Thursday, September 15, 2016

What is meant by kinyan for marriage: Is a wife property which is acquired like an ox or a slave?

update - added sources that clearly indicate that the husband is more obligated regarding his wife's sexual satisfaction than she is obligated to him - and they are in fact muturally obligated.

I have been working on understanding the issue of kinyan in regards to a wife. The normal translation would be that the husband acquires a wife in 3 ways (Kiddushin 2a), money, document or intercourse. And therefore one might conclude that the Jewish view of marriage is that a man buys a wife in the same way as he buys a cow or a slave. But the gemora makes clear that that is not so. We find in Kiddushin (6a) and other places that while a heathen slave is physically bought and possessed – a woman is not. In short the husband clearly doesn’t own her as a slave or an ox and she is not his property. 

Tosfos haRosh(Kesubos 2a): His field got flooded… In a case where the wife developed serious blemishes we say “his field got flooded”[it is his bad luck]. It should similarly be true that if the husband developed serious blemishes then we should say that “her field got flooded” [it is her bad luck]. So why is it only when the husband gets serious blemishes that we force him to divorce her? The answer is that the wife is his monetary purchase (kinyan kaspo) just as his slave or ox or donkey and therefore what happens to her is the result of his mazel (luck). [the reverse is not true because he is not her possession]
However as the Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 1:1) states, the Torah requires that a man makes a kinyan on a woman to make her his wife. We see also regarding Teruma which a cohen is allowed to eat – that that which he owns can also eat teruma. The heter provided in the Torah (Vayikra 22:11) A cohen who acquires a person himsef (i.e. a slave)  through money (kinyan kaspo). That person can eat the  cohen’s teruma as well as he who is born in the cohen’s house from slaves – they can eat of his bread )-  is called kinyan kaspo (acquired with his money).
Yevamos(66a): As it was taught: How do we know that a cohen who marries a woman and acquires slaves that they can eat teruma? Because it say, And the cohen who acquires a soul – through kinyan kaspo (monetary acquition) -that person he acquired can eat teruma.
Thus a wife is called kinyan kaspo – even though not kinyan gufa (acquisition of her body). That is enough to be able to eat teruma. A problem arises since a Hebrew slave who is also not kinyan gufo – is not allowed to eat teruma. What is the difference between them? Furthermore why is a wife acquired through intercourse or a yevama allowed to eat teruma – they clearly are not even kinyan kaspo? This requires further study.

There are additional problems understanding the nature of monetary kinyan. As is well known the Rambam says it is only rabbinic in nature (divrei sofrim). This is also the view that Rashi rejects from his own teachers as well as the view found in the Gaonim. However even accepting the majority view that kinyan with money  is doreissa – it is formally learned from a gezera shaveh comparing two verses - which as Tosfos (Kiddushin 2a) points out is problematic. One verse says that the money was taken in acquiring the field while in the second verse the woman is being taken to be his wife. For the gezera shaveh to be meaningful the first verse should have said, “The field was acquired by giving money” and compare this to the common word of acquisition in the second verse -  “The woman who is being acquired through the man giving money. In short monetary kinyan is not acquiring a wife in the sense of buying a field or a slave but it is something. It might be a metaphor - but it is clearly not a commercial transaction.

Putting aside these issues. So if the basis of marriage is kinyan kaspo – what exactly is acquired? The Netziv (4:35) [see translation below] says the kinyan is on her sexuality but not any other aspect of her. Similarly R Avraham minHaHar (Nedarim 15b) says that a wife can not take a Neder prohibiting to her husband the pleasure of intercourse and can be forced to go against the Neder if she makes it - because she was acquired by him regarding intercourse as the verse says "when a man takes a wife". 

This too is problematic. Does that mean that she is a sex slave to her husband while being free in everyone other sense? While the language of the Netziv suggests that as does the statement in Nedarim (20b) that “a man can do whatever he wants with his wife” – it is clearly not the view of our Sages. They clearly state that a man can only do what his wife willingly consents to do –see Nedarim (20b) regarding Tisha Midos that a man is not allowed to force his wife to have intercourse (i.e., rape or even intimidate her).  Nor is it the view of the halacha.
Nedarim (20b): And I will purge out from among you the rebels and them that transgress against me (Yechezkiel 20:38). R’ Levi said these are the children that result from 9 improper types of intercourse.  They are children born of a fearful relationship, rape, a hated wife, one whose husband was under the ban, when intercourse was done by mistaken identity, when they were fighting, when they were drunk, when he mentally planned on divorcing her, from a promiscuous  relations and a brazen woman.
This is also stated in Eiruvin
Eiruvin (100b): It is prohibited for a man to force his wife to participate in the mitzva of intercourse… Whoever forces his to wife to participate in the mitzva of intercourse will have children who are unworthy. What is the proof? It is Mishlei (19:2): Also without consent the soul is not good. It was also taught in a braissa: Also without consent the soul is not good – that is referring to a man who forces his wife to participate in the mitzva of intercourse.
This is also the halacha as stated in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch
Rambam(Hilchos Ishus 15:17):…. Furthermore he should not rape her or force her to have sex. Rather he should have sexual relations with her only with her consent and only in the context of pleasant conversion and joy.
Shulchan Aruch(E.H. 25:2): A man should not have sex with his wife unless she is willing. If she is not willing he should placate her until she is willing. …
Shulchan Aruch(O.C. 240:10):  If he is angry with her it is prohibited to have intercourse until he has placated her. He is able to speak with her prior to intercourse until she is willing
This idea that a wife is a sex slave or a mere tool for obtaining spirituality is clearly denounced by the Steipler and other major rabbinic authorities.
Steipler(Igros Kodesh #1:2): The actual behaviors involved in intercourse of the mitzva of onah are explained in the Siddur of the Yaavetz in his discussion of the halachos of Shabbos night. Please study that well. What he says there is the actual halacha and not just advice or custom.  That is because according to the halacha it is prohibited to have intercourse in a manner that the woman is not satisfied. The husband is required to satisfy her with hugs and kisses until she is aroused to want intercourse. Otherwise the intercourse is equivalent to placing her before a lion who mangles its prey before it eats as is explained in Pesachim (49). [It is a terrible crime to deny that which the wife has rights to - even if he is doing this out of piety and asceticism.  That is simply because stealing from his wife cannot be justified for the sake of  being pious. In fact he is stealing from her and treating her as a captive slave]. Furthermore when he has intercourse against her will the resulting children are considered sinners and rebels which is called in Nedarim (20b)  bnei anusa (children of rape)…. . She will be pained and embarrassed and will cry in private and her tears will not be unanswered by Heaven because the Gate of Tears is not locked. Our Sages say in Bava Metzia that a man should always be careful with the honor of his wife because she readily cries. Look there... There is no question that judgment will be aroused against him and he will not merit to have Divine assistance either in in material needs or in spirituality. And this that he imagines that his actions increase his spiritual level - this is simply a worthless and false fantasy because he is sinning and transgressing by this defective and impure actions - not becoming elevated. It is explicit in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 240:8) that sexual intercourse should only be done after placating his wife and getting her to want it. Because otherwise it is prohibited without her consent as is stated there in the Shulchan Aruch and the words of the Siddur of the Yaavetz - which are the true halacha of the Torah….
However there are views that the requirement of consent is only concerning a wife who is normally available except when she has a reasonable excuse such as not feeling well. But in regard to a wife who refuses simply because she wants to irritate her husband i.e. a moredes - it would be permitted to force her to have intercourse because he has acquired her. This seems to be not only the view of the Netziv but also the Atzi Arazim (E.H. 25) who says it is the view of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch and others.  He extends this to include sodomy - as a literal understanding of Nedarim (20b) indicates. The Rosh (Kesubos 5:32) also permits forcing a moredes as does Rabbeinu Yeruchim (Nesiv 23:8), Mordechai (Kiddushin 530), Ran(Nedarim 20b), Bach (E.H. 25:1), Shita Mekubetzes(Nedarim 20b) and Tur (E.H. 77). Clearly they understand that kinyan is an actual purchase of the women's sexuality and not simply a symbolic gesture to signify that she is now prohibited to other men. They view that as long as the wife is respectful of the husband's rights to her - then the husband needs to be sensitive and not force her to do anything she doesn't want. But if she is a moredes that requirement no longer applies. It is also conceivable that these views are no longer relevant to modern times when the status of women and marriage have changed significantly This requires additional study and consultation with your own rabbi. See also Yaskil Avi (5:69) that when the husband makes excessive demands on his wife - she is not a moredes for refusing.

Bottom line. We know that one term used for marriage - that a man is mekadesh (sanctifies) a woman – means that she is prohibited to have sexual relations with any other man. But the second term used for marriage – kinyan presents problems. If a marriage through kinyan is not acquisition in the sense of ownership, what does kinyan mean?

I just came across the following academic article which offers an answer which seem consistent with the rabbinic texts. It suggests that kinyan means “subordination” not “ownership”. This is just the summary that she presents at the end of the article.

T.M.Lemos: Were Israelite Women Chattel 241 Conclusion As should by now be clear, although I have argued against the idea that women in ancient Israel were property, my purpose has not been to assert instead that relationships between women and men in ancient Israel were at all equal. While Israelite society was governed by different hierarchies, and gender binaries were not always the most important set of oppositions, 42 the extant evidence in my view leaves little doubt that wives were subordinate to husbands and daughters to fathers. In the case of wives, however, this subordination is not best understood in terms of ownership or a property relation. If Israelite texts themselves consider the status of wives to be different from the status of slaves, and if wives could not be purchased, sold, or devolved, it seems inaccurate to state that wives in ancient Israel were “merely chattel,” as scholars not infrequently do. Recognizing instead that the concept of subordination is what illuminates relations between women and men is important because it allows us to compare the subjugation of wives to the subjugation of other classes of Israelites, including that of free men to other free men. All subordination is not equivalent, and one might be dominant in one scenario and subordinate in another, as was the case, too, with free women, who might be dominant in relation to their children, slaves, or even certain free men, but subservient to their husbands. In my view, understanding Israelite women as property, whether in general terms or in relation to their sexuality, is not only inaccurate but is also less useful heuristically than what I have proposed. Rather, it is in probing the nature of hierarchies and relations of dominance that we come to understand better the nuances of family dynamics, community bonds, and social organization in ancient Israel and in the wider ancient Near East.
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Onah - the obligation of the husband to provide sexual satisfaction to his wife is greater than the wife's obligation to the husband. In other words the man in regards to sexual relations is more a slave to the wife than she is to him.

Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 12:1-2): 1) When a man marries a woman – whether she is a virgin or not or whether she is an adult or child or whether she is a convert or not or a freed slave – he is obligated in ten things and he has rights in four things. 2) Of these 10, 3 are Torah obligations – feeding her, clothing her, and having sexual relations with her. The 7 Rabbinic obligations which are inforced by beis din – even if not stated explicity – include the basic kesuba, and conditions of the kesuba. The latter includes the obligation to cure her from sickness, to redeem her from captivity, to bury her when she dies, when he dies she is to be maintained from his wealth and can remain in his house as long as she remains a widow. Their daughters are likewise maintained from his wealth after he dies until they gets engaged. Their sons are to inherit her kesuba beyond the portion of inheritance they received with their brothers.

Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 14:7): It is forbidden for a man to deprive his wife of her conjugal rights. If he transgresses and deprives her of these rights in order to cause her distress, he violates one of the Torah's negative commandments, as [Exodus 21:10] states: "Do not deprive [her] of her sustenance, garments or conjugal rights."12 If he becomes sick or his virility is weakened, and he is unable to engage in sexual relations, he is given a period of six months13- for [a woman is never required to wait] longer for her conjugal rights than this - in the hope that he recovers. Afterwards, the prerogative is hers [whether to remain married] or whether he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 14:2): A wife has the right to prevent her husband from making business trips except to close places, so that he will not be prevented from fulfilling his conjugal duties. He may make such journeys only with her permission. Similarly, she has the prerogative of preventing him from changing from a profession that grants her more frequent conjugal rights to one that grants her less frequent rights - e.g., a donkey-driver who wishes to become a camel-driver, or a camel-driver who wishes to become a seaman.3 Students of the Torah may, however, depart for Torah study for two or three years without their wives' permission. Similarly, a wife cannot prevent a husband who is pampered and indulged from becoming a student of the Torah.

Beis Yosef (E.H. 25): Lust, a child and a wife require a balance – the left pushes away while the right brings close (Sanhedrin 107b). However if he sees that she wants more intercourse because she is dresses up and makes efforts to be noted – then he is obligated to cause her to rejoice with sexual intercourse as is noted in Pesachim (72b) A man is obligated to give enjoyment to his wife even if it is not the time required by halacha and even if she is pregnant. This is the correct text

Tur (O.C. 240): The Ravad asks concerning the gemora "lust, child and a woman – the left hands pushes away and the right hand brings close - since our Sages have specified that sexual relations should be done according to a man's strength as it says in Kesubos – then what significance is there for the pushing away of the left hand and the bringing close of the right hand? He answers that this dialectic of the left and right hands applies only in the case of tayalim for whom the sexual obligation is every day and it means that they should reduce the amount of sexual activity with the permission of their wife and her consent in order that they not be overwhelmed with lust. In contrast Torah scholars should not reduce the amount of sexual intercourse and surely in the case of others such as camel driers and sailors. He also explains that the rights to sexual intercourse (onah) which the Sages specified to fulfill the desires of the wife are not to be reduced without her consent but if it is necessary to increase the amount of intercourse in order to be saved from sin – he has the right. In this manner they warned about fighting the evil inclination and he should not give into to all his lusts but rather the left should push away i.e., he should not eliminate sexual intercourse completely because we are concerned that in fighting his lusts he might want to eliminate his obligation to his wife (onah). In addition he explains that the frequency of sexual intercourse that the Sages fixed – was not meant to be the absolute maximum – but rather what a woman would typically be satisfied with. However if he sees that she wants more by the fact that she goes out of her way to look attractive and acts as if she wants more attention – then the husband is obligated to rejoice with mitzva with her (sexual relations) as is stated in Pesachim, Rava said that a man is obligated to rejoice with his wife in the matter of mitzva – even if it is not the time specified by her rights to sexual intercourse (onah). And this is true even if she is pregnant and she needs sexual attention. Thus it says that if a person knows that his wife fears sin and yet does not have sexual relations with her is called a sinner. Now if this was said when he is obligated to her – then it is obvious that he is a sinner since it is a Torah obligation – but it is referring even if it is not the time of his obligation. Our Sages also said that a man is obligated to have sexual relations with his wife before he leaves on a journey even if it is close to her menstrual period. We also see in mesechta Kalla, "What should a man do in order that he has sons? He should do the will of Heaven and the will of his wife." The will of Heaven means that he should give generously to the poor. The will of his wife means – means that he should seduce her during sexual intercourse. Rabbi Yehoshua said it means he should give her joy during sexual relations. And since he is required to fulfill is wife's desires and to cause her rejoicing whenever she wants it – therefore a man is warned to resist with the left from concern that he will end up doing more than is necessary and he will be drawn after frivolities and hedonism.

Steipler(Igros Kodesh 1:4):[[ 4) While it is true that many talmidei chachomm conduct themselves in an ascetic manner in a number of intimate things – but that is only with the complete agreement of his wife and with her forgiveness with a full heart. And this agreement comes in most cases after it is explained to her that in truth her husband loves her and it is only for the sake of heaven that he is restraining himself. Or alternatively she married someone who is known as a tzadik whose reputation compensates for her loss of intimacy with him. But G-d forbid that the husband should conduct himself as an ascetic when it causes pain to his wife who is dependent upon him and does not forgive him whole heartedly concerning that which he is obligated to do for her.

Igros Moshe (O.C. 6 5.2): [Menachos 43b It was taught: R. Judah used to say, A man is bound to say the following three blessings daily: who has made me a Jew’, ‘. . . . who hast not made me a woman’; and ‘ . . . who hast not made me a brutish man’. R. Aha b. Jacob once overhead his son saying the blessing … who hast not made me a brutish man’, whereupon he said to him, ‘And this too!’ Said the other, ‘Then what blessing should I say instead?’ [He replied,] . . . who hast not made me a slave’. And is not that the same as a woman?[Rashi explains because in terms of the obligation of doing mitzvos – a woman and a slave are equal]— A slave is more contemptible.] Look at Rashi (Menachos 43b) who explains in his first explanation to the question of saying a beracha “who has not made me a slave” is the same saying “who has not made me a woman", that “the wife is also a slave to her husband as a slave is to his master.” If I weren't afraid I would say that it is necessary to erase the first explantion of Rashi. Because G-d forbid for Rashi to say this ridiculous statement. That is because according to the Torah there is no obligation for the wife to do anything for the husband except for having normal marital relations. And even in regard to intercourse, he is in fact more obligated to her because he also has a negative Torah commandment not to deprive her of sexual satisfaction. In fact it is only a decree of the Sages that requires that her work belongs to her husband. Corresponding to this requirement to work for him, he is required to feed her. But the only work she is obligated to do is house work and not to work in the field. She also has some obligation regarding wool - which is an easy job that women typically do. See Shulchan Aruch EH simon 80. Her meals are his obligation since she should not have it any worse than her family and his family and certainly not less than what she typically eats. Similarly he is obligated to provide her clothing according to what the women of that city typically get as well as according to the standard of his and her family. That is because she is to go up in her standard of living with him and not go down. In addition he is obligated to honor her and he cannot leave the house without her permission except to go to his job that is known to her. In fact we see from all this the opposite of her being his slave. He is obligated to do all the work to earn a living as is stated in the Kesubah. Even if it means hiring himself out according to Tosfos (Kesubos 63). Thus we see that the husband is more of a slave to her then she is to him. This Rashi requires further study (tzorech iyun gadol).

Please keep in mind that there are other views and other factors in deciding practical halacha concerning this issue - please consult with your personal rabbi.


Netziv (Meishiv Davar 4:35): Question: You asked a second time to discuss what does it mean that a man acquires (kinyan) a wife? Why and for what purpose is she acquired. This is what you wrote in the first letter in which you noted that according to the Torah a man makes no acquisition of the woman except in respect to intercourse – however aside from intercourse there is absolutely no acquisition. As a consequence if she makes a neder (vow) and says that she is prohibiting him from the pleasure of intercourse with her – there is no need to nullify the neder. But she can be pressured to have intercourse - in spite of the neder - because for that purpose she was acquired by her husband. Answer: This matter is very clear. This that it says in the Torah that the wife is kinyan kaspo (acquired with money) and also this that we find that the wife of a man is his slave and maidservant – the intent is clearly that she is like his slave and maidservant – but not literally so. Just as the work of a slave’s hand belongs to his master so is his wife regarding intercourse but not in any other aspect. A clear proof that a wife is not literally a slave to her husband is that our Sages say that according to the Torah, the work of her hands does not belong to her husband. But how do our Sages know this. Is it stated clearly in the Torah? But doesn't the Torah say that she is kinyan kaspo (acquired by money) which is the same description given for a slave and maidservant? So what is the source that her work does not belong to her husband? In fact let’s reverse the question, how do we know that his wife is obligated to him regarding intercourse and therefore can not prohibit herself sexually to her husband. There is no problem if he was the one making the neder and said that he is prohibiting her from having intercourse with him. Of course the neder would not be valid because we have a clear Torah verse prohibiting him from diminishing her rights to sexual intercourse. And even according to the view that that verse is only talking about his obligation to cloth her, nevertheless the neder is still not valid because he is obligated to satisfy her sexually from a kal v’chomer. As we see in a braissa in the Mechilta (Shoftim). Rav Yonason said “she’era kesusa” is referring to clothing which is appropriate for her body. If she is young she should not be given clothing for an old person. Additionally that this verse can mean that she should not be given clothing for the summer in the winter and vice verse…. And how do we know that he needs to feed her?…How do we know intercourse?. There is a kal v’chomer. And those things which she didn’t get married for you can not prevent her from having, those things for which she did marry to get she surely can not be prevented from having. (I speak further about this in my sefer HaEmek She’ela (6:1). In contrast regarding the wife - she can not withhold the pleasure of intercourse from the husband. So what is the source that says she is required to have intercourse with him? Perhaps it is from the fact that she is called “kinyan kaspo” (acquired with money) and that she is owned by the husband also in regard to everything else like his maidservant? But that is clearly not so and it is a elementary from the verse “When a man takes a wife”. Why does it end “And he has sexual relations with her” – and mentions nothing else? From this we learn that only for that particular aspect i.e., sexual intercourse she is acquired by him like a maidservant to serve him – but not for anything else….The kinyan (acquisition) of the man is only concerning the sexuality of wife. This is not a question regarding an unmarried woman according to the view of the Rambam who says it is prohibited to have intercourse with an unmarried woman. But even according to those who disagree with the Rambam – having intercourse with an unmarried women is only optional - but she is not obligated to have intercourse with him. And if he forces an unmarried woman to have intercourse – G-d forbid - then he is required to pay her for shame and degradation. Forcing an unmarried woman is like theft and like beating someone. In contrast his wife who is acquired by him – she is required to have intercourse with him any time he wants and if she does not do it willingly he is able to force her – just as a master who forces his maidservant to do who work. All of this is very clear and it isn’t worthwhile going over it again…. It is important to note that a man’s wife is acquired by him and also sanctified by him. It is important to understand that these two things are separate. Acquisition (kinyan) means that she is required to have intercource with her husband just as a slave is required to do his work for his master. In contrast, kiddushin (sanctification) is like hekdesh i.e., she is prohibited to others. The significance of having two separate aspects is that from the point of view of the wife being acquired to her husband – it is considered theft if she gave her love to someone else and did nothing else. This would be like a slave who works for someone other than his master at a time when he had work to do for his master – this is pure theft. On the other hand purely from the point of view of acquisition, if her husband gave her permission to have intercourse with someone else it would be permitted – just as a slave who was permitted to work for someone else. Consequently that is why she is also sanctified (mekudeshesh) from which there is no escape except by receiving a Get from her husband or if he dies. However from the pure perspective of sanctification, I would not know that she has any obligation or that she is acquired by her husband. I would only know that she is prohibited to others through the sanctification. Consequently that is why she also has to be acquired. I have already written in the name of the Rambam that if one sanctifies an unborn baby that the kiddushin is valid and the baby is a married woman and is prohibited to others – but the baby is not also acquired by the husband. Consequently if a man sanctifies a woman who is prohibited to him by a negative commandment, she is definitely not acquired by him but she is in fact sanctified to him. Therefore anyone else who has intercourse with her is committing adultery….In summary, there is no doubt that a wife is only acquired (kinyan) by her husband concerning her sexuality and nothing else and there is no reason to repeat this again.

86 comments :

  1. You may want to look in Rabbi Meiselman's book - Jewish Woman in Jewish Law, where I seem to recall he discusses this at length with quotes and sources.

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  2. קדושין טז ע״א

    אמר רבא זאת אומרת *עבד עברי גופו קנוי* והרב שמחל על גרעונו אין גרעונו מחול

    תוס׳ שם

    ותימה דרבא דקאמר עבד עברי גופו קנוי היכי פליג אמתניתין וליכא למימר דרבא דייק מברייתא הכי וליה לא סבירא ליה...
    וי''ל *דמתני' נמי סברה דגופו קנוי* והא דלא חשיב שטר משום דתנא דמתני' לא חשיב אלא יציאות שהם בע''כ של אדון...

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  3. Let's talk reality. I'm married. If anybody is owned it's me, the man. Most marriages are like that.

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  4. "kinyan kaspo" This might be described as: The husband acquired a mutually acceptable relationship with his wife using monetary means.

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  5. The fact that a womans income or if she found something does not belong to the husband (it's only CHAZAL who instituted the HALACHA that it belongs to the husband for various reasons) proves that she is absolutely not the property of the husband,the word KINYAN as far as KIDUSHIN is concerned is not a monetary issue but a EVEN EZER ISSUR V'HETER issue,KINYAN in this instace means she belongs to the husband in the sense she is off limits to the rest of the world.
    To prove this point there is a famous AVNEI MILUIM were he is MECHADESH something very interesting,as we know you cannot be MEKADESH an EISHES ISH,the reason the KIDUSHIM are not valid is because the punishment for the ISSUR of EISHES ISH is KORRUS and we have a KLALL "EIN KIDUSHIN TOFSIM B' CHAIVA KRISSUS" now there are some instances were the woman is a full fetched EISHES ISH but there is no ISSUR KORRUS (for instance when a KOTON is MEYABEM or someone is MEKADESH a SHIFCHA CHARIFA
    which is a half SHIFCHA and half BAS CHORIN) says the AVNEI MELUIM in that case even though she is a full fetched EISHES ISH she can go ahead and be MEKADESH herself to someone else because she is NOT the property of her husband and the KIDUSHIM are valid and she basically has two husbands.

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  6. Thanks for sharing your interesting insights and observations. From the Ketuvah , he is making a kinyan of responsiblity amd the kidushin sanctifying and making her his sexual partner as said above, which of course is always dependent on her consent at the time of relationships. The question is what commitments does the women make - also whether she is aware of her commitments - that would make her into a moredes etc. The concept of a kinyan of subservience or subordiation seems to more about being descriptive of the relationship between husband and wife that existed in certain periods - I doubt that perception of marriage exists today and something with which a girl goes into a marriage. It depends more about personalities and roles in the family , so a domineerig woman , who is also the breadwinner and looks after the kids would be in charge , but still work like a slave to keep her family going.

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  7. the little I saw of his book it seemed more apologetics rather than scholarship

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  8. you raise some interesting points. Clearly according to some sources such as Rashba and Mabit - a marriage is based upon the expectations of both sides and that can change of time as well as from couple to couple. The issue is the halachic literature based on sources. It is reasonable that when using a term such as kinyan it means something - what does it mean?

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  9. The_Original_Bored_LawyerSeptember 11, 2016 at 5:27 PM

    The simplest proof that a man does not own his wife like chattel is that he cannot sell her. All he can do is release her status back to her through a get. And, when he dies, she is not inherited, but her ishus status dissolves. I do not know of any other property, whether land, movables, slaves or anything else, that is treated that way in the Torah.

    There are places in the Torah where kinyan (or kanah) is used to mean something that is not property.

    'הָאָדָם יָדַע אֶת חַוָּה אִשְׁתּוֹ וַתַּהַר וַתֵּלֶד אֶת קַיִן וַתֹּאמֶר קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת ה:
    (Bereishis 4:1)

    תִּפֹּל עֲלֵיהֶם אֵימָתָה וָפַחַד בִּגְדֹל זְרוֹעֲךָ יִדְּמוּ כָּאָבֶן עַד יַעֲבֹר עַמְּךָ ה עַד יַעֲבֹר עַם זוּ קָנִיתָ:
    (Shemos 15:16)

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  10. interesting point - thanks!

    But why do we need two terms kiddushin and kinyan if they both mean the same thing?

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  11. but that is not how it is used. For example teruma. If I have a mutually acceptable relationsip through a monetary arrangement with a cohen - am I a kinyan kaspo and can I eat teruma?

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  12. I am asking in the world of learning - there are hundreds of pages of text dealing with the significance of making a kinyan - but it is not clear from any of them what the kinyan is

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  13. you want to elaborate. there are many places where it says that an eved ivrei is not a kinyan guf

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  14. agreed - but what does kinyan mean. Especially since the gemora and commentaries talk about it as a legal action?

    Is all this ink being spilt to create an atmosphere that marriage is taken seriously?

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  15. The Talmud isn't talking about acquisition as we normally think of it. It's not property acquisition. As Rabbi Soloveitchik said, the Torah has its own logic, its own orbit. It's more that she enters his moral domain. It's a matrimonial concept. Even though the word nikneh is used, it isn't the same nikneh as elsewhere. Like Jack Korn described it quite well above your comment.

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  16. That book is terribly apologetic. He wrote it as a youth when he was still modern orthodox.

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  17. but she obviously has obligations also as a result of the kinyan - what are they? where are they spelled out? why doesn't the gemora just use the term kiddushin - what is added by saying kinyan? Furthermore kinyan is not simply a metaphor because it determines whether she is married and that she needs a get to be free. It determines whether she can eat teruma if marrried to a cohen

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  18. this is the first page of Rabbi Meiselman's chapter on kinyan. Not impressed

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  19. these are the first two pages of the chapter on kinyan. Anybody agree with him?

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  20. I don't see anything inconsistent or apologetic about the defining the term "kinyan" (as applied to Torah marriage) as establishment of a close, special relationship between the husband and wife. So that neither the husband nor wife are chattel, but they both have rights and responsibilities within the relationship.

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  21. try learning the various gemoras that deal with the issue of kinyan - using that defintion. It is not that marriage is not a close special relationship - but that is not how the gemora, rishonim and achronim use the term.

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  22. This might help, from Kornfeld Daf

    http://www.dafyomi.co.il/kidushin/insites/kd-dt-005.htm

    HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN zt'l (in KUNTRESEI SHI'URIM 1:2) suggests that these three expressions correspond to the three types of Kinyan which Kidushin creates (see Background to Kidushin 2:1). The first type of Kinyan which Kidushin creates is a Kinyan of Ishus, which permits a man to live with his wife and which creates a familial relationship ("She'er") between them.
    The second type of Kinyan is a Kinyan Isur, which prohibits her to every other man in the world.
    The third type of Kinyan is a monetary Kinyan which grants the husband certain rights over the wife and her possessions, and which grants the wife the right to eat Terumah if her husband is a Kohen.
    Each of the three phrases in the Beraisa emphasizes one of the three Kinyanim which Kidushin creates. "Mekudeshes" emphasizes the Kinyan Isur (as the Gemara on 2b compares the word "Mekudeshes" with the word "Hekdesh"). "Me'ureses" represents the monetary Kinyan (which come about through the Erusin). "Harei At l'Intu" ("Behold, you are my wife") represents the Kinyan of Ishus, the husband-wife relationship. If a man betroths a woman with any one of these phrases, he creates a full-fledged Kidushin in which all three Kinyanim take effect.
    Rav Gustman adds that this may explain why Rashi emphasizes that a man must say either "Harei At Mekudeshes" or "Harei At Me'ureses." One might have thought that a man must say all three phrases in order to create the three Kinyanim of Kidushin. Therefore, Rashi points out that any one of them creates a complete Kidushin.

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  23. It's not merely homiletic. It creates responsibilities and relationships. It's just that ownership as in chattel is not one of them.

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  24. thanks - but why is it necessary that they "suggest"? why isn't it clearer what the term means?

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  25. The Talmud does not seem interested in precise dogma regarding the marriage kinyan. The Mishnah on Kiddushin 2a uses the term "niknes", not "koneh". Kiddushin 2b makes note that the mishnah does not state "ha eish koneh". The Gemara is not making a precise definition of dogma, but it is defining the parameters of the "kinyan" in a way that the kinyan is not a kinyan of property in the normal sense. This is consistent with Kiddushin 6b where it states that the wife's body does not belong to the husband.

    It seems we could define the meaning of a marriage kinyan as establishment of a close, special relationship, without contradicting those Gemaras.

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  26. We don't know from this what exact language R' Gustman used, plus he may have been speaking as an anav. Or could be as you say that the term is a bit unclear to everybody. But the main thing we get from this is that kinyan is not strictly a term used for acquiring property. One kinyan is ishus, permissibility of the wife to the husband. If he just flat out owned her, you wouldn't have these nuances of kinyan.

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  27. BetYouCantPushJustOneSeptember 11, 2016 at 6:49 PM

    The kinyan is on her womb. In all societies, both Tribalistic and modern ones (The nuclear family), the item which the woman is exchanging for the man's ability to provide her with the product of his excess labor is the fruit of her womb.

    The "kinyan" here is only ritual, and it is not required, it is automatically implied in any union, intentional or unintentional where even outside suspicion would require a Get.

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  28. The academic solution seems similar to my suggestion that the husband's kinyan is the "fact" that his wife has a subsidiary status even this is society rooted and not through a kinyan.

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  29. I'm not seeing how the above post demonstrates that Halacha views wives as "subordinate" to their husbands from a Torah or Halachic sense.

    Note that I'm not disputing the assertion, just seeking clarification how any of the Torah sources posted in this essay demonstrates that assertion.

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  30. forgot to add,that the PNEI YEHOSHUA disagrees with with the AVNEI MELUIM and says that besides the reason of EIN KEDUSHIM TOFSIM BE'CHAIVA KRISUS there is another more fundamental reason why you can't be MEKADESH an EISHES ISH and the reason is because she belongs already to the first husband therefore she cannot sell herself to someone else,exactly the same reason you cannot sell any of your possessions to Jack after having it sold to Joe so too she cannot sell herself to a second husband.
    It's obvious from the PNEI YEHOSHUA that he considers a wife the possesion of the husband just like any of his other possessions

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  31. So why does the Rambam say kinyan is required?
    רמב"ם הלכות אישות פרק א הלכה א
    קודם מתן תורה היה אדם פוגע אשה בשוק אם רצה הוא והיא לישא אותה מכניסה לביתו ובועלה בינו לבין עצמו ותהיה לו לאשה, כיון שנתנה תורה נצטוו ישראל שאם ירצה האיש לישא אשה יקנה אותה תחלה בפני עדים ואחר כך תהיה לו לאשה שנאמר +דברים כ"ב+ כי יקח איש אשה ובא אליה.

    Are you claiming that the first mishna in kiddushin is optional?

    משנה מסכת קידושין פרק א
    האשה נקנית בשלש דרכים וקונה את עצמה בשתי דרכים נקנית בכסף בשטר ובביאה בכסף בית שמאי אומרים בדינר ובשוה דינר ובית הלל אומרים בפרוטה ובשוה פרוטה וכמה היא פרוטה אחד משמנה באיסר האיטלקי וקונה את עצמה בגט ובמיתת הבעל היבמה נקנית בביאה וקונה את עצמה בחליצה ובמיתת היבם:


    You are basically tossing out shas

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  32. as stated before - the term mekadesh deals with the issue of permissibility of wife to husband and the prohibition to the rest of the world . What is gained by saying there is a kinyan?

    Assuming that he doesn't flat out own her - according to the Netziv he does own her from the point of view of ishus i.e., sexuality.

    You are ignoring the issue teruma where her ability to eat teruma is dependent on being acquired kinyan kaspo which is learned from marriage. So she is either being acquired so she can eat teruma or she is not acquired and thus cannot eat teruma.

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  33. not sure what you mean by dogma. Please go through one of the issues, such as whether a woman is acquired by chupah or can eat teruma or needs a divorce is is guilty of adultery etc with your definition of kinyan. It doesn't work

    It is not defining the parameters of kinyan. It is stating there there is a kinyan. It says it isn't kinyan gufa but kinyan kaspo. Your saying it isn't kinyan in a normal sense - says nothing except repeat that we dont have a clear idea of what is happening

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  34. T. M. Lemos here. I am in fact a she--just f.y.i. ; )

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  35. All sources you brought about a man not forcing his wife, have nothing to do with kinyan laws. They have to do with mentchlichkeit. Even to mistreat an ox is wrong. We are all even required to feed our animals before we ourselves eat, but that doesn't mean there is a weakness in the kinyan.

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  36. I don't really chap your dilemma. The kinyan is to enact (make be חל) all of the rules as they are stated. The Torah gives specific rules that apply to matrimonial relationships. These rules to be chal occurs through an act. That act is referred to as a maaseh kinyan. There are all sorts of kinyanim. There is kinyan hagoof, kinyan pairos, kinyan hischayvus(kinyan devorim when applied correctly). A kinyan can be made with a tnai. So there is also a kinyan to enact matrimonial laws.

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  37. you are missing the point. Go through the various gemoros about kinyan and tell me what the rules are that are being enacted and how they come about. What is the kinyan that enables teruma to be eaten? kinyan kaspo. what is kinyan kaspo. if you look at the commentaries you see it has a variety of meanings that are not consistent. What is marriage and why does it need a kinyan? There is no kinyan gufa so what is being acquired? To say that kinyan makes everything work really ignores the question of how and what. You are presupposing that we know what marriage is and kinyan is making it happening instead of saying we did a kinyan what is the result of the kinyan as opposed to kedusha as opposed to pilegesh etc etc. You can't ignore the mechanism unless you consider this not a legal system but simply a ritual associated with preconceived rules and practices.

    in short you are totally ignoring the questions raised by the rishonim and achronim and saying marriage is what happens when you get married

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  38. that is definitely not what the commentaries say. please look at the Netziv 4:35. He assumes because there is a kinyan the wife's sexuality is the property of the husband and he can force her. In contrast the Rashba assumes that sexual relations are simply what marriage is about and that there is not any particular obligation on the wife but rather a mutual relationship. Rav Moshe seems to be agreeing with the Netziv. Before we get to menshlikite what are the parameters of the halacha. And again was in the significance of the kinyan. Why can't the wife acquire the husband? why bother with kinyan at all?

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  39. Did you bring Rashba and R' Moshe?

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  40. the kinyan could be simply a sign of gemiras da'at concerning an agreement between 2 parties , on the other hand the fact that min ha'torah a man can divorce his wife agaiinst her will shows he has certain rights over her which he can dispose without her involvement - implies he had a kinyan over her which he can get rid of

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  41. no nor did I bring the Pnei Yehoshua or the dispute between the Bavli and Yerushalmi or the Maharal etc etc.

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  42. So I am not in the sugya at the moment to be searching and finding mekoros. I can address what you bring. The netziv seems like the gemara which says you can do what ever you want if not for mentshlichkeit, and that is what the Rema paskens too. In other words he has the kinyan right to use her as he pleases, but yet he may not behave like an animal because that's just wrong behavior.

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  43. BetYouCantPushJustOneSeptember 12, 2016 at 4:29 AM

    I did not mean to sound like I'm opposing Shas, G-D forbid, and I hereby retract and declare null and void anything I sais which alludes to this. Perhaps I shouldn't put my two cents in when the argument is out of my league. Please continue, I will listen instead of speak.

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  44. look up the avney miluim; basically it's a concept of issur, she becomes assur to the rest of the world; what i understand is that (one) way to create the issur is via a kinyan; otherwise shtar or bya also create the same result

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  45. Two points:
    1) The word "kinyan" does not necessarily imply property. For example "k'nei l'cha chaver."
    2) My understanding of the term kinyan in this sugya is actions that effect a chalos (i.e. a change in status). In the case of purchasing property, the action of giving over the shtar or the chalipin effects the chalos of the property becoming someone else's (even if no money has changed hands). In the case of marriage, the action of giving kesef (or shtar or biah), effects the chalos of her now being assur on everyone else and muttar to him. The kesef is just one type of action described by Chazal for achieving the desired effect.

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  46. This sounds correct to me, except that I think the kinyan is the same for both property and marriage/issur. A kinyan is a maaseh that creates a chalos of some kind. In the case of property the chalos is the property changing hands. In the case of marriage the chalos is her becoming muttar to him (according to the Rambam) and assur on everyone else.

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  47. why isn't she making a kinyan on her husband - or are you claiming nothing changes for the husband when he gets married?

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  48. Exactly. The husband's status remains the same. Pre-Rabbeinu Gershom there is no added issur on the husband vis-a-vis other women.

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  49. so why are most of the obligations generated by marriage on the husband?

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  50. could you also explain the following

    Tosfos haRosh (Kesubos 2a): His field got flooded… In a case where the wife developed serious blemishes we say “his field got flooded”[it is his bad luck]. It should similarly be true that if the husband developed serious blemishes then we should say that “her field got flooded” [it is her bad luck]. So why is it only when the husband gets serious blemishes that we force him to divorce her? The answer is that the wife is his monetary purchase (kinyan kaspo) just as his slave or ox or donkey and therefore what happens to her is the result of his mazel (luck). [the reverse is not true because he is not her possession]

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  51. That isn't due to a change in status but an acceptance of responsibility. When a person purchases an ox, he takes on a lot responsibility (to feed the ox, to prevent it from eating other's crops, to prevent it from goring, etc.) but the person's halachic status remains unchanged.

    In the case of marriage, only the woman's status changes but both parties accept upon themselves responibilities. The Torah gave 3 responsibilities to the man, and Chazal gave more as well as some to the woman. That more reflects the typical practical abilities of each party to fulfill those responsibilities, than a matter of status.

    Contrary to the Netziv, it seems to me that the woman's sexual obligations (and minor housework obligations) are not part of her change in status and are not related to the kinyan. Rather they are akin to the man's sexual and financial obligations that he accepts along with marriage. That is why "punishment" for failing to fulfill those obligations are minusing off her kesuba for her and adding to the kesuba for him.

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  52. I don't remember this Tosafosh haRosh. I will look it up when I get home tonight.

    I will point out, however, that the Rosh must be speaking about the kesuba (because otherwise he can just divorce her if he wants). His question is why does she still get the kesuba when we force him to divorce her because he became mukeh shechin and she also gets the kesubah when he divorces her because she became a mukas shechin? You either say nistachpa sadeihu when someone makes a commitment or you do not.

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  53. neder almenas that she can get killed if she is mezane?
    al daas rabim? nope; the chidush of the tora is that thru the maase kinyan she does become asur, same like with bya and/or shtar

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  54. Because she is in his rishus now. She is supposed to be generally devoted to him so we must spell out his obligations to her. Too bad, the new feminist orthodoxy chucked this concept. So what we have today is his obligations and none for her, or few for her.

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  55. Perhaps: prior to the kinyan, she is free to marry any man not halachically forbidden to her. After the kinyan, she no longer has this freedom. So he has "purchased" a type of exclusive option.

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  56. but that is the language of kiddushin. What is added by saying there is a kinyan?

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  57. maybe the act of kiddushin creates the kinyan, r gustman's language suggests this

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  58. meaning it is sufficient to tell her hari ot medushesh li - and there is no need for giving a ring?

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  59. Rabbi E:

    "So why is it only when the husband gets serious blemishes that we force him to divorce her?"

    Please take out the word "only" - it is not in the Tos. Rosh, and it is confusing!

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  60. "As is well known the Rambam says it is only rabbinic in nature (divrei sofrim)."

    This is not only not well-known, but also wrong! See kesef Mishna and Lechem Mishneh Ishus 1:2 that the Rambam agrees that it is מן התורה, but calls any Halacha which is not מפורש בקרא "Divrei Sofrim". As is well known this is the Derech of the Rambam in many, many places.

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  61. A. She still has to accept the status.
    B. There might be a chumra status. (Q: assuming she would require a get lechumra, can she then marry a cohen?)

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  62. it is not obvious - though the explanation of the the kesef mishna is well known. It is clear from the teachers of Rashi and the Gaonim that they understood it to be rabbinic

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  63. that is the only thing that concerns you?! What about what he says?

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  64. It is very interesting! But I was breaking my head to work out what he meant until I looked it up for myself!

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  65. Breishis 1:28, Vayomer lohem elokim Pru Urvu umilu es ho'oretz vechivshihu. Rashi -
    1) lelamdoch shehazochor kovesh es hanekeivo shelo tehe yatzonis,
    2) lelamdoch shehoIsh shedarko lichbosh metzuve al piryo verivyo, velo hoisho.
    Mishnah in masechet Kidushin says Hoisho *niknis* bishlosho drochim bekessef, bishtar, ubebiah. Niknis means buying and acquiring so as to own, to have and to hold like any other Kinyan chalipin Transaction. There are no free lunches, you *must* give her a consideration minimum a shava prutah in order to own/acquire her. Once bought, he owns her similar as the ownership of a slave if you will, that is subservient to the Master. Both, Master and Slave have rules, regulations, and obligations similar to a wife/cattle/chattel. Although a wife is subservient to his *conjugal rights* and his obligations as it states vehi yimshol bach of which is the tachliss of the briah *lo latohu broah elo lasheves yetzoro*, he must do it with *consent* and with *love* and much care so that she is elevated to a much higher esteem than a slave. If he forces her against her will, not only are the offsprings from such called bnei anusso, but is against all and everything of Torah veHalacha. If she never finds herself to be up to it or in the mood, she is considered a Moredes, ke'eved hamored al Rabo veyotza'as beli Ksubah. Ke'eved is only semantics no matter how you slice it, for all practical purposes she has to be an Ezer doing wifely duties as listed in Talmud, same goes for eved like the duties that are also listed. The husband has his duties, to feed, cloth, conjugal obligations and the whole rest of the story as listed in the Kesubah. Indeed, he is more of a *slave* in his undertakings of the burden to her, than she is to him.



    The manner of acquiring 1) is for the man to pursue and to *own* and *be meyuad leish* so that she should not be like hefker being with other men as well all along, 2) as well as to conquer her in a military way like a Yefas Toar when she is a Nochriyo, as they say, "to the victor belongs the spoils". Even a Nochriyo has procedures how to go about in her acquisition for marriage, again rules and regulations, still and all she becomes a wife and not a slave. If he so chooses, he can have her remain a shifcha va'avodo leolam. This transition scenario can best demonstrate distinctly the difference between a shifcha/slave and a wife!
    See Breishis31:15 the difference in description of Rochel and Leah ...halo nochriyos nechshavni lo ki mechoronu... (consideration) and how Lavan complained ...vatnaheg es bnosay kishvuyot chorev (slavery).

    This is the Torah setup for a unit of a yiddishe family. Whether you like to call it like a slave, or owning body/soul, at the end of the day in Halacha it is all the same. She is bought of with a consideration, if an adult - bishlosho drochim, if minor then mohar to her father, or through Kovshuho the military way. And she is freed through a Sefer Krissus at which time she acquires herself back ownership, her body/soul if you will, again free to marry and be bought out by anyone else in the world. In the case if the husband dies, same applies.

    To Have costs money, to Hold costs even more, to get rid is topping all. Marriage is a form of Art, not Rocket Science, nor a simple Real Estate transaction. In today's times, it can cost you blood, sweat, n'tears, and even your life, go ask the Mediators, they will tell you all about it, or read the papers if you so will.

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  66. It is not just the KM - IIANM, they cite a שו"ת הרמב"ם to that effect as well.

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  67. that is what you are supposed to do

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  68. He buys her, thereby owns her, no one else can tell her what to do or not do, no one else may have relations with her. This is Das Moshe veYehudis, he must give at least a shave prutah to buy her, and this full expression of Harei at... is matbea shetovu chachomim. Anything less, no dice and no deal. Although she is bought like an eved as the word indicates, "KINYAN" for ownership purposes, he can not treat her like an eved. All else is dictated by Halacha lemoshe misinai vechaza"l.

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  69. I would like to propose an understanding of this concept, based on Ramban & Ritva to Kidushin 16a. They refer to something called a קנין איסור which a lord has over his slave and a husband has over his wife.

    If my understanding of their words is correct, קנין איסור means the ability to control the איסור והיתר status of an other. There are other examples of the ability to effect a a change in another's status, such as נדר דאסר חפצא עליה but there's no control over it; once one has effected an issur on the חפץ he no longer has the ability to divorce that איסור. (The concept of התרת נדרים is not in the נודר's ability.)

    So the difference between קידושין and קנין is that קידושין is merely the ability to create the issur, just as creating a issur of hekdesh. The kinyan is the ability to control that issur by writing and giving a get.

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  70. The_Original_Bored_LawyerSeptember 16, 2016 at 5:03 PM

    The husband can also annul certain of her vows; the reverse is not true. Another example of kinyan issur.

    For that matter, the possuk by a Cohen -- kinyan kaspo -- is another example. Only Kohanim can eat terumah and certain parts of korbanos. This extends to their kinyan kaspo, which includes the wife of a Cohen, even is she is not the daughter of a Cohen. (And conversely, the daughter of a Cohen who marries a Levi or Yisrael cannot eat these things.) In effect, she gets to eat the special Cohen foods as part of his household, not the reverse.

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  71. Rambam says purim and chanukah is divrei sofrim... הלכות מגילה וחנוכה. יש בכללן שתי מצות עשה מדברי סופרים ואינן מן המנין.

    Among many others in those perakim...

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  72. I never said that the Rambam never calls Derabanans דברי סופרים, only that he ALSO calls דאורייתאs which are not explicit דברי סופרים! In this, he follows the example of Chazal, who use דברי סופרים to mean both Rabbinic law (e.g. Chagiga 18b) and also הלכה למשה מסיני (e.g. Sanhedrin 88b).

    וממילא לק"מ, ודו"ק.

    א גוט וואך!

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  73. An important Dayan once asked the rhtetorical question, "is d'rabbanan ... d'rabbanan or d'oraita". Is observance or violation of d'rabbanan only d'rabbanan, or does it have consequences of D@oraita?

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  74. maybe he aquires the marriage, in that only he can break the marriage (eg if her cooking is not up to par). she cannot do the same. so the marriage is aquired by him.



    it would not matter that according to r. moshe (perhaps as compensation) within the institution she has superior rights

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  75. "The Rosh (Kesubos 5:32) also permits forcing a moredes as does Rabbeinu Yeruchim (Nesiv 23:8), Mordechai (Kiddushin 530), Ran(Nedarim 20b), Bach (E.H. 25:1), Shita Mekubetzes(Nedarim 20b) and Tur (E.H. 77)."

    I had trouble cite checking these sources. The Rosh notes only that a man may reduce the Ketubah of a Moredes even if he is forcing her to have sex--there is no endorsement of the forced act. I checked the Ran, Shita Mekubetzes, Bach and Tur, and I don't see where they permit forcing a moredes. I would appreciate if you could provide some guidance on these sources.

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  76. רא"ש מסכת כתובות פרק ה סימן לב
    וכן מורדת מתשמיש אפי' שהבעל משמש עמה בע"כ פוחת מכתובתה(ר) והלכתא כרב הונא דאמרינן לקמן היכי דמי מורדת אמר אמימר דאמרה בעינא ליה ומצערנא ליה שמעינן מינה דמתשמיש הויא מורדת כרב הונא.

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  77. The Rosh I agree. What about the other ones? Is it possible that the reference to 20b is 15b? I would love to find these sources.

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  78. I found the sources. I think you may have mistaken 20b for 15b and 25:1 for 77:1.

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  79. Even in English we are able to talk about "acquiring" a responsibility when characterizing situations that have nothing to do with the act of actual "purchase". Why can't the Hebrew term "qinyan" be similarly malleable & broad?

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  80. the tur agrees with rosh

    טור אבן העזר הלכות כתובות סימן עז
    ואפילו אם ישמש עמה במרדה יפחות לה כיון שהוא בעל כרחה ח)ושוב תקנו שישלחו מבית דין שתחזור בה לא חזרה בה מכריזין עליה ד' פעמים ט)בד' שבתות זו אחר זו בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות

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  81. Ran (20b)הר"ן מסכת נדרים דף כ עמוד ב
    התורה התירתך - דכתיב כי יקח איש אשה שהיא לקוחה לו לעשות בה כל חפצו וכתב הרמב"ם ז"ל בפרק כ"א מהא"ב (הלכ' ט) ובלבד שלא יוציא שז"ל.
    Bach
    ב"ח אבן העזר סימן עו
    התורה התירתך לו ולפיכך אף בזו דאומרת אני בבגדי ואתה בבגדך מורדת חשיבה לפי שמחויבת לעשות בענייני תשמיש כל מה שהבעל רוצה כדכתיב (בראשית ג טז) (ואליך תשוקתו) [ואל אישך תשוקתך] והוא ימשל בך

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