvah observance, men whose entire joy and  pleasure in life was to rejoice in the Almighty. They attained lofty  spiritual levels and merited a degree of Divine inspiration that  raised them high above the bitter darkness of the exile. Such peo­ple's words and deeds were suffused with the sanctity of the  Torah, and its presence permeated their lives.

Nonetheless, within the ghetto's walls there lived also masses of people who were not privileged to taste the Torah's pleasures  and to experience its inspiration. These people thirsted for life,  and their inability to attain it made them depressed. They knew  only difficulty, and the lives of a significant portion of them were  twisted by an ascetic melancholy.

Finally the day came, new winds began to blow and the walls  of the ghetto fell before them. Rays of hope, of light and liberty,  the prospects of life and creativity, wealth and social position, wafted into the darkest corners of the ghetto, to human beings who had been so long deprived of any place in society. The innate thirst for a healthy and complete life which is so natural to every  Jew, a thirst repressed for so many centuries, was reawakened  amid sound and fury.

These radical developments brought the Jewish people to a state of crisis. One-dimensional life-denying; religiosity simply collapsed, totally unable to restrain its children who strayed from its framework, rejecting the indignities of oppression, who strove to break free from their constraints.

Confusion reigned in the Jewish community. On the one side stood the elders, preservers of tradition, who defended with all their might the accepted religious way, which was predicated on a rejection of the pleasures and accomplishments of the material world. On the other side were those drunk and dizzy with their new freedom, who lashed out mercilessly at everything that was precious and holy in the traditional order of Jewish life.
===============

Rav S. R. Hirsch (Nineteen Letters #18): [The leaders of Orthodoxy] became at first enemies of this philosophical spirit, and later of all specifically intellectual and philosophical pursuits in general. Certain misunderstood utterances [e.g., Bereishis Rabbah 44:1] were taken as weapons with which to repel all higher interpretations of the Talmud . . . The inevitable consequence was, therefore, that since oppression and persecution had robbed Israel of every broad and natural view of world and of life, and Talmud had yielded about all the practical results for life of which it was capable, every mind that felt the desire of independent activity was obliged to forsake the paths of study and research in general open to the human intellect, and to take its recourse to dialectic subtleties and hairsplitting. Only a very few [e.g., R’ Yehuda HaLevi’s Kuzari and Ramban] during this entire period stood with their intellectual efforts entirely within Judaism, and built it up out of its own inner concept [Drachman translation]…. we are left with two generations confronting each other. One of them has inherited an uncomprehended Judaism, as practiced by men from habit, a revered but lifeless mummy which it is afraid to bring back to life. The other, though in part burning with noble enthusiasm for the welfare of the Jews, regards Judaism as bereft of any life and spirit, a relic of an era long past and buried, and tries to uncover its spirit, but, not finding it, threatens through its well‑meant efforts to sever the last life nerve of Judaism - out of sheer ignorance [Paritzky translation].

Rav Triebetz: Does Rav Yisroel Salanter have a legacy?

Last night we had a active and at times heated discussion regarding Rav Yisroel Salanter according to the understanding of the Seridei Aish.  The focus was 1) what was Rav Yisroel Salanter trying to accomplish 2) Did he produce any significant change in today's Orthodox World 3) Are there any talmidei chachomim today whose outlook on life can be said to be that of Rav Salanter. 4) The Yeshiva world fought him until they could institutionalize his program and thus render it totally ineffective to what he was trying to accomplish. 5) To what degree did he actually believe in a "frum hashkala" i.e., open minded and empathetic to others - and how much of it was a pragmatic program to save people from the secular haskala. 6) Utilized Prof Steven Pinker description of the ebb and flow of the secular haskala in history to clarify the dynamics of the Mussar movement.

Summary: The focus was understanding what the Seridi Aish wrote here(in translated by Rabbi Leo Jung in Men of the Spirit page 242-247). In essence Rav Yisroel proposed Mussar as a frum haskalah - adopting the lofty ideals, interpersonal sensitivity, tikkun olam of the Englishtment. This was how he was understood by the Maskillim who thought he was a kindred spririt. In fact this was just a tactic which he was ready to discard when it wasn't needed anymore i.e., when the students were safely in yeshiva. Consequently the Mussar Movment of Rav Yisroel doesn't exist in the yeshivos anymore - because it serves no purpose. It now focuses on much more internal states rather than being a movement open to the world of man in all its glory and be concerned with fixing societies problems
======================

The Kovno years were the years of intellectual founding of the  Mussar method, and of the growing realization that the study of  Mussar must assume its place at the top of Hebrew education.

The Mussar movement, rooted in the desire for spiritual per­fection and the improvement of character, acquired a new factor in Kovno: concern for very survival of Judaism, which was  threatened by the Haskalah movement, whose early romantic  charm had long since passed and which could now be seen in its  furious conspiracy against traditional Judaism. R. Israel's slogan  was: "Fight the Maskilim with their own weapons! Form an all­ Hebrew genuine Haskalah movement and educate rabbis and teachers to spread this pure Hebrew Haskalah among the people!”  It was aimed not at the outside enemy threatening to destroy  the Jewish youths, but rather inwards, to fill that youth with pride  and strength and to render it insusceptible to cultural elements  - alien to the spirit of the Torah. He would say: "If we have strong  minded scholars of our own who will bear the standard of the  Torah with pride and dignity, we need not fear presumptuous  deniers of the faith! Against firm infidels we must pitch a firm and proud Jewry. Rejection of the secular Haskalah alone is not enough! " argued R. Israel. "It is the nature of a new cultural trend to  seep in through small crevices. Fighting it with prohibitions and  excommunications alone will not stem the tide, for the spirit of man is not to be stemmed by mere force  The suppression of the spirit in itself is of no value. It cut short spiritual development and results in but a spiritual sterility  The sole defense against a cultural movement breaking in from  the outside is the establishment of an opposing cultural force, and the opening of doors to a fresh trend of thought, stemming from the very depth of our Jewish soul

“Thus not a war against foreign 'enlightenment', but a war for Hebrew original Haskalah, which means moral perfection, nobility of soul, and lofty ideals. Such a deep-rooted Haskalah need  not fear foreign enlightenment, which is but external polish and technical proficiency, has no roots in Judaism, and cannot satisfy  the yearnings of a Jewish heart.”

R. Israel said also: "The best instrument for communal influence is the the normal behavior of the teacher or instructor. The language most readily understood by the people is that of exemplary  conduct. A great man's influence is in his personality. Sermons  . and speeches can entertain, but they cannot captivate the heart  Only deep and sincere faith, flowing from heart to heart, and  clad in mighty deeds, can work wonders. The Greek philosophers  , considered it sufficient to teach the people what is good or bad  beautiful or evil, to develop in man the understanding of at is  good and right in order to realize the good in life. But history  teaches us that these philosophers had little influence upon their  - people. They remained steeped in their heathen beliefs and immoralities. Why? Because the philosophers were men of thought  but not of faith, too many of them did not practice what they  - preached. The wise teacher can impart a certain amount of knowledge to his listeners, but he cannot educate them. This 'knowledge does not become an organic part of the students. The road from  mind to heart is a very long one. Development of the mind does  not develop man's heart, nor does it enrich his soul or form his  character. The acquisition of knowledge turns a man into a  knowledgeable person, but his spiritual make-up remains as it  was formed when he was born.

"Acquired knowledge remains in the mind without growing  and causes no action. Only an improved personality can conquer.  The inspiration, which comes from soul to soul is the sole factor  in education."

R. Israel did not oppose the study of scientific knowledge  and of foreign tongues. During his long stay in Germany he became friendly with R. Ezriel Hildesheimer, and he praised him to  his students as a lofty and perfect man. He dreamed of introducing a method of "Torah 1m Derekh Eretz (Torah and Fine Mannners)" or "Torah and Modern Education" after the fashion of  German Orthodoxy and worked towards a German translation  of the Talmud, hoping that it might be introduced into the universities as a scientific study within the liberal arts departments.

His appreciation of secular learning notwithstanding, he refused to admit these subjects to the yeshivot. "The yeshivah," he  would say, "is not only a school for Torah studies. It is a forma­  tive home and a fertile field for the growth of the Jewish spirit.  The atmosphere of a yeshivah must be pure of all secular matter.  Not he who completed his studies at a yeshivah can be authorized  to serve as rabbi and teacher, but only he who matured in spirit  so that he may take the yeshivah with him wherever he may go."

"Mental, spiritual and moral training is plentifully provided  by the Torah. Secular learning may be utilized as a source of  income, or in the fulfil1ment of practical needs in social and public  service. Far be it from us to turn this secular learning into a  crown of glory; it does not fit those who wear upon their heads  the crown of the Torah. These new rabbis, who graduated from  the state rabbinical schools, take pride in a false crown which  is not theirs. But the Torah crown, in whose name they preach  and through whose strength they rose to their position, is turned  by them into no more than a ceremonial tool, useful only to the  extent of its serviceability in religious ceremonies."

Apparently it was this attitude of R. Israel's towards secular  learning, regarding it not as "heavenly enlightenment" but solely  as source of practical and technical ability, that caused the Maskilim, who, at first, had respected him, to turn against him and  become his violent opponents. They did not dare belittle or attack  him during his lifetime. But after his death, when the leadership  of the Mussar movement was handed to his disciples, who continued in his ways, the Maskilim launched a bitter attack against  this method. There is good reason to assume that many Maskilim  falsely believed R. Israel to be one of them, or at the very least  akin to them in spirit. They saw in 11im a fighter against all that  was stagnant in Jewish religious life, as they saw the people limit  themselves to physical, mechanical observance of the religion only,  ignoring or neglecting, because of their spiritual poverty, the most  important principle of Judaism, the wisdom of Bahya's "Duties  of the Heart." They saw R. Israel calling for a spiritual renascence, the preparation of the heart, moral purification, improvement of manners, and beautification of the soul. They heard his  new ideas set forth in his sermons and they believed they saw a  religious revolutionary, a seeker of new paths, a religious fighter  who wants to change and rearrange all values of Hebrew life. Such  a man they believed would not object to the introduction of European culture "to the tents of Shem."

The Maskilim were gravely mistaken. They had completely  misunderstood R. Israel. He did not fight against the physical  observance of the religion, but only against the spiritual poverty  caused by it....

Did the Mussar Movement fight Haskala by being a frum Haskala or by focusing on developing greater yiras shamayaim and character perfection?

 update May 13: I sent this post to Dr. Marc Shapiro who is one of the world's greatest expert on the Seridei Aish. His reponse totally knocked the air  out my question. He said that  I was reading too much into the words of the Seridei Aish. He said that what the Seridei Aish claimed that Rav Salanter meant by Hebrew Haskala that would be a defense against the maskilim was simply "moral perfection, nobility of soul, and lofty ideals"

I replied with: "You are right I read too much into this. He is defining his haskala as moral perfection, nobility of soul and lofty ideals. Don't know what that has to do with enlightenment. Why not call the kabbala or chasidus enlightenment. In fact why not just say that Yiddishkeit is enlightenment? How did the students who were leaving the yeshivas for the haskala view what he was offering them and why would they think it was a valid alternative form of enlightenment?  Apparently the maskilim of his day also understood him the way I did. Did he mislead them or did he simply nod his head at everything they said? In essence he seemed to be forming what we call a cult  in modern terms.

 =========================================
 I recently posted a discussion of the Seridei Aish regarding the nature of the Mussar Movement. I had been looking for the process that psychology and modern ideas entered the frum world. I thought I found it in the Seridei Aish's description of the Mussar Movement. 

The Seridei Aish clearly states that Rav Salanter in his battle against the Haskala - decided to co-opt the goals and means that were attractive to the frum population and that taking people out of yeshivas and religious observance. Instead of  locking the doors of the yeshiva tighter against the Haskala - he decded to make a frum haskala. That would mean a greater openness to the world and secular studies, a concern with improving the world and  being nice to others. However Rav Trebitz asserted that once the students were safely back in Yeshiva with the aid of a mashgiach and a mussar program - the movement change to an internal one of piety and the  secular studies, tikun olam was dropped and even the  sensitivity to others became secondary to piety and fear of heaven.

The only problem with this view of the Seridei Aish is I can't find anybody who agrees or even cites his views about the Mussar movement. For example Prof Etkes' major biography of Rav Salanter does not mention this view and in fact does not cite the Seridei Aish except for minor historical facts. I looked at several other books dealing with the Mussar Movement and they also do not mention either the Seridei Aish or the idea of a frum haskala. Below I cite the summary of the Encyclopedia Judaica which is similar to the view held by the other references I looked at. They works assert that the Musar movement was focused on increasing fear of G-d and perfection of character. It thus also would serve to inoculate people against interest in the Haskala and the outside world. It was not a frum Haskala or even primarily concerned with the Haskala! Now  the question is why did the Seridei Aish make such a claim? According to this mainstream view Rav Yisroel Salanter does in fact have a major legacy today.

================

Rabbi Yisroel Salanter (Encyclopaedia Judaica Ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. Vol. 13. 2^nd ed. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. p64-66. COPYRIGHT 2007 Keter Publishing House Ltd. Itzhak Alfassi and David Derovan)... [...] The central issue that concerned him was the gap between an individual's professed beliefs and his actions. Searching for the causes of this phenomenon, Lipkin discovered that there was no direct relationship between a person's piety and his knowledge of Torah. Knowledge attained through the standard yeshivah curriculum did not necessarily produce moral behavior, but knowledge of divine retribution, knowing that no one escapes the consequences of his actions, does affect behavior. This insight, coupled with another one, formed the basis for Lipkin's musar campaign. The second insight relates to the difference between a person's appetites and desires and knowledge. Contrary to one's desires, which are innate in a person, knowledge is acquired. For this reason, attaining even the right knowledge is rarely enough to control one's appetites. To solve this problem, Lipkin developed behavioral mechanisms, i.e., the habitual repetition of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral stimuli, "to fortify the intellectual fear of God that the latter eventually achieves the level of distinct instinct capable of combating less worthy desires or even uprooting them totally" (Ross, Immanuel, 1983/84, 70). Later on in his career, Lipkin proposed a different solution based on improving character traits, thus changing one's personality. All of these teachings were Lipkin's means to achieve a particular end: an improvement in piety and religious observance. Lipkin dealt with a number of philosophical issues peripherally in his sermons and writings. These included the paradox of divine knowledge and free will, miracles vs. natural law, the relative ability or inability of the human intellect to grasp objective truth in general or Torah in particular, and emunat hakhamim (blind faith in rabbinic dicta). This aspect of his teachings was developed by his students into "yeshivah ideology" (ibid.). Thus, Lipkin's disciples abandoned his musar methods and began to emphasize his philosophical ideas. Ironically, their musar technique became the identification with a set of proper ideas and opinions.

Making of a Godol: Corporal Punishment & Gedolim

Making of a Godol (Page 143): note 64 When asked about corporal punishment for children, my father declared that unless a parent is absolutely sure that the child deserves to be punished, he must stay his hand, lest the child bear a lifetime grudge against him. As was his wont, he used his own experience as a point of proof. He related that after his teacher had given him permission to leave the classroom for the outhouse, the teacher caught other children who had falsely claimed they had to leave for the outhouse as an excuse for going outside to play. The teacher then spanked them all, including him, whose need for the outhouse was genuine. My father declared that to him "that teacher is loathsome till this day". At that occasion, my father told the story of how R' Baruch-Ber Leibowitz treated his errant child, as recorded in Ch. 3, n. 141: also see there about how R' Yosheh-Laib Bloch and our protagonist punished their children.

Making of a Godol (Pages 744):  (R' Uri Ascher related ° that after his father, R' Shimon Ascher, had concluded six years of study in the Telz Yeshiva in 5691 [1931], he called on the Rogachover before returning home to Switzerland. Knowing that the gaon did not study Aharonim, the visitor asked a question that R' Aqiva Eiger raises. The Rogachover gave R' Shimon an answer unlike that of R' Eiger and administered an unceremonious slap to the 25-year-old's cheek for asking such a weak question!)

Making of a Godol (page 754-755): My father often related an episode that occurred one time at 'Arvith following the session: "R' Baruch-Ber's young child lit a candle in the midst of the brakhoth following the reading of Shma' in order to read from the siddur. After the davenen was over, the rosh yeshiva turned to him and said, 'My dear child, long may you live, you transgressed a rabbinic prohibition [to do work before reciting Havdalah] and you deserve a slap and went ahead and slapped him." (R' Laibel Perlstein/reported that my father told him, "What he gave the child was a slight pat on the cheek. This was his slap." R' Shlomo Ashkenazi reported in our protagonist's name  that before the slap, R' Baruch-Ber told the boy that in order to show his love he had to punish him, "as it is written, [He who withholds his rod hates his son, but he who loves him chastises him often].) R' Mordkhai Shain said that my father narrated the tale (and the one recorded in Ch. 1, n. 64) when responding to a question regarding corporal punishment of misbehaving children. My father concluded that corporal punishment is permissible as long as one strikes his child with the same love and composure that R' Baruch-Ber displayed. [On August 8, 1991, my son R' Yoseph related that during my father's 5741 (1981) visit to Israel - when he added to the story that R' Baruch-Ber also kissed the child, presumably to convey to the boy that despite his sin he was still loved - R' Simhah-Zissel Broida, who was paying a call on our protagonist at the time, remarked that the child deserved the kiss for making the room light for everyone] Heinemann Notations records the following story: Before R' Yosheh-Laib Bloch, Rav of Telz, would hit his child, he called all the family together and delivered a talk about the impropriety of what the youth had done. R' Yosheh-Laib would then turn to the child and say, "For that you get three spanks " My father stressed that this procedure ensured that R' Bloch never struck his child out of anger.[...]

Shevus Yaakov: Teacher beats student from anger at his inattention - must he pay damages?

 Shevus Yaakov (3:140): Question: A teacher became angry at his student and he strongly beat him because of the student was not paying attention to his learning. Is the teacher required to pay for the 4 types of damages he inflicted or is he exempt? Answer: It would seem obvious that the teacher is exempt from having to pay any compensation. We see in the gemora Makkos that a father who kills his son unintentionally or a teacher who kills a student unintentionally or a messenger of beis din - are not punished with exile. This gemora explicity states that the exemption is because they are exempt because the unintended killing took place while they were involved in a mitzva. There is no basis of saying that one can't generalize from the exemption from exile to an exemption of the 4 types of damages - because it is a statute of the Torah.  Don't argue that you can't reason  that if they are exempt from capital punishment and exile then surely they are exempt from the 4 types of payment because we find in a number of places in the gemora that even though a person is exempt from exile he is obligated to pay. That is because this case is different since the gemora which provides an exemption is only when they were involved in doing a mitza as we see in Makkos (8a-b).Therefore that is the reason we should exempt the teacher from payment since he was involved in a mitzva as we see when a person is running erev Shabbos and causes damage since he was involved in a mitzva. So surely in the case of the teacher. Furthermore the gemora compares the three cases with each other and the messenger of the court is exempt even if he damages someone as we see in Choshen Mishpat in the Beis Yosef at the end of simon 8 and is brought in the Rema in Shulchan Aruch without any dissent...A teacher who is discipline a student because of this studies is exempt from all payments of damage. This is stated explicitly in the Termas HaDeshen (#218) that it is not only a person allowed to hit his son or his student but everyone person is allowed to hit anyone under his control if there is justification for hitting him to stop him from sinning. Furthermore he says there is no need to bring the sinner to beis din before hitting him. He learns this out from Bava Kama (28) he a freed slave can be beaten by his former master because he doesn't want to leave the woman he was given as a slave who is not prohibited to him. So if it is permitted to beat another person for this reason then surely it is permitted because the student is wasting time from Torah study. So even though the halacha is that a teacher can only hit a student with a small strap which doesn't cause serious harm - nevertheless bedieved the teacher should not be punished because he didn't comply with that condition. 

Don't think that I am not fully aware of what the Ranach (1:111) wrote concerning an agent of beis din who hit someone out of anger and he was required to pay. The case of a teacher is different since the gemora in Taanis (4a) says that a talmid chachom becomes angry because of the Torah. In particular it causes him greater anguish when he learns with a student who doesn't pay attention to his studies. Therefore the teacher should be exempt from all payment. However in order that the teacher should not become accustomed to beating his student because it is not nice for a talmid chachom to become enraged or to lack patience - for the sake of improving the situation (migder milsa) and to make sure he doesn't violate the halacha of not hitting with more than a small strap - I rule that he must pay for the docotr to cure the student...
 =============================
update 4/18/13 Aruch HaShulchan (C.M. 424:17): There are those who say that a teacher who beats his students is exempt from paying for the damage done by the beating if it was done for the sake of teaching. A proof for this is that our Sages say that a person is exempt from exile when he kills unintentionally [Makkos 8a] while doing a mitza... such as a father who hits his son and a teacher who disciplines his student and an agent of beis din. According to this the case where the father is obligated to pay for beating his son or daughter is only when it is done without any intent for educating them - however if it is done for the welfare of the child then the father is exempt from payment. However there are those who disagree because a person is not allowed to give blows that cause bruises. This that the Torah exempts from exile in Makkos 8a is a statute of the Torah and it appears that the person died because of Heavenly Decree.  Since it is a dispute in the poskim the actual ruling depends on the details of each case according to the understanding of beis din.

פתחי תשובה חושן משפט סימן תכד:ד

(החובל בבניו כו' - עיין בתשובת שבות יעקב ח"ג סימן ק"מ אודות מלמד שכעס על תלמידו והכה אותו בשביל לימודו עד שחבל בו, אם חייב בד' דברים או פטור. והשיב, נראה פשוט דפטור מכולם כדאיתא במסכת מכות [ח' ע"א] מה חטיבת עצים רשות יצא האב המכה את בנו והרב הרודה את תלמידו ושליח ב"ד, ואין לומר דהיינו דפטור מגלות מגזה"כ אבל חייב בד' דברים, זה אינו, דהא מבואר שם בגמרא דאילו פטורים משום דמצוה קעביד, א"כ מה"ט יש לפטור מכולם כדאמרינן גבי רץ בערב שבת בין השמשות [ב"ק ל"ב ע"א]. ועוד, דהא הני תלתא מדמה הש"ס להדדי, ובשליח ב"ד פטור אפילו אם הזיקו כמבואר בב"י סוף סימן ח' ובהגהת שו"ע שם בלי חולק כו', וכן מבואר בתרומת הדשן סי' רי"ח [הובא לעיל סימן תכ"א סעיף י"ג בהגה] דלאו דוקא בנו ותלמידו אלא אפילו לכל אדם שכפוף תחת ידו ראוי להכותו להפרישו מן העבירה כו', וכ"ש בשביל ביטול תורה, אף על גב דקיי"ל דיש להכותו בערקתא דמסאני ולא באכזריות [כדאיתא בשו"ע יו"ד סימן רמ"ה סעיף י'], מ"מ דיעבד אין לקנסו בשביל כך. ואף דבתשובת הראנ"ח ח"א סי' קי"א כתב דבשליח ב"ד שהכה מפני כעס וחימה חייב [הביאו הכנה"ג לעיל סימן ח' [הגב"י סק"ג]], מ"מ בת"ח דאורייתא מרתחא ליה, בפרט שהוא צער גדול כשלומד עם התלמיד ואינו משים לב על לימודו, יש לפוטרו מכל, אבל מ"מ כדי שלא יהא רגיל לעשות כן ולמיגדר מילתא פסקתי שישלם שכר הרופא, עכ"ד ע"ש. ולדבריו צ"ל דאלו הדינים שבסעיף זה בחובל בבניו מיירי שלא הכהו ליסרו, אולם בתשובת קרית חנה סי' כ"ב לא כתב כן [הבאתיו בקצרה בפ"ת ליו"ד סימן רמ"ה שם [סק"ד]], אלא דהכא מיירי אפילו במכהו ליסרו, ומה דאמרו יצא האב המכה את בנו כו' הוא רק דפטור מגלות, משא"כ לענין ד' דברים דאיתרבו שוגג כמזיד כו', והאריך בזה ע"ש וצ"ע: