Jewish Law has an important review article by R' Yitzchak Kasdan
Observations On And Beyond Rabbi Alfred Cohen's “Daat Torah”
Rabbi Alfred Cohen's article on “Daat Torah” (Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, Spring 2003), posted with permission elsewhere on this site, is a welcome, extensive re-examination of the subject. In at least two not inconsequential respects, Rabbi Cohen brings full circle the public discussion about this topic that -- with respect to popular Jewish, English language periodicals and books -- first began 40 years ago with the publication of an article that appeared in The Jewish Observer. At the same time, however, as comprehensive as he is, Rabbi Cohen overlooks an important, well-grounded basis for at least one element of his understanding of “Daat Torah” that only has recently been emphasized in English publications. In these regards, and as I attempt to demonstrate in greater detail below,
(i) Rabbi Cohen provides an important gemara and Rishon source -- Bava Batra 12a as explained by the Ritva -- that has not been well publicized (and perhaps even inadvertently or otherwise been ignored) by those critical of the concept of “Daat Torah” throughout the years, but which appears was significant to the author of the seminal article on the topic that appeared in the early Jewish Observer issue, Rabbi Bernard Weinberger. Equally important, Rabbi Cohen steers the conversation back towards the original parameters of “Daat Torah” that Rabbi Weinberger attempted to set forth in his piece -- balancing, if you will, the place of “Daat Torah” in personal and/local issues versus in those with broader, national communal implications.
(ii) Yet, as wide-reaching as Rabbi Cohen's article is, Rabbi Cohen's article misses an important, well and long established foundation for “Daat Torah” that has been stressed only recently in English essays and shiurim, primarily by Rav Dovid Cohen. That is, the relationship between concepts of “Daat Torah” and malchut (kingship), which “crown” Rabbis assumed as noted in traditional and historical sources. This relationship is useful in understanding why, according to many including Rabbi (Alfred) Cohen, “Daat Torah” “must” be followed.2 [...]
see my comment to the R'Dessler post.
ReplyDeleteLet me add R' Kook's point that without a melech the power devolves to the people and add the question - if HKB"H had a preffered model with separation of powers (per R' YBS because he didn't trust any one man), why wouldn't we try to get back to that model rather than one forced upon us by exile?
GT
Joel Rich
The primary issue in the "Daas Torah" discussion is one of communal leadership. Who is the one responsible for establishing communal policy and making significant communal decisions? Being that communal policies and decisions almost always involve value judgements, the "Daas Torah" position is that such decisions should be made by those best equipped to assess such value judgements in light of the Torah, i.e. Torah scholars of the highest caliber available.
ReplyDeleteThere are proponents of "Daas Torah" who go further than this, arguing that "Daas Torah" implies a degree of ruach hakodesh or even infallibility. Some will also argue that "Daas Torah" applies not only to communal decisions but also to personal decisions, i.e. that one should/must consult with a gadol before making any significant personal decision.
Such claims are usually not relevant to the main discussion of "Daas Torah" but will frequently be brought into the debate because, on the pro-"Daas Torah" side, they make a big impression (esp. when backed up by some good stories), or, on the anti-"Daas Torah" side, they provide a useful straw man for opponents of "Daas Torah" to attack ("Daas Torah" = papal infallibility).
In this regard, I believe that some defenders of "Daas Torah" are doing the concept a disservice and some of its attackers are being disingenuous.
The primary issue in the Daas Torah discussion is one of defining the limits of a community and the assumed axiom of a singular "Torah" view.
ReplyDeleteI know about Rav Hamuvhak, and I know about Shtei Botei Din Beir Achas and the Issur of Lo Tisgodedu. I also know that communities are different, as are their Shailos and their needs.
A Melech has to be wanted and chosen by his community. In a year of Hakhel, it's important to note that according to many, it's Lav Dafka that you need a Melech in order to have Hakhel. It can be the teacher, kohen gadol etc
Not having the Beis Hamikdosh however is not negotiable and as such there is no Hakhel Chiyuv. We can see that not having the sense of community which flows from the centrality of a Beis Hamikdosh and all that goes with it, is more critical than having an actual king figure.
Without the definition of a single community, how can there be a single daas torah?
There are many communities, many great Rabbis and some not so great. Each group follows their manhigim.
The attitude of "your manhig needs to be kofuf to my manhig" is the daas torah I can do without.
The real problems are:
ReplyDelete1) There are two definitions of Daas Torah: the classical one refered to in the article which I would think no frum Yid would have a problem with, and the "man in the street" version extant today which basically runs: Our gedolim have a special connection to God so whatever they say is infallible and can't be questioned and we must defer to their opinion in everything.
2) Communal leadership is a complex job with changing priorities and needs. It's not something a person can do competently without training. For example, I know a couple of physicists who are brilliant but i wouldn't trust them to run their department. They haven't a clue how to do it, nor the training. The idea that Torah knowledge alone qualifies for a position of leadership is concerning.
Isaac Balbin said...
ReplyDeleteThe attitude of "your manhig needs to be kofuf to my manhig" is the daas torah I can do without.
This is an even greater "straw man" than the issues I already mentioned. To my knowledge, there are no (respectable) proponents of Daas Torah who maintain that Daas Torah establishes a single monolithic "opinion" that is binding on all communities.
The classic debate over Torah leadership between the mainstream rabbonim and Mizrachi (which came to a crisis in the dispute over the rabbinate of Vilna in which Mizrachi succeeded in replacing R' Chaim Ozer Grodzinski with their own candidate - a Rabbi Rubinstein) was not over differing opinions between Torah authorities (although these certainly existed) but over the willingness of Mizrachi rabbonim to essentially abdicate their leadership role in favor of the secular Zionist leaders. This issue was the primary area of dispute between the Mizrachi and the anti-Zionist gedolim, other issues (such as the "gimel shevuos") were secondary.
It should be noted that R' Joseph B. Soloveitchik also, originally, supported the Daas Torah position, as illustrated by his early strong support for Agudas Yisrael and his famous hesped of R' Chaim Ozer (HaPardes 14:7). In a shiur on the topic, R' Rakeffet-Rothkoff argues that R' Soloveitchik reversed his position based on his famous "Yosef and his brothers" drasha. (I am not convinced for various reasons.)
In any case, given that this was R' Soloveitchik's initial opinion, that would seem to indicate that even those who question the concept of Daas Torah should be less quick to reject it out of hand as an obviously modern innovation.
Garnel Ironheart said...
ReplyDelete1) There are two definitions of Daas Torah: the classical one refered to in the article which I would think no frum Yid would have a problem with,
Oh, if only that were true!
and the "man in the street" version extant today which basically runs: Our gedolim have a special connection to God so whatever they say is infallible and can't be questioned and we must defer to their opinion in everything.
In any such discussion, if and when we discuss the "man in the street" definition, we have to be clear that we are not discussing the "real" position as put forward by the most qualified proponents. As an illustration, the ideology (more accurately, "ideologies") of Modern Orthodoxy is quite distinct from the "man in the street" definition of Modern Orthodoxy.
In any event, if you remove the middle clauses from your "man in the street" definition of Daas Torah, you have the essence of the Daas Torah position: "Our gedolim have a special connection to God ... and we must defer to their opinion in everything." (I would quibble on the "everything" because it could be interpreted in a variety of ways. I would prefer, "and we must defer to their opinion.")
It is possible that this "man in the street" conception of Daas Torah has arisen because of the influence of Chassidus. Chassidim do tend to ascribe a degree of infallibility to their leaders which many non-chassidim are uncomfortable with.
2) Communal leadership is a complex job with changing priorities and needs. It's not something a person can do competently without training. For example, I know a couple of physicists who are brilliant but i wouldn't trust them to run their department. They haven't a clue how to do it, nor the training. The idea that Torah knowledge alone qualifies for a position of leadership is concerning.
I think you are confusing leadership with administration. These are very different things. An administrator is not a leader. Thus, for example, the Vilna Gaon was the undisputed leader of his community although he held no official role and was not involved in day-to-day communal administration. This is clearly the practice in all communities, even the most chassidic, where the rabbinic leaders/roshei yeshiva/admorim hire competent adminstrators to "run things." Leadership involves making the hard decisions, especially regarding communal priorities (as in the topic that began this discussion).
You are, of course, quite correct that Torah scholarship alone is insuffucient for genuine leadership. No one claims that a gadol is simply a person who "knows a lot of Torah" or is even just a brilliant scholar. Everyone recognizes that gadlus baTorah involves a wide range of characteristics, including humility, ahavas yisrael, and yiras shamayim.
Thus, for example, the Vilna Gaon was the undisputed leader of his community although he held no official role and was not involved in day-to-day communal administration.
ReplyDelete===================
If so, why did no one except for a few in his inner circle accept his psak (but rather they continued minhagei vilna as they had been prior to the Gaon)?
Gmar Tov
Joel Rich
> Chassidim do tend to ascribe a degree of infallibility to their leaders which many non-chassidim are uncomfortable with.
ReplyDeleteI've often mused that the reason for the new "daas Torah" is because that idea has found its way into the Litvish community. But instead of calling them rebbes, they're called gedolim.
Joel Rich said...
ReplyDeleteIf so, why did no one except for a few in his inner circle accept his psak (but rather they continued minhagei vilna as they had been prior to the Gaon)?
I don't know enough about the rules for changing communal minhagim to properly address the question. (I suspect that the Gra, given his position regarding such changes on the part of the chassidim, would probably have held a fairly conservative position that issue.)
In any event, I am fairly certain that most of the Gra's unique practices (as embodied in Maaseh Rav) were probably not seen by the Gra as psakim for the general community.
Rabbi Eidensohn might be able to get some useful input on this question from R' Shternbuch, who is a well-known "Gra-nik".
LaserA wrote:
ReplyDeleteThis is an even greater "straw man" than the issues I already mentioned. To my knowledge, there are no (respectable) proponents of Daas Torah who maintain that Daas Torah establishes a single monolithic "opinion" that is binding on all communities.
I'd suggest this itself is a straw man :-) and one that wouldn't hold in a normal wind.
Check out the letters of the Chazon Ish, 1, Siman 33 for instance.
Isaac Balbin said...
ReplyDeleteCheck out the letters of the Chazon Ish, 1, Siman 33 for instance.
Are you refering to קובץ אגרות א:לג? I just looked it over and don't see how it is relevant to this discussion. Please explain.
R' Rakeffet-Rothkoff argues that R' Soloveitchik reversed his position based on his famous "Yosef and his brothers" drasha. (I am not convinced for various reasons.)
ReplyDeletecf. http://www.lookstein.org/articles/soloveitchik_posek.htm
RTW said...
ReplyDeletecf. http://www.lookstein.org/articles/soloveitchik_posek.htm
Thank you for the reference to this interesting article.
The material relevant to our discussion can be found at the end of the article, where Rabbi Wurzburger discusses Rav Soloveitchik's position on "Daas Torah". Of particular interest is footnote 28:
I am of course aware that in his eulogy on R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski ("Nosei Hatzitz ve-hahoshen" in Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Divrei Hegut ve- Ha'arakha (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1991), pp. 187-94) the Rav insists that the authority invested in rabbinic leadership must not be restricted to formal halakhic rulings, but also extends over public policy issues. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Rav referred here to an official Rav of a community whose authority was formally recognized by election or appointment to a position of leadership. This must not be confused with the Da' at Torah dispensed by various Roshei Yeshiva who cannot claim a public mandate for guidance of a community.
It should also be noted that the authority of the Priest was based upon the supernatural guidance provided by the "Urim ve-Tumim" and the possession of ru'ah haKodesh. See also Lawrence Kaplan's discussion of the issue in his study "Daas Torah," Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, Moshe Z. Sokol, ed. (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1992), pp. 8-10.
With all due respect to Rabbi Wurzburger, I find his interpretation of Rav Soloveitchik's hesped of Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzenski to be forced and tendentious. Specifically, to claim that R' Soloveitchik intended his words to apply only to "official" rabbis, and not to talmidei chachamim, especially gedolei yisrael, in general is, in my opinion, insupportable both from the language of the hesped itself and the historical context that he was discussing.
The following are some select quotes from the hesped (as printed in HaPardes 14:7) to illustrate my point. I strongly recommend that people read the material themselves:
פוסקי שאלות ביורה דעה, פסקו שאלות אורח חיים פוליטי, חמורות ומסובכות
ובתקופה האחרונה שיטה חדשה נולדה בישראל, המבדלת ... בין גאון הדור ובין מנהיג הדור, שיטה זו אומרת חכמי התורה... אינם ראויים לשאת את חושן המשפט המורה בכל תסבכת השיטות היום-יומיות של כלל ישראל: הללו, גדולי התורה אינם ברי סמכא להורות להעם בבעיות פוליטיות המתחדשים לבקרים, פוסקי הלכות בעגונה ובאיסור והיתר אינם ברי סמכא לפסק הלכה למעשה בנוגע ליחס ישראל לאומות העולם
הנהגת ישראל זוהי שולחן ערוך! חלק התורה!
In my opinion, it is clear that this is not merely a defense of the status of "official" rabbis. Moreover, R' Soloveitchik was responding to those who removed R' Chaim Ozer from his official position and then ceased to respect his leadership as the greatest Torah figure in Vilna. If we are to intepret the hesped as Rabbi Wurzburger would have us, then the hesped would be a defense of those who ignored the no-longer official leadership of R' Chaim Ozer, rather than a condemnation. This was clearly not Rav Soloveitchik's intent.
As for Rabbi Wurzburger's second point, that the kohein gadol received supernatural guidance, it is clear that Rav Soloveitchik did not see this as an objection. Rabbi Wurzburger is, of course, free to disagree with Rav Soloveitchik, but the issue at hand is what Rav Soloveitchik believed.
I believe that it is clear that, when he gave this hesped, Rav Soloveitchik held to a very clear Agudah-style position of "Daas Torah". The question is, did this change.
As I mentioned, R' Rakeffet-Rothkoff maintains that he did change his position. (I heard this in a recorded shiur given by R' Rakeffet-Rothkoff downloaded from yutorah.org. Unfortunately, I can't remember what shiur it was.) He finds this reversal in Rav Soloveitchik's drasha (printed in "The Rav Speaks") in which he compared the dispute between the founders of Mizrachi and the bulk of the gedolei Torah to the dispute between Yosef and his brothers. Rav Soloveitchik argues that just as hashgacha eventually demonstrated the correctness of Yosef, so too, hashgacha has demonstrated the correctness of Mizrachi.
There is obviously much to discuss regarding this drasha (and, as a non-Zionist, I am not in agreement with Rav Soloveitchik's conclusions), but as regards to our specific issue, I am not convinced that the drasha constitutes an actual reversal in Rav Soloveitchik's position regarding "Daas Torah". The fact that R' Soloveitchik believed that the gedolei Torah were wrong on an issue does not prove that he no longer believed that the gedolei Torah were the proper leaders of the Jewish people. As we see from Chazal's discussion of the encounter between Rav Yochanan ben Zakkai and Vespasian (Gittin 56b), rabbinic leadership is not infallible. No leader is infallible, yet, clearly, some individuals are better qualified to lead than others. "Daat Torah" is not an ideology of infallibility but a criterion for choosing our leaders.
In short, despite Rabbi Wurzburger's article, it seems clear, in my opinion, that originally R' Soloveitchik did hold of "Daas Torah" and he described those who opposed it as a שיטה חדשה. Moreover, I am unconvinced that R' Soloveitchik ever actually changed his position in this regard.
you don't seem to have read R' Wurzburger's essay in it's entirity. That wasn't the part I felt was most relevant; I don't really care what the Rav thought in the 40's.
ReplyDeleteThis part was:
"We have so far discussed a number of specific issues which pointed to the uniqueness of the Rav as an authority figure for modern Orthodoxy. But even more important is the Rav's general approach to the nature of rabbinic authority, which in his view was limited to the domain of pesak halakha. He respected the right of individuals to form their own opinions and attitudes with respect to matters which were not subject to halakhic legislation. Because of his respect for human autonomy and individuality, he never wanted to impose his particular attitudes upon others or even offer his personal opinions as Da'at Torah.28 On the contrary, when I turned to him for guidance on policy matters, which at times also involved halakhic considerations, he frequently replied that I should rely upon my own judgment. Similarly, whenever the Rav expounded on his philosophy of halakha, he stressed that these were merely his personal opinions which he was prepared to share with others but which did not possess any kind of authoritative status.
This non-authoritarian approach runs counter to current trends in the Orthodox community which seeks authoritative guidance from halakhic luminaries on all policy matters. Nowadays, fundamentalism flourishes because, as Eric Fromm has pointed out, there are many who desperately seek an escape from personal responsibility."
you don't seem to have read R' Wurzburger's essay in it's entirity. That wasn't the part I felt was most relevant; I don't really care what the Rav thought in the 40's.
ReplyDeleteThis part was:
"We have so far discussed a number of specific issues which pointed to the uniqueness of the Rav as an authority figure for modern Orthodoxy. But even more important is the Rav's general approach to the nature of rabbinic authority, which in his view was limited to the domain of pesak halakha. He respected the right of individuals to form their own opinions and attitudes with respect to matters which were not subject to halakhic legislation. Because of his respect for human autonomy and individuality, he never wanted to impose his particular attitudes upon others or even offer his personal opinions as Da'at Torah.28 On the contrary, when I turned to him for guidance on policy matters, which at times also involved halakhic considerations, he frequently replied that I should rely upon my own judgment. Similarly, whenever the Rav expounded on his philosophy of halakha, he stressed that these were merely his personal opinions which he was prepared to share with others but which did not possess any kind of authoritative status.
This non-authoritarian approach runs counter to current trends in the Orthodox community which seeks authoritative guidance from halakhic luminaries on all policy matters. Nowadays, fundamentalism flourishes because, as Eric Fromm has pointed out, there are many who desperately seek an escape from personal responsibility."
rtw said...
ReplyDeleteyou don't seem to have read R' Wurzburger's essay in it's entirity. That wasn't the part I felt was most relevant; I don't really care what the Rav thought in the 40's.
Well, of course, I read the passage you quoted. The footnote I quoted came from that very same section of the essay. I did not consider the text you quoted as significant because it amounts to nothing more than Rabbi Wurzburger's personal impression of Rav Soloveitchik's position. He does not add anything serious to the discussion. There are many reasons why a rebbe might tell his talmid to use his own judgement on an issue. To use that, or other similar situations where the rebbe hesitated to take a leadership position on an issue, as a basis to reject the rebbe's explicit statements is tendentious at best.
Given Rabbi Wurzburger's forced (and, in my opinion, distorted) interpretation of Rav Soloveitchik's actual statements in this regard, it is questionable how much credit we should give to his interpretations of Rav Soloveitchik's unstated opinions.
Rabbi Wurzburger's closing comment, ascribing support for "Daas Torah" to "desperately seek[ing] an escape from personal responsibility", clearly shows that Rabbi Wurzburger has no respect for those Torah sages and Torah communities that ascribe to this principle. I believe that his bias has caused him to distort the words of his rebbe and to see in his rebbe's actions a position that his rebbe may not have held.
See http://www.yutorah.org/_shiurim/1-14%20Carmy.pdf
ReplyDeleteRegarding Rav Soloveitchiks views, Rabbi Rakeffet told me that as a result of the Holocaust Rav Solveitchik came to the realization that many lives were lost because of the lack of independent thought. Therefore he came to the view that it was important not to blindly follow the views of gedolim and that one should also use his own seichel.
ReplyDeletertw said...
ReplyDeleteSee http://www.yutorah.org/_shiurim/1-14%20Carmy.pdf
Thank you again for the interesting reference. I was pleased to find that, in its broad outlines, Rabbi Carmy's analysis of Rav Soloveitchik's position is similar to my own.
Daas Torah said...
Regarding Rav Soloveitchiks views, Rabbi Rakeffet told me that as a result of the Holocaust Rav Solveitchik came to the realization that many lives were lost because of the lack of independent thought. Therefore he came to the view that it was important not to blindly follow the views of gedolim and that one should also use his own seichel.
Thank you for this information. Did he say this based on an actual statement by Rav Soloveitchik?
In any event, while it is certainly possible that Rav Soloveitchik did, in fact, change his view on this matter, nevertheless it appears clear that he did not view the position of "Daas Torah" as a modern innovation, but as the traditional position which, if he did indeed change his position, he believed was no longer tenable.
One important additional point: In describing the position of "Daas Torah" that Rav Soloveitchik rejected you used the phrases "lack of independent thought" and "blindly follow the views of gedolim" as contrasted to "one should also use his own seichel."
I do not believe this is a valid description of the "Daas Torah" ideology (although it may well have been what Rav Soloveitchik was opposed to). As I have stated repeatedly, "Daas Torah" is about communal leadership. Briefly stated, to the degree that a community requires leadership, that leadership must come from those possessing "Daas Torah." Every community has leaders who make decisions affecting the entire community. "Independent thought" and "following your own seichel" simply are not options, in any community, with regards to general communal affairs (unless you are the leader). Someone will be making those decisions! Who shall it be?
Lazera, I think you're oversimplifying issues that deserve more.
ReplyDeleteR. Carmy's position is different from yours. I quote:
This is not to say that the differences between the two addresses do not reflect a change in attitude. The audience for the eulogy would have absorbed the clear message that gedolim should have a major role in the decision-making process and that enhancing their authority is a high priority. No such exhortations characterize the Rav’s later utterances. There is enough public oral evidence that the Rav did not favor direct rabbinic intervention in political affairs, especially where they lack the requisite expertise to speak with authority.
As for your psychobabble about R' Wurzburger's "forced" reading (he had no respect for charedim and therefore he distorted the Rav's teachings...that's not "clear" to me at all and you should do teshuva for that lashon hara.), I'm not sure it's forced at all. Yes, it's different from R. Carmy's, but he tells the readers to see Kaplan's treatment for elaboration. I did. Did you? Kaplan believes that to the Rav, it was R. Chayyim Ozer's "personal charisma and learning, filtered through and mediated by his position of communal Rav, that was the source of his authority." And that was why it was such a bad thing to remove him. I don't think that's a forced reading at all. Au contraire, the essay's not a defense of those who didn't listen to him afterwards, it's an attack on those who removed him from power.
See also http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/08/r-soloveitchik-on-daas-torah-ii.html .
Dr. Nachum Klafter has a different understanding:
WADR to Rabbi Ahron L. and his intimate knowledge of the Rav's thought, as well as his deep understanding of Torah and hashkafa in general, I would submit that the "Daas Torah" that Rabbi AL sees in the Rav's hesped for Rabbi Chayim Ozer is completely different from the "Daas Torah" that is touted in the Haredi world nowadays.
The hesped for Rabbi Chayim Ozer had a central thesis: He was the last to serve with both the Tzitz and the Choshen. I.e. he was the legal authority in pesak halakha as the godol ha-dor as a posek, and he was also the political/communal manhig of for kelal yisroel, and as such had purview over establishing the communal priorities and agenda for the eidah. His qualifications for this were his authority as a Torah scholar and leader, and his sensitivity and attunement to the needs of kelal yisroel.
The "Daas Torah" which is spoken about in the Haredi world in our times is totally different. It is posited by adherents to this Haredi ideology that Torah scholars, because of their immersion in Torah and their purity from contamination by foreign influences, can achieve a spiritual/cognitive state where their pronouncements in non-halakhic matters will be infallible to error in wisdom or judgment. The mechanisms and explanations for this infallibility vary slightly from one Haredi ideologue to another--some state claim it is Siyata De-Shamaya and ruach ha-Kodesh bestowed by G-d upon our shephards. Others talk about it as a sort of psychological and spiritual transformation which occurs in the mind and soul such that a persons basic instincts and assumptions are holy, and that such individuals experience insights and foreknowledge which is achieved rather than bestowed.
In any case, I do not believe that evidence can be adduced from the Rav's poetic hesped for Rabbi Chayim Ozer that he ever subscribed the above notions of Rabbinic authority. Furthermore, his statements that Rabby Chayim Ozer was the LAST (if I remember the hesped correctly) to wear both the tzitz and the choshen should argue to the contrary. The implication, as I unerstand it, is that the eida no longer turns to our posekim to also serve as our political and communal manhigim. The "expertise" in pesak has become more technical, and "Leadership" in a political and communal sense has been separated from it. This is a separate issue from the Haredi notion of "Daas Torah".
I think it is very possible to lament the fact that our Shoftim are not our communal leaders and realize that in an ideal Torah society they would be, and at the same time to see our Torah Manhigim of prior generations as fallible human beings who did not possess any supernatural basis for their wisdeom, but who have despite their frailties and vulnerabilities risen to an awesome level of greatness in Chochma, avodas HaShem, and mesiaras nefesh for the tzibur. This attitude is unacceptable now in the Haredi world, and this is exactly why The Making of a Godol was banned. I believe that this (I'll call it the "making of a godol view") is the view toward Torah leadership that the Rav wished to put forward in Rabbi Chayim Ozer's hesped.
As for Daas Torah, you wrote earlier that Jacob Katz takes it for granted [!?] that Daas Torah doesn't exist. No he doesn't. He knows it's pashut because he was a huge talmid chacham, but he cites a source: Kaplan.
You seem to be woefully (and blissfully) ignorant of the literature surrounding this topic and hence oversimplify issues and write that what all the academic experts in the field have written on the topic goes against "common sense" (I call that a dismissal). I would advise you to read more about Modern Orthodoxy in general (the fact that you were unfamiliar with R' Wurzburger's essay indicates that you are not well-read in this area either) and the traditional nature of rabbinic authority in particular before ascribing their beliefs to ignorance, bias, or what have you. For starters, read everything which is referred to here: http://www.lookstein.org/links/orthodoxy.htm#_edn87
rtw said...
ReplyDeleteR. Carmy's position is different from yours. I quote:
This is not to say that the differences between the two addresses do not reflect a change in attitude....
I said that Rav Carmy's analyis of Rav Soloveitchik's position is similar to my own. The similarities are several. Briefly, both Rav Carmy and myself agree that Rav Soloveitchik's hesped of Rav Chaim Ozer was a fairly conventional expression of "Daas Torah." (Rav Carmy's caveat that his hesped does not imply support for a "central authoritative body" is valid. Of course, this discomfort with such a body is widespread in the chareidi world as well and is not relevant to the core issue of "Daas Torah".) Furthermore, both Rav Carmy and I agree that Rav Soloveitchik's drasha on "Yosef and his brothers" is not evidence of a true reversal on this issue.
That Rav Soloveitchik's general attitude towards Torah leadership changed is fairly clear; that this was accompanied by a genuine change is his philosophy is not.
As for your psychobabble about R' Wurzburger's "forced" reading (he had no respect for charedim and therefore he distorted the Rav's teachings...that's not "clear" to me at all and you should do teshuva for that lashon hara.)...
It is not psychobabble to point out obvious bias and disrespect. The fact is that ascribing the motive for "Daas Torah" to "desperately seeking to escape personal responsibility" is psychobabble and an explicit insult to the very large portion of the Orthodox world that follows this ideology. One could as easily ascribe the resistance to "Daas Torah" to "desperately seeking to escape religious authority."
...I'm not sure it's forced at all. Yes, it's different from R. Carmy's, but he tells the readers to see Kaplan's treatment for elaboration. I did. Did you?
No. Is it available online? I have read several discussions of the article and nothing I have seen has been particularly impressive.
Kaplan believes that to the Rav, it was R. Chayyim Ozer's "personal charisma and learning, filtered through and mediated by his position of communal Rav, that was the source of his authority." And that was why it was such a bad thing to remove him. I don't think that's a forced reading at all. Au contraire, the essay's not a defense of those who didn't listen to him afterwards, it's an attack on those who removed him from power.
As I have said repeatedly (and will probably have to say again) I believe an honest reading of the hesped (at least as presented in HaPardes) shows this to be a forced and tendentious interpretation of the hesped. Rav Soloveitchik is clearly referring to the gadlus b'Torah that was exemplified by Rav Chaim Ozer, not that was unique to him. He is also clearly applying this to all gedolei Torah and explcitly states that this should continue to be our policy.
Moreover, if, as Rabbi Wurzburger argues, rabbinic authority rests only on "official" rabbis who have been "formally recognized by election or appointment", then it would seem to follow that, with regards to the process of "election or appointment" itself, the rabbi's status would have no bearing. Rav Chaim Ozer was "removed from power" when he was not re-elected.
See also http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/08/r-soloveitchik-on-daas-torah-ii.html .
Thank you again for the reference. We see that Rav Aharon Lichtenstein is also of the opinion that Rav Soloveitchik originally held to the "Daas Torah" position and only later changed his position.
Dr. Nachum Klafter has a different understanding:
...The hesped for Rabbi Chayim Ozer had a central thesis: He was the last to serve with both the Tzitz and the Choshen....
I'm sorry but this would seem to be an absolutely untenable interpretation of the hesped. To quote from the hesped (as printed in HaPardes 14:7):
וגם עכשיו בשעת הספדו של הגרח"ע צריכים אנו לדעת כי זוהי צואתו האחרונה: כבשו את החושן, כי גורלו של הציץ כרוך בזה. הרמת קרן היהדות זוהי חיבור חושן המשפט עם הציץ הקודש! כמובן תפקיד זה חמור מאד, העם מסרב לשמוע דברינו, המון בעט בגדולי ישראל, חשכות של עם הארצות צפה ועולה על פני עולמנו. אבל אסור לנו לכבוש נבואה זו, נבואת הגרח"ע, נבואת חושן המשפט וציץ הקודש.
It is very clear that Rav Soloveitchik was not bemoaning the loss of the "last to serve" but was declaring the message of Rav Chaim Ozer's life to be the integrity of this concept to the survival of the Jewish people.
The "Daas Torah" which is spoken about in the Haredi world in our times is totally different. It is posited by adherents to this Haredi ideology that Torah scholars... can achieve a spiritual/cognitive state where their pronouncements in non-halakhic matters will be infallible to error in wisdom or judgment. The mechanisms and explanations for this infallibility vary slightly....
As I have stated previously, the concept of "Daas Torah" is not a concept of infallibility. This is one of the straw men that I mentioned earlier. That some, usually in the chassidic world, believe their gedolim to be infallible, or virtually so, may well be true, but this is not integral to the general concept of "Daas Torah" nor is it presented as so by its responsible defenders.
The rest of Dr. Klafter's comment is dependent on the two points I have just discussed. He does raise an important issue regarding the attack on The Making of a Godol. It does seem that in recent decades we have become excessively concerned about the "image" of gedolim as superhumanly perfect individuals. This is to be deeply regretted. But, again, this is not directly relevant to the "Daas Torah" issue, which was controversial well before this modern tendency became widespread.
As for Daas Torah, you wrote earlier that Jacob Katz takes it for granted [!?] that Daas Torah doesn't exist. No he doesn't. He knows it's pashut because he was a huge talmid chacham, but he cites a source: Kaplan.
Well, it seems that in the opinions of several of Rav Soloveitchik's most prominent students (Rav Lichtenstien, Rav Carmy, and Rav Rekeffet-Rothkoff) that Rav Soloveitchik believed the opposite to be true. This also appears to be the clear intent of Rav Soloveitchik's own words. The facts of history also appear to support this contention. So, even if one wants to argue, it can hardly be claimed that it is "pashut". Quite frankly, I find it hard to beleive that Kaplan presents some kind of secret wisdom in his article that could effectively reduce all of this evidence to nothing.
You seem to be woefully (and blissfully) ignorant of the literature surrounding this topic and hence oversimplify issues.... I would advise you to read more about Modern Orthodoxy in general... and the traditional nature of rabbinic authority in particular before ascribing their beliefs to ignorance, bias, or what have you....
This is a very cute way to effectively give up on a discussion. The fact is that I have read a fair amount of this material (incl. Rabbi Wurzburger's article, but I had forgotten about it). I do not claim to be an "expert" on Modern Orthodoxy (though I probably know more about it and its ideologies than most Modern Orthodox Jews). I don't believe that one must keep silent on basic Jewish issues because one has not read every academic article on the topic. If you truly feel, for example, that Kaplan's article presents some powerful argument or critical piece of evidence that no one else is aware of, then you should present it. Quite frankly, I doubt that this is true.
At no point in this discussion have I rejected a point based purely on an accusation of bias or ignorance. I have always presented my arguments for why the point is invalid in of itself. In the case of Rabbi Wurzburger, for example, I responded to his actual evidence at length and then pointed out that, given his distorted presentation of that material, relying on his personal impression of his rebbe's opinion is deeply problematic.
That Rav Soloveitchik's general attitude towards Torah leadership changed is fairly clear; that this was accompanied by a genuine change is his philosophy is not.
ReplyDeleteTaken on it's face, this is the most ridiculous statement I've ever read. Are we talking about the same Rav who, after leaving the Agudah, wrote Kol Dodi Dofek and the Drashot? Please, elaborate.
It is not psychobabble to point out obvious bias and disrespect.
Straw man!
The psychobabble (and lashon hara) is that Rabbi Wurzburger "has no respect for those Torah sages and Torah communities that ascribe to this principle. I believe that his bias has caused him to distort the words of his rebbe and to see in his rebbe's actions a position that his rebbe may not have held."
I don't understand how a valid critique of another community somehow indicates that somebody has no respect for that community. Note for example the Rav's critiques of the Agudah quoted in R. Carmy's article.
Is it available online?
I found it online recently, but I forgot where.
I have read several discussions of the article and nothing I have seen has been particularly impressive.
Where and what struck you as unimpressive?
Well, it seems that in the opinions of several of Rav Soloveitchik's most prominent students (Rav Lichtenstien, Rav Carmy, and Rav Rekeffet-Rothkoff) that Rav Soloveitchik believed the opposite to be true.
Every single person you just mentioned believed that the Rav changed his mind about the viability of Daas Torah after leaving the Agudah! (and talk about arguing from authority...somehow Katz's logic can go against "common sense" but if the Rav argues something, that means the issue's not so simple? Please!)
Quite frankly, I find it hard to beleive that Kaplan presents some kind of secret wisdom in his article that could effectively reduce all of this evidence to nothing...If you truly feel, for example, that Kaplan's article presents some powerful argument or critical piece of evidence that no one else is aware of, then you should present it.
What evidence? The evidence of history? It points towards the opposite conclusion; all the experts think you're wrong, so it can't be as simple as you think, right?
It's impossible to encapsulate the literature surrounding DT in a soundbite (or, to put it another way: "Only the extremes are logical, but they are absurd."). How about this? You give me the strongest single example of Daas Torah you can think of from the time of the Rishonim until pre-Chasam Sofer outside of Hungary (because it's easy to muddle the waters with Hungarian extremism and vague occurences before the rishonim) and I'll refute it convincingly.
At no point in this discussion have I rejected a point based purely on an accusation of bias or ignorance.
ReplyDeleteYou'll excuse me for thinking of this conversation as an extension of our previous one where you wrote:
I will point out that it is obviously an issue with heavy political and ideological implications, and, as such, any scholarship has to be read with a strong dose of skepticism.
In any event, the points I have made are all based on basic history and common-sense. Simply referring to scholarship without actually rebutting my points is nothing more than arguing from authority
By the by, I'm no "talmid" of Kaplan and I do disagree with him, and vehemently, on certain issues in that essay; some of it represents shoddy scholarship at best. But it's the best treatment out right now and his thesis is unhindered.
rtw said...
ReplyDelete"That Rav Soloveitchik's general attitude towards Torah leadership changed is fairly clear; that this was accompanied by a genuine change is his philosophy is not."
Taken on it's face, this is the most ridiculous statement I've ever read. Are we talking about the same Rav who, after leaving the Agudah, wrote Kol Dodi Dofek and the Drashot? Please, elaborate.
Well, of course it's ridicuous when taken out of context of the issue we are discussing, i.e. "Daas Torah". That Rav Soloveitchik changed his philosophy regarding Zionism and any number of ther issues is obvious. That he changed his philosophy regarding Torah leadership is not. Many of his students maintain that he did, but, as Rav Carmy makes clear, that is not really evident from his writings.
"It is not psychobabble to point out obvious bias and disrespect."
Straw man!
The psychobabble (and lashon hara) is that Rabbi Wurzburger "has no respect for those Torah sages and Torah communities that ascribe to this principle. I believe that his bias has caused him to distort the words of his rebbe and to see in his rebbe's actions a position that his rebbe may not have held."
I don't understand how a valid critique of another community somehow indicates that somebody has no respect for that community. Note for example the Rav's critiques of the Agudah quoted in R. Carmy's article.
Well, at the risk of repeating myself, if one would argue that the reason that some reject "Daas Torah" is out of a "desperate desire to escape religious authority," few would consider that a respectful statement. Ascribing the position of the bulk of the gedolei Torah of the past century and their communities to psychological immaturity (i.e. "desperately seeking to escape from personal responsibility) is pop psychology of the most irresponsible kind (akin to Obama's comment about "bitter" people "clinging to guns and religion") and displays a deep disdain for those he disagrees with.
Rav Soloveitchik's criticisms of Agudah cited by R' Carmy, as hyperbolic as they may be, are not analogous in the least to Wurzburger's disdainful dismissal.
Incidentally, I don't understand what your "Straw man!" comment is intended to convey. A straw man argument is a common logical fallacy caused by misrepresenting the position you oppose. (Thus, in our context for example, claiming that "Daas Torah" means infallibilty or requires one to consult with a gadol before making any personal decision would be straw man arguments because they misrepresent the actual position of "Daas Torah".) I fail to see how this fallacy might apply to the text you are quoting.
"Is it available online?"
I found it online recently, but I forgot where.
I put in a an interlibrary loan for it at my local library but it may be several weeks before I get it.
"I have read several discussions of the article and nothing I have seen has been particularly impressive."
Where and what struck you as unimpressive?
That is virtually impossible question to answer. If, after I eventually read the essay, this discussion is still ongoing, I will provide my analysis then.
"Well, it seems that in the opinions of several of Rav Soloveitchik's most prominent students (Rav Lichtenstien, Rav Carmy, and Rav Rekeffet-Rothkoff) that Rav Soloveitchik believed the opposite to be true."
Every single person you just mentioned believed that the Rav changed his mind about the viability of Daas Torah after leaving the Agudah!
Yes (with the possible exception of Rav Carmy), but if you followed my original point regarding Rav Soloveitchik, that doesn't matter. As I said (several comments back when I first raised the issue of Rav Soloveitchik), "given that this was R' Soloveitchik's initial opinion, that would seem to indicate that even those who question the concept of Daas Torah should be less quick to reject it out of hand as an obviously modern innovation." The fact that he later changed his mind about the viability of Torah leadership does not change my point.
(and talk about arguing from authority...somehow Katz's logic can go against "common sense" but if the Rav argues something, that means the issue's not so simple? Please!)
First of all, I never rejected Katz's logic regarding the origin of "Daas Torah" because he does not present any. As I pointed out, in his essay he takes it for granted that "Daas Torah" is a modern innovation (and, as you pointed out, his "source" is Kaplan).
Secondly, the one time I mentioned "common-sense" was to explain the nature of the reasoning I was using in support of "Daas Torah". I never simply rejected something because it went "against" common-sense. Common-sense can frequently be incorrect, but the burden of proof is usually in its favor.
I think we need to review the context in which this discussion began. In a discussion of the issue of priorities in yeshiva education I commented that this issue was a classic example of why we need "Daas Torah" for communal decisions. You responded that this was "pure narishkeit" and that "Daas Torah" is "the strictest, most hardcore, definition of Jewish authority" and "has it's roots in either the Chasam Sofer's students (Katz) or Hasidic Poland or whatever."
I responded: "The claim that the concept of Daas Torah - i.e. Torah leadership - was "invented" in the last two hundred years is, in my opinion, baseless. Throughout history, the leadership of the Jewish people has been dominated by the great Torah sages, whether it was the Sanhedrin in Temple times, the Gaonim of Bavel, the various naggidim of the Sephardic world, the Vaad Arba Aratzos, and, of course, local rabbonim. The only thing that changed in modern times was the need to defend this established practice in the face of new secular Jewish "leaders". (Rav Simcha Wasserman discusses this in his foreword to the Artscroll biography of his father, Reb Elchonon.)"
This statement was what I described as "based on basic history and common-sense." It is obvious that this statement was not intended as a direct rebuttal for any specific arguments that might have been made by Katz or any other academics. I was simply saying that anyone broadly familiar with Torah sources, Jewish culture, and Jewish history would recognize that the idea of rabbinic leadership - "Daas Torah" - is not a new concept or practice. Throughout history, if one asked any Jew (or non-Jew) who was the "leader" of the Jews in a given community, it is a virtual certainty that they would respond, "The rabbi, of course!" This was true even in the event that the community was dominated by a powerful layman (or group of laymen). The people in general saw the rabbis as their leaders.
This claim is virtually self-evident (thus, "common sense"). As R' Simcha Wasserman points out, this state of affairs was simply taken for granted by everyone until late modern times (roughly the turn of the 20th century). (Indeed, prior to modern times, it is questionable whether there were any other potential leaders in the first place. Certainly there were various powerful laymen, both good (e.g. Don Joseph Nasi) and bad (e.g. Yosef ben Toviah), but they were not leaders. It is only in modern times that a broad class of alternate "leaders" arose to compete with the rabbinical monopoly on Jewish leadership.) The academic arguments against "Daas Torah" are a form of historical revisionism. While such scholarship can play an important role, it can also be quite harmful. In any event, when an academic proposes to turn the conventional understanding of history on its head, the burden of proof is on the academic.
What evidence? The evidence of history? It points towards the opposite conclusion; all the experts think you're wrong, so it can't be as simple as you think, right?
When you say "all the experts think you're wrong" you are obviously excluding experts such as the Chafetz Chaim, Rav Elchonon Wasserman, Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzenski, the Chazon Ish, R' Aharon Kotler, Rav Dessler and all of the other gedolei Torah that explicitly endorsed the approach of "Daas Torah" as the traditional mode of Jewish leadership. I assume that by "all the experts" you mean, those few academics who have chosen to write on this topic. (Incidentally, my impression of the secular Jewish histories is that they too generally take rabbinic leadership for granted prior to modern times.)
It's impossible to encapsulate the literature surrounding DT in a soundbite (or, to put it another way: "Only the extremes are logical, but they are absurd.").
This is a familiar pattern. Didn't we have another debate on this blog where one side kept claiming that the other side can't possibly understand the deep and complex ideas underlying their ideology and therefore we had no right to raise questions and concerns?
How about this? You give me the strongest single example of Daas Torah you can think of from the time of the Rishonim until pre-Chasam Sofer outside of Hungary (because it's easy to muddle the waters with Hungarian extremism and vague occurences before the rishonim) and I'll refute it convincingly.
This is an interesting gauntlet you've thrown down. For one thing, when I placed a similar challenge before you (about two weeks ago) you simply ignored it. (When you claimed that "the amount of authority given to Talmudic authorities today... is unprecedented", I responded, "I would appreciate some clear examples of unprecedented authority by modern authorities....")
Your challenge is doubly interesting in that it "conveniently" avoids the very clear examples of rabbinic authority during Talmudic and Geonic times. (To describe the authority of the Geonim as "vague" is somewhat disingenuous.)
Finally, I feel that this challenge may inappropriately shift the burden of proof. As I explained earlier, I believe that the "Daas Torah" position clearly has prior claim as the status quo conception of Jewish leadership throughout history. Even someone like Rav Soloveitchik considered the non-"Daas Torah" position to be a "shitah chadasha", even if he ultimately sided with that shitah.
Nevertheless, I believe I will take up your challenge within the limits of my abilities and time constraints (no more chol hamoed). There are, of course, a number of difficulties. What exactly would an ideological opponent of "Daas Torah" consider a "strong" example of "Daas Torah"?
Would the leadership roles played by such figures as Rambam, R' Yitzchak Abarbanel, and R' Menashe b. Yisrael - with their strong ties to the non-Jewish world - constitute "strong" examples? Perhaps they are just odd, coincidental cases of Jewish leaders who also just "happened" to be gedolei Torah?
Would the traditional role of the Sephardic nagiddim be an example of "Daas Torah? After all, many of these figures included great gedolei Torah, such as the Rambam, R' Avraham ben haRambam, and R' Shmuel HaNagid. But, on the other hand, many of the nagidim are obscure figures and some appear to have been laymen. So, while this does not necessarily contradict the claims of the proponents of "Daas Torah", it may not be a "strong" example either. (A brief review of the Sefer Hakabala l'ha'Raavad would seem to indicate that the nagiddim served under the authority of the religious leaders, but I haven't had time to study this fully. Another interesting consideration: When the office of nagid in Egypt was abolished in 1517 by the Turks, it was replaced with a "chief rabbi" in the person of the Radvaz. This would seem to indicate that the leadership role of nagid was similar in nature to rabbinic authority.)
What about the famous "Vaad Arba Aratzos"? There we find a case of clear communal authority vested in an organization in which rabbonim played an integral role. The counter-argument might be that, ultimately, the Vaad did contain an important lay component, so without very clear knowledge of the inner workings of the Vaad (which does not apear to exist), it may or may not be a "strong" example. However, it is clear that the rabbonim had a very prominent leadership role within the Vaad. R' Nosson Hanover's description of the Vaad as "כמו סנהדרין בלשכת הגזית" would also seem to indicate that Vaad was not viewed primarily as a lay organization.
So, what would some "strong" examples be?
Perhaps the leadership of the Maharal is a "strong" example of "Daas Torah". As is clear from any review of his life, he was seen as a leader not simply in Torah knowledge and teaching, but also in practical matters, such as communal regulations and taxation, as well as in interaction with non-Jewish authorities. Moreoever, it appears that these functions were, for the most part, not truly unique to him but were seen as the legitimate general function of rabbonim.
Another possible "strong" example might be the Tosefos Yom Tov, R' Yom Tov Lippman Heller, who similar to the Maharal (whom he studied under) functioned in the role of rabbi not simply as a religious functionary but as the clear chief of the mundane aspects of communal affairs as well. (It was these responsibilities that gained him the enmity of some, and eventually led to his imprisonment.)
Another possible "strong" example of "Daas Torah" is the leadership of R' Yoselman of Rosheim, the famous shtadlan of German Jewry in the 16th century.
Or perhaps we have a "strong" example in the famous meeting in St. Petersburg in 1843, when the Russian government, at the instigation of the maskilim, convened a council to discuss modifiying the traditional methods of Jewish education. Who were the representatives of the traditional Jews? None other than the rosh yeshiva of Volozhin, R' Yitzchak (son of R' Chaim) Volozhiner and the Lubavitcher rebbe, R' Menachem Mendel - the Tzemach Tzedek. They were the one's recognized to be the true leaders of Torah Jewry.
Of course, no single example will prove the case. Nevertheless, for an open-minded person familiar with Jewish history there is a clear pattern. Leadership in the Jewish nation has traditionally rested in the hands of the rabbinic leaders, the gedolei Torah. There were, of course, places and times when this was not so, or at least, not fully so, but the general pattern is clear.
rtw said (in a separate comment)...
"At no point in this discussion have I rejected a point based purely on an accusation of bias or ignorance."
You'll excuse me for thinking of this conversation as an extension of our previous one where you wrote:
"I will point out that it is obviously an issue with heavy political and ideological implications, and, as such, any scholarship has to be read with a strong dose of skepticism."
"In any event, the points I have made are all based on basic history and common-sense. Simply referring to scholarship without actually rebutting my points is nothing more than arguing from authority."
Do you actually see these statements as contradictory?
Recommending skepticism because of possible bias is not the same as rejecting a point based solely on the accusation of bias. The first is a basic aspect of responsible reading and thinking while the second is itself a form of bias. I have made this point previously and I find it disturbing that you do not seem to grasp it.
By the by, I'm no "talmid" of Kaplan and I do disagree with him, and vehemently, on certain issues in that essay; some of it represents shoddy scholarship at best. But it's the best treatment out right now and his thesis is unhindered.
Are you truly saying that the only reason you accept Kaplan's thesis is because, despite its flaws, it's the best academic discussion available? Is this how you decide where you stand on important Jewish issues?
"That Rav Soloveitchik's general attitude towards Torah leadership changed is fairly clear; that this was accompanied by a genuine change is his philosophy is not."...That Rav Soloveitchik changed his philosophy regarding Zionism and any number of ther issues is obvious. That he changed his philosophy regarding Torah leadership is not. Many of his students maintain that he did, but, as Rav Carmy makes clear, that is not really evident from his writings.
ReplyDeleteSo he changed his "attitude towards Torah leadership" but not his "philosophy towards Torah leadership?" Sorry, still don't understand what you're saying (do you, Dr. Eidensohn? Maybe you could elaborate for me). Please elaborate.
Ascribing the position of the bulk of the gedolei Torah of the past century and their communities to psychological immaturity...is pop psychology of the most irresponsible kind
I don't agree that applying Eric Fromm's writings about fundamentalism to the haredim represents "pop psychology of the most irresponsible kind." I guess we'll have to agree to disagree unless there's something additional you can bring to this conversation.
...and displays a deep disdain for those he disagrees with. Rav Soloveitchik's criticisms of Agudah cited by R' Carmy, as hyperbolic as they may be, are not analogous in the least to Wurzburger's disdainful dismissal.
“demand nothing of their followers (not diligence at the gates of Torah, nor unadulterated
fear of Heaven, nor dispersal of funds for charity, nor punctilious observance of mizvot) except expressions of vilification and scorn regarding our movement.” So you don't believe those critiques display disrespect?
Incidentally, I don't understand what your "Straw man!" comment is intended to convey...
Please don't patronize me by explaining what a straw man argument is.
"Obvious bias and disrespect" is different from "no respect." and "his bias has caused him to distort the words of his rebbe and to see in his rebbe's actions a position that his rebbe may not have held." The latter two were my complaint about psychobabble.
Anyways, you don't seem to have any evidence in relation to that last claim, especially considering certain comments of the Rav regarding haredim, so I dismiss it.
That is virtually impossible question to answer. If, after I eventually read the essay, this discussion is still ongoing, I will provide my analysis then.
It won't be. I'm going back to work in a few days and I hope to end this conversation then. If not then, I certainly won't be able to carry it on for several weeks. But I encourage you to send your questions to a scholar of intellectual history and fight it out with him. Living in an intellectual bubble is bad for everybody, which is why I personally sought out the most intelligent and wise Modern Orthodox rabbanim and scholars I could find, as well as the best of the English-speaking haredi crop and debated everything before coming to my current (always tentative) conclusions.
First of all, I never rejected Katz's logic regarding the origin of "Daas Torah"
You did before finding the essay.
When you say "all the experts think you're wrong" you are obviously excluding experts such as the Chafetz Chaim, Rav Elchonon Wasserman, Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzenski, the Chazon Ish, R' Aharon Kotler, Rav Dessler and all of the other gedolei Torah that explicitly endorsed the approach of "Daas Torah" as the traditional mode of Jewish leadership. I assume that by "all the experts" you mean, those few academics who have chosen to write on this topic.
Er, yes, I am excluding all of them. All of the academic experts on this topic disagree with the gedolim you named.
(Incidentally, my impression of the secular Jewish histories is that they too generally take rabbinic leadership for granted prior to modern times.)
examples?
Didn't we have another debate on this blog where one side kept claiming that the other side can't possibly understand the deep and complex ideas underlying their ideology and therefore we had no right to raise questions and concerns?
Oh, come off it. I explicitly challenged you to a debate. I only retracted once I saw how little you've read of the literature on the specific topic. I thought it only fair to debate you about the Rav's position on the matter since you did actually read R. Wurzburger's essay.
From there we've gone into the heart of the very subject I wanted to avoid in the first place, DT in and of itself. And I've simply "rolled with the flow" as they say. Oh, well.
And let's say it's an interesting pattern. So it's an interesting pattern. That's nice. Would you rather me stop debating you because I do believe you're biased and your points aren't as cogent as your (eloquent) expression? Wouldn't that represent a fundamental weakness to my positions, etc.?
For one thing, when I placed a similar challenge before you (about two weeks ago) you simply ignored it. (When you claimed that "the amount of authority given to Talmudic authorities today... is unprecedented", I responded, "I would appreciate some clear examples of unprecedented authority by modern authorities....")
see above.
Your challenge is doubly interesting in that it "conveniently" avoids the very clear examples of rabbinic authority during Talmudic and Geonic times. (To describe the authority of the Geonim as "vague" is somewhat disingenuous.)
Finally, I feel that this challenge may inappropriately shift the burden of proof. As I explained earlier, I believe that the "Daas Torah" position clearly has prior claim as the status quo conception of Jewish leadership throughout history. Even someone like Rav Soloveitchik considered the non-"Daas Torah" position to be a "shitah chadasha", even if he ultimately sided with that shitah.
Where does the Rav consider that position to be a shitah chadasha? What's your source?
You have several thousands years to choose from. I would think that if DT was so obviously inherent in Jewish history, you wouldn't need to rely on gaonic examples. Indeed, acharonic examples are best due to the larger amounts of evidence we have in our possession to these periods of history.
And I see you're not relying on them. So let's just use your examples. If you think I'm being disingenuous, that's your perogative.
Now onto your examples: I'm sorry, but are those your final answers? There are so many perhapses and maybes in there that I'm not sure I'm not accusing you of anything; I just want to make sure these are the examples you're using.
And I want to know specific examples of where they utilized DT. All of the figures you mentioned were obviously "gedolim," nobody disagrees with that. Vis-a-vis what issues did they operate utilizing this specific mode of rabbinic authority? Please give me specific issues, not just names of rabbis (otherwise you're not really providing proofs as much as making vague references to them and I my friend, am not a psychic.). If you think they operated on it in relation to "all issues," then give me one example for them.
I have made this point previously and I find it disturbing that you do not seem to grasp it.
That's nice.
It's that you think that all of the academic experts' logic in understanding intellectual Jewish history can go against common sense that disturbs me. I have made this point previously and I fail to understand how you don't understand it.
Are you truly saying that the only reason you accept Kaplan's thesis is because, despite its flaws, it's the best academic discussion available? Is this how you decide where you stand on important Jewish issues?
No and no. Certain elements, mostly in the footnotes, of Kaplan's essay itself are off IMHO. None of the problems hinder his thesis.
I had to write a ton here and it took me a lot of time. I did so to show you that I have an answer to all your arguments -- if I hadn't responded at such length, you might have taken that as an inherent weakness in my arguments; I might have missed some by accident due to the length of your comment. But in the future, I won't write comments at such length and will only respond to the most important arguments. I would ask that you please keep your comments' length to a minimum so we can focus on the most important points.
By the bye, when you wrote "rabbinic leadership," I took it as DT.
ReplyDeletertw said...
ReplyDeleteSo he changed his "attitude towards Torah leadership" but not his "philosophy towards Torah leadership?" Sorry, still don't understand what you're saying.... Please elaborate.
It is quite common for people to express cycnicism about something that, in principle, they agree with. Thus, for example, many loyal American's can be quite cycnical about democracy in general and American democracy in particular, but this does not mean that they think the system should discarded. Similarly, many who believe that the "Daas Torah" model of Jewish leadership is correct may still be quite cycnical and frustrated about much that goes on within that system. This does not mean that they believe any other system would be superior.
That Rav Soloveitchik expressed cycnicism and frustration with rabbinic leadership, especially rabbinc leadership among those communities he ideologically disagreed with, is not surprising in the least. This does not necessarily mean that he actually changed his philosophy.
“demand nothing of their followers (not diligence at the gates of Torah, nor unadulterated fear of Heaven, nor dispersal of funds for charity, nor punctilious observance of mizvot) except expressions of vilification and scorn regarding our movement.” So you don't believe those critiques display disrespect?
To express frustration - in a letter to a colleague - about one's unnamed ideological opponents for their apparent obsessive opposition, even in hyperbolic terms, is not the same as saying that they only believe what they believe because they are emotionally immature.
"(Incidentally, my impression of the secular Jewish histories is that they too generally take rabbinic leadership for granted prior to modern times.)"
examples?
An "impression" is something that develops over a long time from wide exposure. It is not something based on a concrete example. (Dictionary definition: "A vague notion, remembrance, or belief.") There is a reason I put this in parentheses.
"Even someone like Rav Soloveitchik considered the non-"Daas Torah" position to be a "shitah chadasha", even if he ultimately sided with that shitah."
Where does the Rav consider that position to be a shitah chadasha? What's your source?
The hesped on R' Chaim Ozer. I quoted the relevant passage earlier:
ובתקופה האחרונה שיטה חדשה נולדה בישראל, המבדלת ... בין גאון הדור ובין מנהיג הדור
You have several thousands years to choose from.
Several thousand? The gaonic period ended roughly a thousand years ago.
Now onto your examples: I'm sorry, but are those your final answers? ....
And I want to know specific examples of where they utilized DT. All of the figures you mentioned were obviously "gedolim," nobody disagrees with that. Vis-a-vis what issues did they operate utilizing this specific mode of rabbinic authority? Please give me specific issues, not just names of rabbis (otherwise you're not really providing proofs as much as making vague references to them and I my friend, am not a psychic.). If you think they operated on it in relation to "all issues," then give me one example for them.
I think this question illustrates that we have been talking at cross-purposes here for the bulk of this discussion. (A concern I raised at the beginning.) I'm not certain we are even talking about the same issue.
To clarify, I said early in this discussion (here) that, "In its most basic sense, the concept of daas Torah is simply that it is those within a community who have acheived the highest levels of Torah perfection who are best qualified to decide communal questions."
Or, as I put it here, it is "that those who have acheived the highest levels of Torah perfection are best qualified to be Jewish leaders."
"Daas Torah" is a model of communal organization. In the "Daas Torah" model, the leaders of the community, meaning those who make the critical decisions regarding communal policies and priorities, should be those within that community who have acheived the highest level of Torah perfection. (This can also be called "rabbinic leadership", in that such leaders are usually called rabbis.) Such leadership is not relegated only to "religious" issues but applies to all aspects of community affairs, including the community's dealings with the non-Jewish world.
The "Daas Torah" model does not require some kind of unique method of decision making on the part of the rabbinic leaders. Nor does it expect such rabbinic leaders to make decisions without input from laymen. It demands only that the final decision on communal affairs must rest with the rabbinic leadership.
Why? Because virtually all communal decisions involve value judgements. The main responsibility of any leader is to make such value judgements in a way that is consistent with his community's value system. The value system of a Jewish community comes from the Torah, thus those who have the greatest degree of Torah knowledge (combined with the various character traits necessary for true Torah knowledge) are the best qualified to make such decisions.
My point, from the very beginning of this discussion, was that this model of Jewish communal organization, which we call "Daas Torah", is not new but has been the dominant model throughout history. The examples I gave were all examples of gedolei Torah engaged in communal leadership in the broadest possible sense, not limited simply to religious aspects.
It seems that when you refer to "Daas Torah", you mean something quite different. You appear to mean some kind of decision making process that is unique to talmidei chachamim. While I don't deny that such unique processes exist, they are extraneous to the basic concept of "Daas Torah". For example, while talmidei chachamim may well have unique siyata d'shmaya (Heavenly assistance) in their decision making, this idea is not necessary for the concept of "Daas Torah." Even if there were no such thing as siyata d'shmaya, the "Daas Torah" concept would still apply.
It was my concern regarding this kind of confusion very early in this discussion that caused me to write, "Perhaps you are operating with some other definition for Daas Torah. If so, then we are talking at cross-purposes. Moreover, if your definition of "daas Torah" is different, that might explain why you are so quick to attack it."
I believe it is now obvious that my original concern was correct and that we are not using the same definition. I am not sure how this arose, as I have been very clear, many times, as to exactly what I mean when I refer to "Daas Torah." Almost every comment I have made on this topic has had some restatement of the definition of "Daas Torah" that I have been using. I don't know how I could have made my intent clearer.
In any event, given the definition I have been using and the point I have been arguing for, each of the examples I gave is valid. However, as I pointed out, proving that the "Daas Torah" model was the dominant model throughout history obviously cannot be done from a single example, or even several examples. Nevertheless, as I said earlier, "for an open-minded person familiar with Jewish history there is a clear pattern. Leadership in the Jewish nation has traditionally rested in the hands of the rabbinic leaders, the gedolei Torah."
1. "Several thousands" was a gaffe on my part, much like Senator Obama's gaffe that he's been to 57 states.
ReplyDeletecycnicism
2. I now understand your assessments of R. Wurzburger and the Rav's views on things, but I disagree with them. I disagree with your position on R. Wurzburger for the reasons stated in my last comment and I disagree with your assessment of the Rav because of what R. Carmy says in his essay about oral evidence, which seems to be around for anybody looking. I don't think we'll get any further on this topic.
3. Although it's possible we understand Daas Torah differently, that's not clear at all from my quote and I am attacking a certain view which is most certainly yours -- I disagree with your claim that communal leadership was traditionally ceded to the gedolim. I think this quote from Haym Soloveitchik's now-legendary essay really sums up my view and what I'm trying to argue:
It is a wholly different thing to defer to rabbinic authority on social and political issues that are only tangentially religious, if at all. It is the latter, the new political empowerment, that is the subject of both Bacon's study and this essay...Talmudic authorities did indeed take stands on political issues in the past. What is new in the contemporary scene is the unprecedented frequency and scope of these stands, and the authority currently ceded to them.)
And I can at least show an open-minded person that this is a viable view (even though I think it's the only rational view) by throwing down any and all examples of Daas Torah you can throw at me.
rtw said...
ReplyDeleteI disagree with your claim that communal leadership was traditionally ceded to the gedolim. I think this quote from Haym Soloveitchik's now-legendary essay really sums up my view and what I'm trying to argue:
"It is a wholly different thing to defer to rabbinic authority on social and political issues that are only tangentially religious, if at all. It is the latter, the new political empowerment, that is the subject of both Bacon's study and this essay...Talmudic authorities did indeed take stands on political issues in the past. What is new in the contemporary scene is the unprecedented frequency and scope of these stands, and the authority currently ceded to them.)"
Dr. Soloveitchik's essay, legendary as it may be, is a rather mixed piece of work. While the essay is clearly a product of great scholarship and makes a number of important and profound points, it is also flawed in a number of ways. In his writing, Dr. Soloveitchik is quite unclear about many of his points, employs imprecise language, and jumps to unjustified conclusions. (I am not interested in making a lengthy defense of this assessment. The following example will have to suffice for this discussion.)
With regard to rabbinic authority, Dr. Soloveitchik's main concern appears to be not rabbinic authority per se, but the shift of such authority from one group of rabbis (communal rabbonim) to a different group of rabbis (roshei yeshiva). He explicitly acknowledges that the authority of communal rabbonim was quite broad:
"Authority long associated in Eastern Europe with the city rabbi, who functioned as a quasi-religious mayor, has now passed, and dramatically so, to Talmudic sages, generally the heads of Talmudic academies—roshei yeshivah." (Emphasis added)
(Of course, as Dr. Soloveitchik alludes to in fn. 85, the division between these two groups was itself a modern development. Thus it could be argued, contrary to Dr. Soloveitchik's apparent interpretation, that a division of late development (separating communal rabbonim from roshei yeshiva) was now collapsing in favor of a more unified and traditional conception of rabbinic leadership.)
The issue of "which" rabbis should hold political authority is quite distinct from the question of "if" rabbis should hold political authority. In the first, the concept of "Daas Torah", per se, is unquestioned but merely faces a challenge in application.
Dr. Soloveitchik also acknowledges explicitly (fn. 85) that "Until the death of R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzienski in 1940, political leadership was firmly in the hands of the rabbinate." Thus, it seems to me that his assertion that applying rabbinic authority to non-halachic issues is a recent development simply cannot be taken that seriously.
And I can at least show an open-minded person that this is a viable view (even though I think it's the only rational view) by throwing down any and all examples of Daas Torah you can throw at me.
I have given already given you several examples of the "Daas Torah" model in action at various points of history. That is the concept of "Daas Torah" that I am defending and the cases I have given are clear examples of this concept. You have yet to respond to any of them. I have no interest in defending the definition of "Daas Torah" that you are discussing, even if I agree with aspects of it, because I see it as a distraction from the core issue.
If you do indeed disagree with my claim that Jewish communal leadership has traditionally rested in the hands of the rabbinic leaders, then please respond by showing how the cases I have cited are not examples of rabbinic leadership extending to include, in Dr. Soloveitchik's terms, "social and political issues that are only tangentially religious, if at all."
Although it's possible we understand Daas Torah differently, that's not clear at all from my quote and I am attacking a certain view which is most certainly yours -- I disagree with your claim that communal leadership was traditionally ceded to the gedolim. I think this quote from Haym Soloveitchik's now-legendary essay really sums up my view and what I'm trying to argue:
ReplyDeleteIt is a wholly different thing to defer to rabbinic authority on social and political issues that are only tangentially religious, if at all. It is the latter, the new political empowerment, that is the subject of both Bacon's study and this essay...Talmudic authorities did indeed take stands on political issues in the past. What is new in the contemporary scene is the unprecedented frequency and scope of these stands, and the authority currently ceded to them.)
And I can at least show an open-minded person that this is a viable view (even though I think it's the only rational view) by throwing down any and all examples of Daas Torah you can throw at me.
But you haven't given me one example. All you've done is list off names. Show me! Vis-a-vis what communal matters did the Rambam etc. institute DT?
And if we have different views of DT, we'll work it out through our discussion of the examples.
But if you don't give me any examples, I'm awalking away.
rtw said...
ReplyDeleteBut you haven't given me one example. All you've done is list off names. Show me! Vis-a-vis what communal matters did the Rambam etc. institute DT?
Your question shows that you are entirely missing my point. You are asking me to provide examples to a claim that I have never made. I have not been arguing that the Rambam (or anyone else) ever "instituted" "Daas Torah" in connection to any specific issue (I don't even know what that would mean); I am arguing that his leadership was, in of itself, an example of "Daas Torah."
Again (for the umpteenth time), "Daas Torah" is an approach towards choosing communal leaders. In a community that follows "Daas Torah", the communal leaders will be the Torah scholars.
Thus, the fact that the Rambam was the leader of his community (and one of the main leaders of world Jewry) is an example of the "Daas Torah" model.
So is the leadership of all the other figures I mentioned. They all had leadership roles that clearly included "social and political issues", as I pointed out in each case.
Again, briefly:
The Maharal and Tosefos Yom Tov were communal rabbonim and, in that role, were involved in decision making regarding every aspect of communal life, including taxation and interaction with the non-Jewish government. This can be confirmed through any reliable historical source. (It is also clear that these functions were the expected, even required, responsibility of all community rabbonim.)
R' Yoselman of Rosheim of 16th century Germany was a great talmid chacham and was famous for his shtadlanus in dealing with the non-Jewish powers on behalf of the Jewish people. Again, this can be confirmed through any reliable history.
When the Russian government convened a council to discuss issues of importance to Russian Jewry, the representatives of the traditional Jewish communities were the leading gedolei Torah of the time. This famous incident can be confirmed in any serious Jewish history (esp. those dealing with the Haskala movement).
All of these are examples of rabbinic leaders functioning in leadership roles regarding "social and political issues that are only tangentially religious, if at all." As such, they all are illustrations of the one, single point I have been making, "that Jewish communal leadership has traditionally rested in the hands of the rabbinic leaders." This, and only this, is the claim that I have been making and these examples clearly illustrate my claim.
It seems that either you are not understanding what I'm saying or that you don't wish to debate this point, and desire to shift the discussion to some other issue. I'm not even clear on what that other issue might be.
Re your point on RaR, the reason it's not a throwback to a more traditional and unified leadership is because this leadership style is a new one, at least post-Sanhedrin.
ReplyDeleteYou seem really quick to throw around insults at non-chareidi interlocutors. R' Wurzburger had no respect for the charedim, Jacob Katz didn't know history as well as you do ("common sense and basic history"). I was reacting irrationally to a code word...talk about "pop psychology!"
But I think rather than your two recommendations that you don't understand what I'm saying. What were the communal issue that they took stances on?
Remember how we started this conversation? You said we need DT to decide a very specific communal issue. When I attacked that notion, you said I was reacting irrationally. I'm asking you for some examples of pre-19th century issues. Is that so difficult?
After you do so, I will proceed to demolish your examples, showing you what the gedolim have indicated DT encompasses and how whatever your example is doesn't work. If you don't agree with the gedolim, you can then try and provide a rationale for it.
Last chance.
rtw said...
ReplyDeleteRe your point on RaR, the reason it's not a throwback to a more traditional and unified leadership is because this leadership style is a new one, at least post-Sanhedrin.
For the bulk of the period of the rishonim and acharonim, prior to the founding of Volozhin, the office of communal rav and rosh yeshiva were identical. With the founding of Volozhin, this began to change. Thus, there developed a tension between rabbonim and roshei yeshiva. This was not a major issue in Europe being that the division was far from total (thus, for example, the members of the Soloveitchik family who moved easily between both roles) and had only existed for a relatively short time. In the move to America the difference between the roshei yeshiva and rabbonim became much more pronounced, and that is mostly what Dr. Soloveitchik is talking about.
Prior to the post-Volozhin division between rabbonim and roshei yeshiva, a rav was generally seen as the most prominent talmid chacham in the community. With the division of the two roles, this was no longer necessarily true. Thus, the difficulty for members of the community to know who was the "true" communal leader (this tension arose precisely because the true status of the communal leader was vested in the talmid chacham himself, not the office of rabbi). As time has passed, and the "official rabbinate" has, by and large, become a thing of the past, the emphasis is once again on who is the most prominent talmid chacham. Today, the artificial distinction between rabbonim and roshei yeshiva (which is only about 200 years old) has largely dissolved, leaving a more unified conception of rabbinic leadership, based solely on the (perceived) status of the talmid chacham.
What were the communal issue that they took stances on?
Remember how we started this conversation? You said we need DT to decide a very specific communal issue. When I attacked that notion, you said I was reacting irrationally.
My statement was: "This is a classic moral conflict, and by its very nature, a classic example of why daas Torah is necessary for communal decisions."
As you see from my words, I said that it illustrated why "Daas Torah" is necessary. I did not say it illustrated what "Daas Torah" is.
There are two aspects to the ideology of "Daas Torah":
A) What is "Daas Torah"?
B) Why is "Daas Torah" necessary?
The answer to the first is that "Daas Torah" refers to the belief that talmidei chachamim are the best qualified people to make decisions for a Jewish community.
The answer to the second is, as I have said previously, that leadership decisions, by their nature, require value judgements. The best qualified people to make such value judgements according to Torah values are talmidei chachamim.
My original comment was focused on the second issue, the case in point (priorities within the Jewish educational system) being a classic example of why "Daas Torah" is needed.
You immediately attacked my statement, not on the grounds that it was a poor illustration of why "Daas Torah" is needed, but on the grounds that "Daas Torah" was a modern concept. Your exact words:
"I challenge that said assertion is pure narishkeit. Because there are priority issues in the frum community (like there are in EVERY community) you need the strictest, most hardcore, definition of Jewish authority, which has it's roots in either the Chasam Sofer's students (Katz) or Hasidic Poland or whatever?"
My response and the discussion from that point on has been focused on the historicity of my argument that "Daas Torah" has always been the traditional model of Jewish leadership. I clarified exactly what I meant when I spoke of "Daas Torah" and I argued that this was the traditional mode of Jewish leadership. You claimed that I was wrong but never presented any actual arguments to that effect except to say that the academics disagree. To the degree that I was familiar with the academic arguments, I responded to their claims, but it seems that it all actually comes down to a single article by Lawrence Kaplan which I have not yet read. (Thus, Katz relies on Kaplan's article, as does Dr. Soloveitchik.)
It is only now, after more than two weeks of discussion, that suddenly the issue is no longer the historical validity of my claim, for which I have brought (at your request) a number of examples, but how the "Daas Torah" decision making process has worked in the past, an issue I have never discussed. Quite frankly, I would not arrogate to myself the ability to explain precisely how any gadol may have come to a particular decision. My point has never been about how they decide, only that it is they who decide.
I'm asking you for some examples of pre-19th century issues. Is that so difficult?
It probably would not be, and if the discussion had gone in this direction two weeks ago, I probably would have been able to find some good examples (though, as stated above, I would not claim to be able to reconstruct the decision making process). As it is, this is a sudden change in direction for our discussion, just as I thought we were possibly getting to some kind of substantive dialogue, and I no longer have the time (Yom tov is over, back to work!) nor much interest in starting over again.
After you do so, I will proceed to demolish your examples, showing you what the gedolim have indicated DT encompasses and how whatever your example is doesn't work. If you don't agree with the gedolim, you can then try and provide a rationale for it.
Maybe I'm stupid, but I have no idea what you're trying to say here.
Last chance.
Oh well.
Regarding this dispute as to DT meant the Rav or godol being the source of values for a community because of his being steeped in Torah.
ReplyDeleteI would like to mention that in fact in much of Eastern Europe the Rav or Rosh Yeshiva was not the ultimate decider of community issues or even the community leader. The Rav usually poskened specific issues of kashrus etc while the Rosh Yeshiva taught Torah. The community was usually run by baalei batim also known as the shiva tovei haIr.
If you look at C.M. simon 2 it says, "
שולחן ערוך חושן משפט (סימן ב:א)
כל בית דין, אפילו אינם סמוכים בא"י, אם רואים שהעם פרוצים בעבירות (ושהוא צורך שעה) (טור), היו דנין בין מיתה בין ממון, בין כל דיני עונש, ואפילו אין בדבר עדות גמורה. ואם הוא אלם, חובטים אותו על ידי עובדי כוכבים. ( ויש להם כח להפקיר ממונו ולאבדו כפי מה שרואים לגדור פרצת הדור) (טור בשם הרמב"ם בפרק כ"ד מסנהדרין). וכל מעשיהם יהיו לשם שמים; ודוקא גדול הדור, או טובי העיר שהמחום ב"ד עליהם. הגה: וכן נוהגין בכל מקום שטובי העיר בעירן כב"ד הגדול, מכין ועונשין, והפקרן הפקר כפי המנהג; אעפ"י שיש חולקין וס"ל דאין כח ביד טובי העיר באלה, רק להכריח הצבור במה שהיה מנהג מקדם או שקבלו עליהם מדעת כולם, אבל אינן רשאים לשנות דבר במידי דאיכא רווחא להאי ופסידא להאי, או להפקיע ממון שלא מדעת כולם (מרדכי פ' הגוזל בתרא), מכל מקום הולכין אחר מנהג העיר; וכל שכן אם קבלום עליהם לכל דבר, כן נ"ל (ועיין בי"ד סימן רכ"ח דיני תקנות וחרמי צבור). כתבו האחרונים בתשובותיהם דמי שנתחייב מלקות, יתן ארבעים זהובים במקום מלקות (מהרי"ו סימן קמ"ז ומהר"ם מריזבורק); ולאו דינא קאמר, אלא שהם פסקו כך לפי שעה, אבל ביד הב"ד להלקותו או ליטול ממון כפי ראות עיניהם, לפי הענין, למגדר מלתא (וע"ל ריש סימן תכ"ה בהג"ה).