Guest post by A. Prager -This guest post was written as a response to
Gavriel Cohen's request for information about gedolim and Daas Torah. It represents a sincere - though mistaken - attempt to show the ancient roots of Daas Torah as well as the superiority of gedolim in all areas of knowledge. I originally thought of not publishing it - but then I realized that it in fact is representative of how many Chareidim actually view the matter. So showing the problematic proofs and citations will in fact help clarify the matter.
Basically I think this is a typical chareidi apologetic on the subject - but it is inaccurate. It cherry picks quotes and examples - as if they are representative of the set of all gedolim. It fails to note the common practice of gedolim to recommend the best secular authority - rather than give personal advice. In fact Rav Moshe Feinstein was adamant that when one goes to a doctor to use the best.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach did not learn about electricity from the gemora, Rav Moshe Feinstein learned about medical and technical issues from secular experts, The Chazon Ish allegedly learned his medical knowledge from secular medical books. Rav (Sanhedrin 5b) noted, "I spent eighteen months with a shepherd in order to learn which was a permanent and which a passing blemish ?" Pesachim (94b) notes an instance where the scientific view of secular scholars is said to be superior to that of Chazal. There are many other examples.
Even the assertion he brings that all wisdom can be learned from Torah is not relevant. Rabbi Freifeld told me that while the statement is true - it is not known how to obtain the answers. This is similar to the Rambam noting that while Chazal had books of science - they have been lost and that therefore we learn science from secular sources.
update: A Prager responded:
Thanks for your response.
In my defense, I wasn't
attempting to provide Gavriel with a balanced approach to the sugyah; I
left out most of the relevant material that I have on the subject (8
pages of Mekoros).
All I was trying to prove
was that the position that holds that gedolei hador are to be asked on
issues other than halacha is most certainly a valid one, with precedent
in Rishonim and Achronim. I made that quite clear to him; he was asking
if todays "gedolim culture" was an invention of a tradition that is not
our own, an imaginary reality. I proved to him that that is not the
case. The dissenting opinion was not of concern in that response.
==========================
Dear Gavriel,
The issue is fundamentally important. I have heard many people (choshuve ones too) referring to a lack of cogent and authoritative material that discusses the concept of Daas Torah.
The so-called paucity of sources on the subject has led some to reject the entire concept, as a modern innovation – just about as old as its terminology. I have heard this opinion voiced on a number of occasions and, as I hope you will see, this statement is far from accurate, and fallacy due to lack of knowledge, and also (I sadly suspect) a desire to be liberated from the confines of an imposing Rabbinic authority. It is indeed true that the term daas Torah is a contemporary coinage, but its idea spans back much further:
Let’s start at the beginning. I am presenting you with an argument which I do not feel is enough advanced because there is a lack of awareness of its potency and authenticity.
Is there such a thing as Gedolim?
Well, the answer is obviously yes. The Gemara is replete with references to Gedolim and Gedolei Olam. Your question pertains more to who they are, and what they can and are expected to know.
If you’re looking for sources though, there are many but see: Pesachim 70b and Kesubos 10b.
What can a Gadol b’Torah Know? Is it Accessible for us?
In three places the Gemara refers to the all-encompassing knowledge of Talmidei Chachomim, and ascribes the sources of their wisdom to Yiras Shomayim: regarding the knowedge of the shiur of time it takes to perform biah (Sotah 4b); a specific knowledge of the pain suffered from a certain ailment (Sotah 10a) and the ability to distinguish between pure and impure blood through the sense of smell (Niddah 20b). See also Berachos 58b that Shmuel knew the patterns and paths of the stars like he knew the streets of Nahardea.
The Chasam Sofer (Bava Basra 21a) writes explicitly that there is no need to study any other discipline other than Torah, since everything can be found in its words. Now, its significant that he wrote that; he’s writing that l’maase just over 150 years ago: that means he held that such knowledge (to the extent that it is required) is discernable and available:
חתם סופר מסכת בבא בתרא דף כא עמוד א
ושארי חכמות שצריך לרקחות ולטבחות לשמש אשת חיל תורת ה' לא יספיקו בילדי נכרי' כי הכל ימצא בתורה ההוגה בה לשמה זוכה לדברי' הרבה וכמ"ש רמב"ן בהקדמה לתורה
You will be familiar, I am sure, with the Mishna in Avos (5,22) “turn it over and over, for all is in it”, how do you understand this? Rabenu Yona there writes that all wisdom that is in the world can be found in the words of the Torah. Read his words in context, he’s explaining the Mishna’s injunction to turn it over (mull it through), in other words, we can get there:
פירוש רבינו יונה על אבות ה,כב
הפוך בה וכו' – חזור על דברי תורה שכל חכמת העולם כלולה בה
The Mirkeves Hamishneh there has a similar approach:
מרכבת המשנה לר"י אלאשקר על אבות ה,כב
ועל כן אמר הפוך [בה] והפך בה. ואם לכאורה נראה שאין בה כל כך ענינים, אין זה כי אם מצד קוצר המשיג ועומק המושג, וכאמרו כי לא דבר רק הוא מכם (דברים לב, מז), ואם רק הוא מכם הוא (ירושלמי פאה א, א)...וג"כ רמז שאין צריך לאדם לאבד זמנו בשום חכמה חיצונית לפי שכל החכמות הם נכללים בתורה.
Again, the comments made are especially significant because they are made on this Mishnah which implies that we should delve into the Torah, because “all is in it”.
The Paas Hashulchan has a slightly different approach, which is that anything that one could ever need “for Torah” is found in it:
פאת השלחן בהקדמתו בשם רבנו הגר"א ז"ל
"כל החכמות נצרכים לתורתינו הק' וכלולים בה"
You are familiar, no doubt, with the account of the Chazon Ish who provided advice on how to perform a complex brain operation which was completed successfully. Significantly, the Chazon Ish demonstrated erudite knowledge of the anatomical structure of the brain and how to perform an operation thereon. The surgeon at first rejected the Rabbis advice, but reticently followed the patients wishes to perform the operation according to the instruction of the Chazon Ish, which was successfully completed. The procedure is known today in Israel as “the Karelitz procedure”. I enclose the diagram drawn by the Chazon Ish:
What I am trying to demonstrate, is that there is a strong basis to argue that the Gedolei Yisrael, have an ability to know and rule – even in our generation – on matters much wider than halacha. I have not tried to explain why this is the case.
The very same Chazon Ish in Igros writes that the distinction between kodesh and profane in the perception of the gedolim’s abilities was the hallmark difference between the pre-war reform and those that rejected reform. To say that the gedolim only have a right to make statements in the area of halacha is against the entire ethos of Yiddishkeit, he argues. A similar approach is taken by Rav Hutner in a fascinating essay first printed in the Jewish Observer, November 1977.
So is the approach new? No, it’s heavily based in Gemara, Rishonim, Achronim and Poskim. The term “daas Torah”, as you allude to, is new. I don’t know how familiar you are with between-the-wars Continental Jewish politics? I would suggest that it was due to the political tensions that emerged in pre-war Europe between the religious parties and their secular counterpart that was responsible for the coinage of the term. The novel term is the formalisation of a well-established concept, symptomatic of a political struggle, necessary to demonstrate the authenticity of a Politics guided by Gedolei Yisrael; a model we see practiced today in Israel. It became common usage, I think, for political reasons, but it was always there, just was more relevant to the world of philosophical theory than practice.