Problems are inherent when using mussar or agada as halacha

 Dr. Benny Brown wrote:

... rules are standards that determine the normative status of concrete actions, while principles determine goals that the actions are supposed to achieve.15 A person cannot perform two conflicting actions, but he can undertake different goals that may be found in conflict in particular circumstances, and nevertheless not forego any of them. These goals may be more abstract (such as ‘‘justice’’) or less abstract (such as that ‘‘no man may profit from his own wrong’’).

Yeshayahu Tishbi and Joseph Dan wrote similarly regarding the relationship between halakhah and musar: ‘‘The halakhah cuts to the minimum that the servant of God is required to do in order to fulfill his obligation to his Creator [...] The musar literature seeks not the minimum, but the maximum – the path by which man will reach the zenith of religious life, of approaching and clinging to God.’’21

Maharal (Be’er HaGolah #6): One does not always accept the literal meaning of Agada as our Sages said, “that one does not resolve apparent contradictions in Agada.” That is because it is possible that the idea of the Agada was said in a concealed manner. Therefore, there is no need to ask or resolve contradictions in Agada since by apparently clarifying one Agada a contradiction to a different Agada can be created. It is possible that the original problem was not a problem to those who understand their esoteric nature. In contrast, Halacha cannot be utilized without resolving all apparent contradictions and inconsistencies. Agada on the other hand was not created for the purpose of learning what is prohibited or permitted and therefore consistency is not required. By attempting to create consistency it is possible that problematic elements will be rejected when in fact there was never a problem in the first place to those who are experts in Agada. That is why the Yerushalmi (Peah 2:4) states that one should not learn Halacha from Agada - since it has not been conceptually clarified by the dialectic process of questions and answers…

Nodah BeYehuda (161): Even though the Yerushalmi (Peah 2:4) equates not learning practical Halacha from Mishna, Tosefta and Agada - the reason is not the same for the three. … Medrash and Agada were composed entirely for the purpose of teaching moral lessons by means of allusions and allegories. Thus, they are the source of theological information but were never intended to be used for Halacha. That is why we do not learn at all from Agada to decide practical Halacha.

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Consequently problems are created when taking mussar and agada and viewing it as halacha - as we see concerning bein adam l'chavero issues such as lashon harah or tznius.

Chofetz Chaim disapproved of the Netziv's criticism of the delegitimzing of religious maskilim and religious Zionists

 Update: Making of a Godol (Page xx)… a report by R' Velvel Kercerg that Rebbitzen Feigel Zaks, the Chafetz-Chaim's youngest daughter, told him, "Eighty percent of what they tell about [my father] is not true." I cannot help but assume that in order to bring out bluntly the idea that not everything told about R' Yisrael-Meir Kagan, author of Chafetz Chaim, is true, his daughter exaggerated the percentage of untruths.)

 Making of a Gadol (Page 409):  Furthermore, R' Shlomo Lorincz repeated in the name of R' Simhah Wasserman (son of one of the Chafetz Chaim's major disciples, R' Elchonon Wasserman) that the Chafetz-Chaim was somewhat critical of the Netziv. He disapproved of what the Netziv wrote in his commentary on Humash, HaEmek Davar in the introduction to Sefer Bereishis that the Second Temple was destroyed because "the tzaddiqim and hasidim and those who toiled in Torah study ... were not straight (yeshorim) in their general conduct. Therefore, due to the baseless hatred (sinas chinom) in their hearts, they suspected whomever they saw acting not according to their view in Fear of G-d to be a Sadducee and an epikoros. It was understood that the Netziv intended with his words about the Second Temple to find fault with the bnei Torah of his own generation  for delegitimizing the religious maskilim and the Lovers of Zion faithful whose outlook on the needs of the Jewish nation did not conform to their own. Despite his criticism, the Chafetz Chaim asked the Netziv for his haskamah on his sepher Ahavas Chesed which was published eight years later than HaEmek Davar.

Lashon harah is only prohibited when there is no benefit or to'eles

update - added more sources 9/27/13 [see  Lashon harah revisted
 Balancing the terror of lashon harah]

The main Torah source prohibiting lashon harah is 

Vayikra (19:16): Don't spread gossip amongst your people. Don't stand idly by the blood of your fellow. I am G‑d

 It is important to very  carefully study this verse  to understand what lashon harah is. The first thing to notice is that the verse is not just about lashon harah. The second verse is a command to help people in trouble or to prevent them from getting into trouble. Why are the two issues combined?

A number of commentaries have noted that this dual issue verse teaches that the prohibition of lashon harah is conditional. If a benefit results from saying the negative things that can't be obtained otherwise - then it is permitted to speak. This is known as the heter of to'eles. In fact we see that it is not a heter but it is a condition that determines whether the negative information is lashon harah. This shows that not every negative statement is in fact lashon harah.

Chazon Ish(2:133): Knowledge about a talmid chachom who shapes yiddishkeit is similar to that of an artisan. Just as one is permitted to convey accurate information about an artisan if there is to'eles so it it permitted to reveal information about a gadol if there is to'eles. Of critical importance is to be totally accurate otherwise it is slander. This implies that expressing negative information about others is relevant for those who are considered influential authorities – in order to understand the degree to rely on them.

Rabbeinu Yonah(Mishlei 24:28): Don’t be a gratuitous witness of your fellow man – ...This principle is stated in Berachos (19a), If you see a talmid chachom sinning at night, do not suspect of him of sinning anymore by the day because he will surely have repented by then. Since he has the reputation of a person who is fearful of sinning and he is upset and regrets that his lust overcame him. However if the talmid chachom is in fact a wicked person who is mistakenly thought by the people to be righteous – he is not only to be criticized to those who know how to keep quiet – but in fact it is a mitzva to publicize his deeds until they are well known to the public. That is because severe harm occurs when wicked people are honored because he will turn many away from the proper path and denigrate the honor of the righteous and encourages sinning. There is in fact profanation of G‑d’s name by honoring the wicked because some people will be aware of the sins the wicked do and will concluded that there is nothing wrong with sinning and that it doesn’t lower one’s stature (Yoma 86b)…

Rav Moshe Sternbuch(Teshuvos v'hanhagos 1:839): Question: A a teacher asks his students to reveal who did something wrong. - is this permitted? Answer: It would seem that the teacher first has to say to his student that the prohibition of lashon harah is very severe. However since this is l'toeles there is no prohibition of lashon harah. (See Chofetz Chaim 4 and the statement of the Alter of Kelm in Marpeh Lashon said in the name of Rav Yisroel Salanter with clear proofs that whatever is for to'eles is not prohibited as lashon harah). In this case it is clearly for the benefit of the chinuch of the student and therefore there is no concern that this is lashon harah. In fact just the opposite because just as there is a prohibition to speak negatively about others - there is an obligation to inform the teacher so that he is able to properly chastise the student and thus it is not considered lashon harah at all.

Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Lashon Harah 4:10):  Nevertheless if a person sees someone who has bad midos such as conceit, anger, or other bad personality traits or the person isn't concerned about studying Torah etc. then it is correct to tell his son or his students to avoid associating with such a person in order that they not learn his bad midos. That is because the basis of the prohibition of lashon harah - which applies to even if it is truth - is intent to degrade another person and rejoice in his debasement. However if his intent is to guard his fellow man from learning from his bad deeds - then it is clearly permitted and in fact it is a mitzva to convey this [negative] information to others. However in these cases and similar ones it would seem that it is a mitzva for the one conveying the negative information to explain the reason why he is saying these negative things about another person. That is so the listener will not err and assume that negative comments in general are permitted. Furthermore so that the listener will not be astonished that the speaker seems to be a hypocrite in that sometimes he prohibits lashon harah even when true (see clall 9) because it is an important mitzva to keep his children from sin. and yet he is himself is now saying negative things about others...

Chofetz Chaim (Be’er Mayim Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 9:3): Requiring that the motivation to speak rechilus is for a beneficial goal (to’eles) - doesn’t’ mean that if he doesn’t have this motivation that he is automatically exempt from communicating the necessary information to the person in danger. That is because he still has to fulfill the obligation of “not standing idly by the blood of his fellow.” This also applies to saving someone from financial loss. Look at Rashi (Sanhedrin 73a). This requirement of to’eles for permitting speaking negative words means only that he should try and force himself do it for a benefit and not because he hates the person. Otherwise he will be violating the prohibition of rechilus.

Rav Ovadiah Yosef (Yechava Daas 4:60): … In fact this is the way to understand the verse regarding lashon harah. “Do not speak lashon harah but don’t stand idly by concerning the blood of your fellow.” Even though there is a prohibition of lashon harah, nevertheless the second clause of the verse tells you that it is conditional on this not causing harm. Therefore you are obligated to inform others regarding certain matters in order to them to guard against loss and danger. This is expressed in Nidah (61a) that even though it is prohibited to listen to lashon harah but you should protect yourself from the potential danger you hear about. The Rambam (Mitzva 297) says that protecting another’s money is also included in “don’t stand idly by concerning the blood of your fellow.” … Therefore even if there is only a financial loss, one should inform your fellow man in order that he can protect himself from those who want to harm him. And surely when there is a possible danger to an individual or a group.... 

Malbim (Vayikra 19:16.41): Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow - The literal meaning of the verse is that if you see someone in danger – do not stand by but rather make a serious effort to save him…. However the association in this verse of not speaking lashon harah teaches us that even though we are prohibited to speak lashon harah, nevertheless if you know testimony that can help another - even though it involves lashon harah and breaking confidentiality – it is necessary to reveal the information and to testify. This is true even though revealing secrets is prohibited as lashon harah.

Netziv (Vayikra 19:16): Even though there is a clear prohibition in this verse against lashon harah, nevertheless this is conditional on “not standing idly by the blood of others.” In other words if you know that there is someone who wants to harm another then you are obligated to inform the intended victim and it is prohibited to stand idly by and let it happen.

Ohr HaChaim (Vayikra 19:16): The prohibition of lashon harah is conditional on whether not speaking will not cause harm to another. If you see a group that wants to kill people then you are obligated to notify the potential victims so that they can save themselves. One should not keep silent by saying that you don’t want to speak lashon harah. Thus we learn that if you don’t notify the potential victim and he is killed that you have nullified this mitzva of not standing idly by the blood of others. We learn this from the incident of Gedaliah who was warned of danger but did not pay attention to the warning.

Shulchan Aruch(C.M. 426:1): If you see someone drowning in the sea or being attacked by bandits or wild animals and it is possible to save him by yourself or to pay others to save him and yet you don’t save him or alternatively you hear non‑Jews or informers plotting to do him harm and yet you don’t inform him or alternatively you know that non‑Jews or bandits are planning to attack him and you are able dissuade them and yet you don’t or other such scenarios – you are violating “do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow (Vayikra 19:16).

Rav Elochon Wasserman (Kovetz Ha’aros Yevamos #70): ...It would seem that all that is prohibited between people (bein adam l’chavero) is only prohibited when done in a harmful and destructive manner without justification. For example regarding the prohibition of “Not hating your brother.” This is only prohibited for gratuitous hatred (sinas chinom). In other words when he is not doing anything wrong (davar ervah). However if he is doing something wrong then it is permitted to hate him. It is important to note that the reason for hatred being permitted in this case is not because of the fact that a sinful person is not considered your “brother.” Tosfos (Pesachim 113b) explains that if you hate this sinful person for another reason then you transgress the prohibition. The hatred is only permitted because of the bad (davar ervah) that you see in him. Similarly regarding the prohibition of beating another, the Rambam writes that it is prohibited only if done as fighting (derech netzoyan). This is clear from the fact that it is permitted for a teacher to his student. And this that we noted before in Sanhedrin (84b) – that is only a rabbinic restriction. And similarly concerning the prohibition of causing anguish to a widow or orphan, Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:10) writes that if it is done to teach Torah or a trade – there is no prohibition. Similarly concerning the prohibition of lashon harah, it is permitted against people who cause discord and quarrels in order to stop the fight. Similar concerning using words to cause anguish (onas devarim), it is permitted publicly criticize someone publicly if it is for the sake of chastisement. It is even permitted to publicly embarrass someone if it is done for the necessity of chastisement for a person who has not stopped his bad behavior after being rebuked in private. In such a case it is even permissible to curse him. In fact this is what was done by the prophets in the past as the Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:8) notes. We thus shown from all this, that all the prohibition involving interpersonal actions do not apply when the act is beneficial.
 

Chinuch (236): We are required not to gossip about others as the Torah says (Vayikra 19:16) "You shall not be a tale-bearer." The idea is that if we hear someone say something bad about a friend, we should not tell them "Someone is saying such and such about you" unless our intent is to prevent damage or to stop a fight....

Pischei Tshuva (O.C. 156): I want to note here that while all the books of mussar are greatly concerned about the sin of lashon harah, I am greatly concerned about the opposite problem. I want to protest about the even greater and more common sin of refraining from speaking negatively when it is necessary to save someone from being harmed. For example if you saw a person waiting in ambush to kill someone or breaking into someone’s house or store at night. Is it conceivable that you would refrain from notifying the intended victim to protect himself from the assailant - because of the prohibition of speaking lashon harah?  By not saying anything you commit the unbearable sin of transgressing the prohibition of Vayikra (19:16): Do not speak lashon harah [but] do not stand idly by when the blood of your fellow man is threatened? By not speaking up, you violate the mitzva of returning that which is lost to its owner Devarim (22:2). Now if you can understand the obvious necessity of speaking up in these cases then what is the difference between a robber breaking into someone’s house or store or seeing that his servants are secretly stealing from him or that his partner is deceiving him in their business or that another person is cheating him in commerce or that he is lending money to someone that you know doesn’t repay? How is this different from stopping a proposed marriage to someone you know is a wicked person who would be a horrible husband…. From where do we get the mistaken idea that in the case of murder, I will speak up but that it is prohibited to say anything in other situations where someone is being harmed?…

N.J. High Court: Religious Schools Can Set Their Own Employment Rules

 https://thetablet.org/n-j-high-court-religious-schools-can-set-their-own-employment-rules/

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that religious schools have the ability to make key choices about matters of faith, doctrine, and internal governance without courts getting involved. The decision comes after Victoria Crisitello, a former teacher at St. Theresa’s School in Kenilworth, New Jersey, sued the school, which is part of the Archdiocese of Newark, after telling the school’s principal that she was unmarried and pregnant. 

Views which grate on modern sensibilities:Sexual abuse is less serious than using an inaccurate commerical scale

Update:8/18/13Rape: Different perspectives through history
Update 8/1813 I was in Beit Shemesh for Shabbos. The Rav of the shul gave a drasha about Yafas To'ar based on the Ohr HaChaim (Devarim 21:11)  -  that sometimes rape is the result of spiritual attraction. He also explains the rape of Dinah in this way. This Ohr Hachaim in my opinion is inconsistent with Chazal and clearly grates on modern sensibilities. [The Ohr HaChaim mentions in about 5 places that he sometimes presents views that disagree with Chazal] I mentioned  to the rav that I was not aware of a single other commentary which expresses such a view  While he also didn't know of anyone else who gives this explaiantion - he didn't seem to understand what I found problematic with the Ohr HaChaim. [In contrst there is no mention of any spiritual significance to rape in his commentary  Bereishis 34:1 regarding Dinah and Shechem]
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Update 8/18/13 Chofetz Chaim says that the  Torah indicates that slander is worse than rape

ספר שמירת הלשון ח"ב - פרק כב

"וענשו אתו מאה כסף, כי הוציא שם רע על בתולת ישראל" (דברים כ"ב י"ט). ואיתא בערכין (דף ט"ו.) במשנה, נמצא האומר בפיו חמור מן העושה מעשה, [שעל אונס ומפתה אין צריך לתן, רק חמשים כסף, וגם אינו מתחיב מלקות, מה שאין כן במוציא שם רע]. ונוכל לומר, דזוהי כונת הכתוב (עמוס ד' י"ג), "כי הנה יוצר הרים וברא רוח ומגיד לאדם מה שחו". והינו שהאדם, כשהוא מתבונן לפרקים על עניניו, אינו מתבונן, רק על מעשיו, אבל אודות דבוריו אינו חושב כלל, כי חושב בנפשו, מה קלקול יוכל להגיע על ידי דבור, הלא הוא דבר שאין בו ממש? אבל באמת לא כן הוא, כי הקלקול שמגיע למעלה על ידי דבוריו הוא הרבה יותר ממה שמגיע על ידי מעשיו.

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I just received the following letter which raises a very important question. It seems at first glance at this gemora that either our evaluation of sexual abuse and sin is too high or that of theft is too low.

Dear Rav Eidensohn

I am just working on Yevamot (21a) and I came across this Gemara, which states that the sin of uneven measures is worse than the sin of arayot, because one can do teshuva for the latter:

Yevamos (21a)[Soncino translation and notes] For R. Levi said: The punishments for [false] measures are more rigorous than those for [marrying] forbidden relatives; for in the latter case the word used is El, but in the former Eleh. — El implies rigour, but Eleh implies greater rigour than El. Is not Eleh written also In connection with forbidden relatives? -That [Eleh has been written] to exclude [the sin of false] measures from the penalty of kareth. In what respect, then, are they more rigorous? — In the case of the former, repentance is possible; in that of the latter repentance is impossible. [Bava Basra 88b - One cannot by mere repentance make amends for robbing. The return of the things robbed must precede penitence. In the case of false measures it is practically impossible to trace all the individual members of the public that were defrauded.]

Perhaps this goes some way to explain why incest and other sexual crimes are not treated as seriously as they should be in certain communities. Firstly, the possibility of real teshuva is something which I imagine psychotherapists would challenge. But the Gemara says it is possible. And incest (or other sexual sins) are not as bad as stealing (though I know that in some communities stealing is also not considered such a serious sin).

                           Regards, 

                             D.

Artscroll answers the question based on Rashi (Yevamos 21a) that as long as a mamzer didn't result from the sexual sins it is possible to do complete teshuva. In contrast stealing from the masses when it is not known who the customers are and thus can't return what was stolen and thus can never completely repent. Thus the gemora is not saying that sexual sins are less severe than stealing but rather that the punishment from false measures is more inevitable than for sexual sins. "Thus although the arayos transgressions carry the harsher penalty (kares), the punishment for using false measures is more severe in the aspect of its virtual inevitability, due to the extreme difficult of performing proper penitence to preclude it."

Is it better to be normal or frum?

The recent discussion of Rav Moshe's bus teshuva [ see comments section here] raised an important issue which really deserves a post of its own. Is the ideal goal of an observant person to achieve normalcy - a point of stable equilibrium of various conflicting spiritual demands? Or is it to achieve the maximal level of frumkeit - with as many chumros as he can think of?

My understanding of Rav Moshe Feinstein is that he has an image of being normal and he views that as the ideal. He seems to view a stable functioning person as preferable to one who is always pushing for the extreme. Thus he indicates that a person should not seek out sexual stimulation nor should he even expose himself to  such without need - such  as having a job. But on the other hand, normal means being able to live with periodic exposure to women without losing one's spiritual equilibrium. A normal person is able to function well in a wide variety of circumstances because the balance is internal. Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky also comes to mind as being focused on being normal rather than frum.

The alternative to being normal is to focus on frumkeit. To maximize ones spiritual activities and to take these activities to the extreme. Since contact with women is spiritual harmful, one should avoid it to an extreme degree. Since Torah study is important, one should go to an extreme of hasmada - even if it messes up family relations and other spiritual goals. If davening is good - then davening with great kavanah for long times is even more desirable. Such a position is inherently unstable and difficult to maintain. It is best dealt with in large homogeneous groups where there is maximal predictability and control over the experiences one is likely to encounter. Thus focusing on frumkeit requires removing as much temptation and trials as possible to minimize the chance of failure. A person who focuses on frumkeit is playing for high stakes and also is open to high failure. If he actually sees a woman or hears an apikorus - or fails to live up to his ideal spiritual self - he can crash and be destroyed. Rav Wolbe  talks about frumkeit as an instinctive selfish urge to get close to G-d which can conflict with what G-d want you to accomplish in this world. It is interesting that the major criticism of the Musar movement is that it didn't focus on being normal. The Alter of Novardok nearly destroyed the Mussar movment by acting in an atypical fashion by locking himself in a cabin after his wife died. The Mussar movment was criticized for destroying the best and brightest in the yeshiva by encouraging an extreme examination of  the motivation for doing Torah and mitzva. As the result of realizing how far he was from the ideal, the best bachur in the yeshiva became a non-functioning despondent person.

Is it better to be normal or frum?
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Update: The following are excerpts which warn about identifying ideology with normal.

Dr. Moshe Koppel (Yiddishkeit without Ideology Tradition 2002) wrote 

First, Yiddishkeit is not simply a set of laws but rather embodies particular perspectives on all that is important. These perspectives are manifest in a web of attitudes regarding, for example, what families and communities are supposed to look like, and in a whole host of desirable character traits. These attitudes and traits were implicit in the Torah given to us at Sinai and have taken on particular forms and emphases as a result of our collective experience over the centuries. They include generosity, humility, empathy, alienation, self-deprecating humor, civility, not taking pleasure for granted, argumentativeness, skepticism, awareness of suffering, et cetera. No point in haggling about this list-what I tell you explicitly hardly matters. Such attitudes and traits are imparted from parent to child, from teacher to student, and circulate within communities in a million subtle ways, few of them explicit. Rules can be preserved in books and filed by bureaucrats. Attitudes are implicit, deeper and more defining, but they can evaporate in a fl.ash in changing cultural conditions, especially if not manifested in actions. It is the very essence of Yiddishkeit to preserve these attitudes and pass them on.

Second, every individual has personal needs, interests, talents, character traits and social attitudes. Some of these are distinctly positive or negative and Yiddishkeit takes a firm stand for or against them, but for the most part individual proclivities are simply taken for granted as the backdrop for a life of Torah. People need to eat and to marry, to work and to earn sustenance, to enjoy art and music, to interact with others and to understand them, to defend their lives and their property, to comprehend the workings of nature and to exploit them. I could try to prove to you that Tanach and Gemara are replete with stories in which these needs are assumed and taken fully for granted. But to do so would be unnecessary: you know in your bones that the satisfaction of these needs is fundamental for normal human emotional and intellectual development.

Things sometimes get sticky when certain attitudes which you think of as inseparable from your very self are consistent with the letter of the law but somehow at odds with the attitudes that your family and community are clearly trying to pass on to you. For example, your militantly nationalistic feelings might run up against a tradition of quietism and moderation which strikes you as craven; perhaps your egalitarian tendencies will be frustrated by an unambiguously hierarchical traditional society; your interest in science is liable to be curtailed by a strong focus on Iimud Torah; your exceptional artistic abilities could be discouraged as frivolous; your focus on textual and historical aspects of Gemara might put, you outside the pale of usual yeshivish discourse; your freewheeling individualistic spirituality is likely to be constricted by a tradition of discipline and conformity; your wanderlust will be frustrated by the demand to settle down and assume traditional reponsibilities.

Let me be absolutely clear: where the demands of halakha are unambiguous, you must submit to them. But how does one navigate between much less well-defined traditional attitudes and strong personal inclinations? [...]

Because educational institutions are set up more to impart book knowledge and packaged formulations than hard-to-define attitudes, they are always driven in the direction of ideology. Herein lies their failure. Neither Haredi nor Modem Orthodox institutions have succeeded in imparting, or even sustaining, the normal heimish Yiddishkeit, full of the humor, creativity and authentic yiras shamayim that simple Jews have lived naturally in communities around the world for thousands of years. To put it another way, ordinary, knowledgeable, committed Jews have customarily spoken the language of Yiddishkeit as a first language fluently and unself-consciously. Institutions have taught students to speak the language of Yiddishkeit as a second language-awkwardly constrained by poorly internalized rules of grammar. [...]

Rabbinic infallibility: Examples of Rabbis apologizing for harmful mistakes

After calling  for the rabbis - who condemned Rav "S" as a moser and drove him out of Lakewood - to publicly apologize, I realized that there  are not many well known cases of rabbis apologizing. This  is  either because rabbis rarely make mistakes or alternatively they don't want to be perceived as fallible. It is interesting to note that the Torah reports the mistakes of our forefathers e.g., Yehuda and Tamar. You can also find references in the gemora to serious errors of talmidei chachomim-  such a Kamtza and Bar Kamtza and Rav Avkulas (see below). I posted the story of . Rav Yochanon and Reish Lakish where the errors on both sides resulted in the death of both of them. However no apology resulted. Post Talmudic you have the case of Rabbeinu Yonah and the Rambam.  I would appreciate other cases - in particular a reference to the Shaloh making a mistake. There are discussions about talmidei chachomim being protected from error - but that seems to be about eating unkosher food. Any sources that a rabbi should admit error and apologize or alternatively that a rabbi should not apologize and people shouldn't mention that rabbis erred would also be helpful.

Gittin (56a): R. Johanan said: What is illustrative of the verse, Happy is the man that feareth alway, but he that hardeneth his heart shall fall into mischief?The destruction of Jerusalem came through a Kamza and a Bar Kamza; the destruction of Tur Malka came through a cock and a hen; the destruction of Bethar came through the shaft of a leather. The destruction of Jerusalem came through a Kamza and a Bar Kamza in this way. A certain man had a friend Kamza and an enemy Bar Kamza. He once made a party and said to his servant, Go and bring Kamza. The man went and brought Bar Kamza. When the man [who gave the party] found him there he said, See, you tell tales about me; what are you doing here? Get out. Said the other: Since I am here, let me stay, and I will pay you for whatever I eat and drink.He said, I won't. Then let me give you half the cost of the party. No, said the other. Then let me pay for the whole party. He still said, No, and he took him by the hand and put him out. Said the other, Since the Rabbis were sitting there and did not stop him, this shows that they agreed with him. I will go and inform against then, to the Government. He went and said to the Emperor, The Jews are rebelling against you. He said, How can I tell? He said to him: Send them an offering and see whether they will offer it [on the altar]. So he sent with him a fine calf. While on the way he made a blemish on its upper lip, or as some say on the white of its eye, in a place where we [Jews] count it a blemish but they do not. The Rabbis were inclined to offer it in order not to offend the Government. Said R. Zechariah b. Abkulas to them: People will say that blemished animals are offered on the altar. They then proposed to kill Bar Kamza so that he should not go and inform against them, but R. Zechariah b. Abkulas said to them, Is one who makes a blemish on consecrated animals to be put to death? R. Johanan thereupon remarked: Through the scrupulousness of R. Zechariah b. Abkulas our House has been destroyed, our Temple burnt and we ourselves exiled from our land.

Ta'anis (20a): Our Rabbis have taught: A man should always be gentle as the reed and never unyielding as the cedar. Once R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon was coming from Migdal Gedor,from the house of his teacher, and he was riding leisurely on his ass by the riverside and was feeling happy and elated because he had studied much Torah. There chanced to meet him an exceedingly ugly man who greeted him, ‘Peace be upon you, Sir’. He, however, did not return his salutation but instead said to him, ‘Raca,1 how ugly you are. Are all your fellow citizens as ugly as you are?’ The man replied: ‘I do not know, but go and tell the craftsman who made me, "How Ugly is the vessel which you have made".’ When R. Eleazar realized that he had done wrong he dismounted from the ass and prostrated himself before the man and said to him, ‘I submit myself to you, forgive me’. The man replied: ‘I will not forgive you until you go to the craftsman who made me and say to him,"How ugly is the vessel which you have made".’ He [R. Eleazar] walked behind him until he reached his native city. When his fellow citizens came out to meet him greeting him with the words, ‘Peace be upon you O Teacher, O Master,’ the man asked them, ‘Whom are you addressing thus’? They replied, ‘The man who is walking behind you.’ Thereupon he exclaimed: ‘If this man is a teacher, may there not be any more like him in Israel’! The people then asked him: ‘Why’? He replied: ‘Such and such a thing has he done to me. They said to him: ‘Nevertheless, forgive him, for he is a man greatly learned in the Torah.’ The man replied: ‘For your sakes I will forgive him, but only on the condition that he does not act in the same manner in the future.’ Soon after this R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon entered [the Beth Hamidrash] and expounded thus, A man should always be gentle as the reed and let him never be unyielding as the cedar. And for this reason the reed merited that of it should be made a pen for the writing of the Law, Phylacteries and Mezuzoth.

Update July 10: From Rabbi Yair Hoffman posted with his permission

Dear Rabbi Eidensohn, 

Regarding your call for Rabbinic apologies, there is a fascinating and most remarkable Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kamma Perek 7 Siman 37).  The author writes that, according to his opinion, an actual blessing should be recited at a Siyum – a completion of a Talmudic tractate.  Yes, the Maharshal - Rabbi Shlomo Luriah was of the opinion that the blessing of “SheHaSimcha B’mono” should be recited at a siyum – because “there is no greater simcha or rina before Hashem than a simcha of Torah.”  And he writes further, “And so I ruled.”

 

But then at one such party – sheer pandemonium struck.  The holy Maharshal writes, “And I pinned this terrible event on myself - for I have violated the words of the sages, who had never heard such a thing [about this new practice of reciting the blessing]..”

Now as far as what the apology does and can do..There is a fascinating Ralbag regarding the sin of Gaychazi (Malcham II 5:25) that is most appropriate here. 

 

Let us recall that Elisha the prophet cured Naaman, the general of Aram of his leprosy.  Naaman wanted to reward Elisha.  Elisha refused to take anything.  Gaychazi waited until Elisha was out of sight and ran quickly to Naaman.  He tactfully implied that Elisha required a talent of silver and two suits of clothing.  Naaman gave him two talents of silver. 

 

Later, Elisha asked Gaychazi, “Where are you coming from?” Gaychazi answered, “Your servant went neither here nor there.”  The Ralbag remarks that if Gaychazi would have admitted to the theft he would have incurred a lesser punishment.  Elisha would have told him to return the items in a manner that would demonstrate to Naaman that Elisha had not asked for anything.  Instead, Gaychazi added to his sin by not admitting his error.

It is clear from this Ralbag that when a person has erred, even if he errs grievously – his punishment is lessened if he admits guilt.  Not so with Gaychazi – he confounded his error, by not admitting.  This proved to be the cause of his complete downfall.  Gaychazi was stricken with leprosy forever onward.

I hope these mekoros are helpful.

Yair Hoffman