(2) ילקוט שמעוני משלי - פרק ח - רמז תתקמג
מעשה באשה אחת שהזקינה הרבה, באת לפני ר"י (הגלילי) בן חלפתא אמרה לו רבי זקנתי יותר מדאי ומעשו חיים של נוול הם שאיני טועמת לא מאכל ולא משתה ואני מבקשת ליפטר מן העולם, אמר לה במה הארכת כל כך ימים, אמרה לו למודה אני אפילו יש לי דבר חביב אני מנחת אותו ומשכמת לבית הכנסת בכל יום, אמר לה מנעי עצמך מבית הכנסת שלשה ימים זה אחר זה, הלכה ועשתה כן וביום השלישי חלתה ומתה, לכך אמר שלמה אשרי אדם שומע לי וגו', מה כתיב אחריו כי מוצאי מצא חיים. אמר הקב"ה אם הלכת להתפלל לבית הכנסת לא תעמוד לך על פתח החיצון אלא הוי מתכוין ליכנס דלת לפנים מדלת, לשקוד על דלתי אין כתיב כאן אלא דלתותי, שתי דלתות, ולמה כן שהקב"ה מונה פסיעותיך ונותן לך שכר, מהו לשמגור מזוזות פתחי וכי יש מזוזה בבתי כנסיות, א"ר יהודה ברבי סימון מה מזוזה זו אינה זזה מן הפתח כך לא תהא זז מבתי כנסיות ומבתי מדרשות, ואם תעשה כן דע שאתה מקבל פני שכינה, מה כתיב אחריו כי מוצאי מצא חיים, ולא עוד אלא טעון ברכות שנאמר ויפק רצון מה':
Saadia
ReplyDeleteGaon: “The Book of Beliefs and Opinions”
“Refutation
of Reincarnation”
Yale Judaica
Series, Vol. I “The Soul” chap. VIII pp 259
“Yet, I must say that I have found certain people, who call themselves Jews, professing the
doctrine of metempsychosis (reincarnation) which is designated by them as the
theory of “transmigration” of souls. What the mean thereby is that the spirit
of Ruben is transferred to Simon and afterwards to Levi and after that to
Judah. Many of them would go so far as to assert that the spirit of a human
being might enter into the body of a beast or that of a beast into the body of
a human being, and other such nonsense and
stupidities.”
“This in itself, however, indicates how very foolish they are.
For they take it for granted that the body of a man is capable of transforming
the essence of the soul so as to make of it a human soul, after having been the
soul of a beast. They assume, furthermore, that the soul itself is capable of
transforming the essence of a human body to the point of endowing it with the
traits of the beasts, even though its form be that of men. It was not
sufficient for them, then, that they attributed to the soul a variable nature
by not assigning to it an intrinsic essence, but they contradicted themselves when
they declared the soul capable of transforming and changing the body, and the
body capable of transforming and changing the soul. But such reasoning is a deviation from logic.
The
third [argument they present] is in the form of a logical argument. They same,
namely: “Inasmuch as the Creator is just, it is inconceivable that he should
occasion suffering to little children, unless it be for sins committed by their
souls during the time that they were lodged in their former bodies.” This view
is, however, subject to numerous refutations.
The first is that they have forgotten what we have mentioned on
the subject of compensation in the hereafter for misfortunes experienced in
this world. Furthermore we should like to ask them what they conceive the original
status of the soul to be – we mean its status when it is first created.
Is it charged by its Master with any obligation to obey Him or not? If they
allege that it is not so charged, then there can be no punishments for it
either, since it was not charged with any obligations to begin with. If, on the
other hand, they acknowledge the imposition of such a charge, in which case
obedience and disobedience did not apply before,
they thereby admit that God charges His servants with obligations on account
of the future and not at all on account of the past. But then
they return to our theory and are forced to give up their insistence on the
view that man’s suffering in this world is due solely to his conduct in a
previous existence.”