A psychologist's role in religious change - is there one?

Case 1

Chassidim view that the rebbe's views are true and are based on ruach hakodesh. A chasid comes to a therapist and says he is unhappy, his wife is unhappy and so are his kids. He is following the views of his rebbe and his wife and children try their best to follow the guidelines of the rebbe. He has gone a number of times to the rebbe for guidance, but the rebbe says that his suffering is because of his yetzer harah and he just needs to try harder. However the chasid reports having no sense of fulfillment, spiritual accomplishment, emotional connection. There is no shalom bayis and the kids are depressed. There is no evidence of psychological problems being the cause of these complaints. The chasid reports serious doubts about the validity of his chassidus after he had a serious of discussions with friends who are Litvaks and different types of Chassidim. He yearns for intellectual independence and psychological space from the community and in particular the rebbe who he does not respect. He feels that he is trapped playing a role that for him is phony and hypocritical. He feels energized by immersing in different views and trying to clarify his own views of hashkofa. The therapist concludes that the problem is that the chasid and his families psychological and emotional needs are not met by this particular chassidus.

Case 2

A Litvak from a long line of Litvaks has it made and is the envy of his friends. He has mastered Shas, is a successful rebbe in a major New York yeshiva high school. Married the daughter of a well-known gadol who is a successful teacher in a seminary and a popular speaker. They have 5 kids who are doing well in yeshiva/Beis Yaakov. They have no health or financial worries. However collectively they are report that religion has become a culture and that they find nothing meaningful in what they do. While they are perceived as role models, they feel emptiness both spiritually and psychologically. Over the last year they have found a great attraction to Chassidus because of a couple they met Pesach at a hotel. He now yearns for the spiritual certainty and vibrancy he sees in chassidus – something that surprises him because he was raised to have disdain for Chassidus and rebbes. He feels a need to be a part of a community and to be able to be given guidance by a rebbe. The independence that a Litvak treasures, he views as alienation and distance from G‑d.

Case 3

The 17 year of daughter of a gadol finds it unpleasant living up to everyone's expectations of how a gadol's daughter should be. She would like a career which requires a college education. She wants to marry someone who is frum – but not a Torah genius who will spend the rest of his life learning 18 hours a day. She wants a husband who is a friend that she can relax with – not a revered figure that she must sacrifice her own needs to support and tend to. In short she does not want to be a rebbetzin who is married to the Chofetz Chaim – which is what her family expects of her. She really wants to have a comfortable existence and not the life of poverty that she grew up with sharing a 4 room apartment with her parents and 10 siblings. She came to the therapist because of migraine headaches, periodic bouts of depression and has recently started to cut herself (though she hasn't told her parents).

These cases are not really psychological problems but the result of a mismatch between the nature of the person and religious identity. Is it appropriate for a therapist to suggest a major religious change? If so how should he go about presenting the idea?

How to explain Torah & Psychology to kiruv rabbis?

I was recently asked by a major kiruv organization if I would be willing to write a 20-30 page pamphlet dealing with Psychology - for kiruv rabbis. This is an important issue - but it is complex. It requires discussing not only psychological theories but their correlates in Torah, explaining among other things - the scientific method, positivism, empiricism, reality, validity and statistics. I need to document all my assertions.

We have talked about using Torah values to guide and provide boundaries in the use of psychology - but this has to be condensed into a page or two. My concern also is that these kiruv rabbis really don't have a decent secular background to understand the subject properly. Nor are they likely to have a broad enough understanding of Torah dynamics and halacha.

If you are in kiruv or are a congregational rabbi -  what issues are important to you or are causing you problems. If you refer people to psychologists - let me know about the difficulties you have experienced.

A young man asks, "What qualities to look for in a wife?"

Dear Rabbi Eidensohn,

How are you?

As you know, I am looking for a wife these days.  I also have a keen interest in avoiding the kind of terrible situations you have blogged about recently where husband and wife become estranged and enemies.  Do you have advice for avoiding this outcome?  Do you believe it's avoidable (in some cases, most cases, all cases)?  What is your advice both for during the marriage and also proactive steps that can be taken beforehand in the process itself of seeking a wife.   Ie, are there particular traits or attitudes to be wary of, how to discern them in the prospective partner, etc.  Or a certain dynamic between the two people that will more likely lead to these problems later on? 

On the subject of how to achieve a fulfilling a relationship, I enjoyed the TED video you posted.  Granted it was a short talk, but I don't think she ever gave an actual suggestion or a solution for how "erotic couples" as she termed it (sexually and emotionally fulfilled) strike the balance between love and desire (reliability / mystery, responsibility/ freedom, etc).   The first thought that entered my mind was that the laws of nidda would be conducive to rekindling the desire through distance and separation as she described in the healthy couples and when they most desire their spouse (when they're away).   But yet we see, as you stated, these problems exist also in the Orthodox community.  So it must be more than that.  What would you say is the missing link here that is causing it to not work in the frum world?

What resources would you suggest for learning more about this subject as I aim to build a positive relationship that will succeed?

On one last point, I didn't quite understand why you cited that particular psak of Rav Moshe because it sounded like he only permitted this type of learning in the few days before the marriage for groom-to-be (because at other times it could lead to fantasies when we are not supposed to be preoccupied with those thoughts).   But by posting the video I would think you encourage this learning at any time to understand how a relationship should work. For example, I wouldn't need to wait until 3 days before marriage to view the TED talk.  It seems you take a more liberal view than Rav Moshe based on your professional experience.  Or am I not interpreting the cited psak correctly?

Thanks,

=========================

Dear ....,

You are asking an important question - which doesn't have a clear cut answer. Let me answer you last point first. Rav Moshe Feinstein's teshuva that I cited is referring to specific information regarding physical relations between husband and wife. In contrast the TED talk is talking about the psychological dynamics involved. I don't see any reason to assume a disagreement. If talking about marriage and marriage issues is problematic - then you would need to prevent the learning of Kiddushin and Kesubos and other gemoras until after marriage.

update: Regarding your main question. Start studying Igros Moshe (Y.D. I. #90).

[to be continued]

Weiss Dodelson: Divorce settlement required the Weiss's to ask me to take down blog posts

Just received the following letter which I will discuss with a number of talmidei chachomim before deciding what to do. Would appreciate reader feedback also. 

I am not sure why the Dodelson's required Rabbi Weiss to ask me - the Dodelson's could have asked themselves.  I assume that indicates that the Dodelson's think that I am an agent of the Weiss Family just as Shira Dicker was an agent of the Dodelson's. 

It simply isn't true. In fact my concern was to present both sides - not to force the Dodelson's to concede defeat - as Shira Dicker tried to do to the Weiss Family. I sincerely tried to present the Dodelson's viewpoint - including having guest posts from their supporters and posting their supporters comments.

==========================================

Dear Rabbi Eidensohn,

Our family greatly appreciates your standing up for Torah, halachah and your convictions in supporting Avrohom Meir Weiss and our family throughout these past many months.

We are very well aware that you are completely independent from our family, and that you took up this cause on on your own, as a matter of conscience.

However, as a preclude to the get, the two parties entered into a mutual consent order, and we committed to request that you remove any references to this dispute from your website.

We respectfully request that you do so.

Thank you,

Yisroel Weiss

Problems are inherent when using mussar or agada as halacha

 Dr. Benny Brown wrote:

... rules are standards that determine the normative status of concrete actions, while principles determine goals that the actions are supposed to achieve.15 A person cannot perform two conflicting actions, but he can undertake different goals that may be found in conflict in particular circumstances, and nevertheless not forego any of them. These goals may be more abstract (such as ‘‘justice’’) or less abstract (such as that ‘‘no man may profit from his own wrong’’).

Yeshayahu Tishbi and Joseph Dan wrote similarly regarding the relationship between halakhah and musar: ‘‘The halakhah cuts to the minimum that the servant of God is required to do in order to fulfill his obligation to his Creator [...] The musar literature seeks not the minimum, but the maximum – the path by which man will reach the zenith of religious life, of approaching and clinging to God.’’21

Maharal (Be’er HaGolah #6): One does not always accept the literal meaning of Agada as our Sages said, “that one does not resolve apparent contradictions in Agada.” That is because it is possible that the idea of the Agada was said in a concealed manner. Therefore, there is no need to ask or resolve contradictions in Agada since by apparently clarifying one Agada a contradiction to a different Agada can be created. It is possible that the original problem was not a problem to those who understand their esoteric nature. In contrast, Halacha cannot be utilized without resolving all apparent contradictions and inconsistencies. Agada on the other hand was not created for the purpose of learning what is prohibited or permitted and therefore consistency is not required. By attempting to create consistency it is possible that problematic elements will be rejected when in fact there was never a problem in the first place to those who are experts in Agada. That is why the Yerushalmi (Peah 2:4) states that one should not learn Halacha from Agada - since it has not been conceptually clarified by the dialectic process of questions and answers…

Nodah BeYehuda (161): Even though the Yerushalmi (Peah 2:4) equates not learning practical Halacha from Mishna, Tosefta and Agada - the reason is not the same for the three. … Medrash and Agada were composed entirely for the purpose of teaching moral lessons by means of allusions and allegories. Thus, they are the source of theological information but were never intended to be used for Halacha. That is why we do not learn at all from Agada to decide practical Halacha.

 ======================

Consequently problems are created when taking mussar and agada and viewing it as halacha - as we see concerning bein adam l'chavero issues such as lashon harah or tznius.

Chofetz Chaim disapproved of the Netziv's criticism of the delegitimzing of religious maskilim and religious Zionists

 Update: Making of a Godol (Page xx)… a report by R' Velvel Kercerg that Rebbitzen Feigel Zaks, the Chafetz-Chaim's youngest daughter, told him, "Eighty percent of what they tell about [my father] is not true." I cannot help but assume that in order to bring out bluntly the idea that not everything told about R' Yisrael-Meir Kagan, author of Chafetz Chaim, is true, his daughter exaggerated the percentage of untruths.)

 Making of a Gadol (Page 409):  Furthermore, R' Shlomo Lorincz repeated in the name of R' Simhah Wasserman (son of one of the Chafetz Chaim's major disciples, R' Elchonon Wasserman) that the Chafetz-Chaim was somewhat critical of the Netziv. He disapproved of what the Netziv wrote in his commentary on Humash, HaEmek Davar in the introduction to Sefer Bereishis that the Second Temple was destroyed because "the tzaddiqim and hasidim and those who toiled in Torah study ... were not straight (yeshorim) in their general conduct. Therefore, due to the baseless hatred (sinas chinom) in their hearts, they suspected whomever they saw acting not according to their view in Fear of G-d to be a Sadducee and an epikoros. It was understood that the Netziv intended with his words about the Second Temple to find fault with the bnei Torah of his own generation  for delegitimizing the religious maskilim and the Lovers of Zion faithful whose outlook on the needs of the Jewish nation did not conform to their own. Despite his criticism, the Chafetz Chaim asked the Netziv for his haskamah on his sepher Ahavas Chesed which was published eight years later than HaEmek Davar.

Lashon harah is only prohibited when there is no benefit or to'eles

update - added more sources 9/27/13 [see  Lashon harah revisted
 Balancing the terror of lashon harah]

The main Torah source prohibiting lashon harah is 

Vayikra (19:16): Don't spread gossip amongst your people. Don't stand idly by the blood of your fellow. I am G‑d

 It is important to very  carefully study this verse  to understand what lashon harah is. The first thing to notice is that the verse is not just about lashon harah. The second verse is a command to help people in trouble or to prevent them from getting into trouble. Why are the two issues combined?

A number of commentaries have noted that this dual issue verse teaches that the prohibition of lashon harah is conditional. If a benefit results from saying the negative things that can't be obtained otherwise - then it is permitted to speak. This is known as the heter of to'eles. In fact we see that it is not a heter but it is a condition that determines whether the negative information is lashon harah. This shows that not every negative statement is in fact lashon harah.

Chazon Ish(2:133): Knowledge about a talmid chachom who shapes yiddishkeit is similar to that of an artisan. Just as one is permitted to convey accurate information about an artisan if there is to'eles so it it permitted to reveal information about a gadol if there is to'eles. Of critical importance is to be totally accurate otherwise it is slander. This implies that expressing negative information about others is relevant for those who are considered influential authorities – in order to understand the degree to rely on them.

Rabbeinu Yonah(Mishlei 24:28): Don’t be a gratuitous witness of your fellow man – ...This principle is stated in Berachos (19a), If you see a talmid chachom sinning at night, do not suspect of him of sinning anymore by the day because he will surely have repented by then. Since he has the reputation of a person who is fearful of sinning and he is upset and regrets that his lust overcame him. However if the talmid chachom is in fact a wicked person who is mistakenly thought by the people to be righteous – he is not only to be criticized to those who know how to keep quiet – but in fact it is a mitzva to publicize his deeds until they are well known to the public. That is because severe harm occurs when wicked people are honored because he will turn many away from the proper path and denigrate the honor of the righteous and encourages sinning. There is in fact profanation of G‑d’s name by honoring the wicked because some people will be aware of the sins the wicked do and will concluded that there is nothing wrong with sinning and that it doesn’t lower one’s stature (Yoma 86b)…

Rav Moshe Sternbuch(Teshuvos v'hanhagos 1:839): Question: A a teacher asks his students to reveal who did something wrong. - is this permitted? Answer: It would seem that the teacher first has to say to his student that the prohibition of lashon harah is very severe. However since this is l'toeles there is no prohibition of lashon harah. (See Chofetz Chaim 4 and the statement of the Alter of Kelm in Marpeh Lashon said in the name of Rav Yisroel Salanter with clear proofs that whatever is for to'eles is not prohibited as lashon harah). In this case it is clearly for the benefit of the chinuch of the student and therefore there is no concern that this is lashon harah. In fact just the opposite because just as there is a prohibition to speak negatively about others - there is an obligation to inform the teacher so that he is able to properly chastise the student and thus it is not considered lashon harah at all.

Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Lashon Harah 4:10):  Nevertheless if a person sees someone who has bad midos such as conceit, anger, or other bad personality traits or the person isn't concerned about studying Torah etc. then it is correct to tell his son or his students to avoid associating with such a person in order that they not learn his bad midos. That is because the basis of the prohibition of lashon harah - which applies to even if it is truth - is intent to degrade another person and rejoice in his debasement. However if his intent is to guard his fellow man from learning from his bad deeds - then it is clearly permitted and in fact it is a mitzva to convey this [negative] information to others. However in these cases and similar ones it would seem that it is a mitzva for the one conveying the negative information to explain the reason why he is saying these negative things about another person. That is so the listener will not err and assume that negative comments in general are permitted. Furthermore so that the listener will not be astonished that the speaker seems to be a hypocrite in that sometimes he prohibits lashon harah even when true (see clall 9) because it is an important mitzva to keep his children from sin. and yet he is himself is now saying negative things about others...

Chofetz Chaim (Be’er Mayim Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 9:3): Requiring that the motivation to speak rechilus is for a beneficial goal (to’eles) - doesn’t’ mean that if he doesn’t have this motivation that he is automatically exempt from communicating the necessary information to the person in danger. That is because he still has to fulfill the obligation of “not standing idly by the blood of his fellow.” This also applies to saving someone from financial loss. Look at Rashi (Sanhedrin 73a). This requirement of to’eles for permitting speaking negative words means only that he should try and force himself do it for a benefit and not because he hates the person. Otherwise he will be violating the prohibition of rechilus.

Rav Ovadiah Yosef (Yechava Daas 4:60): … In fact this is the way to understand the verse regarding lashon harah. “Do not speak lashon harah but don’t stand idly by concerning the blood of your fellow.” Even though there is a prohibition of lashon harah, nevertheless the second clause of the verse tells you that it is conditional on this not causing harm. Therefore you are obligated to inform others regarding certain matters in order to them to guard against loss and danger. This is expressed in Nidah (61a) that even though it is prohibited to listen to lashon harah but you should protect yourself from the potential danger you hear about. The Rambam (Mitzva 297) says that protecting another’s money is also included in “don’t stand idly by concerning the blood of your fellow.” … Therefore even if there is only a financial loss, one should inform your fellow man in order that he can protect himself from those who want to harm him. And surely when there is a possible danger to an individual or a group.... 

Malbim (Vayikra 19:16.41): Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow - The literal meaning of the verse is that if you see someone in danger – do not stand by but rather make a serious effort to save him…. However the association in this verse of not speaking lashon harah teaches us that even though we are prohibited to speak lashon harah, nevertheless if you know testimony that can help another - even though it involves lashon harah and breaking confidentiality – it is necessary to reveal the information and to testify. This is true even though revealing secrets is prohibited as lashon harah.

Netziv (Vayikra 19:16): Even though there is a clear prohibition in this verse against lashon harah, nevertheless this is conditional on “not standing idly by the blood of others.” In other words if you know that there is someone who wants to harm another then you are obligated to inform the intended victim and it is prohibited to stand idly by and let it happen.

Ohr HaChaim (Vayikra 19:16): The prohibition of lashon harah is conditional on whether not speaking will not cause harm to another. If you see a group that wants to kill people then you are obligated to notify the potential victims so that they can save themselves. One should not keep silent by saying that you don’t want to speak lashon harah. Thus we learn that if you don’t notify the potential victim and he is killed that you have nullified this mitzva of not standing idly by the blood of others. We learn this from the incident of Gedaliah who was warned of danger but did not pay attention to the warning.

Shulchan Aruch(C.M. 426:1): If you see someone drowning in the sea or being attacked by bandits or wild animals and it is possible to save him by yourself or to pay others to save him and yet you don’t save him or alternatively you hear non‑Jews or informers plotting to do him harm and yet you don’t inform him or alternatively you know that non‑Jews or bandits are planning to attack him and you are able dissuade them and yet you don’t or other such scenarios – you are violating “do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow (Vayikra 19:16).

Rav Elochon Wasserman (Kovetz Ha’aros Yevamos #70): ...It would seem that all that is prohibited between people (bein adam l’chavero) is only prohibited when done in a harmful and destructive manner without justification. For example regarding the prohibition of “Not hating your brother.” This is only prohibited for gratuitous hatred (sinas chinom). In other words when he is not doing anything wrong (davar ervah). However if he is doing something wrong then it is permitted to hate him. It is important to note that the reason for hatred being permitted in this case is not because of the fact that a sinful person is not considered your “brother.” Tosfos (Pesachim 113b) explains that if you hate this sinful person for another reason then you transgress the prohibition. The hatred is only permitted because of the bad (davar ervah) that you see in him. Similarly regarding the prohibition of beating another, the Rambam writes that it is prohibited only if done as fighting (derech netzoyan). This is clear from the fact that it is permitted for a teacher to his student. And this that we noted before in Sanhedrin (84b) – that is only a rabbinic restriction. And similarly concerning the prohibition of causing anguish to a widow or orphan, Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:10) writes that if it is done to teach Torah or a trade – there is no prohibition. Similarly concerning the prohibition of lashon harah, it is permitted against people who cause discord and quarrels in order to stop the fight. Similar concerning using words to cause anguish (onas devarim), it is permitted publicly criticize someone publicly if it is for the sake of chastisement. It is even permitted to publicly embarrass someone if it is done for the necessity of chastisement for a person who has not stopped his bad behavior after being rebuked in private. In such a case it is even permissible to curse him. In fact this is what was done by the prophets in the past as the Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:8) notes. We thus shown from all this, that all the prohibition involving interpersonal actions do not apply when the act is beneficial.
 

Chinuch (236): We are required not to gossip about others as the Torah says (Vayikra 19:16) "You shall not be a tale-bearer." The idea is that if we hear someone say something bad about a friend, we should not tell them "Someone is saying such and such about you" unless our intent is to prevent damage or to stop a fight....

Pischei Tshuva (O.C. 156): I want to note here that while all the books of mussar are greatly concerned about the sin of lashon harah, I am greatly concerned about the opposite problem. I want to protest about the even greater and more common sin of refraining from speaking negatively when it is necessary to save someone from being harmed. For example if you saw a person waiting in ambush to kill someone or breaking into someone’s house or store at night. Is it conceivable that you would refrain from notifying the intended victim to protect himself from the assailant - because of the prohibition of speaking lashon harah?  By not saying anything you commit the unbearable sin of transgressing the prohibition of Vayikra (19:16): Do not speak lashon harah [but] do not stand idly by when the blood of your fellow man is threatened? By not speaking up, you violate the mitzva of returning that which is lost to its owner Devarim (22:2). Now if you can understand the obvious necessity of speaking up in these cases then what is the difference between a robber breaking into someone’s house or store or seeing that his servants are secretly stealing from him or that his partner is deceiving him in their business or that another person is cheating him in commerce or that he is lending money to someone that you know doesn’t repay? How is this different from stopping a proposed marriage to someone you know is a wicked person who would be a horrible husband…. From where do we get the mistaken idea that in the case of murder, I will speak up but that it is prohibited to say anything in other situations where someone is being harmed?…

N.J. High Court: Religious Schools Can Set Their Own Employment Rules

 https://thetablet.org/n-j-high-court-religious-schools-can-set-their-own-employment-rules/

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that religious schools have the ability to make key choices about matters of faith, doctrine, and internal governance without courts getting involved. The decision comes after Victoria Crisitello, a former teacher at St. Theresa’s School in Kenilworth, New Jersey, sued the school, which is part of the Archdiocese of Newark, after telling the school’s principal that she was unmarried and pregnant.