Rav Chaim Ozer Grodinski(Achiezer 3:26.4):… Because of this reason it appears that Rav Posen is concerned about conversion these cases because they won’t observe the laws properly. However according to what I have explained there is no concern for this since they have accepted to observe all the mitzvos – even though it is true that they have in mind to transgress certain mitzvos later out of lust. However this intention does not disqualify their acceptance of mitzvos. It is only where they specifically refused to accept mitzvos that their acceptance of the mitzvos is disqualified. However where is clear that after conversion they will definitely transgress the Torah prohibitions against violating Shabbos and eating improperly slaughtered meat and we know clearly that their conversion was only for appearance sake without inner sincerity – it is an umdena demukach [a proven assessment] that this that he said he was accepting the mitzvos was totally meaningless. Consequently their acceptance of mitzvos is invalid [and they are not valid converts].
Rav Chaim Ozer Grodinski(Achiezer 3:28): Concerning the common practice of converting women who are married to Jews - according to the straight halacha it is not corrrect to convert them. That is because they are converting for the sake of marriage. Therefore even after marriage she is prohibited to him as is clear from the Rashba (#1205). While previously I had written to be lenient in these cases and I based myself on the Rambam (Pe’er HaDor 132) and Rav Shlomo Kluger also paskened leniently in an actual case. Nevertheless the fact is that there is not genuine acceptance of mitzvos in these cases. It is quite obvious that their hearts are not with the Jewish people since they do not observe Shabbos or niddah and they eat unkosher food as I wrote in the previous letter. This problem has already been noted by by the Beis Yitzchok who concluded that a proper beis din would not be involved in this. And regarding the issue of governing the non‑Jewish children…However the writer is correct that a good beis din should not be involved in this type of conversion. Nevertheless I don’t see that it is proper that the rabbis of the generation should make an open protest against conversion. That is because in the eyes of the masses it would be viewed as a chilul HaShem to prevent the women to convert and in particular their children since according to the straight halacha it is possible to convert them.
Igros Moshe(Y.D. 3:106): A candidate for conversion who does not want to accept a certain mitzva is he a ger bedieved?… Concerning the subject of conversion, the vast majority of them want to convert because of marriage and therefore should inherently not be accepted. However if they were accepted anyway - they are in fact valid gerim. This reservation about accepting converts for the sake of marriage is true even if they accept all the mitzvos since they did not decide to convert for the sake of Heaven. Therefore it is obvious that there is suspicion that despite the fact they stated before the beis din that they are accepting to do the mitzvos – that they are not telling the truth and they need to be examined further. This in fact is the intent of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12): When it is known that they converted for ulterior motivation, they should be treated with suspicion until that their righteous is established. That is because since they converted for ulterior motivation, they should be suspected that even though they have verbally accepted the mitzvos but not in their heart. Since there is clear reason to suspect their lack of sincerity, it is not considered a merely a possible mental reservation which has no halachic significance (devarim sheb’lev). See Tosfos (Gittin 32a) and Tosfos (Kiddushin 49b)…Therefore they are to be viewed as doubtful gerim until their righteousness is establish and then they are viewed as definite gerim. Most of the time and perhaps all of the time when a Jew wants a non‑Jew, that the Jew himself is not observant. Therefore it is not logical that the non‑Jew who is converting for the sake of a Jew will be more observant. It is as if we are witnesses that the non‑Jew is not definitely accepting the mitzvos. Therefore it requires a great deal of deliberation in the acceptance of gerim. Unfortunately due to our many sins the situation has degenerated in many places that they accept these type of gerim – even G‑d fearing rabbis – because of the pressure of congregants on them. Therefore it is very critical to fix and create protective measures to stop this great breakdown of the system. It is certain because of these problems that the rabbis of Holland made a decree that gerim would not be accepted unless all of the rabbis agreed. This type of decree is a legitimate approach to protect the Torah and mitzvos against that which can not be permitted as is stated in Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 228:28). Concerning the present case where the candidate for conversion wants to accept all the laws of the Torah but does not want to accept wearing modest clothing. She wants to wear the clothing that are worn – due to our many sins – by the average woman of this degenerate generation. The question is whether to accept her as a valid ger and if the answer is negative - what is her status if she is accepted anyway? This requires careful thought. Bechoros (30b) states that a non‑Jew who comes to accept the entire Torah except for one thing is not to be accepted. R’ Yose says that he isn’t accepted even if rejects one detail of a rabbinic halacha. The question is whether this gemora is only concerning initially whether to accept the candidate as seems from the language of the gemora or that even if he accepted – he is not a valid ger? It is certain that gerim are accepted even though they don’t know most of the laws of the Torah - because we instruct them only in some of the mitzvos. It is certain that we don’t even teach them most of the laws of Shabbos. Furthermore we find an even more extreme situation in that even if the ger doesn’t know any mitzvos he is still a valid ger. This is stated in Shabbos (68b) that a ger who converts amongst non‑Jews is liable for one chatas for all the violations on every Shabbos and prohibited blood and fat and idolatry. Thus we see that even if he isn’t instructed in a single mitzva or even the foundations of religious belief he is still a valid ger. That is because the case in the gemora concerns a person who has accepted upon himself to do all that a Jew is required to do – and that is sufficient for valid conversion. We are not concerned with the possibility that if he knew this particular mitzva he would not accept it. That is because even if it were so it is only a mental reservation which has no halachic significance. Thus informing a candidate for conversion of the nature of mitzvos is only something that is desirable, but has no halachic consequence if not done. Therefore we must say that the language of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:3) “all matters of conversion have to be in the presence of 3 fit to judge whether it is to instruct him about mitzvos or for his acceptance of mitzvos” – is not to be understood literally. That is because the point of the Shulchan Aruch is that the acceptance of mitzvos has to be in the presence of 3 but instructing him about mitzvos is not required for the validity of the conversion. The reason the Shulchan Aruch mentions instructing him in mitzvos is because that is what the beis din does concerning some of the mitzvos when he accepts the obligation to do mitzvos. That is in fact the language of the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 268:12) “and even if he is not informed of the reward and punishment of mitzvos he is still a valid ger.” This wording of the Shulchan Aruch here is also not precise because even if the candidate is not instructed at all concerning any mitzvos – as long as he accepts the obligation to do all the mitzvos that Jews are required to do – he is still a valid ger. It is only because it is typically not forgotten to instruct him in some mitzvos that the Shulchan Aruch mentions that they forgot to instruct him regarding the reward and punishment of mitzvos – because it is possible to forget this occasionally. However if they do tell him a particular mitzva or he knows about it himself since he sees Jews observing it and he says that he doesn’t accept it – that is the case that Bechoros (30b) says that he is not accepted as a ger. Therefore it is possible that in this case even if he was accepted as a ger – despite his rejection of a particular mitzva – bedieved he would still not be a valid ger. However Bechoros (30b) says that he is not to be accepted - which seems to be that he is only not accepted initially if he rejects any mitzva. Furthermore it would seem from the statement of R’ Yose in Bechoros (30b) that even if rejects a single detail of a rabbinic law he is not accepted – it would seem that since he has accepted every Torah mitzva including not to deviate from the rabbinic teachings – but at least he would be a ger according to the Torah. That is because it doesn’t make sense that the Sages would uproot the Torah level conversion - which is relevant to the validity of marriage and other matters – and to create a leniency and that this would not be mentioned openly in the gemora. Therefore we can conclude that even according to R’ Yose he is only saying not to accept them initially but if they were accepted – even if they had rejected a rabbinic law – they are still valid gerim. Furthermore they would be obligated to keep even the mitzva that they had rejected. That is because this that they did not accept it has no halachic significance to exempt them because they are make a condition against that which is written in the Torah – and therefore the condition is nullified... Therefore this woman who doesn’t want to accept to wear only modest clothing should definitely not be accepted initially. However whether she should be accepted bedieved depends on this doubt and it would seem more likely that bedieved if she was accepted that she would be a valid convert. Furthermore concerning whether to accept her initially – any conversion which is because of marriage even if she accepted the entire Torah – she should not be accepted. If so it is certainly is a major justification for the requirement that all the rabbis of Holland agree to accept her conversion – even if she accepted all the Torah laws. Nevertheless it is good that all the rabbis did not agree to accept her because of her refusal to wear modest clothing. That is because accepting her with two issues against her is much more serious than if she only had one. However there is another consideration since because of our many sins we find that Jewish women also are not careful about wearing only modest clothing – even those who are Torah observant. Therefore a non‑Jewish woman who comes to convert might think that modest clothing in only an act of piety that the rabbis are trying to impose on her more than is actually required – because she knows women who are observant and yet wear immodest clothing. And even if the rabbis tell her that it is actually prohibited and not just an act of piety – she doesn’t believe them. If so perhaps she should be viewed as converting without knowing the laws of the Torah and would be considered a valid ger according to Shabbos (68b)? This seems logical – even though I don’t have a proof for this presently. Nevertheless with all things considered it is better not to accept her because she should not be accepted anyway since the conversion is for the sake of marriage. Therefore even though people are lenient to accept converts for the sake of marriage it is not correct to be lenient in additional factors. Consequently the decree is correct and she should not be accepted.
Igros Moshe (Even ha-Ezer 4:78): Concerning a woman who was married by a Conservative rabbi - in Houston who is known to openly violate Shabbos - to a man who was born in San Salvador to a non‑Jewish woman. The Conservative rabbi there claimed that he converted her together with two local men who were open Shabbos violators because he said that no one observes Shabbos in El Salvador. It is clear that the conversion is of no significance so that even if this couple were married by an Orthodox rabbi according to the halacha it still would have no significance because he is a full non‑Jew for whom kiddushin has no halachic significance. Furthermore even if he were converted by a Torah observant beis din – since he has not observed Torah mitzvos even for a moment he has not accepted the obligation of mitzvos - this is not considered conversion. However if he was a valid ger or was a Jew from birth, the marriage by a Conservative rabbi – who is presumed to deny the foundation principles of Judaism even though we don’t actually know the person and surely here where it is known for certain that he openly violates Shabbos –has no halachic significance. Consequently we have two clear factors why the marriage has no significance and therefore she is permitted to marry another man – but not a cohen since she has had sexual relations with a non‑Jew which disqualifiers her from marrying a cohen.