Iran Nuclear Talks: Three Lessons From the War for Negotiators

 https://www.cfr.org/articles/better-than-nothing-deals-three-nuclear-security-lessons-from-the-iran-war

Lesson one: Military strikes are not decisive

The first lesson negotiators should draw is that air wars alone cannot counter proliferation or eliminate a nuclear program. It is possible to stall, delay, or obliterate enrichment facilities, but even a tactically effective, full-scale air war cannot destroy Iran’s vast nuclear program without ground troops.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors have not been able to access major nuclear sites since before the Twelve Day War in 2025, when the U.S. Air Force dropped the world’s largest conventional bomb on Iranian nuclear enrichment sites—creating a blackout the current conflict has only deepened and that world leaders know exposes gaps in enforcing nonproliferation.

That is why the Trump administration’s counter-proliferation-through-force approach could backfire: it encourages those who want to develop nuclear programs to hide their activities rather than adhere to the successful nonproliferation approach of diplomacy and transparency that the P5 representatives of the UN Security Council have used since the signing of the NPT fifty-eight years ago. The Iran war could have a chilling effect on inspections and international engagement among states hedging with some nuclear materials—maintaining the materials and capacity to weaponize but staying below the weaponization threshold. Iran’s nuclear program is symptomatic of inherent disparity embedded into the NPT, which does not permit countries that did not test nuclear weapons before 1967 to ever have them. But will the other states be content to live without their own nuclear weapons now?

Iran’s next steps will likely be unclear during a ceasefire or even after the war concludes. The Islamic Republic could decide to shift to a North Korean model of proliferation, hiding some activities until it decides to unveil its capabilities in the form of nuclear tests and ballistic missile firings. If NPT member states can no longer gain as much transparency into Iranian nuclear program developments because negotiations do not establish invasive inspections, Iran’s path will be less predictable. And with a new leader at the helm of the Iranian regime, its nuclear strategy could be distinct from that of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was recently killed in the U.S.-Israeli attacks.

Iran retains enough nuclear material, enriched to 60 percent capacity, for roughly twelve nuclear weapons if the regime decides to use its remaining nuclear facilities and know-how to sprint to weaponization. As IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has said, the negotiators will “have to address all of this if they want to have a comprehensive agreement” to stymie the Iranian nuclear program.