Chofetz Chaim: Speaking lashon harah when angry at assailant?

This post got started in the comments to a previous post  about lashon harah.

The sefer Chofetz Chaim is widely assumed to be the definitive Shulchan Aruch for knowing the halachic parameters of the prohibition of  lashon harah. The Chofetz Chaim himself was largely responsible for creating single handedly the halachos of lashon harah.  Thus contrary to most other halachos there is no clear development of discussion, analyis and psak over time from Talmud to Rishonim to Achronim. In fact aside from some mention in the Talmud and a sparse listing of 7 halachos in Hilchos De'os of the Rambam , there is no mention in the Tur or Shulchan Aruch. The Chofetz Chaim created a new category of halacha by transforming what was previously viewed as ethical prinicples discussed by Rabbeinu Yonah and other mussar seforim – into clear cut prohibitions. In addition he spent much effort showing that what was commonly presumed to be permitted speech was in fact prohibited (e.g., the heter of speaking before three described in the Talmud and Rishonim is reinterpreted and severely restricted by the Chofetz Chaim so as to be largely irrelevant). In sum, he created many halachos of lashon harah which were previously viewed as ethical values and he restricted previously heterim for speaking lashon harah.

As the Klausenberger Rebbe stated, the Chofetz Chaim viewed lashon harah as a poison gas which under no circumstance can be allowed to escape into the air. Thus he is focused not only in describing lashon harah but he also creates restrictions to minimize the possiblity of even mistakenly speaking lashon harah. In contrast the Shem m'Shmuel presents a more balanced model where not only is speaking lashon harah evil but so is not saying negative things when it is needed (to'eles) to protect others from harm. The view of the Shem m'Shmuel is apparently presumed in the responsa literature dealing with lashon harah because the added restrictions of the Chofetz Chaim are not mentioned. This is also clear from the Pischei Teshuva (O.C. 156) where he notes that the mussar seforim are strongly focused with the prohibition of speaking lashon harah but there is a worse sin – not speaking up to prevent harm to others

The sefer Chofetz Chaim is complicated and not easy to read. It is divided into two major section (lashon harah and rechilus) because he viewed these two prohibitions as being significantly different - even though there is considerable overlap and repetition in their elucidation. Both of these sections  are clarified by his commentary Be'er Mayim Chaim - to which there are also addition notes appended. Within the discussion of the halachos he frequently provides cross references to discussion in other places in the sefer which provide significant modifications and limitations to the original discussion and contributes significantly  to the complexity of the presentation. 

The question I want to address is what exactly is the sefer Chofetz Chaim? To approach this question, I will present a discussion concerning one clear and unambigious case. Is it permitted to speak for to'eles when there is at the same time their is anger or hatred towards the person being talked about? This is a very common situation which can happen when a person has been cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person. Does the Chofetz Chaim permit informing people about the abuser - if the victim is also angry?

An examination of the lashon harah section reveals in clall 10 the following words [Chofetz Chaim Foundation Translation]

Clall 10:1  If "someone" saw a person  commit a "crime" \ sin against a fellow Jew, for example, he stole something from him or withheld wages from him or harmed him, whether the victim was aware of it or not aware of it or if he humiliated the victim or caused him anguish or verbally abused him, and this "someone" knows about the incident with certainty and that the stolen object was not returned or that he did not compensate him for the harm he  caused, and that this person did not approach the victim (14) to  apologize and ask forgiveness for his sin. Even if this "someone"  was the only person who was aware of the incident, he is permitted  to tell other people what happened in order to help the victim (to  restore his loss) and to publicy denigrate the evil actions of this  person (in order that people would stay away from him and not  learn and copy his evil behavior). But all this is on condition that  this "someone" adheres to the following seven rules (listed in the  next halacha, clall 10:2).

It is clear from the above text that the permission to speak about an assailant is totally dependent on whether the seven conditions are met and if they are not fulfilled it is not permitted. I want to focus on the 5^th rule that one "may not make his remarks as a result of some prior hatred that he had for this person."

Clall 10:2: These are the seven rules:

1. The speaker must be a first-hand observer  to the incident  and what he is reporting cannot be something he heard from  someone else unless it was later confirmed as being absolutely true ;

2. The speaker must be extremely careful not to immediately  conclude that the incident had to have been a case of theft or  cheating or damages or something comparable. Instead he must  carefully consider the circumstances of the incident and then  decide whether or not the law defines the incident as theft or damages;

3. The speaker must first rebuke the sinner using language  that is gentle and non-confrontational (8). Perhaps this first  approach will be useful and will result in the sinner rectifying  his actions. If the sinner still will not listen to him, then it is  permitted to publicize the sinner's crime and the wrong that he  did to a fellow Jew. (But if this speaker knows that his rebuke  would be useless, with G‑d's help, I will explain what he must  do further on in the 7th halacha of this Kelal);

4. The speaker may not exaggerate the details o(this "crime" \ sin  any more than they actually are;

5. The speaker's remarks can only be made if his intention is to  achieve a useful outcome as we will explain further on in  the 4th halacha of this Kelal. Moreover, the speaker may not  benefit at all, G-d forbid, in discrediting this sinner, nor may he  make his remarks as a result of some prior hatred that he had for  this person;

6. If the speaker is able to achieve a useful outcome by some other  strategy that would circumvent the need to use Lashon Hara  against this sinner, then in any circumstance it is forbidden to  use Lashon Hara:

7. The speaker's remarks may not cause any additional harm  _ (to this sinner) over and beyond the punishment he would  have received had he appeared in court, been convicted by its  judges and punished to the level that the law required. Please  see a definition of these terms further on in the 9th Kelal of the  Laws of Esurei Rechilut (the 5th & 6th halachot) as that is the  appropriate place to explain these details.

The Chofetz Chaim reiterates that all 7 conditions must be fulfilled to permit speaking lashon harah.

Clall 10:5.... Understand clearly that within the context of these seven rules it makes no difference if the victimized Jew (who was robbed or  cheated or humiliated) asked the speaker to disclose the damages or  the shame that was done to him or ifhe did not ask (and the speaker  made the disclosure of his own accord), the disclosure would be  permitted. But if the speaker did not comply with the seven listed  rules, then even if he was asked to make the disclosure it would  not help (19) and the remarks would be forbidden. Even if the  speaker was a relative of the victimized Jew, the remarks would be  forbidden.

We see clearly that the Chofetz Chaim poskens that if a person's motivation is not because of desire to help others – he is not allowed to describe the bad things another has done. Therefore not only if his motivation is because of his anger at the assailant the Chofetz Chaim does not permit speaking and but even if it is anger mixed with a desire to help others.

Another proof that the Chofetz Chaim requires proper motivation to say lashon harah - even when it is beneficial is

In 10:3 the Chofetz Chaim notes
. And all of this is if the speaker is more virtuous than the offender, and does not commit the sins he is observing (and subsequently reporting). But if he (this observer) is a sinner just like him (13) and he suffers from the same sickness, meaning, he commits the same sins as the victim, then this observer is forbidden to publicize the victim's sins. Because this type of person, in publicizing the sins of the victim has no intention to do good and is not motivated by a sense of "Yir ' at Shamayim" \ a fear of Heaven. Instead this person is driven by a passion to be gleeful at the expense of someone else's suffering and degradation. The prophet Hoshea
addressed this mindset when he said (1 :4) "and I have remembered the blood of Yizre.'el shed by the House of Yehu." Even though Yehu was fulfilling Hashem's will to annihilate the monarchy of Achav in the Valley of Yizre'el, and he was complying with the prophet's instructions, and as a reward G-d granted four generations ofYehu and his descendents kingship over the ten tribes of Israel," nevertheless, ultimately the blood he shed in killing the House of
Achav was remembered and counted against him because Yehu himself was a blatant sinner.

Be'er Mayim Chayim

(KIO/3/1)-(13) 00 ifhe is a sinner just like him: This is a quote from Rabbeinu Yonah in the 3rd sha'ar of Shaare Teshuvah at the end of section #219. Even though he wrote this law in the context of someone who is outside the category of "your brother" because of the many sins committed between himself and G-d, it is obvious that this same rule also applies here in this subject. Rabbeinu Yonah writes that this person's remarks are forbidden because his entire motivation was to rejoice at someone else's pain and degradation. We have already explained this above at the end of the 10th notation specifically from the words of Rabbeinu Yonah, that
even in matters of interpersonal "crimes" if the speaker's motivation is to rejoice at someone else's suffering, then the remarks arc forbidden. 

Concerning the issue of being motivated by anger, the Chofetz Chaim notes in his discussion of rechilus that there is a major dispute between the Taz and the Sma whether one can defend another person by hitting the assailant when your motivation is from anger. The Sma say you can not while the Taz says it is obvious when helping another it doesn't matter what the motivation is. The Chofetz Chaim concludes that there is a dispute regarding hitting but for lashon harah even the Taz would agree that you can't speak lashon harah to benefit others if you do it from anger. He notes that is because it prevents the fullfilment of the conditions - in particular the sin will be exaggerated when the speaker is angry.

(ספר באר מים חיים - הלכות רכילות - כלל ט
(כח)

[הגה"ה - ודע דמה שכתבתי בפנים שלא יחסרו הפרטים הנ"ל, לכאורה הפרט הג', והוא שלא יעשה זה הדבר מצד שנאה, לא שייך רק לדברי הסמ"ע בח"מ בסי' תכ"א סקכ"ח, ע"ש שכתב דהיכא שהוא מצד שנאה אין נפטר במה שהוא מציל עי"ז את חברו, אבל לדברי הט"ז שם בד"ה כדי, שכתב כיון דהוא עושה מצוה בזה אין נפקא מינה בכונתו, לכאורה לא שייך הפרט הזה. אולם באמת כד דייקת גם הט"ז מודה דצריך כאן גם הפרט הזה, דאם יעשה הדבר מצד שנאה לא יושלמו גם שאר הפרטים, דבודאי יחשוב הדבר תיכף לענין רע ויגדיל העולה, ולא יסתכל גם כן אם יצא על ידי סיפורו יותר מכפי הדין, משא"כ בענין דמיירי הט"ז שם

However concerning rechilus the Chofetz Chaim does add a leniency that it is enough that the person tries to force himself to do it for benefit. In that case even though he can't remove the anger from his heart it is permitted to speak rechilus because of the need to fulfill the mitzva of not standing idly by the blood of another. Since the Chofetz Chaim states this leniency only in regards to rechilus and not lashon harah - it must be that it only applies to rechilus. Furthermore it is clear that if the person does not try to remove the anger - that it would be forbidden to speak lashon harah - even for beneficial reasons.

רכילות כלל ט' במ"ח ג''

ג) רק לתועלת. ה...ואין כוונתנו בפרט זה, דאם איננו מכוין לתועלת הוא פטור ממילא מלספר מחמת חשש איסור רכילות, דהלא לא תעמוד על דם רעך כתיב, ואף בענין ממון .... אך כונתנו שיכריח את עצמו בעת הסיפור לכוון לתועלת, ולא מצד שנאה, כי על ידי זה יגנדר על עצמו ממילא איסור רכילות.

In sum, the Chofetz Chaim says lashon harah even for helping others is not permitted unless 7 conditions are fulfilled. One of them is that the motivation needs to benefit others and not because be out of anger. (And in 10:3 the person speaker can not have transgressed the same sins as the perpetrator because his motivation would be wrong) If lashon harah - even if it serves a benefit but it is spoken out of anger or motivation other than being helpful - it is forbidden according to the Chofetz Chaim. Furthermore in the responsa literature these seven conditions of the Chofetz Chaim are not mentioned. Rather it says that speaking lashon harah for benefit (to'eles) is permitted. Thus it would seem that the view of the Chofetz Chaim is not accepted for halacha - despite his assertion to the contrary. It seems to serve primarily as mussar regarding desirable goals to strive for - but not whether particular cases are permitted or not.[ see Dr. Benny Brown's essay on the halachicization of mussar.]

 update
Minchas Asher (Vayikra 19:16) is bothered by a similar question. He concludes
see also lashon harah is character issue not issur

We see then that lashon harah is a concern of character and therefore the speaker's intent is critical in determining whether his words constitute lashon harah. With this principle we can understand the rule that whatever is spoken beneficially does not violate the prohibition of lashon harah – as stated by the Chofetz Chaim (Lashon Harah 3:3). In general we know that there are times when Torah prohibitions are set aside e.g., a positive commandment sets aside a negative one and more severe mitzvos displace lesser mitzvos etc. However this is different because lashon harah is not being displaced when the words are said beneficially. As we stated the prohibition of lashon harah is dependent upon whether it is a bad character trait. Therefore whenever the speaker's motivation is for the good and for benefit of his fellow man and not to hurt him – there is absolutely no issur of lashon harah. It is not that is is being displaced – it doesn't exist! If you examine the matter well it is clearly the correct explanation.

Additional support that lashon harah is primarily a prohibition of faulty character comes from the Chofetz Chaim. He writes that the heter to speak lashon harah for benefit only applies if the speaker doesn't intend to debase his fellow man – but if he means to speak negatively then it is prohibited even if is beneficial. He also writes that if he speaks negatively about a sinner and he himself is guilty of that sin – he does not have a heter to speak. These two halachos seem to contradict the principle that negative speech said for benefit is permitted because it isn't lashon harah. Why should it make a difference what the speaker's intent is and whether he is righteous or not? These apparent contraditions are removed if it accepted that the foundation of the prohibition of lashon harah is because of concern for the speaker's character. 

 update

Attitude toward divorce: Contrast the OU spokesman vs UK divorce judge

OU spokesman Rabbi Dr. Eliyahu Safran  Israel National News

In the past, rather than end an unhappy marriage, a couple – two strangers occupying the same house – often lived a lifetime of misery, imposing that misery on their children even as they tried, with uncertain results, to hide their feelings and behavior from their neighbors and friends.

Such an unhappy life is simply unacceptable in most, if not all, of the Orthodox world today.

Notice, at no point have I suggested a reason for the unhappiness of the unsuccessful marriage.  Whether because the husband was an insufficient provider or because of the stress of a difficult child or any other reason is immaterial.  It really does not matter what the reason is for the failure of a marriage.  What matters is only that, despite an honest attempt by at least one of the partners to make a successful marriage and life, the marriage is untenable.

It was not bashert. 

That realization is a hard blow.  Sometimes the truth that a marriage is unsuccessful takes years to become clear.  Other times, it takes nearly no time for either the husband or wife to discover that the marriage will not work.  “Only three days into the marriage, I knew I had made a terrible mistake.” He is “controlling and belittling.”

... It is a wonder that any marriage survives and succeeds! Yet, most do. Some do not. There needn’t be any shame in that.

 ===============================

UK Divorce Judge Sir Paul Coleridge  Daily Mail

How my family (despite the odd pointed silence) taught me that marriage is worth fighting for. ...

Sometimes you’re happy because you feel as if you are winning, at other times you are depressed because things aren’t going your way. But for much of the time, if you are not careful, you are just rather bored. And being bored in today’s ‘Pass the Partner’ society can all too often lead to discontent and ultimately divorce. Anyone who has ever witnessed the goings-on inside today’s family courts will be aware of the consequences. They are a never-ending carnival of human misery. And what makes this ceaseless river of distress all the more tragic is that in many of the cases there seems to be no solid reason for the divorce to be going ahead.

Some people seem to give up on their marriages simply because their partner has not been attentive towards them or variants on that — their spouse devotes too much time to work, playing golf or is simply said not to be investing enough time in the marriage.<

Such ‘justifications’ would never have been a basis for divorce in the Fifties when the stigma attached to marital breakdown was such that divorcees weren’t allowed in the Royal Enclosure at Ascot (a restriction which, ironically, would exclude many of today’s Royal Family).

But today the process of getting a divorce has become so streamlined that it is a simple form-filling exercise, achievable in six weeks and, if all goes smoothly, at a cost of a few hundred pounds.

It is quicker and easier than getting a driving licence. However, the impact can be devastating and long-lasting, not just for the partners and children involved, but for the wider family, local community and society in general.

Unfortunately, the idea that marriage should be the gold standard is regarded as judgmental and is therefore unpopular with many of the middle-class intelligentsia.

How attitudes have changed even in the four decades since Lisa and I met through mutual friends. When we married in 1973, I was a 23-year-old lawyer, a child bridegroom compared to my 25-year-old wife to be, who was then working as a fashion writer. The differences between us went far beyond our dissimilar fields of work.

In those days I was a party-loving extrovert, while Lisa preferred the company of a few close friends.

As you might expect, we had our disagreements, which tended to result in pointed silences rather than the conflagrations favoured by some couples. But over the years our roles and the sources of tension between us have changed.

If anything it’s me who prefers a quiet night in these days, while Lisa has become steadily more outgoing.

But we have learned to work around and adjust to each other as the years have gone by — though there will always be times when things are not going well.

I think part of the point is that we  took the element of public commitment via our wedding vows  seriously.

Standing up in front of your family and friends to publicly commit to another person gives marriage a psychological stability or glue lacking in other relationships.

This is backed up by evidence that is readily available and will be published by The Marriage Foundation on our website.

The evidence I find overwhelming is that married relationships are more stable and the children of such relationships fare better.

The evidence I find overwhelming is that married relationships are more stable and the children of such relationships fare better.

It is fashionable to argue that none  of this matters, that marriage is simply one of many possible templates for a successful relationship.

But examine the background of almost every child in care or the youth justice system and you will discover a broken home.

Children from such backgrounds are, on every measure of success, less likely to achieve their proper potential and, as their life chances ebb away, the wellbeing of our whole society suffers. Even at the most mundane level, it is estimated that the financial cost to the nation of family breakdown exceeds £44 billion a year: greater than the entire defence budget

I believe that such funds could be far better spent on promoting marriage as an ideal, and in teaching people the art of making it last.<

This is what The Marriage Foundation hopes to achieve and its  remit goes far beyond the younger generations.

In recent years there have been increasing numbers of older couples who have decided to break up once their children have left home.

This may seem to be a victim-less trend, but talk to people in their 20s or 30s whose parents have broken up and you will find that it is still extremely emotionally disturbing not just for them but also for the grandchildren.

To these young minds, it reinforces the idea that marriage is something you can pick up and put down as and when it suits you.

And for these older divorcees, the motivation often seems to be the fantasy that out there somewhere the ‘right’ person is waiting for them and they should grab them while they still have a chance.

We have to rid ourselves of this fantasy that we are going to find  the partner who is perfect in every way: emotionally, physically, intellectually — I’m afraid it’s just a dream. The reality is that, if you are prepared to put in the effort, you will find that the right person for you is right there in front of you — or in Lisa’s case, several purposeful steps ahead of you with a guidebook when we are on holiday.

As we have discovered after many years together, our holidays work best with an agreed division of labour. I tend to be the one who decides where we should go while Lisa does all the planning and detailed research.

That plays to both of our strengths and surely that’s what marriage is about — dancing around each other’s differences and making it work, something far less fashionable than divorce, but infinitely worth the slog.

Appreciating others for what they do for us or why they do it?

In our discussion of the Chofetz Chaim, the issue of the importance of motivation versus actions was mentioned in regards to the dispute of the Taz and the Sma. The case is one in which an assailant is hitting his victim.  The only way to stop him is to hit the assailant. Is it permitted to hit the assailant in order to save the victim from a beating? The Sema says that if you typically try to help people than it is permitted to hit the assailant to save the victim. But if typically you don't concern yourself with saving victims then it is not permitted because this time you must be motivated by hatred of the assailant and not because of a desire to help the victim. The Taz says it makes no sense that you can't help someone because your motivation is problematic. He says it is always permitted to hit the assailant when that is the only way to save the victim - and it doesn't matter what your motivation is.

Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein relates the following story. There was a man - Reuven who had developed a strong hatred for Shimon. In addition he also bore a grudge against a certain yeshiva bachur. Out of his hatred he developed a plan to exact revenge on both of them. One day he told the bachur, that there was a very distinguished talmid chachom who had a fine daughter and they were interested in him. The bachur checked out the family and it was truly an impressive family and the girl was highly praised - it was much more than he had ever hoped to aspire to. Of course he said yes. Reuven told him that he had arranged everything and gave him a time to go to Shimon's house.

When he knocked and the door, Shimon opened it and was truly puzzled as to why this young man had come to see his daughter. He knew nothing about it. It soon became obvious that Reuven was behind this and that his sole motivation was to embarrass them both. Shimon being a refined individual tried to spare the young man as much shame as possible and invited him in to talk Torah over coffee and cake. As they talked Shimon became greatly impressed with the young man - not only his Torah knowledge but his middos. He decided that was in fact what he had hoped for his daughter and suggested that the young man in fact go out with his daughter.

The relationship progressed extremely well and a short time later they were engaged. 

When Reuven discovered that his evil design had been thwarted, he decided to hide his disappointment and make the best of it. He went to Shimon, wished him mazel tov and then asked him for the shadchan fees.

Shimon was outraged, but being a true talmid chachom - he told Reuven that they should go speak to Rav Zilberstein to decide what was appropriate - since obviously Reuven had no intention of making a shidduch but only causing shame and embarrasment. But on the other hand he had brought about the shidduch.

Rav Zilberstein concluded that Reuven was obviously not the shadchan and thus did not deserve the fee. "G-d made the shidduch not you." He noted that this was comparable to Bilam going to curse the Jews and ending up blessing them. Bilam is not given credit for the blessing but he had not intent to cause benefit only harm.

According to the Taz, why shouldn't Reuven be paid for what he accomplished?

update: My concern is not choshem mishpat but the mida of hakaros hatov. Do they need to show gratitude to Reuven for what happened. It seems clear from Rav Zilberstein that there is no reason to show gratitude. 
 =============================================================

This is a post I made 10 years ago Avodah - Gratitude towards your enemy?

R' Chaim Shmuelevitz [Sichos Mussar II #42 page 117] in his discussion of gratitude mentions Shemos Rabbah (1:32) Moshe is introduced to his future father in law as "an Egyptian"

 [Soncino translation] "alternative explanation of AN EGYPTIAN: Moses can be compared to one bitten by a lizard, who ran to place his feet in the water. When he put them in the river, he observed that a small  child was drowning; so he stretched out his hand and saved him. Thereupon the child said: =91Had it not been for you, I would already have perished.=92 To which the man replied: =91Not I have saved you, but the lizard who bit me and from which I escaped, he saved you.=92 Thus the daughters of Jethro greeted Moses: ' Thanks for saving us from the hand of the shepherds.=92 Moses replied: =91The Egyptian whom I slew, he delivered you.=92 They therefore said to their father AN EGYPTIAN. meaning that the Egyptian whom this man slew caused him to come to us.  "

R' Chaim says that we learn from this that one has an obligation of hakaras hatov based upon the consequence of the action not the motivation. Therefore even though the snake and the Egyptian had not intended good but rather the opposite - the recipient of benefit is obligated to have gratitude towards that which caused the benefit.

The commentaries on this medrash have a simpler explanation. Moshe and the rescuer of the child were merely noting that they should not be  viewed as the source of the good but rather HaShem through His various agents.

Does anybody else have R' Shmuelevitz's understanding of hakaras hatov? While the Chovas HaLevavos does mention that hakaras hatov is not dependent upon the motivation of the source - but here we are talking about one's enemy. It would follow that we need to have hakaras hatov to Amalek etc for causing us to do tshuva.

רב אנס נערה בת 15 בבית כנסת

Walla

רב של בית מדרש בפתח תקווה ירצה חמש שנות מאסר בגין שורת עבירות נגד ארבעה אחים, שתי נערות ושני נערים, בהן אונס, מעשים מגונים, תקיפה והתעללות – כך קבע בית משפט השלום בעיר. בפרקליטות אמרו כי האיש בן ה-42 ניצל באופן ציני את אמונתם של המתלוננים באלוהים ובו: "ניהל אותם באמצעות כוחו המאגי כבובות על חוט".

מגזר הדין עולה כי שלושה מארבעת האחים, בן ושתי בנות, הגיעו ללמוד אצל האיש במהלך שנת 2009 שכן הוא היה ידוע בתור מי שמעניק שיעורי תורה לילדים במצוקה. אחותם הגדולה הגיעה מידי פעם לנקות את בית הכנסת המדובר. כבר בתחילה הוא החל להפעיל מניפולציה על ארבעת האחים, וטען בפניהם בין היתר שיש לו כוחות נסתרים. בהמשך הפכו ההבטחות לאיומים – שאם האחים יעזבו אותו הם ימותו, ושאם הבנות לא יפסיקו ללכת עם גופיות הן יחלו במחלות עור.

Tamar Epstein's view seems to be that divorce has no major long term impact on children

Listen to Tamar Epstein at about 39 minutes where she seems to assert that once the divorce is done children will adjust and that the damage from divorce is the initial shock which is being prolonged because of her husband refusing to divorce her. It seems clear that her  cost-benefits analysis together with her view of "painless" divorce expressed here - led her to too readily abandon her marriage without devoting proper time and effort to save it

Recent research indicates that divorce can cause lifelong damage to the children. Unexpected Legacy of Divorce by Wallerstein & Lewis     North Carolina State University  NY Times    The Telegraph     update: National Affairs The Evolution of Divorce by W. BRADFORD WILCOX

The divorce revolution's collective consequences for children are striking. Taking into account both divorce and non-marital childbearing, sociologist Paul Amato estimates that if the United States enjoyed the same level of family stability today as it did in 1960, the nation would have 750,000 fewer children repeating grades, 1.2 million fewer school suspensions, approximately 500,000 fewer acts of teenage delinquency, about 600,000 fewer kids receiving therapy, and approximately 70,000 fewer suicide attempts every year (correction appended). As Amato concludes, turning back the family-­stability clock just a few decades could significantly improve the lives of many children.

Skeptics confronted with this kind of research often argue that it is unfair to compare children of divorce to children from intact, married households. They contend that it is the conflict that precedes the divorce, rather than the divorce itself, that is likely to be particularly traumatic for children. Amato's work suggests that the skeptics have a point: In cases where children are exposed to high levels of conflict — like domestic violence or screaming matches between parents — they do seem to do better if their parents part.

But more than two-thirds of all parental divorces do not involve such highly conflicted marriages. And "unfortunately, these are the very divorces that are most likely to be stressful for children," as Amato and Alan Booth, his colleague at Penn State University, point out. When children see their parents divorce because they have simply drifted apart — or because one or both parents have become unhappy or left to pursue another ­partner — the kids' faith in love, commitment, and marriage is often shattered. In the wake of their parents' divorce, children are also likely to experience a family move, marked declines in their family income, a stressed-out single mother, and substantial periods of paternal absence — all factors that put them at risk. In other words, the clear majority of divorces involving children in America are not in the best interests of the children.

Marranos: Portuguese shul criticizes Shavei Israel and Michael Freund

El Jueves, 9 de enero, 2014 2:42 P.M., Info CIP escribió:

Dear Rabbi Daniel Eidensohn,

Shalom. 

We present the following situation regarding an organization named Shavei Israel.

On 07.01.2014, the JTA published the following news: JTA

“Portuguese priest prompts protest with Jewish museum plan

 (JTA) — The rabbi of Porto urged the Catholic Church of Portugal to block a local priest’s plan to open a museum commemorating Jewish presence in the city. Rabbi Daniel Litvak made the appeal in a letter this week to the Patriarchate of Lisbon against a plan promoted by Father Agostinho Jardim Moreira to open The Center for Jewish Memory. “It would be improper and a travesty for a Catholic priest to try to distort history and possibly benefit financially from a museum in memory of the very people whom the church expelled,” Litvak told JTA on Tuesday. Porto, which has a Jewish community of several dozen, used to have tens of thousands of Jews before their 16th century expulsion and forced conversion into Christianity. Moreira wants to open the museum inside a building that once belonged to Jewish owners before its confiscation, Litvak said. “Porto has a Jewish community with Jews from 14 nations and if anyone should be running a museum, it should be that community,” he said.

But Michael Freund, chairman of Shavei Israel — an Israeli NGO that runs a Jewish heritage center in Trancoso near Porto as part of its outreach to former Jews — offered a passionate defense of Moreira and condemned Litvak’s letter. Moreira’s project “is a welcome and long-overdue initiative, and it has won the support of Portuguese Jewry,” Freund said, adding it would help raise awareness to that community’s endurance and revival despite persecution. “It is disgraceful that Daniel Litvak has taken the inexcusable step of criticizing Father Moreira and this project, and I think his criticism is completely without merit,” Freund told JTA. (…)”

After Freund planted, 1 year ago, completely false news in the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), associating Shavei Israel and “marranos” to the 75^th anniversary of the Oporto Synagogue - http://daattorah.blogspot.pt/2013/02/portuguese-synagogue-protests-false.html; after Freund planted false information on the internet, saying falsely that Rabbi Litvak is a Shavei Israel Rabbi - http://www.zoominfo.com/p/Daniel-Litvak/16558858; after Freund planted false information in the Kashrus Magazine’s Kosher Supervision Guide, associating Shavei Israel to the Oporto kashrut (Please see attachment); after Freund, in face of so many forgeries, was prohibited from entering the Kadoorie Synagogue Mekor Haim; after all this, Freund’s new adventure is to support a Catholic priest who wants to create a Center for Jewish Memory probably to falsify history and make money from Jewish tourists and visitors. 

Of course the Center for Jewish Memory will disseminate the message that matters to Shavei Israel, which is that, even today, there are tens of thousands of marranos (crypto-Jews) in Portugal. There will also be the attempt to create, around the Center, an artificial community of false marranos, for massless conversions. 

We have already stated that it is the opinion of the Religious Committee of the Jewish Community of Oporto, as well as of reputable scholars, that there are no longer any marranos in Portugal, just as there are no longer any samurai warriors in Japan, and it is misleading to imply that there are. The matter is now one for the history books, local culture and tourism. 

In the time of Captain Barros Basto, the marranos came from families who, lost in the clouds of the centuries, separated for a long time from the entire Jewish culture, still elevated, in spirit and in truth, their praises and prayers to Hashem, practicing their ancestors’ religion in secret, at home, or in isolated places in the field and keeping Jewish matrilineal descent through the choice of spouses within the congeneric family settings. There were not mere individuals who claimed willingness to become Jews or claimed chances of having existed Jewish converts among their ancestors. 

Captain Barros Basto represented the last hope for the Portuguese marranos and died in 1961 at a time when, with the exception of the community of Belmonte, which kept the ritual traditions and the family spirit at weddings, the majority of the crypto-Jewish families from other latitudes witnessed the weakening of religious ties, the assimilation and the intermarriage with non-Jews, circumstances that were irreversibly aggravating during the following decades with the advent of the open society.

Freund knows perfectly that there are no marranos in Portugal. The last marranos were those of Belmonte. This fact contradicts his plans. But he insists. The Catholic priest is his new instrument. 

In July and August of 2013, the referred Catholic priest talked to the Jewish Community of Oporto and explained us his project to create the Center for Jewish Memory. At the time, the Community didn't know that Freund commanded the priest, so we expressed readiness to make a partnership with him, provided that the project complied with the historical and religious truth, to be protected by the Jewish Community of Oporto, by his Rabbi and his religious Committee. Faced with the negative response from the priest, the community opposed the project, as is our duty. 

It is obvious that if the intention of the Priest were the inter-religious dialogue, he would have not rejected the partnership with the Jewish Community of Oporto, nor would he be so eager to spend so much energy with the project. Today it is clear that all of this has to do with material and advertising interests on the part of Shavei Israel. 

The Jewish Community of Oporto hopes Shavei Israel finds many marranos, but in countries where they exist.

Rabbi Daniel Litvak

Religious Committee

Board of Directors

Jewish Community of Oporto

http://comunidade-israelita-porto.org/x#0

Below is the example of misrepresentation that Rabbi Litvak belongs to Shavei Israel

 

Google's automatic email invitation causes man to be jailed for violating restraining order

abc news   In what one expert on Internet privacy calls "a worst-case scenario," a Massachusetts man was jailed for sending his ex-girlfriend (who had a restraining order against him) an email invitation to join Google+. 

But Thomas Gagnon contends he didn't send it; Google did, without his knowledge or consent. 

When his ex-girlfriend received the invitation, according to the Salem News, she went to the police, complaining Gagnon had violated the restraining order by sending her the email. Police agreed and arrested him, the News reported. He was jailed then released on $500 bail.[...]

Shear noted: "Google is going through every one of your contacts and sending them an invitation, whether it's your doctor, your lawyer, your mistress, or your ex-fiancee who's got a restraining order against you." 

He called this, "a perfect example of what happens when a company oversteps its bounds."

Schlesinger Twins: Beth loses custody appeal to Supreme Court

Jewish Telegraph     BETH Alexander, the Manchester mother at the centre of a tug-of-love case in Vienna, has lost her appeal for custody of her four-year-old twins.[...]

Beth’s case is now being handled by Martin Preslmayer, who told the Jewish Telegraph yesterday that it was extraordinary a decision had been reached so speedily when appeals normally take three to four months.

He said: “The case is finally closed but Beth has the right to open a new custody case and the strategy [this time] will be different.

“Hopefully, this time she will be treated better.

“It is quite unusual that some judges not even working on that case intervened with the relevant judge in the first instance. That is information I have gained from the client but not been able to check.

“What also seems strange is that so many lawyers suddenly withdrew their power of attorney from the case without reason. [For further reading on this subject click here]

“It is unusual that some decisions took such a long time and some others, especially those not in favour of Beth, were actually issued within a couple of days.”

Dr Preslmayer added that he would be seeking a new psychologist’s report on the children.

The others seen by the court he described as “very, very questionable”. [...]

Promoting divorce with children and without serious cause: Writing a new ending for Masechta Gittin

Guest Post:

It is understandable that someone who wants out of a marriage would be happy (at least temporarily) upon believing that they are “free.”  But Barbara Sofer misses the irony in her unqualified assertion that “Joy spread throughout the Jewish world” upon the news that one such woman is “free.”  [http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/The-Human-Spirit-Free-at-last-but-how-336906]  Really?  Perhaps for those in the “Jewish world” who reject Jewish laws, customs and traditions deemed inconsistent with the values of the 1960s counterculture in which a woman’s right to divorce is absolute and the devastating effects of divorce on children are irrelevant.  In contrast, Chazel’s final word on divorce at the very end of Masechta Gittn [90b] concludes that the destruction of a first marriage is so tragic that even the mizbeach sheds tears (R’ Elazar) and that G-d despises the perpetrator of such action (R’ Yochanan).  And the Gemara is particularly forceful in decrying divorce where there are children involved (for example, Eruvin 41b and Pesachim 87b).

But some in the Jewish world apparently believe the Gemara’s approach to be outdated, and have written a happy new ending to Masechta Gittin in which mourning is replaced by pure joy, and condemnation by legitimization: “Though marriage can offer a rewarding path to personal growth, it is important to remember that it cannot provide a secure or permanent status. Many people will make the decision between marriage and singlehood many times throughout their life. Divorce represents part of the normal family life cycle. It should not be viewed either as deviant or tragic, as it has been in the past. Rather, it establishes a process for ‘uncoupling’ and thereby serves as the foundation for individual renewal and ‘new beginnings’.” [A distillation of “modern” high school and college textbooks by Barbara Defoe Whitehead, “The Experts' Story of Marriage.”]
The women in both “agunah” cases much discussed on this blog and in the general media would have each received a get long ago if they been willing to be reasonable regarding custody arrangements, or at least acted in good faith. Instead, they, and the rabbonim backing them, have decided to turn their cases, which could have been and should have been treated as private matters, into very public debates (carried out in the likes of the New York Post, New York Times, Washington Post, etc.) about completely uprooting Jewish Law and tradition regarding the role of family and the fundamental definitions of marriage and divorce.

Even if one believes that these women should not have been expected to stay in marriages that they wanted out of for whatever reason, it is hard to see any reasonable argument that either had what are generally considered serious cause (domestic violence, substance abuse, infidelity, or even an unwillingness of their spouses to work on their marriages) to destroy their families, especially given that each had just been blessed with a child. Rather, after being married for a year or two, they found themselves being miserable post-partum and felt incompatible with their spouse. Indeed, that is the whole point. They have chosen, with the encouragement of the rabbonim backing them, to become poster children for the worldview that the decision to divorce should not be regarded in Judaism as deviant or tragic, but as the foundation for a woman’s absolute right to seek individual renewal and new beginnings. And each must have full custody of the children because her decision to divorce must not come with unwanted consequences such as recognizing that the children should be allowed to have significant relationships with their fathers.

Remaining silent - when it is required to speak - causes the same spiritual damage as lashon harah

The Klausenberger Rebbe explained the reason behind the Chofetz Chaim's great dread of speaking lashon harah as that one needs to view it spewing a nerve gas into the environment. Chofetz Chaim  clearly feels that it is better to err in not speaking rather than causing the great destruction if you mistakenly speak lashon harah. Fear of lashon harah combined with fear of mistakenly saying lashon harah effectively produces a very strong bias towards silence.

I just found this Shem M'Shmuel who has a different view. He asserts that remaining silent when one needs to speak up e.g., child abuse, fraud, or poor shidduch  - produces the same spiritual damage that saying lashon harah does. Consequently you are not safter remaining silent and being machmire when ever there is a doubt. He thus is claiming that there is no safety in silence and one must speak - even if you risk speaking lashon harah - when there is a to'eles to speak.

שם משמואל - פרשת וישב - שנת תרע"ז

ויש לומר נמי ביוסף כי השתיקה והעדר הדיבור במקום שראוי לדבר נחשבו לו כפגם דיבור וכלה"ר וכמלה בישא, וזה עצמו הביאו להביא דבתם רעה אל אביהם בפועל ממש כי עבירה גוררת עבירה. אף כי גם בזה לא היתה הכוונה ללה"ר ולעבירה ח"ו, אלא שאביהם יישירם, מ"מ לצדיק כביר כזה גם זה נחשב לחטא וכמו לה"ר ממש. ולפי"ז י"ל דגם הא דקלקול ירבעם לא ממנו הי' אלא מן הקלקול הקדום של יוסף הצדיק שלרגלי מעלתו נחשב, לקלקול ועבירה, ועדיין לא נתקן לגמרי עד עשרה הרוגי מלכות כידוע, קלקול זה המעט שבשורש שהוא ענין פירוד והבדל, כאמרם ז"ל (ערכין ט"ז ע"ב) הוא הבדיל וכו' לפיכך אמרה תורה בדד ישב, פרה ורבה בענפים עד שבירבעם שהי' מזרע יוסף משכהו לקלקול גמור ופירוד וקיצוץ בנטיעות, כמו שהאריך רבינו בחיי (בפ' ויצא) מענין חטא ירבעם. ואף שחטא בבחירתו הרע, דאל"ה לא הי' עליו עונש, כי השכר והעונש תלויים בבחירה, מ"מ כבר נסתלקה השמירה העליונה של רגלי חסידיו ישמור ולא יאונה לצדיק כל און, והי' החטא שבשורש מושך אותו לרע, ושוב אין תימה מה שאדם גדול כמוהו נלכד בפח זה:

ולפי האמור יש ליתן טעם מה שהמלך הראשון קודם דהמע"ה לא הי' מזרע יוסף, אחר שזרע יוסף הי' אז עלול לחטא ואמרו ז"ל ראוי' היתה מחלוקתו של ירבעם להיות בימי שבע בן בכרי, אלא שא"כ לא היתה מתיסדת מלכות דוד ולא הי' נבנה ביהמ"ק ע"כ נסתלקה עד ימי רחבעם, כ"ש אם הי' המלך הראשון מזרע יוסף, ובאשר הי' עלול לחטא הי' נשחת ח"ו כל הענין של מלכות ב"ד ובנין ביהמ"ק, ע"כ ניטלה אז המלוכה מזרע יוסף וניתנה לזרע בנימין שגם הוא מזרע רחל וגם הוא ראוי לענין זה כנ"ל:

והנה ענין שתיקה במקום הראוי למללא שנחשב לפגם הדיבור, מצינו נמי ביהודה שהורידוהו אחיו מגדולתו כשראו בצרת אביהם אמרו אתה אמרת למכרו אילו אמרת להשיבו אל אביו היינו שומעים לך. ולכאורה אינו מובן מה קושיא היתה להם עליו יותר מעל עצמם, ונימרו אינהו לנפשייהו שחשבו שימות תחתיו בבור ברעב ובצמא. אך לפי דרכנו יובנו הדברים ששתיקה במקום הראוי לדבר נחשבת פגם הדיבור וכמו לה"ר שמבדיל ומפריד בין איש לרעהו. ובאשר תעודת המלך היא לאחד ולחבר את העם וע"כ נקרא מלך בשם עוצר כמ"ש (שמואל א' ט' י"ז) זה יעצור בעמי, הנה זהו היפוך מדת המלוכה, וע"כ הורידו את יהודה מגדולתו באשר חשבוהו לפוגם במדת המלוכה, וכמו שאיתא במפרשים הטעם בהא דאמרו ז"ל (יומא כ"ב ע"ב) שאול באחת ועלתה לו דוד בשתים ולא עלתה לו, כי חטא שאול הי' בענין המלוכה ובאשר פגם במלוכה נסתלקה ממנו המלוכה, אבל חטאו של דוד לא נחשב לחטא בענין המלוכה, ע"כ די הי' לו עונש אחר, כן נמי באשר חשבו ליהודה פוגם בענין המלוכה ע"כ הורידוהו מגדולתו:

ולפי האמור יש לפרש הפלוגתא דרב ושמואל אי קיבל דוד לה"ר, דאלו ואלו דברי א"ח. דכמו שאמרנו לעיל בענין יוסף דמקלקול מועט בשורש פרה ורבה בענפים וזה משך את ירבעם לחטא, כן נמי יש לומר בענין יהודה, ששתיקתו של יהודה במקום הראוי לדבר גרמה לדהמע"ה למשוך אותו לקבל לה"ר, אבל לא ממנו הי' לקבל לה"ר כי הי' איש מרכבה ולבו חלל בקרבו, ולא הי' מעותד אף לשגגה קלה אפי' שראה במפיבושת דברים נכרים כבש"ס שם, אלא מחמת מעט דמעט הפגם שבשורש דהיינו יהודה שבשבילו הורידוהו מגדולתו זהו שגרם למשכהו לשגגה קלה כזו לקבל לה"ר מציבא, וא"כ מר דאמר לא קיבל דוד לה"ר דיבר ממהות דוד המלך ע"ה בעצמו, ומר דאמר קיבל דוד לה"ר מדבר מגרם הפגם בשורש, ומ"מ ניכרת מעלת דהמע"ה ממה שאנו רואים בירבעם דמעט דמעט פגם שבשורש הביאו לחטאים גדולים מאד ועבירה גוררת עבירה חמורה הימנה, אבל בדהמע"ה לא היתה ביכולת ההמשכה מחמת הפגם שבשורש למשכהו אלא לשגגה קלה כזו שקיבל לה"ר אחר דחזי בי' דברים נכרים, וניכר יתרון אור מן החושך:

The Eidah finally severely criticizes the Sikrikim

bhol

פרסום ראשון: לראשונה תוקפת 'העדה החרדית' את פלג ה'סיקריקים', שבוע לאחר שאנשי הפלג הקיצוני ניסו לחבל בעצרת של 'העדה'.

הבוקר (חמישי) מתפרסמת בעמוד הראשון של הבטאון 'העדה', הודעה רשמית של הנהלת 'העדה החרדית', המגנה את הסיקריקים.

לפני שבוע, בערב ראש חודש שבט, נערכה עצרת תפילה ברחבת בניני זופניק בירושלים, ואנשי הסיקריקים ניסו לחבל בה בשל השתתפות הראב"ד הגר"מ שטרנבוך. הללו שפכו באזור שאריות של דגים מרקיבים וגרמו לבאשה עזה באזור העצרת.

תחת הכותרת 'זעקה גדולה ומרה' נכתב: "אוי לו לדור שכך עלתה בימינו שכמה יצאו אנשים בלי עול, קומץ קטן של יהירים עזי פנים, ריקים ופוחזים משולי המחנה, לחבל כרם בד"צ עדתינו החרדית שיסודה בהררי קודש ובראשה עומדים רבותינו חברי הבד"ץ".

What does it mean that the Torah is the greatest mitzvah?

 Guest Post:

When I was becoming frum, I learned about mitzvos. They were the big challenge: shabbos, niddah, kashrus. Now all I hear about it Limud Torah, as if it's the only mitzvah. I hear often, Limud Torah is the greatest mitzvah. What's the source for this I ask people. They say, "Talmud Torah c'neged culam." This doesn't seem a good source. Cneged doesn't mean greater. It doesn't even mean equal as "shekul" should be a better word for that. R' Joseph Soloveitchik said  "Talmud Torah c'neged culam" doesn't mean Torah is greater than mitzvos but it teaches us about mitzvos, helping us to do them.  (The Rav Thinking Aloud, p. 69) This explanation goes better with the word cneged. Additionally, there are other statements of chazal such as "tzit tzit are equal to all the other mitzvos" and "yishuv ha'aretz is equal to all the other mitzvos." I asked a Rav recently who told me the source is a posuk somewhere that says "the purpose of the world is Torah study." But the Vilna Gaon, even shelaimh, 1, says the purpose is to fix middos.

So is there a source for this idea that Torah study is the greatest mitzvah?

I find the whole concept of Torah study as everything a tremendous turnoff considering I have to spend 65 hours a week earning a living and I start wondering why I'm working so hard to keep mitzvos when they are not important.

New perspectives - what's wrong with TED talks? Benjamin Bratton

Move On - Shua (A Victims Response To Sexual Abuse)