Halacha that a woman should stay in house?

Tehilim (45:14):  כָּל כְּבוּדָּה בַת מֶלֶךְ פְּנִימָה מִמִּשְׁבְּצוֹת זָהָב לְבוּשָׁהּ
 The daughter of the king is all glorious within; her clothing is of embroidered gold.

Rav Menashe Klein (9:250): Question: Concerning the halacha principle that a Jewish woman is considered a princess and therefore it is more respectful for that status that she should remain in the home (kavod bas melech penima) – is it preferable that a wife leave the home for the sake of her husband to a place of immorality [in order to earn a living or other purposes]. Answer: It is difficult to give a clear written response to this question. That is because in modern time this principle that it is best that a Jewish woman should stay in the home is almost nonexistent – because of our many sins. If a woman does remain in her home and doesn’t go out for any reason– even if it causes her husband to lose Torah study - then this is definitely an example of the principle. Traditionally a woman did not go out of her house. However after the Holocaust (because of our many sins) – when we find ourselves a small minority amongst the nations of the world and earning a livelihood is difficult – it has become normative practice for women to leave their homes. However in places outside the home there is the possibility of immorality and no protection against sexual sins – therefore it depends on the nature of the society and the characteristics of the woman. In particular whether she would in fact remain in the house all day if she had the opportunity. (See what I wrote in Mishne Torah 4:125) concerning sending Beis Yaakov girls out to collect money for charity.) First we need to clarify whether we actually rule that this principle is the halacha. It seems that in fact that it is a dispute amongst the poskim - as we see from Gittin 12 that apparently we don’t follow such a principle. Similarly Mahari Bruno (#242) was asked regarding a maid servant who did not want to leave the home to do the shopping because of this principle. He responded that we don’t rule in accord with this principle. In contrast we see in Yevamos (77a) that this principle is cited as halacha [from the fact that Amonite and Moabite women were not punished for failing to provide the Jews with bread and water - since all respectable woman remain in the home] . The Nimukei Yosef say there that the principle is halacha because all Jews are considered royalty. Shulchan Aruch (E.H 4) also rules like Yevamos (77a). See the Levush. Consequently we seem to have contradictory evidence as to whether it is halacha. Furthermore in Shabbos (111a), Rav Shimon says that all Jews are royalty and that is the halacha. On the other hand the Ran says that the Rif says that the halacha that all Jews are not considered royalty. However the BeHag and Rabbeinu Chananel rule like Rav Shimon...Rashi (Shabbos 59) writes that all Jews are royalty. Similarly in Mishna Berachos (1:2) says that they are royalty. However Rabbeinu Yona says normally they are not considered royalty but here we do. In my chidushim I write that there are three different circumstances. In truth there is no question that the honor of a princess is to stay in the home. However in spite of that, we find with Ruth that she did go out to gather grain amongst the other harvesters – and she is praised for doing so.  But look at Rashi and the interpretations of Chazal that say when she went out she sought out the company of proper people. If so we can state that when a person does need to go out of the home this principle requires finding a place where there are proper people. In such circumstances there is no prohibition. 
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Eiruvin(100b): She is wrapped like a mourner, banished from all man and imprisoned in a jail [because the honor of the king’s daughter is within – Rashi] 

Bereishis Rabba (8:12): R. Johanan b. Berokah said: Concerning both man and woman it says,  AND GOD BLESSED THEM, etc.2 ‘We-kibshah’ (and subdue her) is written: the man must master his wife, that she go not out into the market place, tor every woman who goes out into the market place will eventually come to grief. Whence do we know it? From Dinah, as it is written, And Dinah... went out, etc. (Gen. XXXIV, 1). R. Isaac said in R. Hanina's name: The law is as stated by R. Johanan b. Berokah.

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שו"ת מהר"י מברונא סימן רמב

נשאלתי השוכר משרתת אשה או נערה בתולה וראובן שולח אותה על השוק ובבתי הגויים יחידית והמשרתת אומרת השכרתני לשרת כדרך המשרתות בבית ולא כדרך האנשים היוצאים בחוץ:

והשבתי כן הנשים דוברות. אין ראובן יכול לכופן ליכנס יחידית בבתי הגויים ואף יש איסור בדבר משום יחוד, ואף במקום שרבים רגילים ליכנס שם נהי דאיסור ליכא מ"מ אינו יכול לכופן, דיש נשים צנועות נוהגות בצניעות או יראות מרוב שנאה שלא יטילו עליה שם רע או כה"ג, אמנם על השוק בגילוי, רגילות הנשים לילך אבל הבתולות אין דרכן לצאת לשוק ואינו יכול לכוף, ונ"ל דאף איסור יש בדבר שנאמר לא תצא כצאת העבדים. וכתב בפי' התורה לר' יעקב בר אשר ז"ל שנקרא נזיר וז"ל י"מ שלא ישלחנה בחוץ לעשות מלאכתו אלא תשמשנו בבית, עכ"ל והתורה בבתולה קאי ובבתולה מיירי אבל נשים לא כדפירש', אף על גב דכתיב כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה מ"מ אשכחן בפ"ק דגיטין (יב א) דשכיח כדאמרינן מהו דתימא כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה קמ"ל, ובפרק המוצא תפלין (ערובין ק ב) אמר גבי יו"ד קללות שנתקללה חוה וחבושה בבית האסורים ואידך הנך שבח הוא לה דכתיב כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה, והטעם כל ישראל בני מלכים הם. ולית הלכתא הכי, דאמרינן בפ' המקב' (ב"מ קיג א) אמר אביי כולהו ס"ל כל ישראל בני מלכים הם, וכל היכא דאמר אביי הכי כולהו בחד שיטה לית הלכתא כחד מינייהו, כדפסק האשירי בכמה דוכתין, ואף על גב דבפ' ח' שרצים (שבת קכו ב) פסק רב הלכתא כרשב"ג דאמר הכי מפרש התם הלכתא כוותיה ולא מטעמיה ע"ש, וכן פסק האשירי בהדי' בפ' מפנין 

Rav Tzadok: Holiness is not asceticism

Tzadok Rav (Kedoshim Tehiyu #3): What is the meaning of the phrase, "Sanctify yourself with that which is permitted?" It says in Toras Cohanim (beginning of Parshas Kedoshim), “You shall be holy” (kedoshim tehiyu) means you shall be perushim (ascetics).” The Ramban says that there is a separate mitzva to minimize that which is permitted in order that you shouldn’t be a disgusting person within the realm of that which is permitted by the Torah.  For example our Sages (Berachos 22a) say that Torah scholars should not be overly sexually involved with their wives like chickens. And this is true of other pleasures. See Ramban’s commentary to the Torah where he discusses this at length. He brings a proof to this assertion from a Nazir. He is called “holy” (kodosh) because of his avoiding certain pleasures which are generally permitted by the Torah. The Maharsha (Yevamos 20a) also cites this as proof.

 However it says in Vayikra Rabba (24:4), Just as I am parush (ascetic) you should also be and just as I am holy (kodesh) you should also be holy as it says in the Torah – kodesh tehiyu (you shall be holy).  This description is also found in Torah Cohanim (end of Parshas Kedoshim) for the verse, And you shall be kesdoshim (holy) to me.  Thus we see – contrary to the Ramban - that asceticism (perishus) and holiness (kedusha) are not the same thing  but nevertheless they are both included in the word kedoshim in the Torah verses. We also see in the hierarchy mentioned in Avoda Zara (20a) that perishus and kedusha are two separate attributes. Rashi states that perishus (asceticism) applies even from that which is permitted in order to be stringent. This implies that kedusha (holiness) is distinct from perishus and is a higher level. Consequently we can  say that the general meaning of perishus is just to avoid all types of lust and desires – which is the literal meaning of the word perishus. The Mishna Sotah(20a)  states, “A female ascetic (isha perusha) and the wounds of perushim (asceticism)”. Look at the gemora’s (Sotah 22a) explanation as well as Rashi. Sotah (22b) says, There are seven types of perushim... they do the disgusting deeds of Zimri...” Thus we see that separation alone is the essence of perushus. From the Torah verses we see that separation or avoidance of desires is included in the word kedusha but it only the beginning of the process of kedusha. A man begins the process of holiness in this mundane world by means of avoiding lusts for permitted things. However the language of our Sages in the Talmud divides it into two processes

Sotah (3:4): An ascetic (angelic) woman destroys the world

The Tiferes Yisroel that Rav Kasher quotes below says that asceticism is inherently inappropriate for woman and is therefore destructive - is consistent with my thesis that kedusha i.e., perishus - is not the path for women's spiritual development. This is also the explanation of the Maharal. And that is why women don't wear a kittel on Yom Kippur because they can't be like angels who are removed from gashmiyus.

Maharal (Sotah 22a): Mishna: ... an ascetic woman (isha perusha) and ascetic wounds ... destroy the world. Women are materialistic and therefore asceticism is not relevant for her i.e., to abstain from that which is permitted to her. That is because abstaining from that which is permitted is abstaining from materialism entirely and this is simply not characteristic of women since they are materialistic therefore it is not normal for her to be ascetic. If you do find a woman who is ascetic it is because she wants to be viewed as a righteous woman and thus it is for her benefit – rather than for spiritual purposes. This is similar to “ascetic wounds” It happens to a person who is excessive with his asceticism and he does things which are inappropriate. This is only done is to make an impression on others rather than for spirituality and thus it is not normal. So not only do these two categories fail to build the world they actually are destructive to the well being of the world. That is because all things which are excessive - remove a person from the world. Similarly foolish piety which is also mentioned in this Mishna and a cunning wicked person – because they all act inappropriately. It is very necessary to understand these matters in order that a person knows to do acts of piety with wisdom and common sense.

Torah Shleima (Bereishis 30:16.58):The Yerushalmi Sotah (3:4) states that the “isha perusha” referred to in the mishna is one who sits and insults the words of the Torah which says that Leah said “come to me.” In other words she is proclaiming herself more modest than Leah who directly asked for sexual relations from Yaakov. In fact however she is only doing that in order to insult the words of Torah. This is similar to the explanation of the Pnei Moshe. (In the sefer “Ahl HaYerushalmi” it brings from the Roman Manuscript that the text is not ma’aleves (insults) but ma’aleges (ridicules)... Sotah (22a) explains it means a woman such Yochni bas Retuvi ( who was a witch but she presented herself as a righteous woman). ... However the Tiferes Yisroel (Sotah 3:4) says that an isha perusha is one who truly conducts herself with extreme asceticism. The reason that Chazal say such behavior is destructive is that it is not appropriate for a woman to be ascetic. We see this from another statement of Chazal here that a woman prefers one measure of food (minimal) with sexual excess than 9 measures of food (maximal) with sexual abstinence. Thus condemnation of isha perusha (the ascetic woman) is to understood in the context that asceticism is inherently not appropriate for women. Furthermore the Redal in his comments notes that the Yerushalmi’s comment is to explain the statement here of Rabbi Eliezar that one who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he is teaching her immorality. That is because by means of studying Torah she will become cunning which will enable her to bring support for her immoral behavior from Leah who said to her husband, “come have sex with me.” She will also come to ask directly for sexual intercourse.< [I saw in the Otzer HaChaim that it expresses surprise at the words of this Yerushalmi because at first glance it would seem that there is no connection between the isha perusha (ascetic woman) and the woman arrogantly asking for sexual relations. To answer this problem he answers that he heard that in the library of Paris that there is an edition of the Rambam which has the text “isha perutza” (the wanton woman) instead of our text “isha perusha” (the ascetic woman). That variant text seems to fit the Yerushalmi well. However according to our explanation the text which says “ascetic woman” does in fact make sense. In fact if the variant text is the correct one – there would be no need for any explanations since it would be self-evident that a wanton woman would behave that way.]

Wife & mother-in-law fight - who has to leave?

Divrei Rivos (Simon 140): Question:  Rachel is married to Reuven and his mother Leah lives with them in the same house. Every day Rachel has a fight with her mother-in-law Leah. Because of this Rachel claims that she doesn’t want to live with her mother-in-law Leah who she claims is the cause of all the fights and this causes her to have arguments with her husband. Does Rachel have the right to prevent Leah from living with them or not? Answer:  The Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 13:14) writes, “One who says to his wife that he doesn’t want her to bring her parents or siblings into his house – he is to be obeyed. If she wants to see them she must go to them when there is an event or once a month and every Yom Tov but they cannot go visit her unless something happens to her such as sickness or birth. That is because a person cannot be forced to allow others into his domain. Similarly if she says that she doesn’t want his parents or siblings in their home or that she doesn’t want them to live in the same courtyard because they make life unpleasant for her and bother her – she is to be obeyed. That is because we don’t force a person to live without others in his domain.” Thus we see that if they make things bad for her or bother her that she has the right to protest and prevent them from coming into her domain. This is also the ruling of the Tur (E.H. 74) and also of Rav Yerucham (#23). He adds that the Gaon wrote in a teshuva that she must be listened to and if not - she is divorced and must receive her kesuba.  Therefore in our case, if the cause of the fighting is Leah the mother-in-law then it is certain that Rachel the daughter-in-law has the right to eject her from her house and beis din will listen to her. This is so even though the Ravad wrote, “When is this so? - when they come into her domain. However if she comes into their domain they are not removed for her sake from their domain even though the home belongs to her husband and they have no rights in it. That is because her husband wants their presence. “Similarly in our case it would seem that since Reuven wants his mother in his house and Rachel his wife has come into their domain – Leah is not banished for the sake of her daughter-in-law Rachel. However this view of the Ravad is not accepted because the Magid Mishneh says about the Ravad, I say that a man does not live together with a snake. Therefore the halacha is as follows. If it appears to beis din that the relatives are bothering her and causing her to have fights with her husband – then she is right. But if not the husband’s position takes precedence over hers since it is his home and not hers. Therefore she has no right to protest except if she has a legitimate claim. This view is implied by the words of the Rambam that I mentioned before. In the part describing the husband’s rights it doesn’t mentioned any reason why he wants her family to stay away and yet he is to be listened to. In contrast in the part describing her objecting to his family coming it says because they make life unpleasant for her. Thus the Rambam is rejecting the view of the Ravad and even if Rachel is coming into their domain, if it appears to beis din that Leah the mother-in-law is causing the fights then Leah is expelled from her daughter-in-laws house. Thus we rely on the view of the Magid Mishneh since he was the most recent authority and he also saw the Ravad and yet rejected his view... Furthermore in our case if it is determined or if beis din sees that the mother-in-law Leah is the cause of the fights then the law is in accord with Rachel the daughter-in-law and we eject Leah from Rachel’s house....

Every wife is to be ruled by her husband - Ben Yehoyada (Men 43b)

Ben Yehoyada (Menachos 43b): Rabbi Meir said that a man is obligated to say three berachos every day.  [See also Torah Temima]... It seems to me that a woman is at a major disadvantage relative to a man in that she is required to be subordinate to her husband and that he should rule over her. This submission is demonstrated by the nature of their sexual relations. For example, there was a woman who was very learned and smart and her father was a great and important man who married her to an ignoramus who was the son of an ignoramus. She did not want to submit to her husband but rather she wanted to control him. Her father said to her, Submit yourself to your husband and he shall rule over you because that is what G‑d decreed. She said to him, That cannot be the decree for me or those like me - since I am educated and the daughter of a great man – to submit to a boor. Her father replied, The fact is that the decree of G‑d for a woman to submit to her husband is for all women – even for people like you – without exception. This can be seen from sexual relations which is the principle attachment of a wife to her husband in which he is above her and she is below him. These positions are the same for all men and women in the world. This is a strong proof that everyman rules over his wife – no matter who she is. There is a well-known story regarding a king of one of the nations and he only had a single daughter as his heir. She sat on his throne after his death and did not get married. Her uncle told her that she should hurry and get married. She refused saying, And can a queen submit herself to a commoner to be his mattress under him. The uncle replied, You must get married because if you don’t your kingdom will be lost after death since you have no children. She was forced to listen to his words and she got married. Therefore my daughter you must submit yourself to your husband according to the decree of G‑d who created the nature of sexual relations in this manner that the man should be above and the woman should be below. This never changes even for a queen who is the wife of a commoner. Thus we see in the Torah (Bereishis 3:16), And to your husband shall be your desire – which our Sages say is referring to sexual relations. Thus this is a strong proof that your husband is to rule over you. And similarly we can generalize from sexual relations that the husband should rule over his wife. Consequently in the morning after the night which is the time of sexual relations - a man says the blessing that he was not made a woman. With this introduction we can understand the story that is brought in Bereishis Rabbah (20:7) concerning a woman who the child of important people who was married to a lowly man who afflicted her. The Sages heard about this to chastise him. When they came he placed before them a golden candelabra with a clay lamp on top as an allusion to the verse, “And your lust should be for your husband.” Rashi explains that he was hinting to them that even though she was an important person like the gold candelabra but her husband was like the clay lamp on top – nevertheless she loved him. As we stated he was demonstrating to them from the issue of sexual relations that there was a necessity that he rule over her.

Israeli women discriminated against on buses three times in one day

 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned Monday a series of incidents in which women were refused entry to buses or forced to sit in specific spots on Sunday, stating "The State of Israel is a free country, where no one can limit who gets on public transportation and no one can dictate where she or he sits. Whoever does this is breaking the law and should be punished for it."

On Sunday, a group of teenage girls trying to get on a bus in Ashdod were told by the driver to cover up because they were wearing clothes that revealed their arms and legs. The girls were told to sit at the back of the bus.

Donald Trump indicted on 2020 election fraud charges in Georgia

 https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/08/14/trump-indictment-live-updates/70187751007/

A Georgia grand jury indicted 2024 presidential candidate Donald Trump and several allies Monday on conspiracy charges of trying to steal Georgia's electoral votes from President Joe Biden after the 2020 election.

The indictment, bringing 41 charges against 19 defendants, accuses Trump and confederates of a coordinated plan to have state officials essentially spike Biden's victory and award the state to Trump. Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis launched her investigation of Trump in February 2021. The indictment had been expected since a special grand jury recommended unspecified charges in February 2023. 

Defining Rechilus - Rambam vs Chofetz Chaim

The laws of lashon harah are not stated clearly in the Torah nor in the gemora. In addition the distinction between lashon harah and rechilus is not made by the gemora but is made by rishonim such as the Rambam. My question is that the Rambam seems to state that simply talking about others is rechilus while the Chofetz Chaim says that it is only rechilus when a connection is made between the listener and what a 3rd party said about him or did something to him. There are other sources which indicate that rechilus is revealing the secrets of others (Mishna Sanhedrin 3:7) while Kesubos (46a) says it applies to slander.

Vayikra (19:16): Don't bear tales amongst your people and don't stand idly by the blood of others

Yerushalmi Peah (1:1): R Yishmael says that rechilus is lashon harah. It was taught in the name of R' Nechemiah that one should not be like a peddler who bears tales from one person to another.

However the Rambam makes a clear distinction between rechilus, lashon harah and slander

Rambam(Hilchos De’os 7:1-2): : 1) One who is talebearer about his fellow man transgresses a negative commandment as it says (Vayikra 19:16), Don’t be a talebearer amongst your people. This is a very great sin and it has caused many people to be killed amongst Israel. That is why is adjacent to “Don’t stand idly by the blood of your fellow.” Go and learn what happened to Doeg. 2)What is a rachil? It is a person who bears tales and goes from one person to another and he says this is what so and so said or this is what I heard about so and so. And even though what he says is true it destroys the world. There is a much greater sin then this and is included in this prohibition of rechilas (Vayikra 19:16) and that is lashon harah. It is someone saying negative things about others – even though the information is true. However if he says lies about others it is called motzi shem rah (slander) on others. But the one who speaks lashon harah regularly (baal lashon harah) is one who sits and says this is what so and so did and his ancestors were so and so or this is what I heard about him – and what he says is negative. The verse regarding this is Tehilim (12:4), The L-rd shall cut off all flattering lips, and the tongue that speaks arrogant things

In contrast the Chofetz Chaim limits rechilus to reporting information that another did to the person being told the rechilus. The Rambam make no such an assertion and obviously neither did the Talmud

Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Rechilos  1:2): What is a rachil? It is a person who bears tales from one person to another and he goes and says, “This is what so and so said about you or this is what so and so did to you or this is what I heard about him that he did to you or he wants to do to you. Even if the information is not negative about the one he is speaking and even though according to the rachil if the person had been asked directly he would not deny the information either because what he did or said was appropriate or because his intent in his action or words were different – nevertheless he is called a rachil.

However the Kesef Mishna claims that that is what the Rambam meant by citing Doeg.

Kesef Mishna (Hilchos De'os 7:1): One who bears tales about others – The view of the Rambam is that a rachil is one who say, that so and so said this about you or that he did something to you – even though the information is not negative about the one being talked about as we see regarding Do’eg who said that Achimelech gave bread and the sword of Goliath to Dovid and if he had been asked he would not have denied it because he didn’t view this as something negative and in fact the opposite was true in that he thought he was serving Shaul by his actions as he himself said.

Lesson of Pinchas: Leaders must protest evil!

G-d told Moshe was told Bamidbar (25:4). And the Lord said to Moses, Take all the chiefs of the people, and hang them up before the Lord in the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel. Rashi says that this should not be understood literally that the leaders were killed but rather that the leaders should make sure that those who were involved in sexual crimes should be killed.

However it seems that this a dispute in Bamidbar Rabba (20:23)/Tanchuma (Balak 28) whether the verse means that the leaders should judge the guilty and execute them or whether the leaders are the ones who were killed. Abarbanel, Seforno, Panim Yafos, Rekanti and others say in fact that it means the leaders should be killed. Why should Moshe be told to kill the leaders of the Jewish People if they weren’t involved in the depravity? They answer because the leaders didn't protest against the sexual depravity of the people. The failure of the leaders to protest and instead remain complacent was actually a greater sin than the sin of the sexual depravity of the people  and therefore the only way to prevent G‑d’s anger from destroying the people was for the leaders to be executed  (those who sinned and those who failed to stop the sin). This is what motivated Pinchas in his vigilante action against the leader Zimri.

Abarbanel (Bamidbar 25:04): G-d said to Moshe, Take all the leaders and kill them in broad daylight. It was appropriate that when G-d saw this terrible sin being done openly amongst the Jewish people and the leaders and police did not even protest or criticize or punish the sinners. G-d said to Moshe it was proper to give a major punishment to the leaders for ignoring their duty for what was being done before them.

Igros Moshe:Wife refuses Get /Husband remarry without heter 100 Rabbis?

Igros Moshe (E.H. 2:2): Question: (E.H. 2:2): Question: In the case of a moredes (rebellious wife) who obtained a civil divorce as well as many thousands of dollars in the settlement from the secular court and refused to accept a Get in order to torment her husband. Is it possible to permit the husband to remarry without first obtaining permission from 100 Rabbis? Answer: Concerning the case of a moredes who obtained a civil divorce and also $30,000 cash as well as the house and furnishings which she sold for $20,000. The secular court judge blocked her access to $20,000 of the $30,000 that the husband is required to pay and made the access conditional on her accepting the get that is required by the halacha and which she has already agreed to do and which was arranged in Seattle. The letter writer was made the agent to divorce her. However when he returned to Portland and notified the woman that he had the Get in his hand, she reneged on the deal and said that she did not want to free her husband under any circumstances and that she will never accept the Get because she wants to torment him. There is no question even if we don’t believe that she caused the fights between but he was the one who started them and that led to her trying with a lawyer in civil court to obtain a secular law. But since she agreed to take accept the Get and then reneged in order to torment him – she is considered a moredes since she has no interest in living with him as his wife and she also doesn’t want to divorce him. This is explicitly stated in Shulchan Aruch (E.H 77:20), If she rebels against him in order to torment him and she declares that she is tormenting him because of the wrongs he did to her or because he cursed her or because he fought with her - then she has the full status of a moredes. The Rema concludes that after 12 months if he wants to divorce her she must accept the Get even against her will or else he is given permission to marry another women. So surely in this case where she started the fight and then went to civil court to get a secular divorce. Regarding the question of whether he needs a heter of 100 Rabbis. From the language of the Rema is would seem that he permitted the husband of a moredes to remarry even if there is no heter of 100 Rabbis because it is not mentioned either in the Rema or the commentaries. The Maharshdam (E.H. 120) states that Rabbeinu Gershom never applied the cherem to a case of moredes. It would seem that his view is that the husband should not be allowed to remarry unless a number of years have passed so it is clear that she is a moredes. I saw in the Otzer Poskim (E.H. 1:73.24) where Rabbi Akiva Eiger is cited and other Achronim that permit remarriage in such a case even with a heter of 100 Rabbis. Nonetheless, l’chatchila it is best to obtain a heter of 100 Rabbis and that is the accepted practice. However if it is impossible to obtain one – as you write – then he can remarry without the heter of 100 Rabbis since it has now been 5 years that she left her husband and extracted $50, 000 from him in civil court and agreed to accept the Get and it was written according to her wishes and then she reneged in order to torment him. Such a case is rarer than the circumstances cited by the Maharshdam and others. The husband should deposit the Get and have it guarded until she comes and receives it from the agent.

Ben Ish Chai: Lashon harah about yourself?

Ben Ish Chaim (Torah Leshma #409): Question: Is it permitted to speak lashon harah about yourself? Reuven has a visible blemish on his body and he was discussing this blemish with a group of people. Shimon commented that he also had a blemish on his body but that it was covered up. Another person told Shimon that revealing that information was lashon harah since it served no purpose and no one knew about his hidden blemish – so why should he reveal it to others? Shimon responded that since he was testifying about himself and not others – it is not included in the prohibition of lashon harah. Is Shimon correct or not? Answer: There is no question that Shimon did something improper by revealing the existence of a hidden blemish – even though the blemsih he revealed was his own and not that of others. The proof for this is the Yevamos (64b), “The Rabbis told Rav Aba bar Zabda that he should get married to another wife and have children. He responded that if he had the merit he would have had children with his first wife. This in fact was not true but he wanted to conceal the fact that he had become impotent from attending the long lectures of Rav Huna where he was not able to urinate during the time of the lecture.” We see that he concealed the problem and did not want to reveal that he was impotent even to the Rabbis who were his peers who were pressuring him to get married. Nevertheless we see that he did not reveal that he was impotent....
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 I am not sure how this is evidence to justify his point. The  gemora itself reveals by names that a number of scholars became impotent because of Rav Huna's lectures and in addition it concludes with Rav Acha who said that the whole group of 60 students became impotent except for himself. Why isn't that lashon harah according to the Ben Ish Chai since it was said about others? If it is permitted to relate this information about others than why should it be considered lashon harah when said about yourself?


Yevamos (64b): With regard to the assumption that ‘it is possible that it was he who was unworthy to have children from her’, is it not possible that it was she who was unworthy? — Since she is not commanded to fulfil the duty of propagation she is not so punished. But surely it is not so! For the Rabbis once said to R. Abba b. Zabda, ‘Take a wife and beget children’, and he answered them, ‘Had I been worthy I would have had them from my first wife’! — There he was merely evading the Rabbis; for, in fact, R. Abba b. Zabda became impotent through the long discourses of R. Huna.     R. Giddal became impotent through the discourses of R. Huna;20 R. Helbo became impotent through the discourses of R. Huna, and R. Shesheth also became impotent through the discourses of R.Huna.  R. Aha b. Jacob was once attacked by dysuria, and when he was supported on the college cedar tree a discharge issued like a green palm shoot.  R. Aha b. Jacob stated: We were a group of sixty scholars, and all became impotent through the long discourses of R. Huna; with the exception of myself who followed the principle, Wisdom preserveth the life of him that hath it.

Rav Sternbuch: Father's sins atoned by son's suffering?

Rav Sternbuch (2:447): Question: Is someone whose father died obligated to say during the entire first year “I am the atonement for the deceased?” Answer: Kiddushin (31b), If someone is reporting something he heard from his father he should say “I am the atonement for the deceased.” It seems to me that many people do not conduct themselves according to this gemora. But it seems that this is meant as actual halacha by the gemora and in fact the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 240:9) rules that way? Thus we need to find the justification for why people don’t say it within the first year of their father’s death. In fact, however, this halacha is puzzling and in particular according to Rashi who says that the son means to say,” All the bad that my father deserved should come on me instead.” Where do we find that there is an obligation to accept the punishment of Gehinom that his father deserves? And an even greater difficulty for this halacha is even if the son accepts the punishments – how does it help his father. Can a son actually save his father by accepting the father’s punishment in Gehinom? We know that the son has the ability to give merit to his father through Torah study and doing good deeds. But how can he get punished instead of his father by saying “I am the atonement for the deceased. It apparently has no effect so why should he be obligated to say it? I saw in the Ri HaZakein that the obligation to say this is only after repeating a halachic matter that was stated in the name of his father. But regarding secular matters he does not have to say, “I am the atonement for the deceased.”... According to this, saying that he will atone for his father’s sins is not an acceptance of punishment that the father deserves. Rather if someone states a halacha that has been stated in his father’s name, there is a possibility he will err in reporting it especially since it is a verbal report. That is why he says “ I am the atonement for the deceased.” In other words all the bad that his father will receive because of what he is saying father’s name – his father should not be punished if it is mistaken. In addition this obligation to say it is only for the first 12 months after death because those are special days of very strict judgment against his father. However after this period is finished and his father has received his punishment there is no longer concern that he will receive additional punishment for the mistakes of his son – there is no longer a need to say it. (While the Rema says this halacha is also relevant for his mothers even though it is not relevant to say halacha over in her name, but it is relevant to relate minhagim or practicies in her name which are not precise.). Therefore this explains why the phrase is said whenever he is reporting a halacha from his father – as is the plain meaning of the poskim.  But also those who refrain from saying “I am an atonment for the deceased” when it is not a report of a halachic matter said in the name of his father are justified. Only zichrono l’bracha is said because it is meaningless in that case to claim to being accepting punishment [since there is no punishment in that case.

Rav Sternbuch (4:272): ...  It would appear that the intent of the statement is that he is obligating himself in fact to do that which will give merit to his father. For example to say kaddish, to learn Mishna, to give charity and to improve his own deeds. Such is a very great thing and it helps to reduce the suffering the father receives in Gehinom and elsewhere. He is also accepting on himself that if he doesn’t actually do things to benefit his father in these ways we mentioned then - he should receive on himself that evil that he could have saved his father from. Therefore when he mentions his father he says, “Behold I will be an atonement for the deceased.” In other words, “I can be concerned for my father’s atonement and if I am not worried at all – then according to Rashi he is punished. However if he acts appropriately for the sake of his father’s soul then it is literally an atonement for this father. According to this explanation, the statement of “I am an atonement for the deceased” is not an acceptance on himself of the punishment his father. Rather it is a motivation to conduct himself properly by announcing that he is obligated to act for his father’s soul and with this he literally fulfills “Behold I am an atonement for the deceased.”  Conversely by refraining from giving his father additional merit he will be punished for not helping his father. See an alternative explanation in volume 2 simon 447.  This this is a direct rebuke to those who are not concerned with showing respect to their parents after they have died. They view it as sufficient to say kaddish or to be the shliach tzibor. In fact they should increase their giving of charity and good deeds as well as increased their Torah study as well as to be extra careful to avoid sin. Such an approach is a great benefit for his parents after their death. In this he fulfills honoring his father after death – according to the halacha.

Rav Sternbuch: Divorce:Who gets custody of Kids?

Rav Sternbuch (1:783):Question: In the case of a couple getting divorced, who gets the custody of the children? Answer: It would seem that according to Torah law it depends upon what is best for the children. Kesubos (102b) states that the daughter typically goes to the mother – because that is best for her as is explained in Rema (E.H. 82:7). The son typically goes to the father after the age of six as is explained in the Be’er haGolah. That is because the father teaches his son Torah and provides him with guidance. Consequently it is typically best for the son to be with the father. However beis din always must decide what is best for the children as is stated in a responsa ascribed to the Ramban (#38) as well as the Radvaz which is cited in Pischei Teshuva (2:7). Look at Rambam and Ravad (Hilchos Ishus 21:13) whether a son should go to his father when he is less then six when he has already taught him Torah. Also see Noda B’Yehua (E.H. #89), that if they are not in the same city then the son should be with the father even when he is less than six. In modern times since yeshivos are readily available, there are times when it is best for the mother to have custody to educate her son and to send him to yeshiva and he will be as well educated as if the husband had custody. See Rashdam (E.H. 123), that it is obvious that everything is done for the good of the education of the children. And today there are excellent schools also for girls. The main point is to judge what is the best place for the education of the children and their welfare. Therefore in the present case, I advised that for the time being that the custody be reversed so that the son goes to his mother because she will supervise him and send him to an excellent yeshiva. Whereas the daughter should go to the father who will watch her since she has grown some and wants to be with him and he will supervise her. This is according to the Chelkos Mechokek (2:10) that in the case where the daughter says she prefers the father that it is to her benefit and her wishes should be complied with. This is also the view of the Maharshdam we mentioned before – that everything depends on what is good for her. We have also decided that in another year, there were will be a new evaluation to decide what arranged is in their best interest.

Marriage: Man takes - Wife doesn't give herself

Torah Temima(Devarim 24:1.3): If she gives him something and she says I am betrothed to you because of what I gave you - then it is not a valid marriage (Kiddushin 4b). Rashi explains that she says to him “You are sanctified to me.” But Tosfos questions this since the language of kedusha doesn’t apply to a man since marriage doesn’t prohibit him to other women [See Kiddushin (2b), What is the connotation of the term kiddushin? It means that she is prohibited to the whole world like hekdash.] Therefore Tosfos explains that it means that she says to him, “I am sanctified to you.” However in my opinion the language of “kidashto” does not indicate that she is saying,” I am sanctified to you.” If it did mean that then the gemora should have said that she sanctified herself to him. But in general it is not clear where you learn that a woman can sanctify herself to him - since it is well known in many places in the Torah that in marriage the husband is the acquirer or purchaser! It would appear according to Kiddushin (9a), “How is a woman married through a document? The husband writes to the father, Your daughter is sanctified to me – then it is a valid marriage.” Thus we see explicitly that even though in commercial documents the seller writes, I am selling you my field, but here the husband is writing, Your daughter is sanctified to me - and the father doesn’t write, My daughter is sanctified to you. That is because in commercial documents the seller writes that he is selling his property because the Torah makes everything dependent on the seller. In contrast concerning marriage, it says, When a man will take a wife and thus the Torah makes marriage dependent on the husband.” Thus it is clear from this gemora that if the Torah hadn’t stated “when a man will take” the Torah would be understood and logic would support this - that in truth a woman could betroth herself to her husband because it would be equivalent to her selling herself to him – as it states, “And he will rule over you” and well as Tehilim (45), “Because he is your master...” In fact the Rashbam (Bava Basra 48b) explicitly writes that the betrothal of a woman is equivalent to the case of the seller selling himself to the purchaser. [see my explanation in ohs 6]. The normal way of acquisition is that the seller indicates what rights he is transferring to the seller. However since the Torah added in the case of marriage, “When a man acquire a wife” - the husband is the one who has to be described as acquiring rather than the seller writing that he is selling his rights to the purchaser. This point is the intent of the gemora before us. That if the wife says she is giving her rights to herself to him and she says that he now possesses the rights to her in the normal manner of commerce where the seller says to the purchaser, Go and establish possession – the marriage isn’t valid. Since the Torah states, “when he will acquire a wife,” that makes the validity of marriage totally dependent on his taking the initiative in what he says and his act of acquisition.