Thursday, July 31, 2025

Trump tirade against Grassley irritates Republican senators

 https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/5428518-gop-senators-defend-grassley

Republican senators were appalled by President Trump’s rough treatment of 91-year-old Sen. Chuck Grassley (Iowa), the Senate’s most senior Republican, on social media and are pushing back on Trump’s attempts to squeeze the senator into abolishing an arcane procedure known as the Senate blue slip.

GOP senators were not pleased that Trump piled so much pressure on Grassley, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to get rid of a long-established Senate tradition. Trump piled on by reposting on Truth Social posts accusing Grassley of being a “RINO” and “sneaky” and standing in the way of Trump’s agenda.

Nicolle Wallace reacts to Trump saying Epstein ‘stole’ people from Mar-A-Lago

Wednesday, July 30, 2025

Lashon HaRah – Asking Students to inform on others

Igros Moshe (YD II #103) Question: Is it permissible for a teacher to ask his students to inform him  who did something wrong? Answer  This is a disgusting thing since it causes that they are lenient about speaking lashon harah. This is similar to what G-d said to Yehoshua “Am I an informer?” If this is asked for the purpose of chastising the student for pure reasons in order that the misbehaving student  will be punished and reform his ways it might be permitted. But that is relevant where the student takes the initiative for the sake of a fellow student and not where the teacher demands that the students inform on the perpetrator. Such is disgusting even if the students are great Torah scholars. Thus for us it can not be considered pure motivation for adults and surely not for children. 

Igros Moshe (YD II #103) Question: Is it permissible to punish students  in a manner that interferes with their Torah studies? Answer It is certainly not permitted since it is definitely harmful to them while the possible benefit is  highly doubtful. Therefore a different punishment should be used

Igros Moshe (YD IV #30.1) Question: Explaining why asking students to inform on each other is disgusting an d encourages them to be lenient about lashon hara when it seems it is a useful request? Answer  I said it is permitted if done solely for giving proper chastisement and only if the student takes the initiative to inform the teacher to properly chastise the misbehaving student. When the teacher demands that they inform he is being lenient with the severe prohibition of lashon hara. The teacher can explain the seriousnouss of the misbehaving even without punishing the misbehaving student. Even if he can’t he still is not allowed to encourage lashon hara 

Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos VeHanhagos 1:839)  Question: If a teacher tells his students to inform him who misbehaved can they tell him? Answer It seems to me that the teacher first has to explain to them that the sin of lashon hara is a very serious sin. However if the information serves a useful purpose it is not considered lashon harah. In this case since it is for the good of the proper education of the student, thus there is no problem of lashon harah. In fact the opposite is true. Just as it is prohibited to speak lashon harah about another person, there is an obligation  to inform the teacher so that he can properly chastise  and this is not lashon harah at all. I heard that this is described in the Igros Moshe as a disgusting thing and that it causes the students to take the prohibition of lason harah lightly. I don’t see that there is such a concern. Nevertheless the teacher needs to explain to the children what constitutes lashon harah and that the present case is not lashon hara since it is for a beneficial purpose. 

A Critical Examination of Garnel Ironheart’s Approach to Torah and Torah Gedolim A Guest Post

 Conclusion

Garnel Ironheart’s approach to Torah and Torah Gedolim is deeply flawed, characterized by a dismissive attitude toward rabbinic authority, selective engagement with sources, and a divisive tone that undermines communal unity. His prioritization of individual reasoning over established psak, coupled with a tendency to trivialize tradition, risks eroding the sanctity of Torah scholarship. While he raises valid concerns about excessive stringencies, his critiques lack the nuance and respect exemplified by Gedolim who navigate these challenges with humility and rigor. For those seeking a deeper connection to Torah, Ironheart’s writings offer a cautionary tale of how skepticism, when unchecked, can lead to a fragmented and diminished understanding of Jewish tradition.

A Critical Examination of Garnel Ironheart’s Approach to Torah and Torah Gedolim

Garnel Ironheart, a blogger known for his outspoken commentary on Judaism, Israel, and politics, presents a perspective on Torah and Torah Gedolim that often diverges from traditional Orthodox frameworks. His writings, as seen on his blog, reveal a pattern of skepticism toward established rabbinic authority and a selective approach to Torah interpretation that raises significant concerns. This guest post critically examines Ironheart’s methodology, arguing that his approach undermines the integrity of Torah scholarship, dismisses the wisdom of Torah Gedolim, and promotes a fragmented view of Jewish tradition that risks alienating adherents from the broader Orthodox community.

Disregard for Rabbinic Authority

Ironheart’s writings frequently challenge the authority of Torah Gedolim, portraying their rulings as overly rigid or outdated. For instance, in his discussion of halachic practices, he suggests that contemporary observance is burdened by excessive stringencies (chumros) and customs (minhagim) that complicate adherence to Torah law. He nostalgically references a simpler era of Jewish practice, implying that modern rabbinic interpretations have unnecessarily encumbered religious life. This perspective dismisses the nuanced development of halacha, which Gedolim like the Chazon Ish and Rav Moshe Feinstein have meticulously preserved through rigorous analysis of Talmudic sources and responsa. By framing their contributions as obstacles, Ironheart undermines the scholarly depth that ensures halacha’s adaptability and relevance.

Moreover, Ironheart’s critique of specific rabbinic figures, such as his remarks on Rav Hershel Schachter’s opposition to women wearing tefillin, reveals a tendency to prioritize personal reasoning over established psak (halachic rulings). He champions a form of “evidence-based” halacha, likening it to modern methodologies like Evidence-Based Medicine, which suggests a reliance on individual analysis over deference to Gedolim. This approach risks reducing the complex interplay of tradition, precedent, and communal consensus to a mere academic exercise, ignoring the spiritual and historical weight of rabbinic authority. By elevating his own interpretations, Ironheart implicitly questions the legitimacy of Gedolim who dedicate their lives to preserving Torah’s sanctity.

Selective Engagement with Torah Sources

Ironheart’s treatment of Torah texts further highlights his problematic approach. He frequently engages with Torah and Talmudic sources selectively, using them to support his arguments while dismissing interpretations that conflict with his views. For example, in addressing the Documentary Hypothesis—a theory he rejects—Ironheart argues that textual irregularities in the Torah serve as hints to the Oral Law, a position aligned with traditional commentators like Rashi and the Netziv. Yet, his dismissal of academic critiques as mere “apologetics” reveals a lack of intellectual rigor. Rather than engaging with scholarly challenges to explore their implications, he summarily rejects them, suggesting a reluctance to grapple with complex questions that might challenge his worldview.

This selective engagement extends to his discussions of halachic disputes. In posts addressing issues like the Samaritan Torah or tikunei Sofrim (scribal corrections), Ironheart acknowledges minor textual variations but insists they lack halachic significance unless they alter legal outcomes. This criterion, while pragmatic, oversimplifies the intricate relationship between the Written and Oral Torahs. Gedolim like Rav SR Hirsch emphasize that every letter and nuance in the Torah carries divine intent, a principle Ironheart glosses over in his rush to minimize textual discrepancies. His approach risks trivializing the sanctity of the Torah’s text, reducing it to a functional document rather than a divine blueprint.

Erosion of Communal Unity

Ironheart’s writings often promote a vision of Judaism that prioritizes individual interpretation over communal cohesion. His critique of Chareidi practices, such as separate seating on El Al flights, mocks the concerns of a significant segment of the Orthodox community. By framing such practices as excessive, he alienates those who adhere to stricter interpretations, fostering division rather than dialogue. Torah Gedolim, from the Rambam to the Vilna Gaon, have consistently emphasized the importance of communal unity in preserving Jewish identity. Ironheart’s dismissive tone undermines this principle, encouraging a fragmented Orthodoxy where personal preferences trump collective responsibility.

Furthermore, his commentary on social issues, such as his critique of “frummer than thou” attitudes, often veers into caricature. While he rightly points out the dangers of performative piety, his blanket generalizations about observant Jews—particularly those in stricter communities—lack nuance. This approach contrasts sharply with the measured critiques of Gedolim like Rav Yonasan Rosenblum, who address communal flaws while affirming the value of diverse practices. Ironheart’s failure to engage constructively with differing perspectives risks alienating readers who might otherwise benefit from a more balanced discourse.

Undermining the Sanctity of Tradition

Perhaps most concerning is Ironheart’s tendency to question the sanctity of longstanding Jewish traditions. His nostalgic references to a “simpler” Judaism, free from modern complexities like muktzeh or tumah and taharah, betray a misunderstanding of how halacha evolves to meet contemporary needs. Gedolim have historically adapted Torah law to new realities, as seen in the responsa of the Chatam Sofer, who navigated the challenges of modernity while upholding tradition. Ironheart’s suggestion that such adaptations complicate observance ignores the careful balance Gedolim strike between innovation and fidelity.

Additionally, his casual tone when discussing sacred concepts—referring to Torah study as less rigorous than secular pursuits or mocking Chareidi sensitivities—diminishes the reverence due to Torah and its scholars. This contrasts with the approach of Gedolim like Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, who combined intellectual rigor with profound respect for tradition. Ironheart’s flippant style risks normalizing a cavalier attitude toward Torah, potentially leading readers to undervalue its divine origin.

Most Americans disapprove of Israeli military action in Gaza

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/most-americans-now-disapprove-of-israeli-military-action-in-gaza-gallup-poll/ 

A new Gallup poll finds that about six in 10 US adults disapprove of the military action Israel has taken in Gaza, up from 45% a month after the Hamas onslaught of October 7, 2023, which sparked the war.

The poll also sees Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu receiving the most negative rating in terms of his favorability in the US since he was first included in Gallup polling in 1997.

The rising disapproval is driven by Democrats and independents, while Republicans remain largely supportive of both Israel’s military actions and Netanyahu.

Esrog for children - Obligation?

Igros Moshe (YD II #104)  The common minhag is not to buy an esrog and lulav for a child. 

Igros Moshe (OC III #95)  Question Concerning the obligation of chinuch for the mitzva of lulav and esrog. The gemora (Sukkah 46b) says not to buy 4 species and give them as a present to a child for  the first day of Sukkos  even after he has used it on the first day of Sukkos since that makes it the possession of the child and he is required to be the owner of the lulav and esrog the next day to say the beracha  because of the uncertainty of the status of the day. A child can acquire but not transfer ownership to others. Now, there is a dispute on this issue. Some say  that one can give the lulav and esrog to the child without transferring ownership, and that this suffices to satisfy one’s obligation of chinuch. This is so even though the child performs no mitzvah and actually makes an unnecessary blessing; since for the sake of chinuch it does not matter  whether the mitzvah has actually been fulfilled by the child.  It is sufficient that the child thinks they are performing a mitzvah. Others such as the Magen Avraham says this is not sufficient and he must actually do the correct mitzva. The Mishna Berura says that according to the latter view the Shulchan Aruch says that a parent should hold the four species together with his son to enable the parent to say a beracha the next day. However in such a case the child has not done the mitzva since he didn’t own the lulav and esrog and the father did not do the mitzva of chinuch. Nevertheless many other Achronim hold this way. It appears that Shulchan Aruch agrees with this too. Since he says that the father is required to buy an esrog and lulav for his child. The reason that in Europe they were lenient was because of the poverty which prevented the purchase of an esrog anf lulav  for every child. It was not possible even for most adults to have their own esrog and lulav, and instead they took turns using the community’s esrog and lulav and reciting the blessing over it, and were not able themselves to do the wavings of the lulav during hallel either . In fact it is best to be strict in this matter and especially since in America it is possible to acquire them cheaply everyone should buy a set for each child. 

Need to chastise children

Igros Moshe (E.H. IV #68): You and your wife have such great stress from raising your children that you beat them. However it is obvious to everyone that there is absolutely no beneficial purpose in beating them – in fact it makes raising them much more difficult. Therefore it is an irrational behavior caused by nerves and because of this you cannot handle the stress and you do this crazy behavior of viciously beating your small children without any rationale. You are fully aware that you are transgressing a Torah prohibition every time you hit them because it is clearly not justified educationally. Furthermore these beating from rage are without any limit and are just an attempt to dominate them. It is also possibly dangerous because you don’t avoid hitting them on places of the body which are very dangerous to the child. Consequently I give you have permission to use birth control …for two years…This permission also is granted because of the danger to the mother. It is obvious that she is sick with nerves and all this is very stressful to her. Therefore the difficulty of raising children is possibly dangerous not only to the children but also to her life.

Igros Moshe (Y.D. II #103): Concerning the matter of a teacher who wants to punish a student that he has warned (Makkos 8b)… Certainly a teacher needs to punish a student for that which he clearly did - but not for mere suspicions. This is also true even if the teacher thinks that there is clearly circumstantial evidence that the student committed the prohibited act. It is not permitted for any person in the world to rely on his own opinion in order to punish even the slightest – unless he has clear knowledge and witnesses. Even for a matter which is only worth pennies (peruta) it is necessary to have witnesses and surely for corporal punishment which is worth more than money. In fact the teacher’s right to punish is not any different than a beis din for which mere suspicion is irrelevant to punish. However there is an apparent contradiction found in Makkos (8b) that even though a student has learned his lesson it is still permitted to punish him? But that is only if according to the student’s ability he is able to learn more Torah than he does because he is lazy and doesn’t work hard. In such a case he can be punished even though the student in fact had learned his lesson and doesn’t waste his time. But if the student does not look deeply into the matter because of his laziness then it is appropriate to punish him. This action is based only on the evaluation of the teacher because his expertise makes this something obvious to him and it is within his competence to judge these matters and it is impossible to go to beis din to judge this matter. There are obviously other matters that occur regularly to either a rav or a teacher and his students that they judge according to their understanding without bringing in witnesses and judges. These judgments that a rav or a teacher make without testimony of witnesses before a beis din is similar to what we find in Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 35:14) that in circumstances where men don’t typically go – there is an ancient decree to believe women. And similarly a rav or a teacher and his students, it is a very common that he is forced to rely on his expert opinion alone in deciding what actions to take. Nevertheless this knowledge has to be something that is clear to him and not mere suspicions. Furthermore if there are any doubt or suspicions concerning one of his students in a matter that is improper, it is necessary to first speak to him in a way that draws him closer to Torah and keeps him away from the suspected behavior. However if it clearly known to the teacher that it is necessary for the student to be punished, then it is proper to punish him calmly and not with anger or upset….

Rav Dessler (Michtav M’Eliyahu 3:360): Education of children regarding corporal punishment. Question: You have written that the latest scientific research has a fundamental problem with the use of corporal punishment. They say that it is natural that children imitate what their parents do. Consequently if they are given corporal punishment then they will learn the improper lesson that they should hit those who act against their wishes... Answer: The secular researchers are mistaken because of two fallacies in their reasoning which cause them to misunderstand the true nature of the matter. 1) The first mistake is that they think  that man is born without any characteristics at all [tabla rosa] and therefore a person’s nature is totally determined by what he learns from his environment. In other words they mistakenly believe that a man acquires his personality entirely from his surroundings. This is not true. The Torah says “At the door sin crouches”. That means that even before a child is born that there is an instinctive attraction to evil. Our Sages note that when Rivkah was pregnant with Yaakov and Esav  - when she passed the temples of idolatry that Esav pushed to be born. See what the Maharal writes on this. That means that there is an aspect of instinct without conscious awareness or thought at all which are part of a person’s nature that he is born with which he has to fight against. It is obvious of course that the social environment can strengthen characteristics and that he can in fact learn from others. However the primary characteristics do not have to be learned from others because they are innate. 2) The second mistake is that they think that it is necessary to develop independence in children. This is an incredible error. In fact not only do they no need to learn independence but they need to learn submission and humility. They will in fact learn by themselves pride and murder. But to teach them “there is no one like me” is the approach of Edom  and the approach of murder and theft.

Rav Dessler(Michtav M’Eliyahu 3:361): ...My nephew told me that he saw in a sefer that even if the child obeys his parents it is still proper to find an excuse in order to hit him at least a small amount. … the Ibn Ezra (Shemos 20:14) has written that it is not relevant to talk about the love of a peasant to the king’s daughter. Also when the king punishes the peasant with a beating the peasant never thinks about taking revenge against the king and the only lesson he learns from being punished is to be more submissive. That is because it is obvious that he is totally subordinate to the king and the king has the right to punish - but not him. Similar when it is ingrained in a child’s heart the idea that the father is the ruler and total master over him and that he is subservient to his father then because of this subservience he will never learn to hit others just because his father hits him. However our education has become corrupted because the teachers now think that they need to be friends of their students and parents also think this and everything centers on the independence of the children. Because of this, when a father beats his son, the son will retaliate and hit his father or his small brothers… However the secular researchers in their search for new understanding and their desire to destroy the principle of education which were known even by non‑Jews and whose source is in G‑d’s Torah and Prophets - produce things which bring about a reversal of all these basic principles. They are educating future Nazis and brazen people. From this we see to what degree it is necessary to be careful with all aspects of innovation of the secular researchers concerning psychology and education and it is necessary to evaluate and ascertain whether their approach contradicts the words of Chazal and the Rishonim or Jewish practice which itself is Torah. If contradictions are found it is necessary to reject complete all their filthy innovations and not accept anything from them without first examining it with sharp examination and to evaluate it in the light of Torah and Chazal and the words of the gedolim of the Rishonim and Achronim.

Pardes Yosef (Shemos 15:26): Just as we find that medical treatment used in previous generations are not applicable today because they are harmful, so too we find with psychological and educational programs. We are no longer able to utilize corporal punishment and abusive treatment as they did in the past. That is because we find that instead of producing improvements they actually weaken Jewish society. So if previous generation were not burned even with boiling water, we find danger even in using lukewarm water. Therefore treatment and education needs to be mild and patient because the words of the sages are heard when presented pleasantly (Koheles 9:17).

Shevus Yaakov (3:140): Question: A teacher became angry at his student and he strongly beat him because of the student was not paying attention to his learning. Is the teacher required to pay for the 4 types of damages he inflicted or is he exempt? Answer: It would seem obvious that the teacher is exempt from having to pay any compensation. We see in the gemora Makkos that a father who kills his son unintentionally or a teacher who kills a student unintentionally or a messenger of beis din - are not punished with exile. This gemora explicitly states that the exemption is because they are exempt because the unintended killing took place while they were involved in a mitzva. There is no basis of saying that one can't generalize from the exemption from exile to an exemption of the 4 types of damages - because it is a statute of the Torah.  Don't argue that you can't reason  that if they are exempt from capital punishment and exile then surely they are exempt from the 4 types of payment because we find in a number of places in the gemora that even though a person is exempt from exile he is obligated to pay. That is because this case is different since the gemora which provides an exemption is only when they were involved in doing a mitzva as we see in Makkos (8a-b).Therefore that is the reason we should exempt the teacher from payment since he was involved in a mitzva as we see when a person is running erev Shabbos and causes damage since he was involved in a mitzva. So surely in the case of the teacher. Furthermore the gemora compares the three cases with each other and the messenger of the court is exempt even if he damages someone as we see in Choshen Mishpat in the Beis Yosef at the end of simon 8 and is brought in the Rema in Shulchan Aruch without any dissent...A teacher who is discipline a student because of this studies is exempt from all payments of damage. This is stated explicitly in the Termas HaDeshen (#218) that it is not only a person allowed to hit his son or his student but everyone person is allowed to hit anyone under his control if there is justification for hitting him to stop him from sinning. Furthermore he says there is no need to bring the sinner to beis din before hitting him. He learns this out from Bava Kama (28) he a freed slave can be beaten by his former master because he doesn't want to leave the woman he was given as a slave who is not prohibited to him. So if it is permitted to beat another person for this reason then surely it is permitted because the student is wasting time from Torah study. So even though the halacha is that a teacher can only hit a student with a small strap which doesn't cause serious harm - nevertheless bedieved the teacher should not be punished because he didn't comply with that condition. Don't think that I am not fully aware of what the Ranach (1:111) wrote concerning an agent of beis din who hit someone out of anger and he was required to pay. The case of a teacher is different since the gemora in Taranis (4a) says that a talmid chachom becomes angry because of the Torah. In particular it causes him greater anguish when he learns with a student who doesn't pay attention to his studies. Therefore the teacher should be exempt from all payment. However in order that the teacher should not become accustomed to beating his student because it is not nice for a talmid chachom to become enraged or to lack patience - for the sake of improving the situation (migder milsa) and to make sure he doesn't violate the halacha of not hitting with more than a small strap - I rule that he must pay for the doctor to cure the student...

Aruch HaShulchan (C.M. 424:17): There are those who say that a teacher who beats his students is exempt from paying for the damage done by the beating if it was done for the sake of teaching. A proof for this is that our Sages say that a person is exempt from exile when he kills unintentionally [Makkos 8a] while doing a mitzva... such as a father who hits his son and a teacher who disciplines his student and an agent of beis din. According to this the case where the father is obligated to pay for beating his son or daughter is only when it is done without any intent for educating them - however if it is done for the welfare of the child then the father is exempt from payment. However there are those who disagree because a person is not allowed to give blows that cause bruises. This that the Torah exempts from exile in Makkos 8a is a statute of the Torah and it appears that the person died because of Heavenly Decree.  Since it is a dispute in the poskim the actual ruling depends on the details of each case according to the understanding of beis din.

Shemos Raba (2:1) NOW THESE ARE THE NAMES OF THE SONS OF ISRAEL, WHO CAME INTO EGYPT WITH JACOB; EVERY MAN CAME WITH HIS HOUSEHOLD: Thus we read: He that spares his rod hates his son; but he that loves him chastens him at times. Ordinarily, if a man's friend says to him: ' So-and-so, smite your son, he is ready even to deprive him of his livelihood. Then why He that spares his rod hates his son? To teach you that anyone who refrains from chastising his son causes him to fall into evil ways and thus comes to hate him. This is what we find in the case of Ishmael who behaved wickedly before Abraham his father, but he did not chastise him, with the result that he fell into evil ways, so that he despised him and cast him forth empty-handed from his house. What did Ishmael do? When he was fifteen years old, he commenced to bring idols from the street, toyed with them and worshipped them as he had seen others do. So when Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, whom she had borne unto Abraham, making sport she immediately said unto Abraham: Cast out this bondwoman and her son lest my son learn of his ways. Hence And the thing was very grievous in Abraham's sight on account of his son, because he had become depraved. And God said unto Abraham: Let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad a proof that Abraham was subsidiary to Sarah in the matter of prophecy. Presently we read: And Abraham rose up early in the morning, and took bread and a bottle of water... and sent her away, to teach you that he hated Ishmael because of his evil ways and sent him together with his mother Hagar away emptyhanded and expelled him from his house on this account. For otherwise, do you really think that Abraham, of whom it is written: And Abram was very rich in cattle, could send away his wife and son from his house empty-handed without clothes or means of livelihood? But this is to teach you that when Ishmael became depraved he ceased to think about him. What became of him in the end? After he had driven him out, he sat at the cross-roads, and robbed and molested passers-by, as it is said: And he shall be a wild ass of a man: his hand shall be against every man. 

A Question of Propriety

https://aish.com/386470611/ 

Zimri contented that he was not one of "them;" he was one of the leaders. He was not guilty of idolatry, only an old fashioned sin of the flesh, and his partner in this sin was not a Moavite, she was a Midianite. This last part of his defense was especially sensitive and was intended as a personal attack against Moshe: If a relationship with a Midianite woman was inappropriate, how did Moshe himself come to marry a woman from Midian - the daughter of Yitro, "Kohen of Midian?"

Even Moshe's "inaction" contains a great lesson: When it comes to leaders, we must expect not only the highest standard of personal comportment, but also the perception of decency. Any other type of behavior gives rise to cynicism, pollutes the public domain, and leads to "trickle down" immorality. Moshe, the greatest leader we have ever had, teaches us this invaluable lesson -- even when he does absolutely nothing.

Was Moses in a Forbidden Marriage?

 https://www.chabad.org/parshah/article_cdo/aid/5163568/jewish/Was-Moses-in-a-Forbidden-Marriage.htm

To question the legitimacy of someone’s marriage is to cut right to the bone. That is what happened when a leader of the Tribe of Simeon – a man we later discover1 went by the name of Zimri ben Salu – faced off against Moses over his assertion that he had a right to marry a Midianite woman. 

Rogan: Trump administration ‘gaslighting’ supporters on Epstein

 https://thehill.com/homenews/media/5425209-joe-rogan-trump-administration-epstein-files/

Rogan was one of Trump’s most vocal supporters in the media during his 2024 run for president, hosting the president for a nearly three-hour interview days before the election and endorsing him ahead of his election win.

Podcaster Joe Rogan is turning up the heat on President Trump, a onetime ally whom he accused of “gaslighting” his supporters over the controversy involving his administration’s handling of information about convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.

“This one’s a line in the sand, because this is one where there’s a lot of stuff about, you know, when we thought Trump was going to come in and a lot of things are going to be resolved, going to drain the swamp, going to figure everything out, and when you have this one hardcore line in the sand that everybody had been talking about forever, and then they’re trying to gaslight you on that,” he added.

Tuesday, July 29, 2025

Ben or Bas Nidah – marry

Igros Moshe (E.H. 4:14) Avoiding marrying a woman over concerns that she is a bas Nida as her parents are not observant Jews, even though she is modest and a good person is G-d fearing and loves Torah,. The Rambam (Issurei biah 15) and Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 4:13) state that the child of a Nida is blemished but is not a mamzer. All the commentaries state that the child is fit to marry even a cohen but the problem is he is blemished and therefore best to avoid. Therefore the question is whether to avoid marrying them because of this blemish? In particular this woman even though she is modest and a good person and refined and apparently has overcome the spiritual damage - that perhaps her children  will be bad. However it is also possible that the mother was not actually a Nida because she might have gone swimming in a lake - and even a bathing suit does not prevent her from becoming purified. Furthermore our Sages (Kallah) Rambam and Shulchan Aruch described the blemish of ben Nida as being bad personality traits such as brazenness. And even though we have authorities that a mamzer is a brazen person, we don’t rely on that to say that if the person is not brazen  he can’t be a mamzer The Nachlas Yakov said that this just means if a person is brazen he should be suspected of being a mamzer and needs investigation. However since a ben Nida is not prohibited to marry either by the Torah or rabbis it is possible to rely on the existence or absence of bad personality traits to determine whether she is a bas nida, and in this case with her good midos to assume she is not a bas Nida and that the mother must have gone swimming in a body of water similar to a mikve. Similarly the son of sinners who is modest and refined can be assumed not to be a ben Nida. 

Rav Sternbuch (5:313): Should a Ben Torah marry a bas Nida? Regarding the status of bnei Nida there is a dispute between the Taz and the Shach in Shulchan Aruch (Y,D.196:12). The Taz views it has a problem of yichus (pedigree) and is the result of a prohibited relationship while the Shach views that it causes the child to have a  bad personality because of the spiritual impurity. I have already cited the view of the Chazon Ish said that Torah and mitzvos have the power to purify a person from this blemish and thus rise higher than a person borne in kedusha and is not a ben Nida. Thus he and other major authorities actually ruled not like the Taz… It is possible to determine whether she has good midos and if so he should act quickly and not delay. So even though yichus is very important, it is not a reason to delay marriage. After getting engaged you should have minimal meetings with her prior to the wedding. You noted in your letter that a local rabbi advised you not to marry her for the sake of you families honor. In my opinion this is not a concern for the future, rather you should not delay for this reason because delaying might cause sin and damage your spirituality

Torah learning on Tisha b'Av

 Rabbi Freifeld told me that Rav Hutner held that one is allowed to learn seforim on Tisha B'Av that deal with correcting the sins that caused the destruction of the Temple

Haredi Yeshivot fear rising enlistment rates among their students

 https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/412410

Rabbi Moshe Hillel Hirsch, a prominent figure in the haredi community, recently held an emergency meeting at his home with leading rabbis from major yeshivot. The urgent gathering was convened to address growing concerns over a small but notable trend: yeshiva students from haredi backgrounds beginning to enlist in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Although the number of enlistments remains relatively low, senior haredi leaders fear that the trend may signal an erosion of the community’s long-standing opposition to IDF service.

Tevila – Bottles bought with Food and Drink

Igros Moshe (YD II #40) Question:Containers and bottles such as whiskey or juice that were bought with food and drink from non-Jews do they require tevila when reused? Answer  It is reasonable in my humble opnion that they don’t need tevila when they are reused to hold other liquids after the original content has been removed. The reason is that the container is subordinate to the liquid it was sold with. It is like the hide of an animal and thus it means it was never owned by the non-Jew as a container and therefore it first became a container  after it was bought by the Jew and thus it doesn’t require tevila. In a case where  it is possible that that the factory was owned by Jews and it was purchased from a Jewish store. But it is impossible to clarify the matter then the containers should be toveled without a beracha while if they are glass which is only a rabbinic obligation they don’t need at all to be toveled if their Jewish origin can not be clarified  when it requires great effort to tovel them. However if it is possible to clarify it is required to do so even just for the beracha.