Rav Yehuda Silman (Yeschurun 15): Question: Is it permitted to kill someone that there are doubts whether he is in fact a rodef (threat to life)? I was asked concerning a security guard in a public place e.g., the entrance of a restaurant or a mall who notices a man approach and he appears suspicious. The person is acting strangely and appears to be an Arab. When the security guard approaches him, he begins to run. The security guards suspects that he is a terrorist. This is only a suspicion since it is possible that he is in fact a Jew and there are people in the world who act strangely. In addition it is possible that the suspicious stranger is running away simply out of panic. However it is possible that in a short time the stranger will in fact cause a serious terror attack. Is it permitted to kill the stranger when the facts are not clear? This is a common question and a similar question can be asked regarding a bank teller who is suddenly confronted with a bandit with a pistol in his hand. There are many times when it is later determined that the gun was only a toy and even if it were real the bandit didn’t intend to kill but only to scare the bank teller. Nevertheless there is a doubt whether the person is in danger. In such circumstances is it permitted to kill him? Answer:… Conclusions: 1) It appears that we hold in practice that it is permitted to killed a suspected rodef. In other words someone who is doing activities that endanger others even if there are doubts. … 4) Therefore in the two versions of the question that were asked concerning a suspicious person it is permitted to kill him. That is only in a case there are valid bases to suspect that he is trying to kill. 5) In contrast in the case of someone running in the forest or is shooting and there are doubts as to his intent[ - he is not to be viewed as a rodef because we assume he has a legitimate reason for doing these things (chezkas kashrus).
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Suspected rodef - defensive behavior when it is possible but not certain someone is a threat
Rav Yehuda Silman (Yeschurun 15): Question: Is it permitted to kill someone that there are doubts whether he is in fact a rodef (threat to life)? I was asked concerning a security guard in a public place e.g., the entrance of a restaurant or a mall who notices a man approach and he appears suspicious. The person is acting strangely and appears to be an Arab. When the security guard approaches him, he begins to run. The security guards suspects that he is a terrorist. This is only a suspicion since it is possible that he is in fact a Jew and there are people in the world who act strangely. In addition it is possible that the suspicious stranger is running away simply out of panic. However it is possible that in a short time the stranger will in fact cause a serious terror attack. Is it permitted to kill the stranger when the facts are not clear? This is a common question and a similar question can be asked regarding a bank teller who is suddenly confronted with a bandit with a pistol in his hand. There are many times when it is later determined that the gun was only a toy and even if it were real the bandit didn’t intend to kill but only to scare the bank teller. Nevertheless there is a doubt whether the person is in danger. In such circumstances is it permitted to kill him? Answer:… Conclusions: 1) It appears that we hold in practice that it is permitted to killed a suspected rodef. In other words someone who is doing activities that endanger others even if there are doubts. … 4) Therefore in the two versions of the question that were asked concerning a suspicious person it is permitted to kill him. That is only in a case there are valid bases to suspect that he is trying to kill. 5) In contrast in the case of someone running in the forest or is shooting and there are doubts as to his intent[ - he is not to be viewed as a rodef because we assume he has a legitimate reason for doing these things (chezkas kashrus).
Dangers of selling (giving away) chametz - actualized
JPOST
Kikarhashabbat
As reported by haredi media outlets, members of the Mishkenot Yaakov community in the capital’s Ramat Shlomo neighborhood were encouraged by their Rabbi Simcha Rabinowitz to take the tradition one step further, and rather than selling the hametz, actually give it to the non-Jew, who would presumably return it after the holiday.
Many people chose to put their products – including expensive alcoholic beverages – in the room destined for the hametz, believing that such an act would be a higher degree of observing the holiday’s prohibition of not owning leavened products.
After the transaction took place and shortly before the holiday began, however, the gentile arrived with his vehicle and proceeded to take the goods, which were legally his. Objecting to his actions was not an option, since that would prove that the deal was not sincere, which would mean that the hametz would have belonged to the Jews.
Many people chose to put their products – including expensive alcoholic beverages – in the room destined for the hametz, believing that such an act would be a higher degree of observing the holiday’s prohibition of not owning leavened products.
After the transaction took place and shortly before the holiday began, however, the gentile arrived with his vehicle and proceeded to take the goods, which were legally his. Objecting to his actions was not an option, since that would prove that the deal was not sincere, which would mean that the hametz would have belonged to the Jews.
Kikarhashabbat
תושבי רמת שלמה הופתעו: הגוי החליט לממש את זכותו
מקרה לא-נעים בשכונת רמת שלמה בירושלים, כאשר עשרות אנשים הפסידו את מיטב "חמצם", לאחר שהגוי מימש את זכותו ולקח את החמץ לעצמו ● בכניסת החג, הגיע הגוי עם רכבו והחליט לממש את המתנה שקיבל, הוא פתח את החדר בו הופקד החמץ של התושבים, ונעלם ● פרסום ראשון (זמנים, פסח
)
מקרה לא-נעים בשכונת רמת שלמה בירושלים, כאשר עשרות אנשים הפסידו את מיטב "חמצם", לאחר שהגוי מימש את זכותו ולקח את החמץ לעצמו ● בכניסת החג, הגיע הגוי עם רכבו והחליט לממש את המתנה שקיבל, הוא פתח את החדר בו הופקד החמץ של התושבים, ונעלם ● פרסום ראשון (זמנים, פסח
)
Monday, April 18, 2011
Hooked on Addiction: From Food to Drugs to Internet Porn
America is having an addiction moment. Media headlines scream daily about new neuroscience findings on porn addiction, Internet addiction, food addiction and plain, old-fashioned drug addiction. As TIME's Michael Scherer wrote last week, 42 U.S. Senators called on Attorney General Eric Holder to increase obscenity prosecutions for pornography, due in part to fears over sex addiction. There's even a new online magazine about addiction called The Fix (full disclosure: I write for it).
But what do the recent neuroscience studies actually tell us about addiction? What is addiction really?
The Santa Monica bomber test - halachic clarity vs confusion
I recently discovered a very simple test of whether a person will report child abuse. Or rather whether he is so tied up in knots about the complexities of halacha and the horror of mesira that he would not call the police unless a godol gave him permission.
The test is the story of the confused Jewish individual who exploded a bomb at the Santa Monica shul and then escaped to Denver where he was recognized by a rabbi who then called his rabbi for permission to call the police.
The test consists of "What would you do if you recognized the Santa Monica bomber - would you call the police or call your rabbi for permission to call the police."
One answer I got - "You can't really trust the police - after all look at the harsh sentence that Rubashkin got. You have to consider all sides of the issue and a godol would know best what to do. Perhaps the guy just needed some therapy and understanding."
The test illustrates the need for our educational system and rabbonim to educate the community in the laws of pikuach nefesh and rodef. Issues which often do not allow time for a telephone call. This is no different than teaching the issue of pikuach nefesh for Shabbos. One case I heard was of a avreich whose baby developed a fever of 105 over Shabbos. He read through Shmiras Shabbos and concluded that it was permitted but didn't feel comfortable about calling the doctor. After Shabbos he went to the doctor and was told that his child was brain damaged. In a state of shock and depression he went to speak to Rav Moshe Feinstein - "How can this happen? I just wanted to sure to avoid avoid chilul Shabbos. Rav Moshe was very upset and told him - "the halacha is very clear that this was a life threatening situation - there was no heter of being frum at the expense of your child."
How to explain child abuse by Orthodox Jews - to secular therapists?
I was asked to give a speech at a major conference on the issue of child abuse in the Orthodox community. The conference is being held for secular psychotherapists who deal with this issue daily. It will be in a month
I was not asked to speak as a therapist but rather as an Orthodox Jew. This is an interesting and important challenge since these therapists have a significant number of Orthodox patients and clearly would like a better understanding of the dynamics of this issue. Many of the therapists are Jewish but very few are observant. A number of them come from Orthodox backgrounds - but are now secular.
I would appreciate suggestions and insights which you think might be important to get across to an audience that will be polite but not sympathetic to the dynamics of the Orthodox community. What would you say if you had this opportunity?
===============
I'd also like to report the fact that my books on abuse are selling in Jewish books stores without significant opposition - contrary to everyone's prediction.. Eichler's of Flatbush just told me that it is selling well and that they just reordered. The world has changed - but still has a way to go.
Rav Chaim Brisker - . Amora has the power to argue with a Tanna
Contrary to the view of the Kesef Mishna and clearly at variance with Rav Elchonon Wasserman that the authority of a Tanna is that of Sanhedrin which an Amora can not reject. And also in disagreement with the Chazon Ish that the Tanna had greater knowledge of the truth than an Amora - is Rav Chaim Brisker's view that theoretically an Amora can disagree with a Tanna but in general don't.
Rav Elchonon Wasserman[i](Kovetz Shiurim Bava Basra 170a #633): Rav said that the halacha is neither that of R’ Yehuda nor of R’ Yochanon. The Rashbam said that Rav was considered a Tanna and thus could disagree with other Tanaim. However Tosfos (Kesubos) says that R’ Yochanon disagreed with this halacha and since we have a rule that in a dispute between Rav and R’ Yochacon that we rule in accord with R’ Yochanon that means that Rav is not viewed as a Tanna and thus cannot argue with Tannaim. But this presents a question. How can it be that Rav is disagreeing with the Mishna here? This question I asked my teacher R’ Chaim Brisker and he answered, “That in truth an Amora has the power to disagree with a Tanna. This that we regularly find the Talmud rejecting the views of an Amora by simply showing that a Tanna rejects it – that is because as a general rule an Amora did not disagree with a Tanna. So if the Amora only knew the view of the Tanna we assume he would not disagree with it. However where we see that an Amora explicitly disagrees with a Tanna it is possible that the final halacha is in agreement with the Amora.”
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Itamar massacre solved; 2 arrested
.
via ynet - News on 4/17/11
Friday, April 15, 2011
Thursday, April 14, 2011
Is It Murder If a Mom Withholds Cancer Treatment From Her Child?
Time
Imagine you are a single mother suffering from depression, overwhelmed with caring for an autistic, nonverbal and developmentally disabled son. If he were diagnosed with cancer, what would you do?
Kristen LaBrie, a Massachusetts mother, chose to disregard a prescribed chemotherapy regimen. On Tuesday, two years after her son, Jeremy, died at age 9, a Superior Court jury declared her guilty of attempted murder.[...]
Everything given on Sinai - but not everything was given on Sinai?!
From Daas Torah (2nd edition) - translations copyrighted - there are obviously many more sources concerning this matter.
Berachos (5a): Rav Levi bar Chama said in the name of Reish Lakish: What is the meaning of the Shemos (24:12), “ And I gave you the stone Tablets, and the Torah and the Mitzvos which I wrote to teach them.” “The Tablets” is referring to the Ten Commandments. “Torah” is referring to the Five Books of Moshe, “Mitzvos” is referring to the Mishna, “Which I wrote” is referring to Prophets and Writings, “To teach them” is referring to the Talmud. Thus this verse teaches that all of these were given to Moshe at Sinai.
Torah Temima (Shemos 24:12.28): Look at Megila (19b) that learns that G d showed Moshe dikdukei Torah and dikdukei Sofrim and what the Sofrim would generate in the future…. The intent of these statements is that the halachos which would be generated in the future by means of hermeneutic principles and intellectual analysis were in fact inherently contained within the Torah that was given to Moshe. They do not literally mean that also the analyses that were used to generate these halachos were actually said to Moshe as some fundamentalist try to insert this meaning into the drashos I cited. They use these drashos as a banner and insist that the Talmud is saying that all the intellectual analysis as well as the discussion and evaluation that a student would say in the future - were literally already given to Moshe at Sinai. Even though it is self-evident that the intent of these statements is that only the basic laws that were used to generate the details in the future were given to Moshe and not the analysis itself and there is no need to prove this – nevertheless a reliable source that this is true is expressed by our Sages in Menachos (29b). There the greatness of Rabbi Akiva is described in the following manner. “When Moshe went up to Heaven to get the Torah he was shown the sages of every generation. He saw Rabbi Akiva interpreting every detail by means of intellectual analysis and Moshe did not understand what was going on and he got upset. However at some point Rabbi Akiva’s students ask him how he had derived a particular point, he answered that it was the halacha given to Moshe at Sinai. When Moshe heard this he felt better.” Thus we see an explicit proof that our Sages understood that only the fundamental halachos were said to Moshe… and that is why Moshe felt better when Rabbi Akiva said it was halacha given to Moshe at Sinai because that is superior to that which is generated by analysis… A clearer proof that Moshe was not literally given the intellectual analysis that would be used to generate the new halachos is found in Bamidbar Rabba (41), “Did Moshe in fact learn the entire Torah in 40 days. That is not possible since the Torah is described as being greater in size than the earth. Therefore what is meant is that Moshe learned the general principles at Sinai.” This doesn’t need further explanation. There is more to discuss about this general topic but what I have written is sufficient here.
Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvos Shoresh 2): We have already explained in the Introduction to our Commentary to the Mishna that the majority of Torah laws were generated by the use of the 13 Hermeneutic Principles. Furthermore that such laws are sometimes the source of dispute amongst our Sages. However those laws and explanations of the laws which were transmitted by Moshe were never disputed. … The proof to this is Temura (16a) which states that,” 1700 laws derived from kal v’chomer and gezera sheva and dikdukay sofrim were forgotten in the days of mourning for Moshe. Neverthless Osniel ben Knaz rediscovered them through his analysis …” If this large amount is what was forgotten, than obviously the number of unforgotten laws that had been derived by analysis must have been considerably more. This large number of derived laws existed already in the time of Moshe since the forgetting of the 1700 derived laws occurred during the period of mourning for Moshe. Thus we have shown that even in the time of Moshe there were derived laws called dikdukei sofrim (the exactitudes of the Scribes). That is because all that was not heard explicitly at Sinai has been produced by the rabbis….
Rashi (Sukkos 28a): Kalim v’Chomrim – Torah laws deducible by use of kal v’chomer - since they that don’t require a tradition - were not explained at Sinai.
Shaloh (Toldos Adom Beis Chochma): All that which the sages of all generation have discovered was in fact received at Sinai from the Kol (sound) and it is not the result of human intellect and analysis. Thus in truth it was commanded in the Torah by means of Moshe (Devarim 17:11), “According to the Torah which you were taught and the laws which you were commanded to do, do not deviate from that which you were told right or left.” A person who doesn’t obey is deserving of death (Devarim 17:12). This Kol was the great sound with did not end (yasaf)…In the Yerushalmi Peah (2:6) the Sages said that even what an experienced student would decide before his teacher was said on Sinai. Thus it is clear that all the words of the sages in every generation and all that they innovated and all their analysis is from Sinai. It is not from human intellect but from the divine intellect. They served merely to actualize the potential Torah which had been given at Sinai.
Berachos (5a): Rav Levi bar Chama said in the name of Reish Lakish: What is the meaning of the Shemos (24:12), “ And I gave you the stone Tablets, and the Torah and the Mitzvos which I wrote to teach them.” “The Tablets” is referring to the Ten Commandments. “Torah” is referring to the Five Books of Moshe, “Mitzvos” is referring to the Mishna, “Which I wrote” is referring to Prophets and Writings, “To teach them” is referring to the Talmud. Thus this verse teaches that all of these were given to Moshe at Sinai.
Torah Temima (Shemos 24:12.28): Look at Megila (19b) that learns that G d showed Moshe dikdukei Torah and dikdukei Sofrim and what the Sofrim would generate in the future…. The intent of these statements is that the halachos which would be generated in the future by means of hermeneutic principles and intellectual analysis were in fact inherently contained within the Torah that was given to Moshe. They do not literally mean that also the analyses that were used to generate these halachos were actually said to Moshe as some fundamentalist try to insert this meaning into the drashos I cited. They use these drashos as a banner and insist that the Talmud is saying that all the intellectual analysis as well as the discussion and evaluation that a student would say in the future - were literally already given to Moshe at Sinai. Even though it is self-evident that the intent of these statements is that only the basic laws that were used to generate the details in the future were given to Moshe and not the analysis itself and there is no need to prove this – nevertheless a reliable source that this is true is expressed by our Sages in Menachos (29b). There the greatness of Rabbi Akiva is described in the following manner. “When Moshe went up to Heaven to get the Torah he was shown the sages of every generation. He saw Rabbi Akiva interpreting every detail by means of intellectual analysis and Moshe did not understand what was going on and he got upset. However at some point Rabbi Akiva’s students ask him how he had derived a particular point, he answered that it was the halacha given to Moshe at Sinai. When Moshe heard this he felt better.” Thus we see an explicit proof that our Sages understood that only the fundamental halachos were said to Moshe… and that is why Moshe felt better when Rabbi Akiva said it was halacha given to Moshe at Sinai because that is superior to that which is generated by analysis… A clearer proof that Moshe was not literally given the intellectual analysis that would be used to generate the new halachos is found in Bamidbar Rabba (41), “Did Moshe in fact learn the entire Torah in 40 days. That is not possible since the Torah is described as being greater in size than the earth. Therefore what is meant is that Moshe learned the general principles at Sinai.” This doesn’t need further explanation. There is more to discuss about this general topic but what I have written is sufficient here.
Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvos Shoresh 2): We have already explained in the Introduction to our Commentary to the Mishna that the majority of Torah laws were generated by the use of the 13 Hermeneutic Principles. Furthermore that such laws are sometimes the source of dispute amongst our Sages. However those laws and explanations of the laws which were transmitted by Moshe were never disputed. … The proof to this is Temura (16a) which states that,” 1700 laws derived from kal v’chomer and gezera sheva and dikdukay sofrim were forgotten in the days of mourning for Moshe. Neverthless Osniel ben Knaz rediscovered them through his analysis …” If this large amount is what was forgotten, than obviously the number of unforgotten laws that had been derived by analysis must have been considerably more. This large number of derived laws existed already in the time of Moshe since the forgetting of the 1700 derived laws occurred during the period of mourning for Moshe. Thus we have shown that even in the time of Moshe there were derived laws called dikdukei sofrim (the exactitudes of the Scribes). That is because all that was not heard explicitly at Sinai has been produced by the rabbis….
Rashi (Sukkos 28a): Kalim v’Chomrim – Torah laws deducible by use of kal v’chomer - since they that don’t require a tradition - were not explained at Sinai.
Shaloh (Toldos Adom Beis Chochma): All that which the sages of all generation have discovered was in fact received at Sinai from the Kol (sound) and it is not the result of human intellect and analysis. Thus in truth it was commanded in the Torah by means of Moshe (Devarim 17:11), “According to the Torah which you were taught and the laws which you were commanded to do, do not deviate from that which you were told right or left.” A person who doesn’t obey is deserving of death (Devarim 17:12). This Kol was the great sound with did not end (yasaf)…In the Yerushalmi Peah (2:6) the Sages said that even what an experienced student would decide before his teacher was said on Sinai. Thus it is clear that all the words of the sages in every generation and all that they innovated and all their analysis is from Sinai. It is not from human intellect but from the divine intellect. They served merely to actualize the potential Torah which had been given at Sinai.
In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures
NYTimes
It is a question asked repeatedly across America: why, in the aftermath of a financial mess that generated hundreds of billions in losses, have no high-profile participants in the disaster been prosecuted?
Answering such a question — the equivalent of determining why a dog did not bark — is anything but simple. But a private meeting in mid-October 2008 between Timothy F. Geithner, then-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Andrew M. Cuomo, New York’s attorney general at the time, illustrates the complexities of pursuing legal cases in a time of panic.
At the Fed, which oversees the nation’s largest banks, Mr. Geithner worked with the Treasury Department on a large bailout fund for the banks and led efforts to shore up the American International Group, the giant insurer. His focus: stabilizing world financial markets. [...]
It is a question asked repeatedly across America: why, in the aftermath of a financial mess that generated hundreds of billions in losses, have no high-profile participants in the disaster been prosecuted?
Answering such a question — the equivalent of determining why a dog did not bark — is anything but simple. But a private meeting in mid-October 2008 between Timothy F. Geithner, then-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Andrew M. Cuomo, New York’s attorney general at the time, illustrates the complexities of pursuing legal cases in a time of panic.
At the Fed, which oversees the nation’s largest banks, Mr. Geithner worked with the Treasury Department on a large bailout fund for the banks and led efforts to shore up the American International Group, the giant insurer. His focus: stabilizing world financial markets. [...]
If Talmudic authority is result of acceptance - where is evidence?
from Daas Torah - translaton copyrighted
Mahretz Chayes (Toras Neviim #3 Maamar Lo Sasur): The Kesef Mishna (Mamrim 2:1) raises a very strong question against the Rambam. The Rambam says that where there is a dispute based on sevora or drasha concerning a Torah law, a later generation can reject the view of an earlier generation - even though it is not greater in wisdom and number. If so then why don’t Amoraim disagree with Tannaim and in fact we find many instances that an Amora’s view is rejected because his view differs from that stated in a Mishna or braissa. The Kesef Mishna answers, “It is possible to say that from the day that Mishna was completed it was accepted and established that later generations would not be permitted to disagree with the earlier generatons. Similarly when the Talmud was completed, no one had the right to disagree with it.” But there is no evidence in either the Talmud Bavli or Yerushalmi that there was such binding agreement. One can not find the slightest hint in the Mishna or Talmud and the Kesef Mishna’s questions are very solid… However I saw something similar in the Rambam’s Introduction to the Mishna Torah, “However all those matters that are found in the Babylonian Talmud are obligatory for all Jews and they can be forced to observe them… And all these matters were agreed to by all Jews.” We see that the Rambam also writes the reason for the obligation is that all Jews agreed to it. However I don’t know where there is evidence that such an agreement occurred.
Claims of bribed witnesses in Baruch Lebovitz abuse conviction
Daily News
Baruch Lebovits, 60, received a sentence of 10 2/3 to 32 years in prison last year for sexually abusing minors.
Prosecutors stood by a Brooklyn rabbi's child-molestation conviction Wednesday, even as they charged a Hasidic man with shaking down his family and bribing someone to make false accusations.
Baruch Lebovits, 60, received a sentence of 10 2/3 to 32 years in prison a year ago, based on the testimony of a 22-year-old man who said the rabbi sexually abused when he was 16.
The trial and stiff penalty sent shockwaves through Borough Park's tight-knit Jewish community.
But Samuel Kellner, 49, who brought the victim to prosecutors' attention, was charged with paying another man $10,000 to accuse Lebovits of abuse.
Baruch Lebovits, 60, received a sentence of 10 2/3 to 32 years in prison last year for sexually abusing minors.
Prosecutors stood by a Brooklyn rabbi's child-molestation conviction Wednesday, even as they charged a Hasidic man with shaking down his family and bribing someone to make false accusations.
Baruch Lebovits, 60, received a sentence of 10 2/3 to 32 years in prison a year ago, based on the testimony of a 22-year-old man who said the rabbi sexually abused when he was 16.
The trial and stiff penalty sent shockwaves through Borough Park's tight-knit Jewish community.
But Samuel Kellner, 49, who brought the victim to prosecutors' attention, was charged with paying another man $10,000 to accuse Lebovits of abuse.
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