Hirsch: Daas Torah & Agudas Israel

Prof Alan Mittleman ( The Politics of Torah- History of Agudas Israel page 85): In Hirsch's view, the constitutional centrality of Torah implies a republican political philosophy. The stress on lay participation in Torah study means that no religious profes­sionalism - the clergy model of Christianity which he blames the Reform Jews for importing into Judaism—is acceptable." The decisions of the rabbi and the elected officers are accepted as authoritative only when the people are imbued with Torah. If the people are not steeped in Torah, the officers elected by them will lack discernment and the rabbi's decisions will bescorned. Hirsch interprets the rabbinic maxim, "raise up many students" (Avot 1:1) as a rule for rabbis: make yourselves superfluous, when all are full of Torah, your leadership will be unnecessary."

A number of strands come together here. What Hirsch is  proposing is a complete sublimation of the political dimensions of communal life in a system of sacred administration.  The sovereignty of the Torah, the total identification of any  authoritative public decision with the dictates of the Torah, subsume the sphere of political action into the routine of  administration. Hirsch seems to envision, like other nine­teenth century thinkers ,the replacement of politics by ratio­nal administration. Hirsch’s is a liberal utopianism, albeit rooted  in an incipient tendency of the Jewish political tradition, in  full flower. The social reality of the Jews can be ordered  according to the sacred ideas of the text as it has been rationally explicated by the sages and their followers. The  Religionsgesellschaft is to be the embodiment and the model  for this subordination of the uncertain world of politics to the  certainties of the sacred canopy.

It is interesting to note that Hirsch minimizes the role of  rabbinic authority. His view points in the opposite direction  from the Eastern European Orthodox elevation of “ daat  Torah,” the application of charismatic rabbinic authority to  contemporary political questions." Hirsch does not present the rabbi as a kind of oracle, but rather as representative of the  community by expressing those truths of which everyone is  (or should be) aware because they underlie the community's consensus. As in the late medieval kehillah, the rabbi's authority is strictly derivative. It depends on the will of the com­munity board, on the one hand, and his demonstrable competence in legal matters, on the other. Appeals to a supra-rational  charism are out of order.

Hirsch employs what we have termed an empirical or historical model of Jewish community. Drawing perhaps from the social contract tradition of Rousseau, he understand Israel and its public institutions to be a product of decision and choice. The people band together and form authoritative insti­tutions in order to better fulfill the Torah (which they freely accepted) than they could have on their own. The Torah is phenomenologically primary. The community is derivative and instrumental. Yet once composed by covenant or contract, the community has the right to compel its members to continue to acknowledge the basic norm of their collective enterprise. The tradition, according to Hirsch, values mutual compulsion for the public good." Rousseau's tendency toward maximal consensus and his thick view of the common good, expressed in his notion of the volonte generale come to mind here."