The Legacy of Rabbi Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the Agunah Problem by Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

 Last month, on 26 Marcheshvan, 5783, Rabbi Feivel Cohen – author of Badei ha-Shulchan and other works – ascended to the Heavenly Academy. Ten days later, Rabbi Mordechai Willig – chief justice of the Beth Din of America – delivered an eloquent appreciation for Rabbi Cohen [available at <https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/1051145/rabbi-mordechai-i-willig/eruv-in-brooklyn-some-words-on-rav-feivel-cohen/>] , in which he mentioned Rabbi Cohen’s legacy vis-à-vis the agunah problem. I wish to respectfully yet carefully review Rabbi Willig’s remarks in the present essay, ke-darkah shel Torah. 

            The bulk of Rabbi Willig’s lecture explores Hilkhot Eruvin. Seeking to solve a particular difficulty in the field that is raised by Sfat Emet, Rabbi Willig [commencing 53:50 into the recording] cites a brilliant insight of Rabbi Cohen’s book Da‘at Kohen which clinches the discussion. It is at this point that Rabbi Willig turns to eulogizing Rabbi Cohen by describing the latter [not only as a proficient scholar in Eruvin but also] as a closet supporter of his prenup [viz. the 1993 Beth Din of America prenup] designed to rescue agunot. 

            Specifically, Rabbi Willig reports that – years ago, when Rabbi Willig was first contemplating his proposed prenup [before its ultimate release in 1993] – he studied Rabbi Cohen’s book Mi-Dor le-Dor, where the author elucidates how to execute an estate-inheritance-will via a shtar chatzi zakhar without running afoul of the rules of asmakhta (a contingency agreement wherein the person accepting liability never seriously anticipates that his obligation to pay will materialize and hence is halakhically invalid). After digesting the book’s contents, Rabbi Willig arrived at the conclusion that the same mechanism which Rabbi Cohen employs to bypass the asmakhta problem for a shtar chatzi zakhar can likewise bypass the asmakhta problem for committing a husband to pay his wife money as soon as she moves out of the house until such time as the husband will grant a get [=the essence of Rabbi Willig’s prenup, and a putative formula to rescue agunot].  

Seeking confirmation, Rabbi Willig approached Rabbi Cohen with the prenup idea. In Rabbi Willig’s words: “He was very nice to me. He said: ‘You know, it’s very good, the sevara is right, but we’re not doing it over here in Brooklyn.’” The implication of Rabbi Willig’s testimony is that Rabbi Cohen agreed to his prenup in principle, but simply as a matter of voluntary policy [so as not to rustle the feathers of fellow Brooklynites] preferred not to implement the concept in his community. 

            Alas, Rabbi Willig’s extrapolation from shtar chatzi zakhar to the laws of gittin [and likewise Rabbi Cohen’s reported closet support thereof] is (be-mechilat Kevod Toratam) tenuous. In the case of a shtar chatzi zakhar, the sober-minded individual signing the document knows in advance that there is a reasonable probability he will die (until we are privileged to experience the messianic era when the mal'akh ha-mavet will disappear, as per the Gemara, Sukkah 52a) and so he sincerely wishes to bequeath property to others a moment before death occurs [as the shtar chatzi zakhar declares]. By contradistinction, in the case of Rabbi Willig’s prenup, the groom who signs the document does not seriously entertain the probability that his wife will ever demand divorce in the future. [If he realized that this was such a demanding wife, he wouldn’t have signed the document in the first place.] Hence, the quotidian money transfer specified in the prenup indeed represents an asmakhta which the husband is not obligated to pay, and if a secular court nevertheless threatens the husband that he will lose the specified money until he grants a get, then the get is invalid as per the Mishnah, Gittin 88b [that a get coerced by a secular court contrary to Halakhah is invalid].   

            Admittedly, it is true that the Mishnah, Makkot 3a compares the actuarial probability of future death to the actuarial probability of future divorce in calculating how much money to fine edim zomemin (witnesses who claimed that a husband divorced his wife without granting a ketubah, and were then discovered to be false by virtue of their not being in the location of the alleged divorce at the time of the alleged divorce). Perhaps it is this Mishnah that caused Rabbi Willig and Rabbi Cohen to believe that we can extrapolate from the shtar chatzi zakhar (i.e. anticipation of death) to the prenup (i.e. anticipation of divorce). Even so, however, a careful examination of Makkot 3a reveals that [regarding divorce] the Mishnah is discussing the actuarial probability that the husband will offer a get to his wife of his own free will in the future, not the actuarial probability that the wife will demand a get from her husband in the future [the latter representing the basis of Rabbi Willig’s prenup]. Thus, it remains the case that Rabbi Willig’s prenup is subject to the asmakhta objection. Ergo, it is precisely because of our sympathy for agunot that we should encourage any married couple which has signed Rabbi Willig’s prenup to sign the release form [revoking the secular court’s ability to enforce Rabbi Willig’s prenup] in Section A of my relevant essay at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>. Otherwise, the wife may be stuck with an invalid get and hence remain an agunah. The same message [albeit without a sample release form] is offered by Rabbi Pinchas Spira [no immediate relation to this student] in his treatise Kedushat ha-Nissu’in, available at <https://hebrewbooks.org/60970>.  

            Me-inyan le-inyan be-oto inyan (to borrow the expression from Kiddushin 6a), Rabbi Willig’s prenup plays an illuminating role in the specific agunah case of Epstein vs. Friedman. Namely, as reported at <https://yucommentator.org/2012/04/panel-featuring-current-agunah-confronts-crisis/>, on March 29, 2012, Rabbi Hershel Schachter claimed that [notwithstanding Exodus 20:14, which prohibits arbitrarily telling a husband to divorce his wife, nevertheless] Mr. Aharon Friedman is obligated to grant Ms. Tamar Epstein a get because nobody told her about Rabbi Willig’s prenup before her marriage to Mr. Friedman. Had she known about Rabbi Willig’s prenup, she would have executed it prior to her chuppah and thereby enjoyed an automatic “get out of jail free” card.  

Alas, this approach (while well-meaning) represents a compounded error by Rabbi Schachter (be-mechilat Kevod Torato). Firstly, Rabbi Willig’s prenup would not have rescued Ms. Epstein from her agunah predicament since the prenup does not work altogether [as argued in the present article]. Secondly, even if there would be an [alternate] prenup that does work to rescue agunot [which indeed there fortuitously is, as explained in Section Q of my aforementioned essay at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>], failure to apprise the bride of the existence of the prenup [while perhaps unprofessional/unethical on the part of the mesader kiddushin who should have informed the bride in advance] most certainly does not constitute grounds for a Beth Din to subsequently obligate the husband to grant a get. See Shulchan Arukh Even ha-Ezer nos. 77 and 154.

            And this brings us to my final point. Notwithstanding his reported closet support of Rabbi Willig’s prenup, Rabbi Feivel Cohen has clearly announced [in a public manner, and not merely in a private conversation] that Ms. Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Aharon Friedman according to Torah law. [See <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/01/rav-feivel-cohen-rules-heter-is.html>, and my elaboration at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2022/07/response-to-eulogy-for-rabbi-nota-zvi.html>.] Ergo, if we genuinely wish to honour the legacy of Rabbi Cohen vis-à-vis the agunah problem, we should all politely pray that Ms. Epstein soon return to Beth Din with her true husband Mr. Friedman. And this is an especially appropriate aspiration for Chanukah, since the final paragraph of Rambam, Hilkhot Chanukah points out that the Holy One, Blessed Be He, will even allow His Name to be placed in water in order to bring peace between husband and wife. 

  

Rabbi Spira works as Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute of Medical Research [a Pavillion of the Jewish General Hospital] in Montreal, Canada. 

Tish‘ah be-Av and the Agunah Problem by Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

    The Gemara, Ta‘anit 30a, prohibits most areas of Torah study on Tish‘ah be-Av. One of the few permitted exceptions, as identified by Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chaim 554, se’if katan 3, is the passage in Gittin 55b-58a regarding the Temple destruction. The conclusion of that passage – an exposition of Micah 2:2 – is interpreted by Maharsha (Chiddushei Aggadot) as declaring that if even one husband is wrongfully pressured to divorce his wife [in violation of Exodus 20:14] or if even one marriage is poisoned by adultery – then the entire Jewish People is held accountable to collectively protest. Thus, it emerges that Tish‘ah be-Av is a time to reaffirm our commitment to the sanctity of marriage – and to eschew half-baked solutions to the agunah problem – as I previously wrote at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2023/01/the-legacy-of-rabbi-feivel-cohen-vis.html>.

      R. Simchah Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot al Mishnah Berurah Chelek Shishi, points to another exception presented by Mishnah Berurah, this time in se‘if katan 5. Where a halakhic verdict is urgently needed on Tish‘ah be-Av for a sick patient or for litigants in a monetary dispute (who cannot wait until tomorrow), a decisor may study the case as is necessary to provide immediate guidance. Rabbi Rabinowitz explains that this is what justified R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron, Teshuvot Maharsham, I, no. 84, to formulate a responsum on Tish‘ah be-Av to permit an agunah to remarry. Indeed, Rabbi Schwadron concludes that responsum by citing Bach to the effect that rescuing an agunah is a spiritual achievement equivalent to rebuilding one of the ruins of Jerusalem. 

            Upon careful reflection, it emerges that there is no contradiction between the aforementioned Maharsha and Maharsham regarding the agunah-problem message of Tish‘ah be-Av [and, poetically enough, their works carry almost identical names]. Where the Oral Torah declares that an agunah can remarry, such as the case of Maharsham in which he discovered sufficient circumstantial evidence to presume the first husband to be dead, then it is indeed a great mitzvah to enable this remarriage. But where the first husband is demonstrably both alive and innocent of any wrongdoing, then Maharsha directs us to respect that first (and only) marriage. 

For this reason, R. J. David Bleich, responding to the 1992 New York Get Law [a well-meaning but unfortunately less-than-successful attempt to solve the agunah problem], comments as follows [available at <https://traditiononline.org/communications-86/> ]:

                "Regrettably, instead of serving as a panacea resolving the plight of the agunah, the Get Law has itself                       created countless agunot. It is precisely because of concern for agunot that the Get Law cannot                       be allowed to stand."

In other words, we must always take into consideration the Maharsha vs. Maharsham dichotomy, thereby distinguishing true from imagined solutions to the agunah problem. That is why my own prenup proposal [available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>] contains a clause shielding the husband and wife from any secular court that might wreak havoc with a get. 

Prenuptial Agreements | PDF | Halakha | Hebrew Words And Phrases Halakhic analysis of prenuptial agreements, leading to a combination of two halakhically kosher prenuptial agreements to benefit the Jewish wife www.scribd.com

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Continuing on this theme, I would like to highlight my recent exchange with R. Heshey Zelcer in Hakirah Vol. 28 (Spring 2020) [available at <https://hakirah.org/Vol28Letters.pdf>] regarding the [once again well-meaning] Yashar Prenup. I hypothesize that the poskim who are advertised as supporting this prenup (R. Moshe Sternbuch, et al, be-mechilat Kevod Toratam) innocently glossed over paragraph 16 of the agreement, which states as follows: 

 

           “At the initial session, Beth Din shall outline the issues between the Parties and make a            determination of the interim payments necessary to ensure that the lifestyle of the un-                                emancipated children of the household (if any) can be maintained, and that they can continue            to attend yeshiva.” 

 

 Rabbi Sternbuch et al do not raise an objection to this paragraph, presumably because it does not explicitly require the husband to pay the wife until he grants her a get. However, as one can discern from the aforementioned Hakirah exchange, Rabbi Zelcer effectively interprets this clause to in fact mean that the Beth Din will direct the husband to pay the wife until he grants a get. And so, the Yashar Prenup seems to present a problem that is essentially identical to that of the RCA prenup, the latter representing a prenup that Rabbi Sternbuch and others have identified would produce an invalid get. [See <https://hebrewbooks.org/60970>.] 

A careful examination of Rabbi Sternbuch’s letter of approbation for the Yashar Prenup [available at <https://yasharinitiative.org/docs/RabbiMosheSternbuch.pdf>] reveals that he is appreciative to the framers of the prenup for keeping the Jewish litigants out of secular court. However, Rabbi Sternbuch does not say that he permits charging the husband money until the latter grants a get, and – indeed – he could not permit such an innovation without contradicting what he wrote regarding the RCA prenup. [For a different perspective (than mine) on the Yashar Prenup, see Yechezkel Hirshman at <https://achaslmaala.blogspot.com/2023/01/prenups-xii-straight-dope-on-yashar.html>. Hirshman does not believe that the Yashar Prenup actually costs the husband any money, yet he concurs in practice (with me) to keep the proposal on ice. See there for his illuminating approach.] 

      

Rabbi Spira works as the Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute of Medical Research, a pavilion of the Jewish General Hospital in Montreal, Canada. 

The Legacy of Rabbi Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the Agunah Problem – Part 2 bv Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

 The Legacy of Rabbi Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the Agunah Problem – Part 2 

                                                Shalom C. Spira 

 

As I wrote in my previous article at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2022/12/the-legacy-of-rabbi-feivel-cohen-vis.html>, the legacy of R. Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the agunah problem – as he sought to publicly express it – is that the Jewish faith considers Ms. Tamar Epstein to be the wife of Mr. Aharon Friedman. At the same time, it has also been argued [by R. Mordechai Willig] that there is an additional dimension to Rabbi Cohen’s legacy, viz. that he quietly supported Rabbi Willig’s prenup to resolve future agunah cases, based on an extrapolation from shtar chatzi zakhar to the laws of gittin. My article challenged the latter extrapolation, be-mechilat Kevod Toratam. 

 A recent audio recording (dated Oct. 26, 2018) demonstrates that my opinion is shared by R. J. David Bleich. Actually, Rabbi Bleich already contested Rabbi Willig’s prenup back in 1996 in his Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah Vol. 1 (which is elaborated in Section A of my prenup essay at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>). The novelty of the 2018 audio recording is that Rabbi Bleich responds to the specific claim that the shtar chatzi zakhar should serve as a precedent for Rabbi Willig’s prenup. Rabbi Bleich orally counters that this specific claim is “nonsense.” The shtar chatzi zakhar represents a kinyan me-chayim, viz. a mercantile acquisition orchestrated from the time that the client is alive, to bequeath property to his daughter [or some other beneficiary who would not normally inherit according to the algorithm of Numbers 27:8-11] in a manner that takes effect a moment before the client’s death. By contradistinction, Rabbi Willig’s prenup consists of a penalty on the husband for not getting along with his wife and additionally not granting her get. Since there is no gemirat da‘at [seriousness of intention] on the part of the husband, the husband is not obligated to pay the money by Torah law. [And since the secular court will nevertheless enforce the financial penalty, the resulting gittin are invalid.] My thanks are extended to R. Yisrael Zvi Harari, a disciple [of both Rabbi Bleich and Rabbi Willig] at the RIETS kollel le-hora’ah, who conducted the interview and provided me with the audio recording, available at <https://soundcloud.com/shalom-spira/interview-with-rav-bleichmp3>. 

I also received supportive e-mail feedback (on Jan. 2, 2023) from Yechezkel Hirshman (a marriage counsellor and to‘en-in-training who has published an in-depth critique of many different prenups – including my own – at <https://achaslmaala.blogspot.com/2023/01/prenups-xii-straight-dope-on-yashar.html>). Yechezkel wrote to me (inter alia) as follows: 

 

“As per the situation with HRHG Rav Feivel Cohen ZTL, I agree with you that expressing agreement to a specific Halachic construct is not to be construed as an agreement on a compound Halachic innovation. I also agree with your distinction between a shtar chatzi zachar and a get. I think it is pretentious for anybody to claim a deceased gadol as a "closet supporter" of a very contentious issue.” 

 

            Accordingly, let us honour the legacy of Rabbi Cohen by politely praying that Ms. Epstein soon return with her true halakhic husband [Aharon Friedman] to Beth Din, and let us likewise politely encourage all couples that have signed Rabbi Willig’s prenup to sign a release form from that prenup [even if the latter concept contradicts Rabbi Cohen’s closet support]. Ultimately, as underscored by R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik’s 1975 lecture recorded at <https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/767722/rabbi-joseph-b-soloveitchik/gerus-mesorah-part-1/>, a key dividing line between Orthodox Judaism and heterodoxy is that the former respects the sanctity of marriage, pursuant to the Gemara, Kiddushin 2b that betrothal is called kiddushin because the wife becomes forbidden to the entire world like hekdesh (the Temple treasury). Thus, half-baked solutions to the agunah problem must be avoided by Orthodox Jews. 

 

Rabbi Spira works as the Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute for Medical Research [a Pavillion of the Jewish General Hospital] in Montreal, Canada. 

What is a "halachic prenup" as opposed to a non-halachic prenup?

Guest Post by יְדֵיכֶם דָּמִים מָלֵאוּ

The organization that boasts as being the primary educators encouraging Torah-observant Jews to sign a prenuptial agreement, has named it the “‘halachic' prenup.”

What is the word “halachic” meant to suggest and insinuate? Are there any recognized halachic authorities who have ruled that there is a requirement for a marrying couple to sign this prenuptial agreement. If so, who? The only explanation is that since there were and are certain prenuptial agreements that run contrary to halacha and produce an invalid get, ORA is attempting to say that this particular prenuptial is different, as it does not run contrary to halacha according to some poskim.

However, this label is disingenuous and misleading. Does ORA promote calling our jackets "halachic jackets"? Since certain jackets contain wool and linen (shatnez) and are halachicly prohibited to be worn, shouldn't we call those jackets that we may wear "halachic jackets"? The most that anyone would call it would be a “kosher” jacket. No one would call it a “halachic” jacket. As such, the most ORA should call this prenuptial should be a “prenup that is kosher according to some rabbis.”

It appears obvious that the term “halachic” is being used to entice the unknowing and the unquestioning into signing this agreement. ORA understands that asking people to sign a prenuptial that is only potentially kosher would cause the bride and groom to carefully review and deliberate whether or not they would like to sign this prenuptial agreement. The result would be that even fewer people would agree to sign it.

Is there any other explanation?

Additionally, at the Mendel Epstein torture trial, other questionable practice standards of ORA and the BDA have come into light. ORA went out on a limb to help a woman without ever having made contact with her purported estranged husband. Nathan Lewin, a defense attorney in the torture trial case, explained how easily the BDA was duped into writing a “siruv” or excommunication against a nonexistent man. The purported brother and sister showed the BDA an email that they claimed the nonexistent Alex Marconi wrote. Of course, they simply opened up an email account themselves, wrote the email, and claimed that it came from "Alex Marconi." They also provided the address of a Florida post office as Mr. Marconi’s address.

It becomes quite obvious that ORA and the BDA did not do any due diligence before waging war with "Mr. Marconi." A simple internet search would have verified that the address provided was that of a post office. A few phone calls to local community members of “Mr. Marconi” would have revealed that he is not existent, and would have blown the FBI’s cover. Yet, ORA and the BDA did not bother investigating. Interestingly, it seems that the FBI was completely confident that their cover will not be blown by some basic, basic research by either ORA or the BDA. Why?

Are these the organizations that we would like to entrust with our marriages? Are these the organizations we would like to rely upon to validate highly questionable gitten, when major halachic authorities have ruled that children resultant of a subsequent marriage after a first marriage was terminated by a get procured through their prenuptial are mamzeirim?

Get Me'usa explicit threat only?

On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 11:39 PM Rav Shalom Chaim Spira ; wrote:

Shalom Aleikhem Ha-Rav ha-Ga'on R. Daniel Eidensohn, shlit"a,

Thank you for the honour of the question. In response, I am enclosing a scan of Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah Vol. 1 (KTAV Publishing, 1996), pp. 47-52, where R. J. David Bleich answers your question [in the specific context of the 1992 New York Get Law] by arguing that even an implicit threat of financial coercion - if understood as such by a typical husband - will disqualify the resulting get. Of special interest is footnote 16, where Rav Bleich raises a havah amina that perhaps his "implicit coercion" thesis is at odds with Chazon Ish, but then answers Chazon Ish in such a manner to be consistent with his thesis. To this student, it seems intuitive that Chazon Ish is in harmony with Rav Bleich's thesis; see Section L of my prenup essay <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements> where I present Chazon Ish as such. 

Now, although you did not specifically ask me about the South African Get Law identified by Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer IV, no. 106, I see that in your post you raised the issue, so allow me to refer you to Section J of my aforementioned where I offer different approaches to that South African responsum. 

[N.B. My prenup essay assumes that Vol. 7 of Iggerot Mosheh (which includes the South African Get Law responsum) represents the considered ruling of R. Moshe Feinstein - delivered while he was in good health - and therefore needs to be carefully studied-and-applied like the first six volumes of the same work. However, after I already published my prenup essay (which I am no longer at liberty to modify since it is now being studied by a secular Canadian court, and be-Ezrat Ha-Shem Yitbarakh this will result in a very positive blessing for Canadian Jewry), this student discovered that Rav Bleich has issued contradictory indications on whether he accepts the provenance of Vol. 7 of Iggerot Mosheh. I refer to this concept in footnote 239 of my brain death essay at <http://www.scribd.com/document/375175373/Halakhic-Bioethic >. In any event, I don't think this will result in a practical halakhic difference: neither for coerced gittin nor for brain death. It's more of an academic fascination. And, of course, Kevod Torato ha-Rav has publicized this academic fascination at http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2019/01/who-wrote-late-volumes-of-igrot-moshe.html ]

For Orthodox Jews, a Different Kind of Prenup

Wall Street Journal

The halachic prenup—which dates back decades and has been championed by the Beth Din of America, the U.S.’s biggest rabbinical court—has gone mainstream in some circles as a mechanism to avoid the messy, sometimes abusive situations that advocates say can arise as divorce becomes more common in the Orthodox Jewish community.

The prenup serves to reduce the incidence of agunot, a Hebrew term for women who remain married against their will. Orthodox Jewish couples need to both civilly and religiously divorce, and only men have the power to grant the religious divorce, called a “get.”

A husband’s refusal to grant a get is part of a pattern often common in domestic-abuse situations because it is an assertion of power and control over his wife, with economic and social ramifications that are unique to Orthodox communities, said Orly Kusher, an attorney at Sanctuary for Families, a New York-based advocacy group for domestic-violence victims. She leads the group’s new legal-services program focused on agunot.

In situations where women are refused a get, Ms. Kusher said, they are often not allowed to participate in religious ceremonies, and can be denied access to shared finances and to children. The women are sometimes ostracized from the larger Orthodox community, she added, their reputations damaged and religiosity called into question.

“It can be tough on their children,” Ms. Kushner said, “because when they approach the age when they are getting married, they are seen as damaged goods.”

Over 15 years of serving domestic-abuse victims, Shoshannah Frydman, a social worker and clinical director of family violence and social services at New York’s Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty, said she has seen an increasing number of Orthodox Jewish women coming to her agency seeking help and who are often unable to obtain a get. 

Most notable, she said, is the change in demographics. Years ago, her clients were in their 50s and 60s, with children who were also married. Now, she said, more of her clients are in their 20s and 30s, with one or two young children. “That is very significant because it means there is more awareness in the community,” Ms. Frydman said.

The drive toward more women seeking help, advocates and rabbis say, is partly a reaction to modern times. It used to be that communities were bound by geography, with limited mobility and strong rabbinical courts. Under those circumstances, a man refusing a get would be ostracized.

Now, to pressure a man withholding a get, people and organizations take to Twitter and Facebook, hold protests at his home or submit his name to a list published in the Jewish Press, an independent weekly newspaper.[...]

Rabbi Jeremy Stern, executive director of the Organization for the Resolution of Agunot, said his group is currently aiding about 70 women who have been working for years toward a get. Because of that, the organization has raised awareness about prenups and postnups at high schools, colleges and synagogues, even hosting postnup-signing parties. In the past 12 months, 125 prenups and postnups have been included in a registry, up from 48 from the previous 12 months, he said.

“We are very, very strong advocates of the Jewish prenuptial agreement,” said Rabbi Stern, “and we are looking to go out of business by standardizing its use.”

Rav Eliashiv rejected the prenup because of Get Me'usa

Din.org 

Look at the original article plus there are are links to other articles on the topic at the bottom of the original article

Rav Elyashev's strong objections to the prenup is brought down by him in קובץ תשובות ח”ב סקס”ג
 
 

עדויות תלמידי מרן הגרי"ש אלישיב זצ"ל

עדות הגרא"ד לוין שליט"א, ראב"ד בית הדין ירושלים לדיני ממונות ובירורי יוחסין, ובעהמ"ח פסקי דין ירושלים.

בס"ד. לכבוד הרב הגאון רבי פנחס שפירא שליט"א, נו"נ לגדולי ישראל בדורות האחרונים, אחדהש"ט.

מכיון שבקשתם ממני – ברוב ענוותנותכם – לחוות דעתי על מה שעומדים לאשר בחוקיהם לאפשר לכל הנישאים, גם אלו שנרשמים ברבנות, לחתום על הסכם קדם נישואים המחייב את האיש ואת האשה להתגרש כאשר יחליט אחד מהם לכך, ואם לא יחוייב בקנסות כספיים גדולים, שלפי דעתכם יש בזה חוק לעקירת הדת, שהרי מי שמגרש לאחר הסכם כזה נחשב למגרש בכפיה, שאם אין פס"ד של כפיה לגט אזי הגט הזה בטל לפי ההלכה, ובניה מאחר ממזרים!

לדאבון לבי, אני מכיר את הבעיה הזו גם בטרם נחקק חוק כזה בדיניהם, מאז ששימשתי כמנהל מחלקת הנישואין ברבנות ירושלים, בהוראת מרן הגרי"ש אלישיב זצ"ל, וכבר אז הגיעו אלי בני זוג להירשם לנישואין עם הסכמים כאלו ואחרים, ובהנחייתו של מרן זצ"ל לא הסכמתי לאשר אותם אם הם כללו סעיף של כפיה לגירושין שלא כדין.

קריאתכם וזעקתכם על סכנת הממזרות כתוצאה מהסכמים שיש בהם לגרום לגיטין מעושין שלא כדין, מובנת וברורה, וטוב עשיתם שהעליתם על הכתב את הדברים למען ילמדו תועים בינה.

וכבר יצא קול קורא לציבור היראים לדבר ה' מאת דייני בית דיננו שליט"א, שלפני שניגשים לשידוכין יש לברר אם אין ח"ו בעיית יוחסין כזו או אחרת, כי הבעיות רבות וחמורות!

לענ"ד, לאור המצב הקיים, בהם הרבנות הראשית כפופה לחוקיהם, לא נותר ליראי ה' אלא להתנתק ולנהל רישום נישואין וגירושין בבתי דין פרטיים שיבדקו תחילה את כשרות היוחסין כהלכה. כשתימצי לומר, אני קורא בזה להפרדת הדת מהמדינה על כל המשתמע מכך, עד כי יבא שילה ומלאה הארץ דעה.

תבורכו משמים, וכולנו תפילה לבנין ביהמ"ק בב"א.

המכבדכם ומעריככם, אברהם דוב לוין, אב בית דין ירושלים לדיני ממונות ולבירור יוחסין.

עדותו של הגר"נ איזנשטיין שליט"א, רב שכונת מעלות דפנה בירושלים, וראש ועד הרבנים העולמי לעני' גיורים.

לכ' הרב הגאון ר' פנחס שפירא שליט"א, אחדש"ה.

בנידון של מה שמכונה הסכם טרום נישואין שמעתי ממרן הגרי"ש זצוק"ל כמה וכמה פעמים התנגדות מוחלטת לכל סוגי הסכמים (חוץ מהסכם שכתוב בו אך ורק שהצדדים מתחייבים ללכת לבית דין רבני מסויים), שמלבד שלא הוה קידושין ע"פ רוח ישראל סבא לקדש אישה עם מחשבות כיצד להתגרש, אבל עוד יותר חמור שהתחיבויות כאלו עם סכומים של כסף מהווה אסמכתא (וגם לא יועיל קנין בבית דין חשוב ואין פה המקום להאריך בזה) ויגרום לגט מעושה, שידוע דעת מרן זצ"ל שעישוי ממון הוה עישוי (כמבואר בשו"ת תורת חיים), וחלילה יכול להרבות ממזרים בישראל. וע"ז בעה"ח נחום איזנשטיין

Rav Dovid Eidensohn Tel Conf #16 – Prenups Force a Husband to Divorce His Wife Wed 9:30 PM Aug 19

Call 605-562-3130  code 411161#

Prenups are documents a husband signs at his wedding, empowering the wife to leave the house at any time and force the husband to give her a GET. The husband, from the time that the wife leaves the house, must pay his wife a large sum of money regularly, a sum designed to overwhelm his ability to pay and to force him to give her a GET. The Modern Orthodox world is working hard to force every husband to sign a prenup. When that happens, may truly Orthodox people marry children born from Modern Orthodox women who got divorces because of prenups, or not? And what happens if Orthodox husbands sign a prenup and there is a GET? That is our discussion here.

Clarification of R. Ovadiah Yosef's position

Today Kevod Torato ha-Rav critiqued Rav Gestetner regarding ma'eese alai (in a reprint from several years ago) at http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/05/summary-halochot-on-mous-olay-and.html . However, I feel that, be-mechilat Kevod Torat'kha, this critique contains a misrepresentation of R. Ovadiah Yosef, a misrepresentation that originates with R. Michael Broyde at https://traditiononline.org/the-1992-new-york-get-law/ , text accompanying footnote 27. For there, Rabbi Broyde claims that R. Ovadiah Yosef, Teshuvot Yabi'a Omer, III, Even ha-Ezer nos. 18-20 allows coercion of the husband in many cases of ma'eese alai. No, unfortunately, with all due respect to Rabbi Broyde, that is a serious misreading of Yabi'a Omer. To understand this better, please see footnote 39 and accompanying text of my prenup essay at https://www.scribd.com/document/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements . Namely, as I elucidate there, Yabi'a Omer is addressing an extremely narrow case of a Yemenite lady who was forced under threat of physical violence to accept kiddushin from her Yemenite "groom", and soon after this charade-of-a-wedding, she ran away. So, the whole marriage never halakhically took place altogether [for a lady can only receive kiddushin by her free consent, as per the Gemara, Kiddushin 2b]. Still, rather than let the lady walk out without a get [which me-ikar ha-din would be the halakhah], Yabi'a Omer is a little extra-machamir to say "you're both Yemenites, so even according to the so-called groom who claims that a marriage took place [which it really did not], the groom should also accept to be punished with jail as the Rambam holds is appropriate until he writes a get." Now what happened? Rabbi Broyde saw this teshuvah and distorted it (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) as communicating "the Yabi'a Omer allows coercing husbands in many cases of ma'eese alai". So while Rabbi J. David Bleich [in his repudiation of Rabbi Broyde at https://traditiononline.org/communications-86/ ] did not specifically respond to this distortion of Rabbi Broyde, I do respond to this distortion in my prenup essay [so as to illustrate that Rabbi Bleich's repudiation of Rabbi Broyde is correct], and I point out that two volumes later, in Teshuvot Yabi'a Omer, V, Even ha-Ezer no. 14, R. Ovadiah Yosef forbids charging mezonot to a recalcitrant husband even in a case of ma'eese alai, since that would constitute coercion. [So, evidently, the general approach of R. Ovadiah Yosef is to forbid coercion (whether incarceration or financial) in a case of ma'eese alai, with the Yemenite groom from two volumes earlier representing a special exception that has no bearing on any case that would ever arise in New York state.] I feel that Kevod Torato ha-Rav must correct this for the sake of halakhic honesty.

Thank you,

Shalom C. Spira

A prenup undermines a marriage before it has even begun

Spectator by Melanie McDonagh

A friend of mine, quite a distinguished lawyer, takes the view that marriage ceased to make sense after no-fault divorces came in. What, he says sternly, is the point of a contract when there’s no sanction if you break it? Well, quite.

But if no-fault divorce pretty well invalidates marriage after the event, prenups do quite a good job of undermining it beforehand. The point of marriage is that it’s meant to be a lifetime affair – the hint being in the ‘til death do us part’ bit – and the point of prenups is that they make provision for the thing ending before it even gets underway. You’re putting your assets out of the reach of the spouse before you’ve got round to endowing her with all your worldly goods, if the Anglican service is your bag. [...]

So far as the case against it goes, I can’t myself improve on the remarks of the Bishop of Shrewsbury last week,[...]

‘Our society would be proposing to couples seeking marriage that they prepare their own divorce settlement before making the life-long promises of marriage. 
‘It is a legal provision which would surely empty the words of the marriage promise “for better for worse… to love and to cherish till death do we part” of all meaning.

‘Pre-nuptial agreements would render these promises provisional by the legal preparations which anticipate divorce.

‘We must ask ourselves, what message does this send to couples considering marriage? What message does this send to the young at a moment when the institution of marriage stands at such a historically, low ebb.’

ORA:Promoting chilul haShem in the media

ORA Free Tamar  (Partial listing)

• Guaranteeing a 'get' (Washington Jewish Week, 4 Apr 2012)Dave Camp: You Have the Right to Fire Aharon Friedman (Huffington Post, 30 Mar 2012)
• U.S. Congressman Embroiled in Tamar Epstein Divorce Controversy (Wheaton Patch, 29 Mar 2012)
• Congressman Refuses to Meet with Rabbis Over Staffer's Get Refusal (Failed Messiah, 29 Mar 2012)
• Panel on Agunah Crisis Tonight (Washington Jewish Week, 28 Mar 2012)
• Pressure on Rep. Dave Camp to Order Staffer to Give Wife Jewish Divorce (OpposingViews, 27 Mar 2012)
• Congressman's Aide Won't Divorce Wife (Drudge Report, 27 Mar 2012)
• To Give and To Get: Why a Congressman can't order his aide to give his wife a Jewish divorce. (Midland Online, 27 Mar 2012)
• Pressure on Rep. Dave Camp to Order Staffer to Give Wife Jewish Divorce (The Volkh Conspiracy, 27 Mar 2012)
• What should be done about Aharon Friedman's Refusal to Give His Wife a Religious Divorce? (Failed Messiah, 27 Mar 2012)
• Why a Congressman can’t order his aide to give his wife a Jewish divorce (Slate, 26 Mar 2012)
• This Year at the Passover Seder, Remember to Gossip (Huffington Post, 24 Mar 2012)
• Insisting on a Jewish Prenup (Forward, 21 Mar 2012)
• Petition for Freedom (The Missing Peace, 21 Mar 2012)

A Call for Hamas to Surrender by Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

          .The Gemara, Eruvin 45a, establishes that the Sabbath must be desecrated in order to defend the borders of a Jewish state from enemy incursion. That casus belli standard was [more than] adequately met this past Oct. 7, 2023. Hence, as elaborated by R. J. David Bleich, Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah, I, pp. 77-84, the Israeli Defense Forces enjoy moral authorization to wage a war termed “ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar” (rescuing Israel from the oppressor, a termed coined by Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1). This means there is no guilt whatsoever for collateral damage caused by the IDF in its legitimate war of self-defense against Hamas. 

      In my opinion, Rabbi Bleich is supported by Tosafot, Yevamot 114b, s.v. zimnin, who write that it is the nature of war for projectiles to be launched from a large distance, with the combatants not knowing who will actually be hit by those projectiles. Ergo, we can extrapolate from Tosafot that once the Torah authorizes the Jewish army to engage in ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar, it means that the Jewish army is granted immunity from guilt over collateral damage. [And that which the Gemara, Gittin 56b, speaks of “removing the threatening snake with tongues while protecting the barrel of honey” is specifically referring as a critique against Vespasian’s invasive attack on the Temple in Jerusalem, a fundamentally different situation.]  

      In an effort to verify that my proof from Yevamot 114b is dispositive, I touched base with posek ha-dor Rav Bleich. On Nov. 18, 2023 [after havdalah], he responded by e-mail as follows: 

 

“The reference in the Gemara is to milchamah ba-olam. That doesn’t sound as if there was Jewish involvement. If so, Tosafot is describing conduct of non-Jews before the Geneva Convention.” 

 

      Nevertheless, even granted Rabbi Bleich’s caveat, the bottom line is that Tosafot seem to demonstrate that the nature of warfare is to precipitate collateral damage. Ergo, while warfare may well be forbidden to Noahides [as per my previous article at <https://daattorah.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-cri-de-coeur-for-russian-army-to_30.html>], when the same concept of warfare is suddenly authorized for Jews under the rubric of ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar, collateral damage should presumably become justified. 

      It is true that Siftei Chakhamim to Genesis 32:8 comments that Jacob was distressed at the prospect of defending himself in war against Esau, lest Jacob execute collateral damage. However, there the issue appears to be emotional discomfort experienced by the patriarch, rather than identification of moral transgression. Assuredly, any war represents a monumental tragedy, and so Jacob desperately yearned to avoid it. But it remains the case that a military campaign of ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar – once necessitated by enemy attack – is ethically correct. [And see R. Chaim ben Atar, Or ha-Chaim to Genesis 34:31, who comments that it would have been collective self-endangerment for the family of Jacob had it failed to rescue Dinah from Nablus.]

      Furthermore, in my capacity as the author of [what appears to be] the only halakhic prenup that is actually effective in [at least somewhat] alleviating the agunah problem [as recently publicized at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2023/07/tishah-be-av-and-agunah-problem-by.html>], I contend that it is wrong for Hamas to prolong this conflict and thereby risk creating agunah cases among the wives of IDF soldiers. Rather, Hamas should recognize that “wisdom is better than weapons of battle” (Ecclesiastes 9:18), and surrender. 

            In attempting to appeal to the conscience of Gazans, the key issue at hand is how to properly channel the spiritual yearnings of Gazan society in a halakhically correct way. Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:9-10 rules that Noahides must not invent their own religion. Rather, Noahides are commanded by the Holy One, Blessed Be He, to observe the Seven Commandments identified by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 56b. If a Noahide seeks further spiritual enrichment, then he is welcome to choose to volunteer to perform any additional mitzvah [that would normally be directed to Jews alone] that he seeks, and he will receive reward as a volunteer for that mitzvah. The only exceptional mitzvot which Noahides cannot volunteer to observe are Shabbat and Torah study, as per the Gemara, Sanhedrin 58b-59a. [If a Noahide truly desires to observe even the latter two mitzvot, he enjoys the option of applying to a qualified Beth Din for consideration for conversion to Judaism.] 

            Now let us halakhically analyze the ways of many religiously fervent Gazans. They reject idolatry, insisting instead on worshipping the One and Only Master of the universe Who revealed Himself to Abraham. This represents a most impressive achievement, because it fulfills one of the Seven Commandments. Gazans also pray with devotion in Arabic, perhaps as much as five times a day. That’s wonderful, because prayer is a mitzvah that Noahides are either obligated or at least allowed to observe [-see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. Ben No’ach], and prayer can be performed in any language, as per the Mishnah, Sotah 32a. Furthermore, when Gazans pray, they announce that “the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Is Great.” Well said: the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Is indeed Great, as per Deut. 10:17 [-a verse incorporated into the first paragraph of every Jewish amidah prayer for the past 2,400 years, as per the Gemara, Yoma 69b]. And the way that a Gazan should show that he truly recognizes that Greatness, is that the Gazan should observe the Noahide Code. Keep it at that, and thereby keep the peace.  

            Some confusion appears to have arisen from the fact that Gazan married ladies are scrupulously diligent to perform the mitzvah of kisui rosh (head covering). This may have led Hamas to the regrettable (mis)impression that it can therefore attack Jews. [To that effect, a recent statement by Agudath Israel, dated 17 Kislev, 5784, specifically asks all Jews (in the Hebrew version, though not directly translated in the accompanying English version) to strengthen themselves in kisui rosh. See <https://hamodia.com/2023/11/30/statement-from-moetzes-gedolei-hatorah-of-agudas-yisrael-on-yerushalayim-terror-attack/>.] 

            The reality that Arab civilization excels in kisui rosh was already known two millenia ago to the Sages of the Mishnah, as recorded in Shabbat 65a. Actually, the mitzvah of kisui rosh is primarily directed to Jews [as per the Gemara, Ketubot 72a-b], although one could hypothetically argue that it has bears a measure of relevance even to righteous Noahides, regarding whom we have an oral tradition that following the Deluge, they accepted upon themselves an enhanced dimension of respect for the sanctity of marriage. [See Rashi to Genesis 34:7 and Numbers 22:5, as well as Maharsha, Chiddushei Aggadot to Yevamot 63b, s.v. limsokh. And see Eruvin 100b which seems to indicate that Eve covered her head.] In any event, even if Noahides are not formally commanded in kisui rosh, a Noahide who volunteers to perform an extra mitzvah will certainly receive reward [as per the aforementioned Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:10], and so the Gazan married ladies deserve congratulations for their kisui rosh. Yet, at no time does the Talmud suggest that Arab civilization can therefore persecute Jews. On the contrary, Arab civilization – like all of humanity – is expected to seek spiritual excellence by specifically observing all commandments of the Noahide Code, and these commandments include refraining from murder and refraining from kidnapping.   

            Arguably [and as possibly reflected in the aforementioned Agudath Israel statement], there may be room for Jewish improvement regarding kisui rosh. Although R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer, II, no. 12 allows a wig, his responsum is challenged by a lengthy monograph of R. Nehorai Yosef Ohana, Zahav Levushah (Jerusalem, 5774), available online at <https://hebrewbooks.org/56098>. To summarize the hundreds of pages of refutation: Rabbi Feinstein claims that since a gentlemen can presentably groom his face with a scissors-like kosher shaver [despite his thereby becoming visually indistinguishable from someone who grooms his face with a forbidden razor], therefore we should extrapolate that a married lady can also don a wig [despite her thereby becoming visually indistinguishable from a single lady.] Alas, the extrapolation is questionable (with all due respect to Rabbi Feinstein) because the two cases are dissimilar in terms of how they apply in situations of life-preservation. Specifically, piku’ach nefesh indeed allows a gentleman to shave with a normally-forbidden razor [as famously occurred, for example, to R. Michoel Dov Weissmandl and the Stropkover Rebbe when they were hiding in a Bratislava bunker during the Holocaust; see the cleanshaven photos of them in Artscroll’s The Unheeded Cry, ch. 13], whereas even in a situation of piku’ach nefesh, a gentleman has a mitzvah to look away from a lady [other than for a purely functional recognition], as per the Gemara, Sanhedrin 75a. Ergo, it is logical to surmise that kisui rosh should operate with a more rigorous standard [and not be fungible with a wig], so as to visually distinguish the married ladies from the single ladies. Nevertheless, even granted this argument against Rabbi Feinstein, the forum for implementing this improvement is the Beth Din system which supervises conversions to Judaism [and hence can make a demand of prospective converts to accept upon themselves kisui rosh, as one can discern from <http://www.beisdinofsouthflorida.com/%D7%92%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-conversion/>]. That is to say, this argument against Rabbi Feinstein [while valuable in its own right] does not exempt Gazans from their paramount obligation to uphold the Noahide Code, which includes refraining from murder and refraining from kidnap. 

            My late mentor R. Joshua H. Shmidman (previously showcased at <https://daattorah.blogspot.com/2021/05/daas-torah-and-legacy-of-rabbi-joshua-h.html>) would introduce the recitation of the sacrificial order within the Yom Kippur mussaf service with the following insight. The spilling of blood in animal sacrifices, when orchestrated in the manner prescribed by the Torah, serves as a kosher outlet for the worshipper to escape the inclination to spill human blood. As such, I would recommend for Gazans to read R. Binyamin Fuss, Torat ha-Bamah (Jerusalem, 5766), available at <https://hebrewbooks.org/47849>, a detailed Noahide Code treatise on how all humans [other than Jews] can bring animal sacrifices today. In other words, although Jews are barred from offering sacrifices until the Temple will be rebuilt in the messianic era, Noahides can indeed offer sacrifices today as a matter of practical Halakhah, following the guidance in this publication. This will afford Gazan society [and indeed any other Noahide society that so opts] an opportunity to spill animal blood as part of religious observance, without ever engaging in violence against human beings. 

      May we indeed see humanity embrace the Noahide Code, and thereby usher in an era of global harmony. And the first step in that direction is for Hamas to surrender. 

 

Rabbi Spira works as the Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute for Medical Research, a pavilion of the Jewish General Hospital in Montreal, Canada.