A Call for Hamas to Surrender by Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

          .The Gemara, Eruvin 45a, establishes that the Sabbath must be desecrated in order to defend the borders of a Jewish state from enemy incursion. That casus belli standard was [more than] adequately met this past Oct. 7, 2023. Hence, as elaborated by R. J. David Bleich, Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah, I, pp. 77-84, the Israeli Defense Forces enjoy moral authorization to wage a war termed “ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar” (rescuing Israel from the oppressor, a termed coined by Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1). This means there is no guilt whatsoever for collateral damage caused by the IDF in its legitimate war of self-defense against Hamas. 

      In my opinion, Rabbi Bleich is supported by Tosafot, Yevamot 114b, s.v. zimnin, who write that it is the nature of war for projectiles to be launched from a large distance, with the combatants not knowing who will actually be hit by those projectiles. Ergo, we can extrapolate from Tosafot that once the Torah authorizes the Jewish army to engage in ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar, it means that the Jewish army is granted immunity from guilt over collateral damage. [And that which the Gemara, Gittin 56b, speaks of “removing the threatening snake with tongues while protecting the barrel of honey” is specifically referring as a critique against Vespasian’s invasive attack on the Temple in Jerusalem, a fundamentally different situation.]  

      In an effort to verify that my proof from Yevamot 114b is dispositive, I touched base with posek ha-dor Rav Bleich. On Nov. 18, 2023 [after havdalah], he responded by e-mail as follows: 

 

“The reference in the Gemara is to milchamah ba-olam. That doesn’t sound as if there was Jewish involvement. If so, Tosafot is describing conduct of non-Jews before the Geneva Convention.” 

 

      Nevertheless, even granted Rabbi Bleich’s caveat, the bottom line is that Tosafot seem to demonstrate that the nature of warfare is to precipitate collateral damage. Ergo, while warfare may well be forbidden to Noahides [as per my previous article at <https://daattorah.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-cri-de-coeur-for-russian-army-to_30.html>], when the same concept of warfare is suddenly authorized for Jews under the rubric of ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar, collateral damage should presumably become justified. 

      It is true that Siftei Chakhamim to Genesis 32:8 comments that Jacob was distressed at the prospect of defending himself in war against Esau, lest Jacob execute collateral damage. However, there the issue appears to be emotional discomfort experienced by the patriarch, rather than identification of moral transgression. Assuredly, any war represents a monumental tragedy, and so Jacob desperately yearned to avoid it. But it remains the case that a military campaign of ezrat Yisrael mi-yad tzar – once necessitated by enemy attack – is ethically correct. [And see R. Chaim ben Atar, Or ha-Chaim to Genesis 34:31, who comments that it would have been collective self-endangerment for the family of Jacob had it failed to rescue Dinah from Nablus.]

      Furthermore, in my capacity as the author of [what appears to be] the only halakhic prenup that is actually effective in [at least somewhat] alleviating the agunah problem [as recently publicized at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2023/07/tishah-be-av-and-agunah-problem-by.html>], I contend that it is wrong for Hamas to prolong this conflict and thereby risk creating agunah cases among the wives of IDF soldiers. Rather, Hamas should recognize that “wisdom is better than weapons of battle” (Ecclesiastes 9:18), and surrender. 

            In attempting to appeal to the conscience of Gazans, the key issue at hand is how to properly channel the spiritual yearnings of Gazan society in a halakhically correct way. Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:9-10 rules that Noahides must not invent their own religion. Rather, Noahides are commanded by the Holy One, Blessed Be He, to observe the Seven Commandments identified by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 56b. If a Noahide seeks further spiritual enrichment, then he is welcome to choose to volunteer to perform any additional mitzvah [that would normally be directed to Jews alone] that he seeks, and he will receive reward as a volunteer for that mitzvah. The only exceptional mitzvot which Noahides cannot volunteer to observe are Shabbat and Torah study, as per the Gemara, Sanhedrin 58b-59a. [If a Noahide truly desires to observe even the latter two mitzvot, he enjoys the option of applying to a qualified Beth Din for consideration for conversion to Judaism.] 

            Now let us halakhically analyze the ways of many religiously fervent Gazans. They reject idolatry, insisting instead on worshipping the One and Only Master of the universe Who revealed Himself to Abraham. This represents a most impressive achievement, because it fulfills one of the Seven Commandments. Gazans also pray with devotion in Arabic, perhaps as much as five times a day. That’s wonderful, because prayer is a mitzvah that Noahides are either obligated or at least allowed to observe [-see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. Ben No’ach], and prayer can be performed in any language, as per the Mishnah, Sotah 32a. Furthermore, when Gazans pray, they announce that “the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Is Great.” Well said: the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Is indeed Great, as per Deut. 10:17 [-a verse incorporated into the first paragraph of every Jewish amidah prayer for the past 2,400 years, as per the Gemara, Yoma 69b]. And the way that a Gazan should show that he truly recognizes that Greatness, is that the Gazan should observe the Noahide Code. Keep it at that, and thereby keep the peace.  

            Some confusion appears to have arisen from the fact that Gazan married ladies are scrupulously diligent to perform the mitzvah of kisui rosh (head covering). This may have led Hamas to the regrettable (mis)impression that it can therefore attack Jews. [To that effect, a recent statement by Agudath Israel, dated 17 Kislev, 5784, specifically asks all Jews (in the Hebrew version, though not directly translated in the accompanying English version) to strengthen themselves in kisui rosh. See <https://hamodia.com/2023/11/30/statement-from-moetzes-gedolei-hatorah-of-agudas-yisrael-on-yerushalayim-terror-attack/>.] 

            The reality that Arab civilization excels in kisui rosh was already known two millenia ago to the Sages of the Mishnah, as recorded in Shabbat 65a. Actually, the mitzvah of kisui rosh is primarily directed to Jews [as per the Gemara, Ketubot 72a-b], although one could hypothetically argue that it has bears a measure of relevance even to righteous Noahides, regarding whom we have an oral tradition that following the Deluge, they accepted upon themselves an enhanced dimension of respect for the sanctity of marriage. [See Rashi to Genesis 34:7 and Numbers 22:5, as well as Maharsha, Chiddushei Aggadot to Yevamot 63b, s.v. limsokh. And see Eruvin 100b which seems to indicate that Eve covered her head.] In any event, even if Noahides are not formally commanded in kisui rosh, a Noahide who volunteers to perform an extra mitzvah will certainly receive reward [as per the aforementioned Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:10], and so the Gazan married ladies deserve congratulations for their kisui rosh. Yet, at no time does the Talmud suggest that Arab civilization can therefore persecute Jews. On the contrary, Arab civilization – like all of humanity – is expected to seek spiritual excellence by specifically observing all commandments of the Noahide Code, and these commandments include refraining from murder and refraining from kidnapping.   

            Arguably [and as possibly reflected in the aforementioned Agudath Israel statement], there may be room for Jewish improvement regarding kisui rosh. Although R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer, II, no. 12 allows a wig, his responsum is challenged by a lengthy monograph of R. Nehorai Yosef Ohana, Zahav Levushah (Jerusalem, 5774), available online at <https://hebrewbooks.org/56098>. To summarize the hundreds of pages of refutation: Rabbi Feinstein claims that since a gentlemen can presentably groom his face with a scissors-like kosher shaver [despite his thereby becoming visually indistinguishable from someone who grooms his face with a forbidden razor], therefore we should extrapolate that a married lady can also don a wig [despite her thereby becoming visually indistinguishable from a single lady.] Alas, the extrapolation is questionable (with all due respect to Rabbi Feinstein) because the two cases are dissimilar in terms of how they apply in situations of life-preservation. Specifically, piku’ach nefesh indeed allows a gentleman to shave with a normally-forbidden razor [as famously occurred, for example, to R. Michoel Dov Weissmandl and the Stropkover Rebbe when they were hiding in a Bratislava bunker during the Holocaust; see the cleanshaven photos of them in Artscroll’s The Unheeded Cry, ch. 13], whereas even in a situation of piku’ach nefesh, a gentleman has a mitzvah to look away from a lady [other than for a purely functional recognition], as per the Gemara, Sanhedrin 75a. Ergo, it is logical to surmise that kisui rosh should operate with a more rigorous standard [and not be fungible with a wig], so as to visually distinguish the married ladies from the single ladies. Nevertheless, even granted this argument against Rabbi Feinstein, the forum for implementing this improvement is the Beth Din system which supervises conversions to Judaism [and hence can make a demand of prospective converts to accept upon themselves kisui rosh, as one can discern from <http://www.beisdinofsouthflorida.com/%D7%92%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-conversion/>]. That is to say, this argument against Rabbi Feinstein [while valuable in its own right] does not exempt Gazans from their paramount obligation to uphold the Noahide Code, which includes refraining from murder and refraining from kidnap. 

            My late mentor R. Joshua H. Shmidman (previously showcased at <https://daattorah.blogspot.com/2021/05/daas-torah-and-legacy-of-rabbi-joshua-h.html>) would introduce the recitation of the sacrificial order within the Yom Kippur mussaf service with the following insight. The spilling of blood in animal sacrifices, when orchestrated in the manner prescribed by the Torah, serves as a kosher outlet for the worshipper to escape the inclination to spill human blood. As such, I would recommend for Gazans to read R. Binyamin Fuss, Torat ha-Bamah (Jerusalem, 5766), available at <https://hebrewbooks.org/47849>, a detailed Noahide Code treatise on how all humans [other than Jews] can bring animal sacrifices today. In other words, although Jews are barred from offering sacrifices until the Temple will be rebuilt in the messianic era, Noahides can indeed offer sacrifices today as a matter of practical Halakhah, following the guidance in this publication. This will afford Gazan society [and indeed any other Noahide society that so opts] an opportunity to spill animal blood as part of religious observance, without ever engaging in violence against human beings. 

      May we indeed see humanity embrace the Noahide Code, and thereby usher in an era of global harmony. And the first step in that direction is for Hamas to surrender. 

 

Rabbi Spira works as the Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute for Medical Research, a pavilion of the Jewish General Hospital in Montreal, Canada. 

Clarification of R. Ovadiah Yosef's position

Today Kevod Torato ha-Rav critiqued Rav Gestetner regarding ma'eese alai (in a reprint from several years ago) at http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/05/summary-halochot-on-mous-olay-and.html . However, I feel that, be-mechilat Kevod Torat'kha, this critique contains a misrepresentation of R. Ovadiah Yosef, a misrepresentation that originates with R. Michael Broyde at https://traditiononline.org/the-1992-new-york-get-law/ , text accompanying footnote 27. For there, Rabbi Broyde claims that R. Ovadiah Yosef, Teshuvot Yabi'a Omer, III, Even ha-Ezer nos. 18-20 allows coercion of the husband in many cases of ma'eese alai. No, unfortunately, with all due respect to Rabbi Broyde, that is a serious misreading of Yabi'a Omer. To understand this better, please see footnote 39 and accompanying text of my prenup essay at https://www.scribd.com/document/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements . Namely, as I elucidate there, Yabi'a Omer is addressing an extremely narrow case of a Yemenite lady who was forced under threat of physical violence to accept kiddushin from her Yemenite "groom", and soon after this charade-of-a-wedding, she ran away. So, the whole marriage never halakhically took place altogether [for a lady can only receive kiddushin by her free consent, as per the Gemara, Kiddushin 2b]. Still, rather than let the lady walk out without a get [which me-ikar ha-din would be the halakhah], Yabi'a Omer is a little extra-machamir to say "you're both Yemenites, so even according to the so-called groom who claims that a marriage took place [which it really did not], the groom should also accept to be punished with jail as the Rambam holds is appropriate until he writes a get." Now what happened? Rabbi Broyde saw this teshuvah and distorted it (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) as communicating "the Yabi'a Omer allows coercing husbands in many cases of ma'eese alai". So while Rabbi J. David Bleich [in his repudiation of Rabbi Broyde at https://traditiononline.org/communications-86/ ] did not specifically respond to this distortion of Rabbi Broyde, I do respond to this distortion in my prenup essay [so as to illustrate that Rabbi Bleich's repudiation of Rabbi Broyde is correct], and I point out that two volumes later, in Teshuvot Yabi'a Omer, V, Even ha-Ezer no. 14, R. Ovadiah Yosef forbids charging mezonot to a recalcitrant husband even in a case of ma'eese alai, since that would constitute coercion. [So, evidently, the general approach of R. Ovadiah Yosef is to forbid coercion (whether incarceration or financial) in a case of ma'eese alai, with the Yemenite groom from two volumes earlier representing a special exception that has no bearing on any case that would ever arise in New York state.] I feel that Kevod Torato ha-Rav must correct this for the sake of halakhic honesty.

Thank you,

Shalom C. Spira

Tish‘ah be-Av and the Agunah Problem by Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

    The Gemara, Ta‘anit 30a, prohibits most areas of Torah study on Tish‘ah be-Av. One of the few permitted exceptions, as identified by Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chaim 554, se’if katan 3, is the passage in Gittin 55b-58a regarding the Temple destruction. The conclusion of that passage – an exposition of Micah 2:2 – is interpreted by Maharsha (Chiddushei Aggadot) as declaring that if even one husband is wrongfully pressured to divorce his wife [in violation of Exodus 20:14] or if even one marriage is poisoned by adultery – then the entire Jewish People is held accountable to collectively protest. Thus, it emerges that Tish‘ah be-Av is a time to reaffirm our commitment to the sanctity of marriage – and to eschew half-baked solutions to the agunah problem – as I previously wrote at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2023/01/the-legacy-of-rabbi-feivel-cohen-vis.html>.

      R. Simchah Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot al Mishnah Berurah Chelek Shishi, points to another exception presented by Mishnah Berurah, this time in se‘if katan 5. Where a halakhic verdict is urgently needed on Tish‘ah be-Av for a sick patient or for litigants in a monetary dispute (who cannot wait until tomorrow), a decisor may study the case as is necessary to provide immediate guidance. Rabbi Rabinowitz explains that this is what justified R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron, Teshuvot Maharsham, I, no. 84, to formulate a responsum on Tish‘ah be-Av to permit an agunah to remarry. Indeed, Rabbi Schwadron concludes that responsum by citing Bach to the effect that rescuing an agunah is a spiritual achievement equivalent to rebuilding one of the ruins of Jerusalem. 

            Upon careful reflection, it emerges that there is no contradiction between the aforementioned Maharsha and Maharsham regarding the agunah-problem message of Tish‘ah be-Av [and, poetically enough, their works carry almost identical names]. Where the Oral Torah declares that an agunah can remarry, such as the case of Maharsham in which he discovered sufficient circumstantial evidence to presume the first husband to be dead, then it is indeed a great mitzvah to enable this remarriage. But where the first husband is demonstrably both alive and innocent of any wrongdoing, then Maharsha directs us to respect that first (and only) marriage. 

For this reason, R. J. David Bleich, responding to the 1992 New York Get Law [a well-meaning but unfortunately less-than-successful attempt to solve the agunah problem], comments as follows [available at <https://traditiononline.org/communications-86/> ]:

                "Regrettably, instead of serving as a panacea resolving the plight of the agunah, the Get Law has itself                       created countless agunot. It is precisely because of concern for agunot that the Get Law cannot                       be allowed to stand."

In other words, we must always take into consideration the Maharsha vs. Maharsham dichotomy, thereby distinguishing true from imagined solutions to the agunah problem. That is why my own prenup proposal [available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>] contains a clause shielding the husband and wife from any secular court that might wreak havoc with a get. 

Prenuptial Agreements | PDF | Halakha | Hebrew Words And Phrases Halakhic analysis of prenuptial agreements, leading to a combination of two halakhically kosher prenuptial agreements to benefit the Jewish wife www.scribd.com

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Continuing on this theme, I would like to highlight my recent exchange with R. Heshey Zelcer in Hakirah Vol. 28 (Spring 2020) [available at <https://hakirah.org/Vol28Letters.pdf>] regarding the [once again well-meaning] Yashar Prenup. I hypothesize that the poskim who are advertised as supporting this prenup (R. Moshe Sternbuch, et al, be-mechilat Kevod Toratam) innocently glossed over paragraph 16 of the agreement, which states as follows: 

 

           “At the initial session, Beth Din shall outline the issues between the Parties and make a            determination of the interim payments necessary to ensure that the lifestyle of the un-                                emancipated children of the household (if any) can be maintained, and that they can continue            to attend yeshiva.” 

 

 Rabbi Sternbuch et al do not raise an objection to this paragraph, presumably because it does not explicitly require the husband to pay the wife until he grants her a get. However, as one can discern from the aforementioned Hakirah exchange, Rabbi Zelcer effectively interprets this clause to in fact mean that the Beth Din will direct the husband to pay the wife until he grants a get. And so, the Yashar Prenup seems to present a problem that is essentially identical to that of the RCA prenup, the latter representing a prenup that Rabbi Sternbuch and others have identified would produce an invalid get. [See <https://hebrewbooks.org/60970>.] 

A careful examination of Rabbi Sternbuch’s letter of approbation for the Yashar Prenup [available at <https://yasharinitiative.org/docs/RabbiMosheSternbuch.pdf>] reveals that he is appreciative to the framers of the prenup for keeping the Jewish litigants out of secular court. However, Rabbi Sternbuch does not say that he permits charging the husband money until the latter grants a get, and – indeed – he could not permit such an innovation without contradicting what he wrote regarding the RCA prenup. [For a different perspective (than mine) on the Yashar Prenup, see Yechezkel Hirshman at <https://achaslmaala.blogspot.com/2023/01/prenups-xii-straight-dope-on-yashar.html>. Hirshman does not believe that the Yashar Prenup actually costs the husband any money, yet he concurs in practice (with me) to keep the proposal on ice. See there for his illuminating approach.] 

      

Rabbi Spira works as the Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute of Medical Research, a pavilion of the Jewish General Hospital in Montreal, Canada. 

The Legacy of Rabbi Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the Agunah Problem – Part 2 bv Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

 The Legacy of Rabbi Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the Agunah Problem – Part 2 

                                                Shalom C. Spira 

 

As I wrote in my previous article at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2022/12/the-legacy-of-rabbi-feivel-cohen-vis.html>, the legacy of R. Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the agunah problem – as he sought to publicly express it – is that the Jewish faith considers Ms. Tamar Epstein to be the wife of Mr. Aharon Friedman. At the same time, it has also been argued [by R. Mordechai Willig] that there is an additional dimension to Rabbi Cohen’s legacy, viz. that he quietly supported Rabbi Willig’s prenup to resolve future agunah cases, based on an extrapolation from shtar chatzi zakhar to the laws of gittin. My article challenged the latter extrapolation, be-mechilat Kevod Toratam. 

 A recent audio recording (dated Oct. 26, 2018) demonstrates that my opinion is shared by R. J. David Bleich. Actually, Rabbi Bleich already contested Rabbi Willig’s prenup back in 1996 in his Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah Vol. 1 (which is elaborated in Section A of my prenup essay at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>). The novelty of the 2018 audio recording is that Rabbi Bleich responds to the specific claim that the shtar chatzi zakhar should serve as a precedent for Rabbi Willig’s prenup. Rabbi Bleich orally counters that this specific claim is “nonsense.” The shtar chatzi zakhar represents a kinyan me-chayim, viz. a mercantile acquisition orchestrated from the time that the client is alive, to bequeath property to his daughter [or some other beneficiary who would not normally inherit according to the algorithm of Numbers 27:8-11] in a manner that takes effect a moment before the client’s death. By contradistinction, Rabbi Willig’s prenup consists of a penalty on the husband for not getting along with his wife and additionally not granting her get. Since there is no gemirat da‘at [seriousness of intention] on the part of the husband, the husband is not obligated to pay the money by Torah law. [And since the secular court will nevertheless enforce the financial penalty, the resulting gittin are invalid.] My thanks are extended to R. Yisrael Zvi Harari, a disciple [of both Rabbi Bleich and Rabbi Willig] at the RIETS kollel le-hora’ah, who conducted the interview and provided me with the audio recording, available at <https://soundcloud.com/shalom-spira/interview-with-rav-bleichmp3>. 

I also received supportive e-mail feedback (on Jan. 2, 2023) from Yechezkel Hirshman (a marriage counsellor and to‘en-in-training who has published an in-depth critique of many different prenups – including my own – at <https://achaslmaala.blogspot.com/2023/01/prenups-xii-straight-dope-on-yashar.html>). Yechezkel wrote to me (inter alia) as follows: 

 

“As per the situation with HRHG Rav Feivel Cohen ZTL, I agree with you that expressing agreement to a specific Halachic construct is not to be construed as an agreement on a compound Halachic innovation. I also agree with your distinction between a shtar chatzi zachar and a get. I think it is pretentious for anybody to claim a deceased gadol as a "closet supporter" of a very contentious issue.” 

 

            Accordingly, let us honour the legacy of Rabbi Cohen by politely praying that Ms. Epstein soon return with her true halakhic husband [Aharon Friedman] to Beth Din, and let us likewise politely encourage all couples that have signed Rabbi Willig’s prenup to sign a release form from that prenup [even if the latter concept contradicts Rabbi Cohen’s closet support]. Ultimately, as underscored by R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik’s 1975 lecture recorded at <https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/767722/rabbi-joseph-b-soloveitchik/gerus-mesorah-part-1/>, a key dividing line between Orthodox Judaism and heterodoxy is that the former respects the sanctity of marriage, pursuant to the Gemara, Kiddushin 2b that betrothal is called kiddushin because the wife becomes forbidden to the entire world like hekdesh (the Temple treasury). Thus, half-baked solutions to the agunah problem must be avoided by Orthodox Jews. 

 

Rabbi Spira works as the Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute for Medical Research [a Pavillion of the Jewish General Hospital] in Montreal, Canada. 

The Legacy of Rabbi Feivel Cohen vis-à-vis the Agunah Problem by Rabbi Shalom C. Spira

 Last month, on 26 Marcheshvan, 5783, Rabbi Feivel Cohen – author of Badei ha-Shulchan and other works – ascended to the Heavenly Academy. Ten days later, Rabbi Mordechai Willig – chief justice of the Beth Din of America – delivered an eloquent appreciation for Rabbi Cohen [available at <https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/1051145/rabbi-mordechai-i-willig/eruv-in-brooklyn-some-words-on-rav-feivel-cohen/>] , in which he mentioned Rabbi Cohen’s legacy vis-à-vis the agunah problem. I wish to respectfully yet carefully review Rabbi Willig’s remarks in the present essay, ke-darkah shel Torah. 

            The bulk of Rabbi Willig’s lecture explores Hilkhot Eruvin. Seeking to solve a particular difficulty in the field that is raised by Sfat Emet, Rabbi Willig [commencing 53:50 into the recording] cites a brilliant insight of Rabbi Cohen’s book Da‘at Kohen which clinches the discussion. It is at this point that Rabbi Willig turns to eulogizing Rabbi Cohen by describing the latter [not only as a proficient scholar in Eruvin but also] as a closet supporter of his prenup [viz. the 1993 Beth Din of America prenup] designed to rescue agunot. 

            Specifically, Rabbi Willig reports that – years ago, when Rabbi Willig was first contemplating his proposed prenup [before its ultimate release in 1993] – he studied Rabbi Cohen’s book Mi-Dor le-Dor, where the author elucidates how to execute an estate-inheritance-will via a shtar chatzi zakhar without running afoul of the rules of asmakhta (a contingency agreement wherein the person accepting liability never seriously anticipates that his obligation to pay will materialize and hence is halakhically invalid). After digesting the book’s contents, Rabbi Willig arrived at the conclusion that the same mechanism which Rabbi Cohen employs to bypass the asmakhta problem for a shtar chatzi zakhar can likewise bypass the asmakhta problem for committing a husband to pay his wife money as soon as she moves out of the house until such time as the husband will grant a get [=the essence of Rabbi Willig’s prenup, and a putative formula to rescue agunot].  

Seeking confirmation, Rabbi Willig approached Rabbi Cohen with the prenup idea. In Rabbi Willig’s words: “He was very nice to me. He said: ‘You know, it’s very good, the sevara is right, but we’re not doing it over here in Brooklyn.’” The implication of Rabbi Willig’s testimony is that Rabbi Cohen agreed to his prenup in principle, but simply as a matter of voluntary policy [so as not to rustle the feathers of fellow Brooklynites] preferred not to implement the concept in his community. 

            Alas, Rabbi Willig’s extrapolation from shtar chatzi zakhar to the laws of gittin [and likewise Rabbi Cohen’s reported closet support thereof] is (be-mechilat Kevod Toratam) tenuous. In the case of a shtar chatzi zakhar, the sober-minded individual signing the document knows in advance that there is a reasonable probability he will die (until we are privileged to experience the messianic era when the mal'akh ha-mavet will disappear, as per the Gemara, Sukkah 52a) and so he sincerely wishes to bequeath property to others a moment before death occurs [as the shtar chatzi zakhar declares]. By contradistinction, in the case of Rabbi Willig’s prenup, the groom who signs the document does not seriously entertain the probability that his wife will ever demand divorce in the future. [If he realized that this was such a demanding wife, he wouldn’t have signed the document in the first place.] Hence, the quotidian money transfer specified in the prenup indeed represents an asmakhta which the husband is not obligated to pay, and if a secular court nevertheless threatens the husband that he will lose the specified money until he grants a get, then the get is invalid as per the Mishnah, Gittin 88b [that a get coerced by a secular court contrary to Halakhah is invalid].   

            Admittedly, it is true that the Mishnah, Makkot 3a compares the actuarial probability of future death to the actuarial probability of future divorce in calculating how much money to fine edim zomemin (witnesses who claimed that a husband divorced his wife without granting a ketubah, and were then discovered to be false by virtue of their not being in the location of the alleged divorce at the time of the alleged divorce). Perhaps it is this Mishnah that caused Rabbi Willig and Rabbi Cohen to believe that we can extrapolate from the shtar chatzi zakhar (i.e. anticipation of death) to the prenup (i.e. anticipation of divorce). Even so, however, a careful examination of Makkot 3a reveals that [regarding divorce] the Mishnah is discussing the actuarial probability that the husband will offer a get to his wife of his own free will in the future, not the actuarial probability that the wife will demand a get from her husband in the future [the latter representing the basis of Rabbi Willig’s prenup]. Thus, it remains the case that Rabbi Willig’s prenup is subject to the asmakhta objection. Ergo, it is precisely because of our sympathy for agunot that we should encourage any married couple which has signed Rabbi Willig’s prenup to sign the release form [revoking the secular court’s ability to enforce Rabbi Willig’s prenup] in Section A of my relevant essay at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>. Otherwise, the wife may be stuck with an invalid get and hence remain an agunah. The same message [albeit without a sample release form] is offered by Rabbi Pinchas Spira [no immediate relation to this student] in his treatise Kedushat ha-Nissu’in, available at <https://hebrewbooks.org/60970>.  

            Me-inyan le-inyan be-oto inyan (to borrow the expression from Kiddushin 6a), Rabbi Willig’s prenup plays an illuminating role in the specific agunah case of Epstein vs. Friedman. Namely, as reported at <https://yucommentator.org/2012/04/panel-featuring-current-agunah-confronts-crisis/>, on March 29, 2012, Rabbi Hershel Schachter claimed that [notwithstanding Exodus 20:14, which prohibits arbitrarily telling a husband to divorce his wife, nevertheless] Mr. Aharon Friedman is obligated to grant Ms. Tamar Epstein a get because nobody told her about Rabbi Willig’s prenup before her marriage to Mr. Friedman. Had she known about Rabbi Willig’s prenup, she would have executed it prior to her chuppah and thereby enjoyed an automatic “get out of jail free” card.  

Alas, this approach (while well-meaning) represents a compounded error by Rabbi Schachter (be-mechilat Kevod Torato). Firstly, Rabbi Willig’s prenup would not have rescued Ms. Epstein from her agunah predicament since the prenup does not work altogether [as argued in the present article]. Secondly, even if there would be an [alternate] prenup that does work to rescue agunot [which indeed there fortuitously is, as explained in Section Q of my aforementioned essay at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>], failure to apprise the bride of the existence of the prenup [while perhaps unprofessional/unethical on the part of the mesader kiddushin who should have informed the bride in advance] most certainly does not constitute grounds for a Beth Din to subsequently obligate the husband to grant a get. See Shulchan Arukh Even ha-Ezer nos. 77 and 154.

            And this brings us to my final point. Notwithstanding his reported closet support of Rabbi Willig’s prenup, Rabbi Feivel Cohen has clearly announced [in a public manner, and not merely in a private conversation] that Ms. Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Aharon Friedman according to Torah law. [See <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/01/rav-feivel-cohen-rules-heter-is.html>, and my elaboration at <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2022/07/response-to-eulogy-for-rabbi-nota-zvi.html>.] Ergo, if we genuinely wish to honour the legacy of Rabbi Cohen vis-à-vis the agunah problem, we should all politely pray that Ms. Epstein soon return to Beth Din with her true husband Mr. Friedman. And this is an especially appropriate aspiration for Chanukah, since the final paragraph of Rambam, Hilkhot Chanukah points out that the Holy One, Blessed Be He, will even allow His Name to be placed in water in order to bring peace between husband and wife. 

  

Rabbi Spira works as Editor of Manuscripts and Grants at the Lady Davis Institute of Medical Research [a Pavillion of the Jewish General Hospital] in Montreal, Canada. 

Another rabbi ignores halacha: "Withholding a Gett: Unjewish and Evil "

Update: Please read this lenient teshuva. I will be adding others which clearly indicate the complexity of the matter. Contrary to what Rabbi Brackman writes - that it is a clear cut moral issue - Rav Yosef says it is justified for some cases and some times in history - especially when there is a reasonable possibility that she will commit adultery. That is the view of the Tzitz Eliezar also. Other contemporary poskim don't accept the view that the husband can be forced to give a get to save her from committing adultery [to be continued]

Update Jan 17: Rav Sternbuch states that if it is clear to the beis din that there are objective reasons why the woman can't stand her husband and they paskened that the husband should give a Get - he says it is cruel and sinful for the husband to not divorce his wife out of spite and hatred. This is clearly not saying that a woman has the right to leave the marriage for any reason and that the husband must give a get immediately when the Get is request as R Brackman mistakenly states. If the husband is refusing to give a Get because issues have not been resolved - and not because of cruelty and spite - Rav Sternbuch,. Rav Ovadiah Yosef and Rav Eliashiv are not condemning such a person.

Force husband to prevent wife from committing adultery - not as a right to get on demand or because it is immoral to withhold a Get and only if he is objectively repulsive

Rav Ovadiya Yosef (Yabiya Omer 8:2.2): In previous generations the husband was given permission to take an additional wife if his first wife was declared to a moredes (rebellious wife). The first wife would remain an agunah for the rest of her life until she became an old lady with white hair as punishment for rebelling against her husband. An example of this is found in Shut Mishpat v’ Tzedaka b’Yaakov (2:36).... Similar cases are  found in other Achronim. Nevertheless our contemporary society has weakened and there is now a strong possibility that the agunah will deviate from religious observance because of her aguna status. This is a dissolute generation and people do not obey authority. And if the woman makes up her mind later to accept the get from her husband there is a clear concern that her husband will refuse to give her a get out of spite because he is already married to another woman and it is impossible to force him to give a get to his first wife and therefore she will just reject religion and go on a bad path. Because she is still married however, any children she subsequently has with another man will increase the number of mamzerim in the world. A possible solution is that before he can remarry he needs permission from the beis din and thus it is relatively easy to use that to influence him to deposit a get for his first wife with beis din. Only when he has deposited a get then can we give him permission to remarry according to halacha. After I thought of this, I saw that Rav Masas wrote in  his sefer Tevuos Shemesh (E.H. 30), “Even though in all the seforim of the Achronim concerning previous rabbinic courts (beis din), the beis din ruled that in the case of moredes she remained an agunah her entire life until she became an old lady with grey hair and the husband was allowed to marry another woman if he wanted – without first divorcing her. This was a common ruling and the first wife remained unable to remarry until the day that she died. However this approach was appropriate in previous generations when the spirit of Judaism permeated the people and there was no one who would dare do a serious sin – in particular not to openly transgress the serious sexual sins. But it is no longer true true in our day which to our great sorrow the spirit of individual freedom has become dominant and faith has weakened. We no longer have the power to have people properly comply with religious rulings and there is a great concern that people will go off the path of religious observance. There is no question that all our rabbis acknowledge that all efforts need to be made to have the get deposited with beis din...He concludes his words by saying that in the year 1950, all the rabbis of Morocco gather together and they made a decree through the official rabbinical confederation – that no man could remarry until he divorced his first wife who was a moredes and had declared that she couldn’t stand living with him (ma’os alei). This decree was accepted and it became a regular occurrence for the beis din to rule accordingly. This get that the husband was required to give before remarrying was not considered get me’usa ( a coerced get). That is because he had the choice of not remarrying and therefore he didn’t have to give the get. However with a moredes who simply wanted to afflict him and torture him and consequently refused to accept the get – there was no choice but to require that the get be deposited in beis din as we mentioned before....Click link for rest of the teshuva

See Rav Ovadia Yosef 3:20


Rav Ovadiya Yosef (Yabia Omer E.H. 3:18.13) : And in truth even according to the view of the poskim who hold that one does not force the husband to give a get when she claims ma'us alei, nevertheless there is a view that says there is a mitzva for the husband to divorce her and surely when there is a concern that because of the delay in get a get she will go off the derech. As we find in Shita Mekubetes (Kesubos 64)," Rabbeinu Yona wrote, "Even though we don't force a man to give a get when the wife says he is ma'us alei (disgusting to me) - that is only referring to forcing him by beating him with staffs. However beis din informs him that he has a mitzva to divorce her and they advise him to divorce her. And if he doesn't not in fact divorce her then this is a case of when a person transgresses the words of the rabbis that it is permitted to call him a sinner. However Rabbeinu Tam disagreed and said that even this we don't say to him but if he should come to ask whether he should divorce her without her getting the kesuba then beis din gives him the advice that he should divorce her immediately." Furthermore the Rema (Y.D. 248:20) writes that when the wife says ma'us alei the husband is obligated to divorce her. The Taz notes that the Rema here is only reporting the view of the Rambam but the Rema's true view is recorded in E.H. 77 where he doesn't mention that the husband should be forced to divorce her. But according to what we have said the words of the Rema (Y.D. 248.20) has a solid basis and that is the words of Rabbeinu Yonah. This is also noted by my friend the Tzitz Eliezar (5:26.4) based on the Noda B'Yehuda Kama (YD 68) who brings the words of the Rema as halacha l'maaseh and foundation principle. He notes that there is a basis to utilize this view at times of need according to the specific facts and needs of the time and appropriateness - depending on the evaluation of the beis din. I also say that in contemporary society with the degradation of the generations in free countries where every man does what he thinks is correct and there is a great increase in arrogance in the world and experience has taught that when a woman leaves her husband with the claim of ma'us alei and she is in limbo without receiving a get - that she will go and live with other men without the slightest shame or sense of embarrassment. As a result there is an increase in mamzerim in the world. In such a case we say that their degradation is to their benefit. This is expressed by the Ramban (Kesubos 63b), "Chas V'Shalom I am not arguing against the decree of the Gaonim to force him to divorce his wife and not only that but I strongly criticize those who say that it is not correct to follow their decrees but only the law as stated in the Talmud. In fact it is correct to listen to the Gaonim and to follow their decrees. Nevertheless now it is best to be very concern not to follow their decree because it has been abrogated because of the immorality of the generation." In other words in the time of the Ramban, even though women then had the brazenness to claim ma'us alei but they did not reach the extreme of chutpza to live with another man without receiving a get as we find in our days. But in the days before Moshiach as we are in now it is extremely relevant to considering returning to the decree of the Gaonim. And this is surely true when she is young and there is a real concern that she will go off the derech and there isn't much chance that she will return to her husband. Therefore it would appear that those who want to do something to force the husband to give a get have a solid basis for that decision. That is because the concerns that existed at the time of the Gaonim that the woman might go off the derech have returned. [In the time of the Gaonim the concern was that the woman would convert to Christianity for Islam rather than face end her days as an aguna]. Thus we see that whether the get should be forced or not is dependent on the particular time and era. And thus I have seen the gedol hador - Rav Chaim Palaggi in his Chaim v'Shalom (2:35) where he writes regarding forcing the husband that the view of a number of poskim including the Beis Yosef that the husband should not be forced to give a get. He writes, "Nevertheless according to everyone agrees that the woman is not forced to live with the husband. Therefore after a year or two after the time that they have separated from each other it would appear that he should be forced to divorce her. That is because there are two factors.  The man is not able to exist without a wife and the wife herself is not able to be without a husband. And this is surely true where she is young that we have to be concerned for disastrous results when she is chained as an aguna. Just look at how lenient the poskim are concerning preventing agunos in particular when she is young until they even go the extreme of relying on a minority opinion.  And surely the obligation lies on every dayan to be lenient is this manner in order to avoid trouble for both the man and the woman." Rav Chaim Palaggi is a great tree that one can rely on and surely in our day. And it is the same thing in cases where it is possible to combine various disputes of the poskim besides the claim of ma'us alei to be lenient. Also study Chaim V' Shalom (2:112), If there is a dispute between a husband and wife and the wife wants to be divorced and the husband refuses - one should establish a limited time for the matter to be resolved. And if we wait until 18 months  and we have despaired of reconciliation and it appears to beis din that there is nothing more than can be done for the marriage - they should separate the couple and force the husband to give a get until he proclaim,I want to give it.All of this that I have written is for the honor of G-d and His Torah." It is possible that Rav Palaggi is not talking about forcing with clubs but rather just calling him a sinner or similar techniques which is in accord with the view of Rabbeinu Yona and the Rema which we mentioned before.

Husband is not forced to give get when wife demands one- even if wife might commit adultery

Rav Eliashiv (Kovetz Teshuvos 174): Question: We are dealing with a case in which it apparently has been shown that the wife hates her husband – heart and soul – because of his behavior which is simply abnormal. The woman therefore has the claim of ma’us alei with a clear basis. This couple has lived separately for over 6 years. The question is whether the beis din will comply with the request of the wife and require him to give her a get. Answer: Even if you grant that this woman has the status of one who says ma’us alei with a clear justification, that in itself does not require that the husband give her a get. Look at Shut HaRashba (# 135 - attributed to Ramban), Question: When a woman claims ma’us alei... is the husband obligated to divorce her....? Answer: ... You should know that she is not able to force her husband to divorce her since  a woman goes out of the marriage sometimes according to her desires and sometimes not according to her desires. On the other hand the man only leaves the marriage only when he want to leave it... From all these you see that when a woman claims ma’us alei we do not force the husband to give a divorce... Even though the Rambam writes that when a woman says ma’us alei the husband is forced to divorce her – the Rambam is not correct in this matter... Concerning the kesuba and dowry that she brought him – according to the din she does not lose anything unless she insists on being a moredes for 12 months and all these 12 months she is not forced... However if she remains a moredes for 12 months and her husband wants to divorce her – she loses everything.... That is her din when her husband divorces her according to his wishes after 12 months. But if the desire to divorce comes from her – as we said before – he is not forced to divorce her. The words of the Rashba imply not only is the husband not forced to divorce her when she claims ma’us alei but that he has no obligation to give her a get! This is also apparent from the words of Tosfos(Kesubos 63).... Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 77:2): If she says that he disgusts me and I can not have relations with him – if the husband wants to divorce her she does not get any money from the Kesuba at all. Rema (E.H. 77:2)... All of this is only when she doesn’t give a reason and justification for her words as to why she finds him repulsive. But if she does give a reason for her words... And we don’t force him to divorce her  nor do we force her to remain with him. And if you want to claim that he must divorce her – it is obvious that since we don’t force her to remain with him then of necessity that there can’t be an obligation of the husband to give her a get. It is the same thing.

update Jan 17


Rav Sternbuch(5:345): Question:  A woman who has been separated from her husband for a number of years and she claims ma’us alei and there is a clear basis for this claim which has been verified. It is clear that there is no chance that they will reconcile. The husband is close to one of the chassidic rebbes who gives him great honor.  The beis din has met with the couple  many times and is firmly convinced that there is no possibility of reconciliation. Therefore they asked the husband to give his wife a get. However the husband has acted cruelly and refused. Even though I am presently traveling but since this is an emergency situation I will answer briefly.  You should know that many of the Rishonim including the Rambam and Rashi ruled that in a case of ma’us alei we force the husband to give a get. And some say that we force the get because of a decree of the Geonim. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri as well as other Rishonim disagreed and they held that a get can not be forced in a case of ma’us alei. The Rosh writes (43:6) that since there is a major dispute as to what the halacha is we don’t stick our heads between the great mountains. He also writes that whoever is lenient and forces a get results in an increase in mamzerim. The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 77:2) also says not to force the get. So even  though we agree that the halacha is that the get can not be forced when there is a claim of ma’us alei, nevertheless such a husband should not be given honor. Therefore it is necessary to inform the rebbe who is honoring him that he is giving the husband help to torment his wife which is a severe sin.

However prior to putting pressure on him through the rebbe, this the couple should be given 12 months during which efforts should be made to convince them to reconcile and expert marriage therapists should be used to deal with their issues. However when the beis din is convinced that there is no chance that they will reconcile and they paskened that it it appropriate for him to divorce his wife and not leave her an agunah – and nevertheless the husband refuses to divorce her. If we see there is no hope that he will give her a get – then his rebbe should be contacted and requested to stop honoring him. If he will listen to daas Torah he will not lose anything and one who observes mitzva will not know harm.

Rav Sternbuch (4:301): Question: I received a question from America where -  due to our many sins - it is common that women rebel against their husbands and afterwards go to secular courts - Gd forbid! The secular court makes a judgment in her favor - through coercion and not in accord with the law of the Torah. The judgment  obligates the husband to pay very high support payments and carries a penalty of prison for failure to comply. In addition she is typically awarded custody of the children. The husband is asking for a heter of meah rabbonim to be able to remarry without giving her a get since she is a moredes and has transgressed the religious laws. On the other hand she claims that the heter of meah rabbonim is not relevant since she in fact is willing to accept the get. She also claims that there are rabbis who support her position. So she wants to benefit twice by obtaining a get according to the Torah and also a judgment from civil court which steals money from from her husband even after the get. Answer: In my humble opinion there is no validity to her claims and therefore the husband should be given a heter so he can marry another woman. The only limitation is that he needs to deposit the get with beis din as is the established practice. The reason for this is complex. 1) first of all since they are coercing him financially not in accord with the halacha regarding the support payments which are much higher than the halacha - that constitutes theft. Thus the get itself is a forced get. The gedolei poskim are worried about get me'usa. Thus the get is not actually valid and we have the problem that she is still a married woman who thinks she can remarry. Therefore it is necessary to exempt him from all financial obligations that were done against his will in order that the get itself be valid. Furthermore if the wife refuses to go to beis din, then that itself gives her the halachic status of moredes as is clear from Divrei Chaim (E.H. 51) and he cites the Chavas Daas who ruled that a woman who refused to go to beis din  was a moredes and the gedolim agreed with him. ... According to this if she goes with him  only to beis din then he is obligated to give her a get. However when she goes to secular court in addition to make monetary claims - she is not able hold on to both sides. In other words she can't go to the secular court with monetary claims and at the same demand that he give her a get in beis din. If she forces him to accept the rulings of the secular court in marriage matters he has no obligation to give her a get. We need to state in addition that the essence of the Decree of Rabbeinu Gershom was for the benefit of the wife.  However this benefit is only available when she doesn't abrogate her halachic obligations. But in the present case she has created serious devastation in the marriage in that she has rebelled against him and went to secular court where she received excessive judgements concerning maintenance and also the custody of the children. Her husband must give her a get in beis din so that she can remarry. So in the case of moredes the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom which was meant to benefit women was not intended and the husband can remarry with the heter of 100 Rabbis and he deposits the get with beis din until the judgment of the secular court is nullified. When that happens- if he has not yet remarried - then it is prohibited for him to do so until he gives his first wife a get.

In reality your question is a local issue of America and it is the job of American rabbis to decide. However my view is in agreement with the rabbis there who permit the husband to remarry without any difficulty and he needs to deposit a get with beis din. But when the judgment of the secular courts has been nullified then it is prohibited for the husband to remarry until he has properly divorced the first wife.

You should be aware that we are obligated to fight against her going to secular courts and we prevent her from remarrying if she does and if the get is given under these circumstances there is a suspicion that it was coerced (me'usa). Nevertheless in a case where she claims she can't stand him (ma'us alei) and there is no reason to believe they can be reconciled and the man is simply being cruel to her and is being spiteful by not to giving her a divorce - then even though it is prohibited for us to exert any force- G-d forbid! - nevertheless it is correct to notify the husband that the view of many of the gedolim (e.g., Rambam, Ravad, Behag, Rashbam, Rashi etc) is that he is sinning and they would encourage him to give her a get. Because even these poskim are concerned about creating [an invalid get] which would leave her as a married woman even bedieved - so G-d forbid that we should use any type of coercion. Regarding the issue of tormenting her and leaving her an aguna - it is correct for him to be concerned for her claim that she finds him revolting (ma'os alei) and it is prohibited for him to leave her as an aguna - even if she is not correct. But we are not to coerce him G-d forbid with any type of coercion that would possibly bring about a get me'usa. Rather [once we have informed him that it is wrong for him to withhold the get] he needs to come the the realization himself that he must conduct himself like a descendant of Avraham and the verse says that the ways of Torah are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace and that he will find happiness with someone else.

All of this we need to explain to the husband. That leaving her as an aguna is a transgression of a severe sin of onas  devarim - not to torment his wife. That refusing to divorce her serves no purpose except to get revenge against her. He doesn't want to live with her and he shouldn't think her life is worthless and he should be fully aware that in Heaven there is judgment and there is a Judge. He should also be informed that to many of the early gedolim it is correct even to force him to divorce. Unfortunately there are many beis dins that when they see that the husband doesn't want to divorce his wife they simply remain silent. But that is not acceptable. They must inform him that he is unjustifiably tormenting her and this is not correct. This of course is assuming that the beis din is convinced that there is no hope for reconciliation....

===========================

Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos v'Hanhagos 1:389): Question: A woman has suffered for a number of years from her husband who refuses to divorce her - how can he be forced to give a get?  

Answer: It is an established halacha that if the wife refuses to live with her husband because she claims he is disgusting to her (ma'os alei) that it is impossible to force him to divorce her. This is explicitly stated by the Rema (E.H. 77:3). And even if it has been a number of years that they have separated and he is being spiteful and cruel in refusing to divorce her it is clearly stated by the Teshuvos haRosh (43:6) that if we force him to give the get there is the concern that it is a get me'usa and therefore invalid and it only serves to increase mamzerim. However while it is stated in the Rema (E.H. 154:21) that nidoi (cherem) is considered force and is prohibited, nevertheless he says it is permitted to decree that no Jew should do him a favor or should do business with him or even to circumcize his sons or to bury them - until he divorces his wife. But the Pischei Teshuva (E.H. 154:30) says there these shunnings (harhakos) are equivalent to nidoi (cherem) and are not permitted to be imposed today and the only recourse is to tell him that it is permitted to call him a sinner  and he says it is best to be strict according to this opinion. This is agreed to by the Chazon Ish (E.H. 105:12). He concludes in the name of the Rashba that it is not permitted to humiliate the husband or to torment him - examine this well.

However it appears that what is prohibited is to humiliate him and to shun him in a manner similar to cherem - i.e, not to do business with him and not to do him a favor - and that is not done today. (Chazon Ish understands the Pischei Teshuva differently). But when he is not actively humiliated but that he is only not given honors for example he is notified that he will not receive an aliyah in his shul or any other shul and that he will not be allowed to be the shliach tzibor - then this is not like cherem at all even though it causes some humiliation. The only pressure permitted is that he should know that the community does not approve of his conduct of being cruel to his wife - but this is not called force at all.

I recall witnessing an incident involving Rav Yechiel Weinberg (Seridei Aish) concerning a husband who spitefully refused to divorce his wife after a number of years and he directed that it be known and publicized that this husband was not to get an aliya in the shul. That is in accord with what I have written that this type of pressure is not called force. It is also done here in Yerushalayim to publicize notices in the street that a particular person is a sinner and has made his wife an aguna. In my opinion 1) if she has solid justification for her desire to be divorced then it would be possible and appropriate to force him  actively with humiliations to give her a get. We learn from Kesubos (71a) if it is clear that he hates her then he is obligated to divorce her. 2) On the other hand if there is no apparent reason for her being repelled by him we can distance him.  I am inclined to permit humiliation in such cases but it is necessary for beis din first to be very careful and thorough in evaluating the situation as to whether it is appropriate. Similarly one should not spare any efforts to encourage that she live with him when she requests a divorce and there is no clear reason except she says she doesn't like him. 3) But if there is a clear reason - then even if we don't force him with a beating we are accustomed to be lenient to pressure him with notices  in shuls as I mentioned above.

This that the wife creates pressure with the claim that he is tormenting her and she can not stand the situation any more and that she is ready to go to "rabbis" who are lenient in divorce - that is still not justification for us to make rulings against the Torah. The ways of G-d are hidden and some suffer physically while other suffering financially and some suffer in their marriage. We need to hope to G-d that the end of suffering has arrived and that he will divorce her. On the other hand, to force him with high payments for food or to humiliate him when it is not permitted - it doesn't help because this pressure only produces a get me'usa - G-d forbid - which has no validity. But concerning cruelty and spite which is characteristic of Sedom - only Heaven can punish him.

Yachin uVoaz(1:124):[15th Century Algeria] You should know that there are two different types of moredes and they have different laws. There is a moredes who despises her husband and she asserts that he is disgusting to her. On the other hand there is a moredes who says she wants her husband but she wants to torment him In the case of ma'us alei the view of the Rambam is that the husband is forced to divorce her immediately and he learns this from a deduction from the gemora as the Rosh writes. The Rambam states in Hilchos Ishus  (14:8) that if a wife refuses sexual relations that the husband is forced to give a a get since she is not like a prisoner who can be forced to have relations with someone she hates. However there has long been an outcry against the ruling of the Rambam by all the commentators and poskim such as Rabbein Tam, Ramban, Rosh, Rashba and many others. They agree concerning forcing the husband to divorce. Whoever forces the husband to divorce in accordance to the ruling of the Rambam increases mamzerim in the world. And they reject the view of the Rambam with clear proofs from the Talmud as the Rosh does. And many proofs are brought to refute and reject the words of the Rambam. And even the Magid Mishna who normally devotes  himself in all places to justify the words of the Rambam and to firmly establish their validity with clear proofs - in this case he refutes the Rambam and goes into detail with proofs to contradict the Rambam's reasoning and to reject it. It is unnecessary to repeat them here. The halachic view that has become univeral is that one does not force the husband to give a get when she claim ma'us alei and we do not rely on the ruling of the Rambam nor others who agree with him in this matter. And furthermore that even if the halacha was in accord with the Rambam it would be correct to make a protective fence in this matter to prevent immorality amongst the woman because of the degradation of the contemporary generation. Because woman have become haughty and arrogant in their immorality. We are therefore concerned that a wife might have become interested in another man and she wants to discard her husband by declaring he is disgusting to me (ma'us alei). If it became known that that would be sufficient to have her husband forced to give her a get then it would surely cause problems. But in fact the Rambam is not the halacha because of the proofs that the opponents of the Rambam bring [And even in Algeria where they always follow the Rambam there are three exceptions and this is one of them and not those who agree with the Rambam...]. However I saw in the Rosh who writes that if in fact the psak of the Rambam was followed and the woman was divorced by force and she remarried - we don't force her leave the second marriage. However many others disagree with the Rosh and they say that if she remarries after a forced get - she must leave the second marriage.

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update: added my rebuttal in yellow

 I don't have time now to write a rebuttal of this article. Hopefully next week - but I thought it would be helpful to read this well written - though mistaken - piece. One of the comments summarizes the problem well.

Rivka Gornall Leiner · Top Commenter · Graphologist and Counselor at Self-Employed

Adds nothing but one more snowball in the avanche of one sided articles written by those who sleep quietly while female get refusal, child alienation, false abuse accusations, monetary extortion (on both sides) and cruelty play out because of the woman's spite or greed. This might help your rabbi points in feminist pc Denver but it ignores reality.

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Times of Israel    by Rabbi Levi Brackman

In my fourteen years of practicing as a rabbi I have been asked numerous times to offer counsel and support to couples in failing marriages. Despite the fact that it takes two to tango, often the breakdown of a marriage is more the fault of one party than the other. Yet, no matter how the marriage ends and who is at fault, if the husband does not actively agree to give a Gett (Jewish religious divorce) immediately after the wife requests it he is always in the wrong no matter what.

Why? That is clearly not the view of the Torah. See Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 77:2-3). So what is meant by wrong no matter what? Does that mean that the husband should not request marriage counseling first? Does that mean a mistaken belief that the Torah requires a Get on demand? What if the wife takes the kids and moves to another state. He is simply supposed to give a Get and forget about his children? Or perhaps it mean that if all issues are settled, the is no basis for reconciliation and yet the husband out of spite refuses to give a Get that he is wrong? If it is the latter than I agree totally but if the former conditions - I disagree strongly.

From a religious perspective, the Torah is very protective about the feelings and dignity of women — even more so than that of men. The Talmud warns men to never hurt their spouses feelings and or cause them to weep. It cautions men to be exceedingly careful about their spouses dignity and honor (Baba Metzia, 59a) and to respect and honor them more than they honor themselves (Yevamot, 62b, Maimonides, Ishut, 15:19). These guidelines are based on Biblical sources and have been codified into Jewish law. Furthermore the Talmud tells us that in matters of worldly and household affairs the women’s opinion takes precedence to that of the man’s (Baba Metzia, ibid).

Yes it is true that the Torah is concerned out not hurting the feelings of others - especially one's wife. But the sources cited are not dealing with divorce - but rather the conditions for a viable marriage. Similarly it is well known that there are a variety of laws about not hurting other people's feelings. However there are also laws that require criticizing others as well as saying bad things about them - even if it hurts there feelings. We don't refrain from telling others not to steal because it might hurt their feelings. We don't refrain from punishing murderers - even though it hurts them and embarrasses their family. Chastisement is a mitzva as is loving your fellow man.  One can not legitimately claim  that the Torah categorically prohibits hurting the feeling of others - especially one's wife. If Rabbi Brackman has sources for doing so - I would appreciate see them. Like most things in life - the various Torah obligations need to be prioritized and balanced.

Clearly a man who refuses his wife’s request to give a religious bill of divorce for any period of time after it is made clear that from her perspective the marriage is over, is contravening these extremely serious sections of Jewish law in the most grievous manner possible. But refusing to give a Gett is also the mark of a man who lacks basic human empathy and common decency.[...]

The above statement is not supported by the gemora, Shulchan Aruch or poskim. As noted above - I would appreciate sources for what seems to be a declaration that the concern for a wife's feeling is more important than all the other Torah obligations and Torah rights that a person has as well as the welfare of her children. That simply is not so.

Some men hide behind Jewish law as a reason not to give a Gett. They argue that all aspects of the divorce needs to be settled before they are Halachicly (according to Jewish law) allowed to give the Gett. They then proceed to make any settlement as difficult as possible, allowing them to continue their abusive and controlling behavior. Tragically there are some Jewish courts that allow men to behave this way. Happily, however, most of the larger reputable Jewish courts will not allow narcissistic men to use religion as a tool to further abuse and blackmail their wives. The most obnoxious Gett refusers, however, seem to avoid reputable Jewish courts. As pernicious, are men who tell their wife, who is desperate for a divorce, that they “want to work on their marriage” and therefore won’t give a Gett. Again this ploy won’t work at most reputable Jewish courts.

Is Rabbi Brackman claiming that insistence that all aspects be settled before giving a get is not the halacha or is he saying that the halacha is unfair to women for requiring this? Or is he saying that women view this halachic fact as giving an unfair advantage to the men? Is he saying that some men take advantage of this halacha or that the wife often claims that they are - even when there are legitimate reasons not to. Again he is describing a complex situation in very simplistic terms and in addition is totally ignoring the possibility that there are sometimes legitimate reasons for continuing negotiations - even if it makes the wife unhappy. In fact it is clear from Rabbi Brackman's writing that he views the woman as inevitably the victim and the man the bully. That is simply an inaccurate picture and biased description. Likewise he fails to note that some courts are biased against men - and that men try to avoid using such courts - even though women prefer them. [...] 

Thus, in Judaism when a man refuses to give his wife a Gett he is taking away her most basic human right — her freedom to live and be who she wants to be. The moment the wife decides she no longer wants to be married to her husband human empathy and common decency dictates that he must let her free. By finding excuses for not doing so he is controlling her in a manner that contravenes every aspect of her basic human rights. There is only one apt description for that type of behavior — pure evil.

Rabbi Brackman's idiosyncratic understanding of get is well expressed  "in Judaism when a man refuses to give his wife a Get he is taking away her most basic human right — her freedom to live and be who she wants to be." He is conflating Judaism with secular values.  He does not show that the Torah requires Get on demand and in fact it doesn't. Obviously such a fact bothers Rabbi Brackman.

Western man places freedom to do whatever he/she wants as the highest values - but it clearly is not a Jewish values. I would like to see him present a source which says that Judaism says that man's most basic right is freedom to live and be who she wants to be. Judaism takes away the right of a married woman to commit adultery, of males to have sexual relations with males, of Jews marrying non-Jews etc etc. Why doesn't Rabbi Brackman explicitly acknowledge that the values of Judaism as defined by halacha and hashkofa - are simply not adequate for him.

In the final analysis, the refusal to give a Gett by a husband, for any reason, will cause pain to his wife and therefore is not only contrary to the spirit of Judaism it contravenes the letter of the law as well. But beyond that it is a terrible desecration of G-d’s name because it in essence is just another example of the cynical use of religion to hurt and control another human being. Tragically this is yet another case of women being especially disadvantaged in this regard. [...]

 The above statement as a categorically statement is false as is clear from the gemora, Shulchan Aruch and poskim.

As the Halachic Prenup, which ensures substantial monetary penalties for not giving a Gett, becomes more popular this problem will hopefully become a thing of the past. But until that happens there are still women who are chained and suffering and it is up to you and me to do all we can to ensure that their evil tormentors do not get away with it.

He fails to note that in the Chareidi world the prenup is understood to be an example of financial pressure and thus is problematic as Get Me'usa. If his intent is to proclaim that only the Modern Orthodox understanding of halacha is legitimate - then he should say so instead of giving the clear but false impression that all Orthodox poskim agree with his view
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Finally Rabbi Brackman posted a statement on Facebook criticizing those such as myself who have a "mistaken" understanding because we don't agree with his views concerning Get. 

He fails to note that such disagreement is not just that of the simple people such as myself - but is in fact the normative view of poskim through the ages as I have shown in many posts on my blog [just search for term "get me'sua" (or "get meusa" or "forced get") in the archives.

https://www.facebook.com/levi.brackman/posts/10205684977302618

There we go, it was bound to happen, Daniel Eidensohn, in his Daas Torah blog read my article and characterized it as a "well written - though mistaken - piece" and me as a "rabbi ignores halacha." I wonder what part is mistaken or against Halacha?

Perhaps the line that: "The Torah is very protective about the feelings and dignity of women — even more so than that of men."

Perhaps he thinks this is a mistake: "Refusing to give a Gett is also the mark of a man who lacks basic human empathy and common decency"?

Or maybe he disagrees with this: "the refusal to give a Gett by a husband, for any reason, will cause pain to his wife and therefore is not only contrary to the spirit of Judaism it contravenes the letter of the law as well."

He probably disagrees with the general idea that men should not be allowed to use the Get to further control and intimidate their wives.

Whatever it is he disagree with, the fact that his opinion is shared by so many of his circle is deeply troubling. What on earth is wrong with these people. It boggles the mind.