The following is an excerpt from an article which appeared in Tradition. Go to the Tradition website to read the full article.
Tradition
Rabbinic authorities have always sought ways and means of alleviating the
plight of unfortunate individuals stigmatized by mamzerut in order to permit
such individuals to marry within "the community of God." Their
efforts consisted of examining the loopholes which would have the effect of
removing the onus of bastardy. Perhaps the most famous of these proposed remedies
is a tentative suggestion advanced by Rabbi Shalom Mordecai Schwadron in his Teshuvot
Maharsham, I, no. 9.
The Mishnah, Gittin 32a, states that in former times a
husband could appoint a proxy to deliver a bil of divorce to his wife and yet retain
the prerogative of annuling the proxy and thereby invalidating the divorce.
Originally the husband was not required to inform the proxy of his change of
heart. This practice was later banned by Rabban
Rabban Gamaliel the Elder in order to promote "the better ordering
of society" (tikkun ha-olam). In defining the concept of tikkun haolam, R.
Yochanan maintained that the measure was designed to prevent the proliferation
of mamzerim. A messenger, unaware of the fact that his authority to deliver the
bill of divorce had been nullfied, might in good faith present the bil of
divorce to the woman in question. The woman, equally unaware that the proxy had
been annulled and her divorce nullifed would feel free to remarry. Under such
circumstances any issue of a subsequent union would be momzerim in the eyes of
Jewish law.
R. Yochanan states that it was to prevent such unfortunate
occurrences that Rabban Gamaliel forbade annulment of the proxy other than in
the presence of the messenger. In the event that the husband transgresses the
injunction of Rabban Gamaliel and annuls the proxy other than in the presence
of the messenger, R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ordained that the act of annulment itself
be null and void so that the bil of divorce may retain its validity. In
discussing Rabban Gamaliel's decree the Gemara raises an obvious objection. It
is axiomatic that a bil of divorce which is invalid according to Biblical law
cannot be validated by rabbinic decree. In response to this objection the
Gemara enunciates the well known dictum: "Everyone who betroths (a wife J
does so in accordance with the intention of the Sages, and they annulled his betrothal."
The import of this statement is that while the Sages have no
power to validate a bil of divorce which is not valid under biblical law they
do have the power to annul the marriage itself retroactively. Since they do not
acquiesce to the marriage under such circumstances the stipulated condition has
not been fulfilled and the marriage itself is null and void. The status of the
woman in these circumstances is not that of a divorcee but that of a single
woman who had been consorting with a male without benefit of a nuptial ceremony.
Accordingly, as a result of Rabban Gamaliel's decree, annulment
of a proxy other than in the presence of the messenger and sub. sequent
delivery of the get to the wife become the occasion for the retroactive
annulment of the marriage. Tosafot points out that Rabban Gamaliel's decree
could be utilied in furthering certain ends which Rabban Gamaliel would
certainly not have sought to promote. By invoking this decree acts of adultery could
be legitimized with the cooperation of the husband and both the adulterer and
the adultress might be enabled to escape punishment.
This could be effected by having the husband draw up a bil of
divorce, appoint a proxy to deliver it to his wife and subsequently annul the
proxy other than in the presence of his messenger. The resultant effect would
be annulment of the marriage ab initio which would then mean that subsequent intercourse
with another male was in the nature of fornication rather than adultery. Ri, cited by Tosafot, maintains
that this procedure is perfectly legal.
Maharsham, quoting Tosafot, points out that a mamzer could
also be legitimized retroactively in precisely the same manner. If the husband is
yet living and willng to cooperate he could simply appoint a proxy to deliver a
bil of divorce to his wife and then proceed to annul the proxy other than is
the presence of the messenger. Since the marriage is annulled retroactively the
liaison between his wife and another man does not constitute adultery and hence
the issue of that union are not mamzerim.
The innovative suggestion of Maharsham has been the subject
of several recent articles of note. The proposal was brought to the atten. tion
of readers of TRADITION by Rabbi Dr. Louis Rabinowitz, Spring 1971, pp. 5.15.
Moriah (Elul 5730-Tishri 5731) featured an article by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,
eminent Israeli halakhic authority, containing a lengthy and exhaustive
analysis of Maharsham's position. In Panim el Panim of Shevat 2 and I Adar 13, 5733
the Israeli sèholar and jurist Professor M. Silberg discusses practical proposals
to eliminate inci. dences of mamzerut. Professor Silberg's views are
challenged by Rabbi Judah Dick (Panim el Panim, I Adar 13, 5733), a New York
at. torney and Talmudic scholar who has espoused the cause of the agunah both
in legal proceedings before civil courts and . in a determined effort to find
halakhic redress for her unfortunate plight.
Maharsham's language, "Had you
consulted me before the bil of divorce was executed by the first husband I
would have made a suggestion le-halakhah vo-lo le-ma'Qseh (according to
theoretical halakhah but not for practical application)" clearly indicates
that Maharsham viewed his innovative proposal as relegated to the realm of theory
and not for actual implementation. Maharsham's use of the subjunctive phrase
"had you consulted me" demonstrates that his answer even at that time
would not have been intended for practical application. Rabbi Auerbach presents
numerous reasons, many highly technical, in explaining why practical
implementation of this proposal is precluded. The most salient of these
considerations are the following:
1. The major argument against implementation of Maharsham's proposal
is that Ramban, Shita Mekubetzet and Me'iri, in their commentaries on Ketubot
3a state , clearly that any children born of an adultrous relationship prior to
the retroactive annulment of the marriage are mamzerim by virtue of rabbinic
decree. According to these authorities the rabbinic decree providing for
annulment of the marriage was accompanied by a de. cree declaring such issue to
be legitimate precisely because the Sages did not want the decree regarding retroactive
annulment of the marriage to serve as a tool in the hands of evildoers. This
opinion is followed by many latter-day authorities. (See Ketab Sofer, Even ha- Ezer,
no. 51; Oneg Yom Tov, no. 169; and R. Shlomo Kluger,H a- Elef Lekha Shlomo,
Even ha-Ezer, no. 34. Pitchei T eshuvah, Even ha- Ezer 144: 1 also cites Berit
Avra. ham, Even ha-Ezer, no. 49, sec. 5. See also Rashba, Ketubot 3a and Isaac
Elchanan Spektor, Ein Yitzchak, I, Orach Chaim, no. 28, sec. 23.) Oneg Yom Tov
states explicitly that "It is for this reason that this solution is not
mentioned by any authority."
2. Retroactive annulment of the marriage renders all
preceding acts of coitus acts of fornication. An individual is not permitted
retroactively to transform his actions into transgressions and certainly should
not be advised to do so and abetted in such a course of action by a B-it Din.
3. It is not certain that when the husband is counseled by a
Bet Din to annul the proxy the marriage itself is in fact annulled
retroactively. The phraseology employed by the Gemara in explaining why such
annulment was legislated is "He acted with impropriety. . . ." When
acting upon the advice of a B.-it Din the husband can hardly be said to have
acted with impropriety and hence there are no grounds for annullng the
marriage.
4. A number of early authorities, including Ramban, Re'ah
and Rashba, maintain that in point of fact the original marriage is never annulled.
According to this interpretation, the husband, cognizant of the statutory
provision for such annulment, recognizes that annulment of the proxy is of no
avail and hence never actually intends to annul the proxy. P'nei Yehoshu'a, Ketubot
3a, offers a different interpretation in agreement with the basic premise that
in actuality no annulment takes place. Both Dr. Rabinowitz and Professor Silberg
assert that the late Chief Rabbi Herzog did in fact invoke Maharsham's proposal
in practice. Rabbi Herzog does indeed discuss Maharsham's responsum in his
Heikhal Yitzchak, II, nos. 17- 19. However, Rabbi Herzog's ruling in the
specific case brought to his attention was based on different grounds. As is is
often the case in halakhic responsa, considerations which are themselves
insuffcient to warrant the conclusion advanced are adduced as a usnit" or
secondary line of reasoning in order to strengthen the ultimate decision.
Rabbi Auerbach reports that dayyanim in Israel have on numerous
occasions refrained from following Maharsham's suggestion precisely because the
latter stated explicitly that his words were not intended for practical
implementation. Apart from halakhic objections which have been advanced, the
proposal as formulated by Maharsham suffers from one practical drawback, viz.,
it requires the active cooperation of the original husband. Needless to say the
cooperation of an estranged husband is often difficult to obtain. [...]