Sotah (3:4): An ascetic (angelic) woman destroys the world

The Tiferes Yisroel that Rav Kasher quotes below says that asceticism is inherently inappropriate for woman and is therefore destructive - is consistent with my thesis that kedusha i.e., perishus - is not the path for women's spiritual development. This is also the explanation of the Maharal. And that is why women don't wear a kittel on Yom Kippur because they can't be like angels who are removed from gashmiyus.

Maharal (Sotah 22a): Mishna: ... an ascetic woman (isha perusha) and ascetic wounds ... destroy the world. Women are materialistic and therefore asceticism is not relevant for her i.e., to abstain from that which is permitted to her. That is because abstaining from that which is permitted is abstaining from materialism entirely and this is simply not characteristic of women since they are materialistic therefore it is not normal for her to be ascetic. If you do find a woman who is ascetic it is because she wants to be viewed as a righteous woman and thus it is for her benefit – rather than for spiritual purposes. This is similar to “ascetic wounds” It happens to a person who is excessive with his asceticism and he does things which are inappropriate. This is only done is to make an impression on others rather than for spirituality and thus it is not normal. So not only do these two categories fail to build the world they actually are destructive to the well being of the world. That is because all things which are excessive - remove a person from the world. Similarly foolish piety which is also mentioned in this Mishna and a cunning wicked person – because they all act inappropriately. It is very necessary to understand these matters in order that a person knows to do acts of piety with wisdom and common sense.

Torah Shleima (Bereishis 30:16.58):The Yerushalmi Sotah (3:4) states that the “isha perusha” referred to in the mishna is one who sits and insults the words of the Torah which says that Leah said “come to me.” In other words she is proclaiming herself more modest than Leah who directly asked for sexual relations from Yaakov. In fact however she is only doing that in order to insult the words of Torah. This is similar to the explanation of the Pnei Moshe. (In the sefer “Ahl HaYerushalmi” it brings from the Roman Manuscript that the text is not ma’aleves (insults) but ma’aleges (ridicules)... Sotah (22a) explains it means a woman such Yochni bas Retuvi ( who was a witch but she presented herself as a righteous woman). ... However the Tiferes Yisroel (Sotah 3:4) says that an isha perusha is one who truly conducts herself with extreme asceticism. The reason that Chazal say such behavior is destructive is that it is not appropriate for a woman to be ascetic. We see this from another statement of Chazal here that a woman prefers one measure of food (minimal) with sexual excess than 9 measures of food (maximal) with sexual abstinence. Thus condemnation of isha perusha (the ascetic woman) is to understood in the context that asceticism is inherently not appropriate for women. Furthermore the Redal in his comments notes that the Yerushalmi’s comment is to explain the statement here of Rabbi Eliezar that one who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he is teaching her immorality. That is because by means of studying Torah she will become cunning which will enable her to bring support for her immoral behavior from Leah who said to her husband, “come have sex with me.” She will also come to ask directly for sexual intercourse.< [I saw in the Otzer HaChaim that it expresses surprise at the words of this Yerushalmi because at first glance it would seem that there is no connection between the isha perusha (ascetic woman) and the woman arrogantly asking for sexual relations. To answer this problem he answers that he heard that in the library of Paris that there is an edition of the Rambam which has the text “isha perutza” (the wanton woman) instead of our text “isha perusha” (the ascetic woman). That variant text seems to fit the Yerushalmi well. However according to our explanation the text which says “ascetic woman” does in fact make sense. In fact if the variant text is the correct one – there would be no need for any explanations since it would be self-evident that a wanton woman would behave that way.]

Wife & mother-in-law fight - who has to leave?

Divrei Rivos (Simon 140): Question:  Rachel is married to Reuven and his mother Leah lives with them in the same house. Every day Rachel has a fight with her mother-in-law Leah. Because of this Rachel claims that she doesn’t want to live with her mother-in-law Leah who she claims is the cause of all the fights and this causes her to have arguments with her husband. Does Rachel have the right to prevent Leah from living with them or not? Answer:  The Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 13:14) writes, “One who says to his wife that he doesn’t want her to bring her parents or siblings into his house – he is to be obeyed. If she wants to see them she must go to them when there is an event or once a month and every Yom Tov but they cannot go visit her unless something happens to her such as sickness or birth. That is because a person cannot be forced to allow others into his domain. Similarly if she says that she doesn’t want his parents or siblings in their home or that she doesn’t want them to live in the same courtyard because they make life unpleasant for her and bother her – she is to be obeyed. That is because we don’t force a person to live without others in his domain.” Thus we see that if they make things bad for her or bother her that she has the right to protest and prevent them from coming into her domain. This is also the ruling of the Tur (E.H. 74) and also of Rav Yerucham (#23). He adds that the Gaon wrote in a teshuva that she must be listened to and if not - she is divorced and must receive her kesuba.  Therefore in our case, if the cause of the fighting is Leah the mother-in-law then it is certain that Rachel the daughter-in-law has the right to eject her from her house and beis din will listen to her. This is so even though the Ravad wrote, “When is this so? - when they come into her domain. However if she comes into their domain they are not removed for her sake from their domain even though the home belongs to her husband and they have no rights in it. That is because her husband wants their presence. “Similarly in our case it would seem that since Reuven wants his mother in his house and Rachel his wife has come into their domain – Leah is not banished for the sake of her daughter-in-law Rachel. However this view of the Ravad is not accepted because the Magid Mishneh says about the Ravad, I say that a man does not live together with a snake. Therefore the halacha is as follows. If it appears to beis din that the relatives are bothering her and causing her to have fights with her husband – then she is right. But if not the husband’s position takes precedence over hers since it is his home and not hers. Therefore she has no right to protest except if she has a legitimate claim. This view is implied by the words of the Rambam that I mentioned before. In the part describing the husband’s rights it doesn’t mentioned any reason why he wants her family to stay away and yet he is to be listened to. In contrast in the part describing her objecting to his family coming it says because they make life unpleasant for her. Thus the Rambam is rejecting the view of the Ravad and even if Rachel is coming into their domain, if it appears to beis din that Leah the mother-in-law is causing the fights then Leah is expelled from her daughter-in-laws house. Thus we rely on the view of the Magid Mishneh since he was the most recent authority and he also saw the Ravad and yet rejected his view... Furthermore in our case if it is determined or if beis din sees that the mother-in-law Leah is the cause of the fights then the law is in accord with Rachel the daughter-in-law and we eject Leah from Rachel’s house....

Israeli women discriminated against on buses three times in one day

 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned Monday a series of incidents in which women were refused entry to buses or forced to sit in specific spots on Sunday, stating "The State of Israel is a free country, where no one can limit who gets on public transportation and no one can dictate where she or he sits. Whoever does this is breaking the law and should be punished for it."

On Sunday, a group of teenage girls trying to get on a bus in Ashdod were told by the driver to cover up because they were wearing clothes that revealed their arms and legs. The girls were told to sit at the back of the bus.

Donald Trump indicted on 2020 election fraud charges in Georgia

 https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/08/14/trump-indictment-live-updates/70187751007/

A Georgia grand jury indicted 2024 presidential candidate Donald Trump and several allies Monday on conspiracy charges of trying to steal Georgia's electoral votes from President Joe Biden after the 2020 election.

The indictment, bringing 41 charges against 19 defendants, accuses Trump and confederates of a coordinated plan to have state officials essentially spike Biden's victory and award the state to Trump. Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis launched her investigation of Trump in February 2021. The indictment had been expected since a special grand jury recommended unspecified charges in February 2023. 

Defining Rechilus - Rambam vs Chofetz Chaim

The laws of lashon harah are not stated clearly in the Torah nor in the gemora. In addition the distinction between lashon harah and rechilus is not made by the gemora but is made by rishonim such as the Rambam. My question is that the Rambam seems to state that simply talking about others is rechilus while the Chofetz Chaim says that it is only rechilus when a connection is made between the listener and what a 3rd party said about him or did something to him. There are other sources which indicate that rechilus is revealing the secrets of others (Mishna Sanhedrin 3:7) while Kesubos (46a) says it applies to slander.

Vayikra (19:16): Don't bear tales amongst your people and don't stand idly by the blood of others

Yerushalmi Peah (1:1): R Yishmael says that rechilus is lashon harah. It was taught in the name of R' Nechemiah that one should not be like a peddler who bears tales from one person to another.

However the Rambam makes a clear distinction between rechilus, lashon harah and slander

Rambam(Hilchos De’os 7:1-2): : 1) One who is talebearer about his fellow man transgresses a negative commandment as it says (Vayikra 19:16), Don’t be a talebearer amongst your people. This is a very great sin and it has caused many people to be killed amongst Israel. That is why is adjacent to “Don’t stand idly by the blood of your fellow.” Go and learn what happened to Doeg. 2)What is a rachil? It is a person who bears tales and goes from one person to another and he says this is what so and so said or this is what I heard about so and so. And even though what he says is true it destroys the world. There is a much greater sin then this and is included in this prohibition of rechilas (Vayikra 19:16) and that is lashon harah. It is someone saying negative things about others – even though the information is true. However if he says lies about others it is called motzi shem rah (slander) on others. But the one who speaks lashon harah regularly (baal lashon harah) is one who sits and says this is what so and so did and his ancestors were so and so or this is what I heard about him – and what he says is negative. The verse regarding this is Tehilim (12:4), The L-rd shall cut off all flattering lips, and the tongue that speaks arrogant things

In contrast the Chofetz Chaim limits rechilus to reporting information that another did to the person being told the rechilus. The Rambam make no such an assertion and obviously neither did the Talmud

Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Rechilos  1:2): What is a rachil? It is a person who bears tales from one person to another and he goes and says, “This is what so and so said about you or this is what so and so did to you or this is what I heard about him that he did to you or he wants to do to you. Even if the information is not negative about the one he is speaking and even though according to the rachil if the person had been asked directly he would not deny the information either because what he did or said was appropriate or because his intent in his action or words were different – nevertheless he is called a rachil.

However the Kesef Mishna claims that that is what the Rambam meant by citing Doeg.

Kesef Mishna (Hilchos De'os 7:1): One who bears tales about others – The view of the Rambam is that a rachil is one who say, that so and so said this about you or that he did something to you – even though the information is not negative about the one being talked about as we see regarding Do’eg who said that Achimelech gave bread and the sword of Goliath to Dovid and if he had been asked he would not have denied it because he didn’t view this as something negative and in fact the opposite was true in that he thought he was serving Shaul by his actions as he himself said.

Lesson of Pinchas: Leaders must protest evil!

G-d told Moshe was told Bamidbar (25:4). And the Lord said to Moses, Take all the chiefs of the people, and hang them up before the Lord in the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel. Rashi says that this should not be understood literally that the leaders were killed but rather that the leaders should make sure that those who were involved in sexual crimes should be killed.

However it seems that this a dispute in Bamidbar Rabba (20:23)/Tanchuma (Balak 28) whether the verse means that the leaders should judge the guilty and execute them or whether the leaders are the ones who were killed. Abarbanel, Seforno, Panim Yafos, Rekanti and others say in fact that it means the leaders should be killed. Why should Moshe be told to kill the leaders of the Jewish People if they weren’t involved in the depravity? They answer because the leaders didn't protest against the sexual depravity of the people. The failure of the leaders to protest and instead remain complacent was actually a greater sin than the sin of the sexual depravity of the people  and therefore the only way to prevent G‑d’s anger from destroying the people was for the leaders to be executed  (those who sinned and those who failed to stop the sin). This is what motivated Pinchas in his vigilante action against the leader Zimri.

Abarbanel (Bamidbar 25:04): G-d said to Moshe, Take all the leaders and kill them in broad daylight. It was appropriate that when G-d saw this terrible sin being done openly amongst the Jewish people and the leaders and police did not even protest or criticize or punish the sinners. G-d said to Moshe it was proper to give a major punishment to the leaders for ignoring their duty for what was being done before them.

Igros Moshe:Wife refuses Get /Husband remarry without heter 100 Rabbis?

Igros Moshe (E.H. 2:2): Question: (E.H. 2:2): Question: In the case of a moredes (rebellious wife) who obtained a civil divorce as well as many thousands of dollars in the settlement from the secular court and refused to accept a Get in order to torment her husband. Is it possible to permit the husband to remarry without first obtaining permission from 100 Rabbis? Answer: Concerning the case of a moredes who obtained a civil divorce and also $30,000 cash as well as the house and furnishings which she sold for $20,000. The secular court judge blocked her access to $20,000 of the $30,000 that the husband is required to pay and made the access conditional on her accepting the get that is required by the halacha and which she has already agreed to do and which was arranged in Seattle. The letter writer was made the agent to divorce her. However when he returned to Portland and notified the woman that he had the Get in his hand, she reneged on the deal and said that she did not want to free her husband under any circumstances and that she will never accept the Get because she wants to torment him. There is no question even if we don’t believe that she caused the fights between but he was the one who started them and that led to her trying with a lawyer in civil court to obtain a secular law. But since she agreed to take accept the Get and then reneged in order to torment him – she is considered a moredes since she has no interest in living with him as his wife and she also doesn’t want to divorce him. This is explicitly stated in Shulchan Aruch (E.H 77:20), If she rebels against him in order to torment him and she declares that she is tormenting him because of the wrongs he did to her or because he cursed her or because he fought with her - then she has the full status of a moredes. The Rema concludes that after 12 months if he wants to divorce her she must accept the Get even against her will or else he is given permission to marry another women. So surely in this case where she started the fight and then went to civil court to get a secular divorce. Regarding the question of whether he needs a heter of 100 Rabbis. From the language of the Rema is would seem that he permitted the husband of a moredes to remarry even if there is no heter of 100 Rabbis because it is not mentioned either in the Rema or the commentaries. The Maharshdam (E.H. 120) states that Rabbeinu Gershom never applied the cherem to a case of moredes. It would seem that his view is that the husband should not be allowed to remarry unless a number of years have passed so it is clear that she is a moredes. I saw in the Otzer Poskim (E.H. 1:73.24) where Rabbi Akiva Eiger is cited and other Achronim that permit remarriage in such a case even with a heter of 100 Rabbis. Nonetheless, l’chatchila it is best to obtain a heter of 100 Rabbis and that is the accepted practice. However if it is impossible to obtain one – as you write – then he can remarry without the heter of 100 Rabbis since it has now been 5 years that she left her husband and extracted $50, 000 from him in civil court and agreed to accept the Get and it was written according to her wishes and then she reneged in order to torment him. Such a case is rarer than the circumstances cited by the Maharshdam and others. The husband should deposit the Get and have it guarded until she comes and receives it from the agent.

Ben Ish Chai: Lashon harah about yourself?

Ben Ish Chaim (Torah Leshma #409): Question: Is it permitted to speak lashon harah about yourself? Reuven has a visible blemish on his body and he was discussing this blemish with a group of people. Shimon commented that he also had a blemish on his body but that it was covered up. Another person told Shimon that revealing that information was lashon harah since it served no purpose and no one knew about his hidden blemish – so why should he reveal it to others? Shimon responded that since he was testifying about himself and not others – it is not included in the prohibition of lashon harah. Is Shimon correct or not? Answer: There is no question that Shimon did something improper by revealing the existence of a hidden blemish – even though the blemsih he revealed was his own and not that of others. The proof for this is the Yevamos (64b), “The Rabbis told Rav Aba bar Zabda that he should get married to another wife and have children. He responded that if he had the merit he would have had children with his first wife. This in fact was not true but he wanted to conceal the fact that he had become impotent from attending the long lectures of Rav Huna where he was not able to urinate during the time of the lecture.” We see that he concealed the problem and did not want to reveal that he was impotent even to the Rabbis who were his peers who were pressuring him to get married. Nevertheless we see that he did not reveal that he was impotent....
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 I am not sure how this is evidence to justify his point. The  gemora itself reveals by names that a number of scholars became impotent because of Rav Huna's lectures and in addition it concludes with Rav Acha who said that the whole group of 60 students became impotent except for himself. Why isn't that lashon harah according to the Ben Ish Chai since it was said about others? If it is permitted to relate this information about others than why should it be considered lashon harah when said about yourself?


Yevamos (64b): With regard to the assumption that ‘it is possible that it was he who was unworthy to have children from her’, is it not possible that it was she who was unworthy? — Since she is not commanded to fulfil the duty of propagation she is not so punished. But surely it is not so! For the Rabbis once said to R. Abba b. Zabda, ‘Take a wife and beget children’, and he answered them, ‘Had I been worthy I would have had them from my first wife’! — There he was merely evading the Rabbis; for, in fact, R. Abba b. Zabda became impotent through the long discourses of R. Huna.     R. Giddal became impotent through the discourses of R. Huna;20 R. Helbo became impotent through the discourses of R. Huna, and R. Shesheth also became impotent through the discourses of R.Huna.  R. Aha b. Jacob was once attacked by dysuria, and when he was supported on the college cedar tree a discharge issued like a green palm shoot.  R. Aha b. Jacob stated: We were a group of sixty scholars, and all became impotent through the long discourses of R. Huna; with the exception of myself who followed the principle, Wisdom preserveth the life of him that hath it.

Rav Sternbuch: Father's sins atoned by son's suffering?

Rav Sternbuch (2:447): Question: Is someone whose father died obligated to say during the entire first year “I am the atonement for the deceased?” Answer: Kiddushin (31b), If someone is reporting something he heard from his father he should say “I am the atonement for the deceased.” It seems to me that many people do not conduct themselves according to this gemora. But it seems that this is meant as actual halacha by the gemora and in fact the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 240:9) rules that way? Thus we need to find the justification for why people don’t say it within the first year of their father’s death. In fact, however, this halacha is puzzling and in particular according to Rashi who says that the son means to say,” All the bad that my father deserved should come on me instead.” Where do we find that there is an obligation to accept the punishment of Gehinom that his father deserves? And an even greater difficulty for this halacha is even if the son accepts the punishments – how does it help his father. Can a son actually save his father by accepting the father’s punishment in Gehinom? We know that the son has the ability to give merit to his father through Torah study and doing good deeds. But how can he get punished instead of his father by saying “I am the atonement for the deceased. It apparently has no effect so why should he be obligated to say it? I saw in the Ri HaZakein that the obligation to say this is only after repeating a halachic matter that was stated in the name of his father. But regarding secular matters he does not have to say, “I am the atonement for the deceased.”... According to this, saying that he will atone for his father’s sins is not an acceptance of punishment that the father deserves. Rather if someone states a halacha that has been stated in his father’s name, there is a possibility he will err in reporting it especially since it is a verbal report. That is why he says “ I am the atonement for the deceased.” In other words all the bad that his father will receive because of what he is saying father’s name – his father should not be punished if it is mistaken. In addition this obligation to say it is only for the first 12 months after death because those are special days of very strict judgment against his father. However after this period is finished and his father has received his punishment there is no longer concern that he will receive additional punishment for the mistakes of his son – there is no longer a need to say it. (While the Rema says this halacha is also relevant for his mothers even though it is not relevant to say halacha over in her name, but it is relevant to relate minhagim or practicies in her name which are not precise.). Therefore this explains why the phrase is said whenever he is reporting a halacha from his father – as is the plain meaning of the poskim.  But also those who refrain from saying “I am an atonment for the deceased” when it is not a report of a halachic matter said in the name of his father are justified. Only zichrono l’bracha is said because it is meaningless in that case to claim to being accepting punishment [since there is no punishment in that case.

Rav Sternbuch (4:272): ...  It would appear that the intent of the statement is that he is obligating himself in fact to do that which will give merit to his father. For example to say kaddish, to learn Mishna, to give charity and to improve his own deeds. Such is a very great thing and it helps to reduce the suffering the father receives in Gehinom and elsewhere. He is also accepting on himself that if he doesn’t actually do things to benefit his father in these ways we mentioned then - he should receive on himself that evil that he could have saved his father from. Therefore when he mentions his father he says, “Behold I will be an atonement for the deceased.” In other words, “I can be concerned for my father’s atonement and if I am not worried at all – then according to Rashi he is punished. However if he acts appropriately for the sake of his father’s soul then it is literally an atonement for this father. According to this explanation, the statement of “I am an atonement for the deceased” is not an acceptance on himself of the punishment his father. Rather it is a motivation to conduct himself properly by announcing that he is obligated to act for his father’s soul and with this he literally fulfills “Behold I am an atonement for the deceased.”  Conversely by refraining from giving his father additional merit he will be punished for not helping his father. See an alternative explanation in volume 2 simon 447.  This this is a direct rebuke to those who are not concerned with showing respect to their parents after they have died. They view it as sufficient to say kaddish or to be the shliach tzibor. In fact they should increase their giving of charity and good deeds as well as increased their Torah study as well as to be extra careful to avoid sin. Such an approach is a great benefit for his parents after their death. In this he fulfills honoring his father after death – according to the halacha.

Rav Sternbuch: Divorce:Who gets custody of Kids?

Rav Sternbuch (1:783):Question: In the case of a couple getting divorced, who gets the custody of the children? Answer: It would seem that according to Torah law it depends upon what is best for the children. Kesubos (102b) states that the daughter typically goes to the mother – because that is best for her as is explained in Rema (E.H. 82:7). The son typically goes to the father after the age of six as is explained in the Be’er haGolah. That is because the father teaches his son Torah and provides him with guidance. Consequently it is typically best for the son to be with the father. However beis din always must decide what is best for the children as is stated in a responsa ascribed to the Ramban (#38) as well as the Radvaz which is cited in Pischei Teshuva (2:7). Look at Rambam and Ravad (Hilchos Ishus 21:13) whether a son should go to his father when he is less then six when he has already taught him Torah. Also see Noda B’Yehua (E.H. #89), that if they are not in the same city then the son should be with the father even when he is less than six. In modern times since yeshivos are readily available, there are times when it is best for the mother to have custody to educate her son and to send him to yeshiva and he will be as well educated as if the husband had custody. See Rashdam (E.H. 123), that it is obvious that everything is done for the good of the education of the children. And today there are excellent schools also for girls. The main point is to judge what is the best place for the education of the children and their welfare. Therefore in the present case, I advised that for the time being that the custody be reversed so that the son goes to his mother because she will supervise him and send him to an excellent yeshiva. Whereas the daughter should go to the father who will watch her since she has grown some and wants to be with him and he will supervise her. This is according to the Chelkos Mechokek (2:10) that in the case where the daughter says she prefers the father that it is to her benefit and her wishes should be complied with. This is also the view of the Maharshdam we mentioned before – that everything depends on what is good for her. We have also decided that in another year, there were will be a new evaluation to decide what arranged is in their best interest.

Marriage: Man takes - Wife doesn't give herself

Torah Temima(Devarim 24:1.3): If she gives him something and she says I am betrothed to you because of what I gave you - then it is not a valid marriage (Kiddushin 4b). Rashi explains that she says to him “You are sanctified to me.” But Tosfos questions this since the language of kedusha doesn’t apply to a man since marriage doesn’t prohibit him to other women [See Kiddushin (2b), What is the connotation of the term kiddushin? It means that she is prohibited to the whole world like hekdash.] Therefore Tosfos explains that it means that she says to him, “I am sanctified to you.” However in my opinion the language of “kidashto” does not indicate that she is saying,” I am sanctified to you.” If it did mean that then the gemora should have said that she sanctified herself to him. But in general it is not clear where you learn that a woman can sanctify herself to him - since it is well known in many places in the Torah that in marriage the husband is the acquirer or purchaser! It would appear according to Kiddushin (9a), “How is a woman married through a document? The husband writes to the father, Your daughter is sanctified to me – then it is a valid marriage.” Thus we see explicitly that even though in commercial documents the seller writes, I am selling you my field, but here the husband is writing, Your daughter is sanctified to me - and the father doesn’t write, My daughter is sanctified to you. That is because in commercial documents the seller writes that he is selling his property because the Torah makes everything dependent on the seller. In contrast concerning marriage, it says, When a man will take a wife and thus the Torah makes marriage dependent on the husband.” Thus it is clear from this gemora that if the Torah hadn’t stated “when a man will take” the Torah would be understood and logic would support this - that in truth a woman could betroth herself to her husband because it would be equivalent to her selling herself to him – as it states, “And he will rule over you” and well as Tehilim (45), “Because he is your master...” In fact the Rashbam (Bava Basra 48b) explicitly writes that the betrothal of a woman is equivalent to the case of the seller selling himself to the purchaser. [see my explanation in ohs 6]. The normal way of acquisition is that the seller indicates what rights he is transferring to the seller. However since the Torah added in the case of marriage, “When a man acquire a wife” - the husband is the one who has to be described as acquiring rather than the seller writing that he is selling his rights to the purchaser. This point is the intent of the gemora before us. That if the wife says she is giving her rights to herself to him and she says that he now possesses the rights to her in the normal manner of commerce where the seller says to the purchaser, Go and establish possession – the marriage isn’t valid. Since the Torah states, “when he will acquire a wife,” that makes the validity of marriage totally dependent on his taking the initiative in what he says and his act of acquisition.

Sex as a metaphor for love of Torah & G-d

In researching my present sefer on sexuality  - it has become obvious that the current attitude towards sexual issues is different then it was in Biblical and Talmudic times. Then it was not only more openly discussed and used as a metaphor in Biblical and Talmudic texts as well as Kabbalistic writings  - but there was also a very positive appreciation of sexual attraction and pleasures. In fact love of Torah and love of G-d are expressed as sexual feelings. Is it just a metaphor or is it that intense spirituality is on a continuum with  human sexuality? Below is just a small sampling of texts.

Sanhedrin (106a): R. Johanan said: Woe to the nation that may be found [attempting to hinder], when the Holy One, blessed be He, accomplishes the redemption of his children: who would throw his garment between a lion and a lioness when these are copulating!

Ramban (Shemos 30:13): The reason that our Sages have called the language of the Torah “the Holy Language” is because the words of the Torah and the Prophets and all issues of holiness were said in this language. It is the language that G‑d speaks in with His prophets and his congregations – including the Ten Commandments and other prophecies. The various names of G‑d are in Hebrew including that which created the world…The different parts of the universe were all originally given their names in Hebrew…. However the Rambam writes in Moreh Nevuchim (3:8): Don’t think that Hebrew is called the holy language out of pride or to fool people. Rather it is correctly called that because there are no words in it for either male or female sex organs… except as metaphor. Don’t make the mistake that from “sheigal” in Tehilim (45:10). That is referring to a woman who is set-aside for sex – and not intercourse itself. Similarly what it says in Devarim (28:30) is referring to taking a wife for a concubine. In fact there is no need for his explanation because it is quite obvious that the explanation is as I have explained. Furthermore the explanation he has given is not true. The cases involving “sheigal” indicate that in fact it is describing sexual intercourse and not just alluding to it… The Sages do speak in “a clean way” but that just indicates that normal Hebrew is in fact describing sexual intercourse…

Rambam(Hilchos Teshuva 10:3): What is the nature of the love that man should have for G‑d? It should be an extreme and excessive love to the degree that his soul is totally bound up with the love of G‑d and he is constantly obsessed with it as if he is lovesick. A lovesick person is never free from the passion of his love for that woman and he thinks about her constantly whether he is sitting or standing or at the time that he is eating and drinking. The love of G‑d should be even greater than this and should be implanted in the heart of those that love Him and are obsessed with Him constantly as we are commanded to, “Love Him with all your heart and all your soul” (Devarim 6:5). This concept was expressed by Shlomo (Shir HaShirim 2:5), “I am lovesick.” In fact all of Shir Hashirim is a parable describing the love of G‑d [with the metaphor of love of a woman].

Rosh HaShanna(4a): With the reward from the fact that Torah is as cherished to Jews as shegel (sexual intercourse) is to non‑Jews – you have merited the precious jewelry of Ophir.

Eiruvin(54b): Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani asked why are the words of Torah compared to a hind in Mishlei (5:19) “Let her be like the loving hind and a graceful roe..”? It is to inform you just as a hind has a narrow womb and is therefore loved by her mate at all times as the very first hour- so are the words of Torah beloved by those that study them at all times as they did from the first. And why are the words of Torah compared to a “graceful roe?”That is because Torah confers grace on those who study it. "Her breasts will satisfy you at all times” (Mishlei 5:19). Why were the words of the Torah compared to a breast? Just as a breast – whenever the child sucks it he finds milk in it – so it is with the words of the Torah. Whenever a man thinks about them he finds deep reasons and ideas in them. “And he will be lovesick and obsessed with her always (Mishlei 5:19) [and he will act like a fool and a crazy person and abandon his work in order to run to learn Torah and the Torah will protect him – Rashi, Maharasha]. For example R’ Eleazar ben Pedas. They say about R’ Eleazar that he sat and studied Torah in the lower market of Tzippori while his cloak lay in the upper market of Tzippori [he forgot it because of his preocuppation with Torah – Rabbeinu Chananel]. R’ Yitzchok said that once a man came to take the cloak and found a poisonous snake in it.

Rav Tzadok(Shaar HaYichud): And thus I have seen written in a book which was written by a holy man and he said that the sect of Shabtsai Tzvi which did that which it did- because they were involved in the study of Kabbala when their hearts were full of the lusts of this world. Consequentially they took literally the metaphors of kabbala. Thus when they saw in the Kabbala literature terms such as sexual relations, hugging, kissing and others similar expressions it aroused in them lusts and adultery until they became very wicked people. And similarly I am aware of one rav from the previous generation who was considered to be a scholar and kabbalist and he printed a book on kabbalistic matters with the haskomos of the gedolim of that generation. And afterwards he sinned by committing adultery. There is no question that this was caused by his involvement in kabbala and his taking literally the metaphors of kabbala as is clear from what he wrote in his book. I am writing this in order that people are warned how carefully they must be when studying esoteric material as our Rabbis have said.

Rav Sternbuch: Destroying Television to Stop Sin?

Rav Sternbuch (1:368):Question: A baal teshuva, when visiting his parents who have a television, damages it in order that the family members will not watch it. Is it permitted for him to damage so? Answer: The prohibition of watching television is very serious and it is an aspect of sexual immorality. That is because as the result of watching this impure device it increases his attraction to sexual sins. Therefore it is definitely necessary to stop a person from watching television in various ways. It is literally a psik reisha ( a direct cause of sinning) for someone who lives in a house with a television which degrades those who watch it. However there is a dispute between the Ketzos and the Nesivos (C.M. 3) whether the ability to force someone to do keep a mitzva is uniquely permitted to beis din or whether every single person is allowed to force others to keep mitzvos. According to the Ketzos it is only permitted for beis din while the Nesivos says that every person has a mitzva to prevent others from sinning.... Accordingly the Nesivos would permit in our case to carry out whatever activity is needed to stop television watching. In contrast the Ketzos says that only beis din has the power to decide and therefore the individual can not act on his own initiative to harm another’s property. However it would seem that those poskim who require permission from beis din are correct. We also see from the Yereim (#278) that coercing that might involve death is considered a knas which can not be done by the layman but requires mumchin (expert judges) in Israel. See also Minchas Chinuch (Parashas Bo). And even if the actual halacha was that each individual has to obligation to force mitzva observance, it would appear that we shouldn’t have a system of anarchy where one person can decide to harm to property of another. Therefore even if it were allowed – it is necessary to consult with a beis din before doing anything. That is because pragmatically there are times that this vigilante action against another’s property will cause the other person to be turned off by Judaism rather than making him more observant. Thus no one should take the property of others with the claim that they were only doing it for the sake of Heaven in order to stop him from sin. Furthermore it could be that the halacha only would permit taking another’s property when the sin is a monetary one. However in this case where the obligation is to prevent him from doing a sin, it is not relevant for an individual to force compliance by taking another’s property. However in our case property is not being taken to force him to behave. Rather the question is whether to destroy an impure device which causes spiritual harm and encourages transgressing severe sins. Thus it seems we are only destroying evil. Support for this view is found in Berachos (20a) which says there was the case of a certain pious individual who ripped off an immodest red garment from a woman that was worth 400 zuz. It seem from the gemora that such an action of stopping immorality is proper in a case of chilul haShem– even though it caused the pious person to have to repay the 400 zuz. So surely in the case of the television which causes much greater impurity. Similarly we see that Rachel stole her father’s idols to stop him from involvement with idolatry as Rashi (Bereishis 31:19) explained.

However despite these apparent proofs that an individual can act on his own initiative, I feel that every such action requires a consultation with a rav. We see clearly in the above gemora, that the pious person indicated that he should have been more patient and not have been so hasty to rip the garment. Also we see that Yaakov did not approve of this theft which Rachel kept concealed from him and in fact he cursed the person who stole the idols – and she died from the curse. (We see that sometimes a pious act causes much more spiritual harm then if no action were taken. And that instead of glorifying G‑d – the reverse happens as is known from many incidents.). It could also be that in our case it is not the appropriate time to stop them from watching television and an act that is premature can cause much harm. Thus even if the act itself is permitted it might be at the wrong time. Therefore the act can not be done in isolation of context and it is necessary to get permission with a wise person as to what is appropriate and to follow his words. It is also a good idea to speak with the parents and to try to explain to them that television causes much harm. And so even if they enjoy it for the moment – it will eventually cause severe harm to the entire family. In fact there is nothing comparable to its harmfulness. In conclusion, concerning damaging or destroying the television, even if he is willing to pay for it, it is best if he asks a posek before he does anything. One who acts according to the rabbis will always merit success.

קצות החושן (סימן ג ס"ק א):  ואפילו לפי מ"ש הרמב"ן בחידושיו סוף ב"ב (קעה, ב ד"ה הא דאמר רבה) דגם למ"ד שעבודא לאו דאורייתא יורדין לנכסיו, טעמא דידיה לפי דהב"ד רשאין לכוף אותו בכל מילי דכפיה לקיים מצוותו ולהכי נמי יורדין לנכסיו משום כפיה והיינו כפייה דידיה לקיים המצוה בעל כרחו, וא"כ כיון דאינו אלא מתורת כפיה דהא הנכסים אינם משועבדים וא"כ מוכח דשליחותייהו דקמאי קא עבדינן.

נתיבות המשפט (ביאורים סימן ג ס"ק א ): גם מה שכתב [בסק"א] דאי שעבודא לאו דאורייתא והבית דין כופין בעי בי"ד [מומחין] דוקא לכפותו דהדיוטות לאו בני עישוי נינהו. נראה לפענ"ד דליתא, דכיון דדמי לעשה סוכה ואינו עושה דכופין אותו לקיים המצוה, כל אדם מצווה להפריש חבירו מאיסור אפילו מי שאינו בכלל בית דין, כדמוכח בב"ק כ"ח [ע"א] גבי נרצע שכלו ימיו, דיכול רבו להכותו כדי להפרישו מאיסור שפחה, ע"ש. ואי בעינן בגמר דין ג' והיינו לומר פלוני זכאי, יבואר אי"ה בסימן ה' [סק"ב].

Women reach perfection only through men

Rav Tzadok(Dover Tzedek page 41): Berachos (17a) asks, What is the merit that women have – to achieve the World to Come? [Concerning the pshat see Sotah 21a] The reason that this is a question is that women don’t have a mechanism for self-perfection as men do with Torah study. The gemora replies that their merit comes from assisting their husband and children in learning Torah... In other words their perfection is not acquired directly but only through their husbands and children. The husband is oblgated to provide her food, clothing and sexual relations while the son is obligated to honor her and fear her as is said in Kesubos (64a), A woman asks for a staff in her hand (son to support her) while alive and a spade for her burial. In other words her faults and imperfections are completed by the actions of others. Thus she draws perfection from them and her defining nature is being controlled or taken care of by others.

That is why the Torah says your husband “will control you.” In contrast the woman is described in Kiddushin (30b), That she is in the domain of others and she has no control or any power and that is why whatever she acquires is automatically acquired by her husband. In fact the only genuine power she has is that her husband is obligated to her in order that he provide what she lacks and this is also true for the son as we mentioned before.
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Pnei Yehoshua(Berachos 17a): Greater is the promise that G‑d made to women then to men...Rav asked R’ Chiya, “How do women merit getting the World to Come? By making their children go to synagogue...” It would seem that there is problem here. What was Rav’s original problem that cause him to ask, “Why do women merit the World to Come? Isn’t it obvious since they are commanded to observe all the negative commandments like men as well as all positive commandments which are not time bound – so why was it necessary to answer that it is because they take their children to synagogue to read...? Furthermore it seems Rav not only asked the question but he also answered it the gemora doesn’t say that R’ Chiya replied to Rav that it was because they take their children to synagogue. It would also seem reasonable that the opening statement of “Greater is the promise” was also said by Rav himself since this was something he frequently said. Thus all these statements all go back to a single source – Rav – according to what I explained. The message is that it is necessary for everyone to purify 248 limbs and 365 sinews in this world by means of observe the 248 positive commandments and the 365 negative commandments. This is a prerequisite if a person wants to enjoy being in the Divine presence as I have already explained. Consequently this would only be relevant for men since they fulfill all 248 positive commandments while women are missing the time bound mitzvos which they are exempt. Thus those limbs which are not purified by obligatory mitzvos are not purified and remained damaged and thus can not benefit from the Divine presence. Despite this Rav concluded from the verse that despite this lack of purification the promise that G‑d gave to women was greater. Therefore Rav was not asking a question of R’ Chisda but in fact was explaining the meaning of the verse. He was telling R’ Chisda that reason that they have a greater promise is because they cause their children and husband to learn Torah.  Thus his explanation is that since they are aiding their husbands and children to learn Tporah and keep and do all the 613 mitzvos – they receive reward even for those mitzvos that they themselves are not commanded to keep. Similarly for Torah study – even though they are not commanded to study and the reward of Torah is equal to the rest – nevetheless the women do in fact receive reward for all mitzvos. We find such an explanation by R’ Eliezar ben Azariah in Chagiga (3a) by Hakeil – Why are children brought – to give reward to those who bring them. That is also the explanation here in in resolving the difficulties in this aggada.