Psak is mainly reasoning

 Igros Moshe (YD IV #38.2) Question: What is the significance of a sefer of collected rulings without explanation? Answer It would seem that if a scholar made a ruling in a specific case before him according to what he read in a book written by a great scholar which lacks the reasoning used for his ruling that that is not considered a halachic ruling at all and another authority can rule just the opposite whether strictltly or leniently. Nontheless it seems reasonable that in fact this is a halachic ruling since he is basing himself on the ruling of a well known authority who obviously had a legitimate reason for his ruling. Even though the second person did not know the reason it seems others can also rule like the original authority. 

If Lashon Harah is a Character issue- not Issur - then Motivation is paramount not Actions

[update - finished translations] There are a number of critical differences whether lashon harah is primarily a moral issue or primarily an issur. Precise definitions are not needed for moral definitions - people recognize what is right and wrong. In contrast issur requires clear cut parameters and definitions. Perhaps even more important is that moral issues focus on motivation while issur is mainly concerned with the deed. If lashon harah is primarily moral, that would explain why a person who unwittingly said derogatory statements has not committed the sin of lashon harah. If a person speaks derogatory statements for a good purpose he is exempt. In contrast a person is not exempt from transgressing Shabbos or killing simply because he was not thinking of sinning. Rav Asher Weiss (Minchas Asher Vayikra 19:16) brings an example of exemption from the sin of lashon harah because there was no intent to harm.

    Mo''ed Koton (16a): Is it not a fact that R. Simeon, Rabbi's son, and Bar Kappara were once sitting rehearsing the lesson together when a difficulty arose about a certain passage and R. Simeon said to Bar Kappara, ‘This [matter] needs Rabbi [to explain it]’, and Bar Kappara replied: ‘And what forsooth can Rabbi [have to] say on this?’ He went and repeated it to his father, [at which] the latter was vexed, and [when] Bar Kappara next presented himself before Rabbi, he said: ‘Bar Kappara, I have never known you! He realized that he [Rabbi] had taken the matter to heart and submitted himself to the [disability of a] ‘reproof’ for thirty days.

Rashi (Mo'ed Koton 16a) says Rav Shimon repeated Bar Kappara's statement innocently to his father and not as loshon harrah. Rav Weiss says, "Rashi is saying that when one innocently states something without intent of saying something negative - then it is not considered as loshon harah. Thus it appears that the explanation for this is that even though lashon harah is a very serious sin - but it's basis is concern for character perfection. Therefore whatever is not said with a negative intent for another or to harm him - but is said innocently - is not considered a sin at all. It is not even considered shogeg. That is because the underlying principle of this sin is concern for imperfect character traits - and that is dependent on motivation. I give a similar explanation concerning the view of Ramban that the prohibition of fraudulent commercial transaction is only if it is intentionally fraudulent. 

"However Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Lashon HaRah 7 in Be'er Mayim Chaim 18) says that in fact one is guilty of lashon harah when it is said innocently. The Chofetz Chaim explains that  Rashi doesn't mean that he said it without intent to harm but rather he was not paying attention to what he was saying. He notes that the Rambam(Hilchos Lashon Harah 7:4) poskens that even if one said lashon harah as a joke or as levity that he is guilty of lashon harah. However the Chofetz Chaim's explanation is problematic. Aside from the fact that the explanation does not fit with Rashi's words - it is difficult to accept the assertion that Bar Kapara sinned beshogeg and wasn't paying attention to what he was saying." 

"Furthermore the Rambam is understood by the Chofetz Chaim to mean that even when there is no intention of saying something negative it is still lashon harah. However the Rambam meant something different.  When a person makes a joke out of derogatory material it is still  the sin of lashon harah since his words are still inherently derogatory in themselves. It is the nature of jokes and levity to be abusive and thus he transgresses – even though he doesn't intend to degrade another person. In contrast concerning words that are not inherently derogatory in themselves – such as Bar Kapara – who only meant that Rabbi Yehuda wasn't in a position to know how to resolve this  particular question. In addition Rav Shimon when he repeated Bar Kapara's words to his father had not intended to convey anything negative about Bar Kapara but he was merely asking for a clarification. In such a case the prohibition of lashon harah is not violated since the information was said innocently and the words themselves were not inherently derogatory. Thus negative words said as a joke are different than ambiguous words which were said innocently and thus there is no support for the Chofetz Chaim from this Rambam.  In contrast a person who intends to hurt another transgresses the prohibition of lashon harah no matter what words he uses. This in my opinion is the proper understanding of Rashi and the fundamental principle of what constitutes lashon harah.

We see then that lashon harah is a concern of character and therefore the speaker's intent is critical in determining whether his words constitute lashon harah. With this principle we can understand the rule that whatever is spoken beneficially does not violate the prohibition of lashon harah – as stated by the Chofetz Chaim (Lashon Harah 3:3). In general we know that there are times when Torah prohibitions are set aside e.g., a positive commandment sets aside a negative one and more severe mitzvos displace lesser mitzvos etc. However this is different because lashon harah is not being displaced when the words are said beneficially. As we stated the prohibition of lashon harah is dependent upon whether it is a bad character trait. Therefore whenever the speaker's motivation is for the good and for benefit of his fellow man and not to hurt him – there is absolutely no issur of lashon harah. It is not that is is being displaced – it doesn't exist! If you examine the matter well it is clearly the correct explanation.

Additional support that lashon harah is primarily a prohibition of faulty character comes from the Chofetz Chaim. He writes that the heter to speak lashon harah for benefit only applies if the speaker doesn't intend to debase his fellow man – but if he means to speak negatively then it is prohibited even if is beneficial. He also writes that if he speaks negatively about a sinner and he himself is guilty of that sin – he does not have a heter to speak. These two halachos seem to contradict the principle that negative speech said for benefit is permitted because it isn't lashon harah. Why should it make a difference what the speaker's intent is and whether he is righteous or not? These apparent contraditions are removed if it accepted that the foundation of the prohibition of lashon harah is because of concern for the speaker's character. 

[Whether in fact motivation for saying something beneficial determines if there is a heter - involves the  machlokes of the Sma and Taz which will be discussed in another post]

Lashon Harah and preventing Harm

Vayikra (19:16): Don't spread gossip amongst your people. Don't stand idly by the blood of your fellow. I am G‑d

Chazon Ish(2:133): Knowledge about a talmid chachom who shapes yiddishkeit is similar to that of an artisan. Just as one is permitted to convey accurate information about an artisan if there is to'eles so it it permitted to reveal information about a gadol if there is to'eles. Of critical importance is to be totally accurate otherwise it is slander. This implies that expressing negative information about others is relevant for those who are considered influential authorities – in order to understand the degree to rely on them.

Rabbeinu Yonah(Mishlei 24:28): Don’t be a gratuitous witness of your fellow man – ...This principle is stated in Berachos (19a), If you see a talmid chachom sinning at night, do not suspect of him of sinning anymore by the day because he will surely have repented by then. Since he has the reputation of a person who is fearful of sinning and he is upset and regrets that his lust overcame him. However if the talmid chachom is in fact a wicked person who is mistakenly thought by the people to be righteous – he is not only to be criticized to those who know how to keep quiet – but in fact it is a mitzva to publicize his deeds until they are well known to the public. That is because severe harm occurs when wicked people are honored because he will turn many away from the proper path and denigrate the honor of the righteous and encourages sinning. There is in fact profanation of G‑d’s name by honoring the wicked because some people will be aware of the sins the wicked do and will concluded that there is nothing wrong with sinning and that it doesn’t lower one’s stature (Yoma 86b)…

Rav Moshe Sternbuch(Teshuvos v'hanhagos 1:839): Question: A a teacher asks his students to reveal who did something wrong. - is this permitted? Answer: It would seem that the teacher first has to say to his student that the prohibition of lashon harah is very severe. However since this is l'toeles there is no prohibition of lashon harah. (See Chofetz Chaim 4 and the statement of the Alter of Kelm in Marpeh Lashon said in the name of Rav Yisroel Salanter with clear proofs that whatever is for to'eles is not prohibited as lashon harah). In this case it is clearly for the benefit of the chinuch of the student and therefore there is no concern that this is lashon harah. In fact just the opposite because just as there is a prohibition to speak negatively about others - there is an obligation to inform the teacher so that he is able to properly chastise the student and thus it is not considered lashon harah at all.

Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Lashon Harah 4:10):  Nevertheless if a person sees someone who has bad midos such as conceit, anger, or other bad personality traits or the person isn't concerned about studying Torah etc. then it is correct to tell his son or his students to avoid associating with such a person in order that they not learn his bad midos. That is because the basis of the prohibition of lashon harah - which applies to even if it is truth - is intent to degrade another person and rejoice in his debasement. However if his intent is to guard his fellow man from learning from his bad deeds - then it is clearly permitted and in fact it is a mitzva to convey this [negative] information to others. However in these cases and similar ones it would seem that it is a mitzva for the one conveying the negative information to explain the reason why he is saying these negative things about another person. That is so the listener will not err and assume that negative comments in general are permitted. Furthermore so that the listener will not be astonished that the speaker seems to be a hypocrite in that sometimes he prohibits lashon harah even when true (see clall 9) because it is an important mitzva to keep his children from sin. and yet he is himself is now saying negative things about others...

Chofetz Chaim (Be’er Mayim Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 9:3): Requiring that the motivation to speak rechilus is for a beneficial goal (to’eles) - doesn’t’ mean that if he doesn’t have this motivation that he is automatically exempt from communicating the necessary information to the person in danger. That is because he still has to fulfill the obligation of “not standing idly by the blood of his fellow.” This also applies to saving someone from financial loss. Look at Rashi (Sanhedrin 73a). This requirement of to’eles for permitting speaking negative words means only that he should try and force himself do it for a benefit and not because he hates the person. Otherwise he will be violating the prohibition of rechilus.

Rav Ovadiah Yosef (Yechava Daas 4:60): … In fact this is the way to understand the verse regarding lashon harah. “Do not speak lashon harah but don’t stand idly by concerning the blood of your fellow.” Even though there is a prohibition of lashon harah, nevertheless the second clause of the verse tells you that it is conditional on this not causing harm. Therefore you are obligated to inform others regarding certain matters in order to them to guard against loss and danger. This is expressed in Nidah (61a) that even though it is prohibited to listen to lashon harah but you should protect yourself from the potential danger you hear about. The Rambam (Mitzva 297) says that protecting another’s money is also included in “don’t stand idly by concerning the blood of your fellow.” … Therefore even if there is only a financial loss, one should inform your fellow man in order that he can protect himself from those who want to harm him. And surely when there is a possible danger to an individual or a group.... 

Malbim (Vayikra 19:16.41): Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow - The literal meaning of the verse is that if you see someone in danger – do not stand by but rather make a serious effort to save him…. However the association in this verse of not speaking lashon harah teaches us that even though we are prohibited to speak lashon harah, nevertheless if you know testimony that can help another - even though it involves lashon harah and breaking confidentiality – it is necessary to reveal the information and to testify. This is true even though revealing secrets is prohibited as lashon harah.

Netziv (Vayikra 19:16): Even though there is a clear prohibition in this verse against lashon harah, nevertheless this is conditional on “not standing idly by the blood of others.” In other words if you know that there is someone who wants to harm another then you are obligated to inform the intended victim and it is prohibited to stand idly by and let it happen.

Ohr HaChaim (Vayikra 19:16): The prohibition of lashon harah is conditional on whether not speaking will not cause harm to another. If you see a group that wants to kill people then you are obligated to notify the potential victims so that they can save themselves. One should not keep silent by saying that you don’t want to speak lashon harah. Thus we learn that if you don’t notify the potential victim and he is killed that you have nullified this mitzva of not standing idly by the blood of others. We learn this from the incident of Gedaliah who was warned of danger but did not pay attention to the warning.

Shulchan Aruch(C.M. 426:1): If you see someone drowning in the sea or being attacked by bandits or wild animals and it is possible to save him by yourself or to pay others to save him and yet you don’t save him or alternatively you hear non‑Jews or informers plotting to do him harm and yet you don’t inform him or alternatively you know that non‑Jews or bandits are planning to attack him and you are able dissuade them and yet you don’t or other such scenarios – you are violating “do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow (Vayikra 19:16).

Rav Elochon Wasserman (Kovetz Ha’aros Yevamos #70): ...It would seem that all that is prohibited between people (bein adam l’chavero) is only prohibited when done in a harmful and destructive manner without justification. For example regarding the prohibition of “Not hating your brother.” This is only prohibited for gratuitous hatred (sinas chinom). In other words when he is not doing anything wrong (davar ervah). However if he is doing something wrong then it is permitted to hate him. It is important to note that the reason for hatred being permitted in this case is not because of the fact that a sinful person is not considered your “brother.” Tosfos (Pesachim 113b) explains that if you hate this sinful person for another reason then you transgress the prohibition. The hatred is only permitted because of the bad (davar ervah) that you see in him. Similarly regarding the prohibition of beating another, the Rambam writes that it is prohibited only if done as fighting (derech netzoyan). This is clear from the fact that it is permitted for a teacher to his student. And this that we noted before in Sanhedrin (84b) – that is only a rabbinic restriction. And similarly concerning the prohibition of causing anguish to a widow or orphan, Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:10) writes that if it is done to teach Torah or a trade – there is no prohibition. Similarly concerning the prohibition of lashon harah, it is permitted against people who cause discord and quarrels in order to stop the fight. Similar concerning using words to cause anguish (onas devarim), it is permitted publicly criticize someone publicly if it is for the sake of chastisement. It is even permitted to publicly embarrass someone if it is done for the necessity of chastisement for a person who has not stopped his bad behavior after being rebuked in private. In such a case it is even permissible to curse him. In fact this is what was done by the prophets in the past as the Rambam (Hilchos De’os 6:8) notes. We thus shown from all this, that all the prohibition involving interpersonal actions do not apply when the act is beneficial.

 Chinuch (236): We are required not to gossip about others as the Torah says (Vayikra 19:16) "You shall not be a tale-bearer." The idea is that if we hear someone say something bad about a friend, we should not tell them "Someone is saying such and such about you" unless our intent is to prevent damage or to stop a fight....

Pischei Tshuva (O.C. 156): I want to note here that while all the books of mussar are greatly concerned about the sin of lashon harah, I am greatly concerned about the opposite problem. I want to protest about the even greater and more common sin of refraining from speaking negatively when it is necessary to save someone from being harmed. For example if you saw a person waiting in ambush to kill someone or breaking into someone’s house or store at night. Is it conceivable that you would refrain from notifying the intended victim to protect himself from the assailant - because of the prohibition of speaking lashon harah?  By not saying anything you commit the unbearable sin of transgressing the prohibition of Vayikra (19:16): Do not speak lashon harah [but] do not stand idly by when the blood of your fellow man is threatened? By not speaking up, you violate the mitzva of returning that which is lost to its owner Devarim (22:2). Now if you can understand the obvious necessity of speaking up in these cases then what is the difference between a robber breaking into someone’s house or store or seeing that his servants are secretly stealing from him or that his partner is deceiving him in their business or that another person is cheating him in commerce or that he is lending money to someone that you know doesn’t repay? How is this different from stopping a proposed marriage to someone you know is a wicked person who would be a horrible husband…. From where do we get the mistaken idea that in the case of murder, I will speak up but that it is prohibited to say anything in other situations where someone is being harmed?…

Hatzaloh and use of goyim to avoid violating Shabbos

 When I lived in Brooklyn I davened on Shabbos at the shul of Rav Dovid Cohen who served as the posek of Hatzaloh. He would always ask Rav Moshe the big issues. I Remember one Shabbos he spoke saying he had just asked Rav Moshe whether they needed to use goyim to avoid violating Shabbos. He said that Rav Moshe had emphatically said no because a goy is not as concerned about saving a jew as a Jew is and the delay in treatment might be fatal. He said he never saw Rav Moshe so angry because he was so upset about the question

Luck of the Irish

 There was once an Irish cop who served as a volunteer for the Williamsburg hatzaloh. One Saturday he had a heart attack. So he called hatzalaoh for help. Fortunately for him he dialed the wrong number. He dialed the hatzaloh of the East Side which was under Rav Moshe and they sent help and he was saved. If he had gotten through to Williamsburg they followed the view of the Mishna Berura and would not have saved him

Trump Sparks MAGA Backlash Over Earlier Warning to States About Israel

 https://www.newsweek.com/israel-boycotts-donald-trump-maga-response-fema-2108785

The Trump administration drew the fury of some of the president's staunchest supporters when Reuters reported that Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funds would be denied to states and cities that boycott Israeli companies.

The blowback highlights a broader fissure within the Republican Party between hawkish lawmakers who support sending more aid and weapons to Israel and isolationist MAGA influencers who oppose the U.S. becoming more involved in conflicts in the Middle East.

‘No president’s ever read it this way’: Trump faces major legal challenge over tariff justification

From a souring economy to Epstein, Trump 'isn't fixing anything. This is gaslighting.

Nobel-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz: Trump firing BLS head ‘like driving a car with no odometer'

Trump Admin Broke Rules to Move Ghislaine to Club Fed Camp

 https://www.thedailybeast.com/snitch-ghislaines-prison-move-was-due-to-death-threats/

Convicted child sex trafficker Ghislaine Maxwell secured a secret prison transfer after the Bureau of Prisons waived a rule designated to punish sex offenders.

Maxwell, alleged sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein‘s accomplice, has spent the last three years serving a 20-year sentence at a federal prison in Tallahassee, Florida.

Trump defends firing labor statistics chief after weak jobs report

 https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5434438-trump-defends-firing-labor-statistics-chief

Trump’s decision to fire the labor statistics head over the jobs report sparked immediate blowback on Capitol Hill, with Democrats accusing the White House of going after the messenger and attempting to silence those detailing a weak labor market during his tenure.

Making a Palestinian State Less Likely

 https://www.wsj.com/opinion/palestinian-state-gaza-hamas-u-k-france-canada-israel-894e8a3f?mod=hp_opin_pos_4

The Gaza aid crunch is starting to abate, as local prices fall. Why are Gazans paying for aid at all? Well, the United Nations says 87% of the aid trucks that it and its partners have tried to deliver since May 19 have been “intercepted” by mobs or “armed actors.” Much of the food ends up sold at market, with Hamas taking a cut. The U.N. rejects Israeli security escorts.

The U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which gives free aid to Gazans at large distribution sites, has been shunned by the established aid groups. This has hindered GHF efforts to scale up—the best way to shrink the crowds at each site. For now, large masses must trek past Israel Defense Forces lines to reach these sites, while Hamas instigates stampedes. Much hunger in Gaza has been concentrated in the north, where there are no GHF sites.

Hatzala return to home in car on Shabbos after they complete their life saving task?

 Igros Moshe (O. C. IV #80) Question: A volunteer in the Hatzala organization who leaves his home to save a life on Shabbos when can he return home? Answer: It is a great thing that they do and there is no need to delay and have a non Jew do this.  The main question is if he goes by car to minimize delay. If we require that he wait to the end of Shabbos to return by car, there is concern that it reduces the likelihood he will be available to save another person on Shabbos  Tosfos has a principle that we allow things sometimes to avoid an undersirable consequence of prohibition regarding saving life.  Rambam also rules that someone who goes to rescue his fellow Jew from attack on Shabbos is permitted to return home afterwards with his weapons on Shabbos in order to ensure that in the future people will be willing to help on Shabbos. 

Trump’s mental decline is undeniable — so what now?

 https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/5429516-trump-confabulation-dementia-signs

For Trump, the day we could no longer pretend everything is fine came on July 15, when he told a lengthy story about his uncle, John Trump, who he claimed taught at MIT and held three degrees in “nuclear, chemical, and math.” His uncle, according to Trump, once told him how he had taught Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, and how very smart Kaczynski was.

Trump’s uncle was indeed a professor at MIT, but everything else in this story is pure confabulation. Trump’s uncle didn’t have degrees in “nuclear, chemical, and math” — he had degrees in electrical engineering and physics. And Kaczynski did not go to MIT at all — he went to Harvard.

Difficulty with mathematical concepts is another early warning sign of dementia. Now watch Trump attempting to explain how he is going to make drug prices go down by “1,000 percent, 600 percent, 500 percent, 1,500 percent.” That’s complete nonsense, unless drug companies will be paying patients to accept prescriptions, since reducing drug prices by 100 percent would mean they were free. Certainly, someone who got a business degree from Wharton and has spent his life running a company would know how percentages work.

Or take his insistence that former President Obama and his FBI director, James Comey, made up the Epstein files, even though they were long out of office by the time Epstein was most recently arrested in 2019. Again, that’s very troubling, because being unable to correctly process when past events took place is a common feature in confabulation. The same goes for being unable to remember that he himself appointed Jerome Powell as the chair of the federal reserve. And then, of course, there are all the little lapses in judgment that Trump has been displaying recently. 

Donald Trump is showing all the signs of suffering from dementia. If this were a neighbor, a parent, or a family friend, you would have no trouble seeing it. We should not turn our heads just because it is the president.