Tuesday, January 14, 2014

Chofetz Chaim: Speaking lashon harah when angry at assailant?


This post got started in the comments to a previous post  about lashon harah.

The sefer Chofetz Chaim is widely assumed to be the definitive Shulchan Aruch for knowing the halachic parameters of the prohibition of  lashon harah. The Chofetz Chaim himself was largely responsible for creating single handedly the halachos of lashon harah.  Thus contrary to most other halachos there is no clear development of discussion, analyis and psak over time from Talmud to Rishonim to Achronim. In fact aside from some mention in the Talmud and a sparse listing of 7 halachos in Hilchos De'os of the Rambam , there is no mention in the Tur or Shulchan Aruch. The Chofetz Chaim created a new category of halacha by transforming what was previously viewed as ethical prinicples discussed by Rabbeinu Yonah and other mussar seforim – into clear cut prohibitions. In addition he spent much effort showing that what was commonly presumed to be permitted speech was in fact prohibited (e.g., the heter of speaking before three described in the Talmud and Rishonim is reinterpreted and severely restricted by the Chofetz Chaim so as to be largely irrelevant). In sum, he created many halachos of lashon harah which were previously viewed as ethical values and he restricted previously heterim for speaking lashon harah.

As the Klausenberger Rebbe stated, the Chofetz Chaim viewed lashon harah as a poison gas which under no circumstance can be allowed to escape into the air. Thus he is focused not only in describing lashon harah but he also creates restrictions to minimize the possiblity of even mistakenly speaking lashon harah. In contrast the Shem m'Shmuel presents a more balanced model where not only is speaking lashon harah evil but so is not saying negative things when it is needed (to'eles) to protect others from harm. The view of the Shem m'Shmuel is apparently presumed in the responsa literature dealing with lashon harah because the added restrictions of the Chofetz Chaim are not mentioned. This is also clear from the Pischei Teshuva (O.C. 156) where he notes that the mussar seforim are strongly focused with the prohibition of speaking lashon harah but there is a worse sin – not speaking up to prevent harm to others

The sefer Chofetz Chaim is complicated and not easy to read. It is divided into two major section (lashon harah and rechilus) because he viewed these two prohibitions as being significantly different - even though there is considerable overlap and repetition in their elucidation. Both of these sections  are clarified by his commentary Be'er Mayim Chaim - to which there are also addition notes appended. Within the discussion of the halachos he frequently provides cross references to discussion in other places in the sefer which provide significant modifications and limitations to the original discussion and contributes significantly  to the complexity of the presentation. 

The question I want to address is what exactly is the sefer Chofetz Chaim? To approach this question, I will present a discussion concerning one clear and unambigious case. Is it permitted to speak for to'eles when there is at the same time their is anger or hatred towards the person being talked about? This is a very common situation which can happen when a person has been cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person. Does the Chofetz Chaim permit informing people about the abuser - if the victim is also angry?

An examination of the lashon harah section reveals in clall 10 the following words [Chofetz Chaim Foundation Translation]

Clall 10:1  If "someone" saw a person  commit a "crime" \ sin against a fellow Jew, for example, he stole something from him or withheld wages from him or harmed him, whether the victim was aware of it or not aware of it or if he humiliated the victim or caused him anguish or verbally abused him, and this "someone" knows about the incident with certainty and that the stolen object was not returned or that he did not compensate him for the harm he  caused, and that this person did not approach the victim (14) to  apologize and ask forgiveness for his sin. Even if this "someone"  was the only person who was aware of the incident, he is permitted  to tell other people what happened in order to help the victim (to  restore his loss) and to publicy denigrate the evil actions of this  person (in order that people would stay away from him and not  learn and copy his evil behavior). But all this is on condition that  this "someone" adheres to the following seven rules (listed in the  next halacha, clall 10:2).

It is clear from the above text that the permission to speak about an assailant is totally dependent on whether the seven conditions are met and if they are not fulfilled it is not permitted. I want to focus on the 5th rule that one "may not make his remarks as a result of some prior hatred that he had for this person."

Clall 10:2: These are the seven rules:
1. The speaker must be a first-hand observer  to the incident  and what he is reporting cannot be something he heard from  someone else unless it was later confirmed as being absolutely true ;
2. The speaker must be extremely careful not to immediately  conclude that the incident had to have been a case of theft or  cheating or damages or something comparable. Instead he must  carefully consider the circumstances of the incident and then  decide whether or not the law defines the incident as theft or damages;
3. The speaker must first rebuke the sinner using language  that is gentle and non-confrontational (8). Perhaps this first  approach will be useful and will result in the sinner rectifying  his actions. If the sinner still will not listen to him, then it is  permitted to publicize the sinner's crime and the wrong that he  did to a fellow Jew. (But if this speaker knows that his rebuke  would be useless, with G‑d's help, I will explain what he must  do further on in the 7th halacha of this Kelal);
4. The speaker may not exaggerate the details o(this "crime" \ sin  any more than they actually are;
5. The speaker's remarks can only be made if his intention is to  achieve a useful outcome as we will explain further on in  the 4th halacha of this Kelal. Moreover, the speaker may not  benefit at all, G-d forbid, in discrediting this sinner, nor may he  make his remarks as a result of some prior hatred that he had for  this person;
6. If the speaker is able to achieve a useful outcome by some other  strategy that would circumvent the need to use Lashon Hara  against this sinner, then in any circumstance it is forbidden to  use Lashon Hara:
7. The speaker's remarks may not cause any additional harm  _ (to this sinner) over and beyond the punishment he would  have received had he appeared in court, been convicted by its  judges and punished to the level that the law required. Please  see a definition of these terms further on in the 9th Kelal of the  Laws of Esurei Rechilut (the 5th & 6th halachot) as that is the  appropriate place to explain these details.

The Chofetz Chaim reiterates that all 7 conditions must be fulfilled to permit speaking lashon harah.
Clall 10:5.... Understand clearly that within the context of these seven rules it makes no difference if the victimized Jew (who was robbed or  cheated or humiliated) asked the speaker to disclose the damages or  the shame that was done to him or ifhe did not ask (and the speaker  made the disclosure of his own accord), the disclosure would be  permitted. But if the speaker did not comply with the seven listed  rules, then even if he was asked to make the disclosure it would  not help (19) and the remarks would be forbidden. Even if the  speaker was a relative of the victimized Jew, the remarks would be  forbidden.

We see clearly that the Chofetz Chaim poskens that if a person's motivation is not because of desire to help others – he is not allowed to describe the bad things another has done. Therefore not only if his motivation is because of his anger at the assailant the Chofetz Chaim does not permit speaking and but even if it is anger mixed with a desire to help others.

Another proof that the Chofetz Chaim requires proper motivation to say lashon harah - even when it is beneficial is

In 10:3 the Chofetz Chaim notes
. And all of this is if the speaker is more virtuous than the offender, and does not commit the sins he is observing (and subsequently reporting). But if he (this observer) is a sinner just like him (13) and he suffers from the same sickness, meaning, he commits the same sins as the victim, then this observer is forbidden to publicize the victim's sins. Because this type of person, in publicizing the sins of the victim has no intention to do good and is not motivated by a sense of "Yir ' at Shamayim" \ a fear of Heaven. Instead this person is driven by a passion to be gleeful at the expense of someone else's suffering and degradation. The prophet Hoshea
addressed this mindset when he said (1 :4) "and I have remembered the blood of Yizre.'el shed by the House of Yehu." Even though Yehu was fulfilling Hashem's will to annihilate the monarchy of Achav in the Valley of Yizre'el, and he was complying with the prophet's instructions, and as a reward G-d granted four generations ofYehu and his descendents kingship over the ten tribes of Israel," nevertheless, ultimately the blood he shed in killing the House of
Achav was remembered and counted against him because Yehu himself was a blatant sinner.

Be'er Mayim Chayim

(KIO/3/1)-(13) 00 ifhe is a sinner just like him: This is a quote from Rabbeinu Yonah in the 3rd sha'ar of Shaare Teshuvah at the end of section #219. Even though he wrote this law in the context of someone who is outside the category of "your brother" because of the many sins committed between himself and G-d, it is obvious that this same rule also applies here in this subject. Rabbeinu Yonah writes that this person's remarks are forbidden because his entire motivation was to rejoice at someone else's pain and degradation. We have already explained this above at the end of the 10th notation specifically from the words of Rabbeinu Yonah, that
even in matters of interpersonal "crimes" if the speaker's motivation is to rejoice at someone else's suffering, then the remarks arc forbidden. 

Concerning the issue of being motivated by anger, the Chofetz Chaim notes in his discussion of rechilus that there is a major dispute between the Taz and the Sma whether one can defend another person by hitting the assailant when your motivation is from anger. The Sma say you can not while the Taz says it is obvious when helping another it doesn't matter what the motivation is. The Chofetz Chaim concludes that there is a dispute regarding hitting but for lashon harah even the Taz would agree that you can't speak lashon harah to benefit others if you do it from anger. He notes that is because it prevents the fullfilment of the conditions - in particular the sin will be exaggerated when the speaker is angry.
(ספר באר מים חיים - הלכות רכילות - כלל ט
(כח)
[הגה"ה - ודע דמה שכתבתי בפנים שלא יחסרו הפרטים הנ"ל, לכאורה הפרט הג', והוא שלא יעשה זה הדבר מצד שנאה, לא שייך רק לדברי הסמ"ע בח"מ בסי' תכ"א סקכ"ח, ע"ש שכתב דהיכא שהוא מצד שנאה אין נפטר במה שהוא מציל עי"ז את חברו, אבל לדברי הט"ז שם בד"ה כדי, שכתב כיון דהוא עושה מצוה בזה אין נפקא מינה בכונתו, לכאורה לא שייך הפרט הזה. אולם באמת כד דייקת גם הט"ז מודה דצריך כאן גם הפרט הזה, דאם יעשה הדבר מצד שנאה לא יושלמו גם שאר הפרטים, דבודאי יחשוב הדבר תיכף לענין רע ויגדיל העולה, ולא יסתכל גם כן אם יצא על ידי סיפורו יותר מכפי הדין, משא"כ בענין דמיירי הט"ז שם

However concerning rechilus the Chofetz Chaim does add a leniency that it is enough that the person tries to force himself to do it for benefit. In that case even though he can't remove the anger from his heart it is permitted to speak rechilus because of the need to fulfill the mitzva of not standing idly by the blood of another. Since the Chofetz Chaim states this leniency only in regards to rechilus and not lashon harah - it must be that it only applies to rechilus. Furthermore it is clear that if the person does not try to remove the anger - that it would be forbidden to speak lashon harah - even for beneficial reasons.

רכילות כלל ט' במ"ח ג''
ג) רק לתועלת. ה...ואין כוונתנו בפרט זה, דאם איננו מכוין לתועלת הוא פטור ממילא מלספר מחמת חשש איסור רכילות, דהלא לא תעמוד על דם רעך כתיב, ואף בענין ממון .... אך כונתנו שיכריח את עצמו בעת הסיפור לכוון לתועלת, ולא מצד שנאה, כי על ידי זה יגנדר על עצמו ממילא איסור רכילות.

In sum, the Chofetz Chaim says lashon harah even for helping others is not permitted unless 7 conditions are fulfilled. One of them is that the motivation needs to benefit others and not because be out of anger. (And in 10:3 the person speaker can not have transgressed the same sins as the perpetrator because his motivation would be wrong) If lashon harah - even if it serves a benefit but it is spoken out of anger or motivation other than being helpful - it is forbidden according to the Chofetz Chaim. Furthermore in the responsa literature these seven conditions of the Chofetz Chaim are not mentioned. Rather it says that speaking lashon harah for benefit (to'eles) is permitted. Thus it would seem that the view of the Chofetz Chaim is not accepted for halacha - despite his assertion to the contrary. It seems to serve primarily as mussar regarding desirable goals to strive for - but not whether particular cases are permitted or not.[ see Dr. Benny Brown's essay on the halachicization of mussar.]

 update
Minchas Asher (Vayikra 19:16) is bothered by a similar question. He concludes
see also lashon harah is character issue not issur
We see then that lashon harah is a concern of character and therefore the speaker's intent is critical in determining whether his words constitute lashon harah. With this principle we can understand the rule that whatever is spoken beneficially does not violate the prohibition of lashon harah – as stated by the Chofetz Chaim (Lashon Harah 3:3). In general we know that there are times when Torah prohibitions are set aside e.g., a positive commandment sets aside a negative one and more severe mitzvos displace lesser mitzvos etc. However this is different because lashon harah is not being displaced when the words are said beneficially. As we stated the prohibition of lashon harah is dependent upon whether it is a bad character trait. Therefore whenever the speaker's motivation is for the good and for benefit of his fellow man and not to hurt him – there is absolutely no issur of lashon harah. It is not that is is being displaced – it doesn't exist! If you examine the matter well it is clearly the correct explanation.
Additional support that lashon harah is primarily a prohibition of faulty character comes from the Chofetz Chaim. He writes that the heter to speak lashon harah for benefit only applies if the speaker doesn't intend to debase his fellow man – but if he means to speak negatively then it is prohibited even if is beneficial. He also writes that if he speaks negatively about a sinner and he himself is guilty of that sin – he does not have a heter to speak. These two halachos seem to contradict the principle that negative speech said for benefit is permitted because it isn't lashon harah. Why should it make a difference what the speaker's intent is and whether he is righteous or not? These apparent contraditions are removed if it accepted that the foundation of the prohibition of lashon harah is because of concern for the speaker's character. 
 update

60 comments:

  1. With all due respect, if it is not in the Shulhan Aruch, then is this just innovation, i.e. new halacha?

    ReplyDelete
  2. I don't see why something not being mentioned by others means it is not valid. According to that reasoning, you could argue that anything not found in the kitzur Shulchan Aruch is not valid halacha. No one until the Chofetz Chaim wrote a complete compedium of the halachos with all details teased out. Earlier sefarom were "kitzurim."

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Lashon harah is mentioned in Talmud, Rishonim Achronim and Kabbala - but it is mentioned as mussar ie. an undesirable interpersonal activity.

      Chofetz Chaim explicity says he is presently the halachic paramters - not the mussar ones. That in fact he reserved for his sefer Shemiras Halashon.

      The final product he produced"with all the details" does not work in real life nor does it provide a realistic practical handbook of the parameters of speech.

      The fact that the Rambam included it in hilchos de'os (perfection of personality) and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch did not mention it at all - indicates that Chazal conceptualization is mussar not halacha.

      Delete
    2. These are important distinctions - another example would be certain views that appear in Rambam's Hilchot Yesodei haTorah. For example, that the Earth is centre of the Universe, and 7 planets rotate around the earth. Now it cannot be "halacha" to believe this, since that 6 letter word Science has disproved such a model. I once hear Nathan Aviezer being critical of Lubavitcher rebbe fo insisting that it is still the case, and can be shown by Einstein's relativity theory.

      Delete
    3. The Lubavicher Rebbe was partially right not because of Einstein's relativity but Newton's. Newton argued that if two objects are moving in relation to each other, either can be assumed to be moving or at rest relative to the other.

      Delete
  3. RDE,

    Why are you so anti-Chofetz Chaim? So many posts against him you write. Trying to show how wrong he is.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. CV - I am presenting information. If you want to say you think I misunderstood something or left our sources - then please enlighten me.

      To attack my reasoning and texts by saying I am being anti-Chofetz Chaim - is a ridiculous ad hominem approach

      There are many significant differences of attempting to follow the approach of the Chofetz Chaim versus that of main stream poskim. Reporting child abuse is one of them, informing people of problems with shidduchim is another. By and large the poskim tell you that what is said for benefit and not to harm is ok. This is the view of the Chazon Ish and Rav Elchonon Wasserman and many others. Are you going to say they were also anti Chofetz Chaim. See Rav Sternbuch teshuva dealing with a principal who refused to listen to allegations that one of his teachers was abusiing students because it was "lashon harah" and his comments regarding Rav Chaim Ozer and the Gerrer Rebbe who said there was no issue of lashon harah in their listening to reports and allegations.

      I see too many people who will not say "lashon harah" because it is so complicated and awesome. They say that because of the complexity and seriousness of lashon harah - they will only inform others if a gadol tells them to. But since it is not easy to consult a gadol they end up not saying anything.

      That is the Shem M'Shmuel I cited. Not saying the lashon harah needed to protect others is also against the Torah. See Pischei Teshuva 156

      Delete
  4. R' Daniel;

    It seems you didn't notice what i wrote you in your last post - you can't bring a proof from פר באר מים חיים - הלכות רכילות - כלל ט (כח that by לשון הרע even if the person tries to force himself to do it for benefit it's NO GOOD, as you say:

    " even the Taz would agree that you can't speak lashon harah to benefit others if you do it from anger. He notes that is because it prevents the fullfilment of the conditions - in particular the sin will be exaggerated when the speaker is angry."

    The proof youre bring to אסר is from HILCHOS רכילות - which you yourself admit IS OKAY if the person tries to force himself to do it for benefit???!!!

    So you're obviously misunderstanding the C"C.


    I'm rushing now, but I hope to add more later..

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. you are right you are rushing and you misread what I wrote.

      It is the Chofetz Chaim who makes the claim that the Taz would agree with the view of the Sma when dealing with lashon harah even though they disagree in the case of beating an assailant - not me. There is in fact no evidence of such an assertion. The Taz focuses on the fact that a person is being helped by beating the assailant and says motivation is not relevant. The Taz does not speak about lashon harah - esepcially the concern that anger will prevent a person from fulfilling the 7 conditions. The Chofetz Chaim is asserting that the Taz' concern for keeping the 7 conditions would make him change his mind.

      The Sema who says that correct motivation is critical and thus one can not beat an assailant if you hate him rather than that you want to save the victim - is similar to the Chofetz Chaim's view that one can not speak lashon harah if you are not motivated solely by the desire to do good. I just wanted to show you that there is such a counterintuitive view.

      Delete
    2. DT:

      What the Taz writes:
      "אולם באמת כד דייקת גם הט"ז מודה דצריך כאן גם הפרט הזה, דאם יעשה הדבר מצד שנאה לא יושלמו גם שאר הפרטים, דבודאי יחשוב הדבר תיכף לענין רע ויגדיל העולה, ולא יסתכל גם כן אם יצא על ידי סיפורו יותר מכפי הדין, משא"כ בענין דמיירי הט"ז שם"

      can easily be understood as follows:

      As I mentioned in my other post, there are three issues: a) ascertaining that an actual transgression happened, b) that a benefit / Toeles emerge from acting, c) positive motivation.

      The Taz is simply saying that in the case in Siman תכא there is NO DOUBT about a & b; someone is hurting someone else שלא על פי דין & by acting I can hold him back from continuing to do so. so the Taz says that we don't care about motivation.

      However, the C"C - knowing human nature in areas where actions are AMBIGUOUS - prohibits acting out of "assumptions" of Toeles, where feelings of anger are APPARENT. We can't trust ourselves to judge that "a" and "b" are present - we assume a transgression when it isn't actually there & we assume a Toeles when there is none.

      I BELIEVE THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, as I believe this is the mistake some Rabonim make by allowing women to call Police when the women "feel" threatened - when there is actually is no real threat... allow separations because women "feel" abused - when there never was any abuse ... allow people to go to ערכאות when they "feel" the other party is לא ציית דינא, etc....

      Delete
  5. DT writes:

    “I will present a discussion concerning one clear and unambiguous case. Is it permitted to speak for to'eles when there is at the same time there is anger or hatred towards the person being talked about? This is a very common situation which can happen when a person has been cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person. Does the Chofetz Chaim permit informing people about the abuser - if the victim is also angry?”

    The unequivocal answer is that the C”C most definitely DOES permit someone who was “cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person” to inform other people about the abuser, if 1) An איסור was surely done, and 2) an actual benefit/תועלת can arise.

    Just remover the caveats: The C”C DOES constantly remind us (in other places) to MAKE SURE that an actual עבירה was done and that some good can come out from informing others. THAT is why he has 5/7 conditions. It has NOTHING to do with motivation – he simply says – what any בעל שכל knows – that when our emotions are “hot” we need to be careful not to lose our judgment.

    Every extreme action causes an extreme reaction: Being too frum causes people to become to frei….

    In לשון הרע כלל י' הל' י"ג the C”C CLEARLY ALLOWS someone who was “cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person” to inform other people:

    וְאַף עַל פִּי כֵן נִרְאֶה לִי, דְּאִם הוּא מְשַׁעֵר, שֶׁעַל יְדֵי זֶה, שֶׁיְּסַפֵּר לַאֲנָשִׁים, הַאֵיךְ שֶׁפְּלוֹנִי (לג) עָשָׂה לוֹ עַוְלָה בְּעִנְיַן מָמוֹן וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, תּוּכַל לָבוֹא לוֹ מִזֶּה תּוֹעֶלֶת עַל לְהַבָּא, כְּגוֹן, שֶׁיְּסַפֵּר לַאֲנָשִׁים, שֶׁדִּבְרֵיהֶן נִשְׁמָעִין לוֹ, אִם יוֹכִיחוּהוּ עַל זֶה, וְאוּלַי עַל יְדֵי זֶה יָשִׁיב לוֹ הַגְּזֵלָה וְהַהֶזֵּק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, (לד) מֻתָּר לוֹ לְסַפֵּר לָהֶם וּלְבַקֵשׁ מֵאִתָּם, שֶׁיְּסַיְּעוּהוּ בָּזֶה. וְלִפְעָמִים יְצֻיַּר תּוֹעֶלֶת עַל לְהַבָּא מֵהַסִפּוּר, אֲפִלּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּעִנְיַן מָמוֹן, (דְּהַיְנוּ עִנְיַן צַעַר וּבֹשֶת וְאוֹנָאַת דְּבָרִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה), כְּגוֹן, אִם נוֹדַע לוֹ בְּבֵרוּר, אֵיךְ שֶׁפְּלוֹנִי רוֹצֶה לְחָרְפוֹ וּלְגַדְּפוֹ עַל דָּבָר פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי, אִם יְסַפֵּר זֶה לַאֲנָשִׁים חֲשׁוּבִים אוֹ לִקְרוֹבָיו שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי, וְיַעֲרִיךְ לִפְנֵיהֶם אֶת אֲמִתַּת הָעִנְיָן, וְיִרְאוּ בְּעַצְמָם שֶׁהַדִּין עִמוֹ, אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיִּמְנְעוּהוּ מִזֶּה, אוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הוּא דָּבָר, שֶׁכְּבָר עָבַר, שֶׁכְּבָר חֵרֵף אוֹתוֹ, אַךְ שֶׁהוּא מְשַׁעֵר, שֶׁאִם לֹא יְסַפֵּר הַדָּבָר לִקְרוֹבָיו, אוֹ לַאֲנָשִׁים חֲשׁוּבִים, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּמְנְעוּהוּ מִזֶּה, יָבוֹא עוֹד לְחָרְפוֹ וּלְגַדְּפוֹ (לה) בְּכָל אֵלּוּ הָאֳפָנִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, מֻתָּר לְסַפֵּר הַדָּבָר לִבְנֵי אָדָם, אַף שֶׁעַל יְדֵי הַסִפּוּר יִתְבַּזֶּה חֲבֵרוֹ לִפְנֵי הַשּׁוֹמְעִים, כֵּיוָן דְּאֵין כַּוָּנַת הַמְסַפֵּר לָזֶה, רַק הוּא רוֹצֶה לִשְׁמֹר אֶת עַצְמוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה לוֹ מִמֶנּוּ נְזֶק בְּעִנְיַן מָמוֹן אוֹ צַעַר וּבִיּוּשׁ.
    (לג) עשה לו עולה וכו'. וכל שכן אם הוא רוצה לעשות לו עולה וע''י סיפורו אפשר שימנעוהו מזה דמותר לספר להם ולבקשם שימנעוהו מזה.
    (לד) מותר לו לספר להם. אף דבתוך כך מוכרח לספר כל המעשה והוא ממילא גנאי לחבירו אעפ''כ מותר ולא אמרינן לא התירה התורה אלא בבית דין, ואף דלא שייך בזה התירא דר''י כדי לקנא לאמת מ''מ נראה פשוט דמותר, כמו דלענין רכילות ג''כ לא שייך ההיתר דר''י וכמ''ש למעלה בס''ק כ' ואפ''ה היכא דנוגע לאחד בענין ממון כגון שהוא יודע שאחד רוצה להזיק לאחר או כדי שלא יתבזה חבירו, כגון אם שמע מאחד שאמר אם אפגע לפלוני במקום פלוני אחרפנו ואגדפנו והוא מכיר להאיש הזה דגזים ועביד, בודאי מותר לספר לו אם הוא רואה שע''י סיפורו ישמור את עצמו ממנו ולא יבוא לזה וכמו שנכתוב אי''ה לקמן בהלכות רכילות ואין בזה משום רכילות כיון דעיקר כונתו בסיפורו לסלק הנזקין ולהשבית הריב, כן הוא הדין בזה דאין בזה משום לשה''ר כיון דעיקר כונתו לשמור את עצמו ולא לגנות לחבירו.


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I don't get your point. Where do you see that the Chofetz Chaim doesn't require the 7 conditions. If he does require the 7 conditions in all instances that means he also requires that the person not be motivated by anger or hatred.

      Your assertion that motivation has nothing to do with it but only if he is accurate. Not sure where you got that. Further evidence the Chofetz Chaim is not simply trying to assure accuracy is the following

      In 10:3 the Chofetz Chaim notes
      . And all of this is if the speaker is more virtuous than
      the offender, and does not commit the sins he is observing (and
      subsequently reporting). But ifhe (this observer) is a sinner just
      like him (13) and he suffers from the same sickness, meaning, he
      commits the same sins as the victim, then this observer is forbidden
      to publicize the victim's sins. Because this type of person, in
      publicizing the sins of the victim has no intention to do good and is
      not motivated by a sense of "Yir ' at Shamayim" \ a fear of Heaven.
      Instead this person is driven by a passion to be gleeful at the expense
      of someone else's suffering and degradation. The prophet Hoshea
      addressed this mindset when he said (1 :4) "and J have remembered
      the blood of Yizre.'el shed by the House of Yehu." Even though
      Yehu was fulfilling Hashem's will to annihilate the monarchy of Achav in the Valley of Yizre'el, and he was complying with the
      prophet's instructions, and as a reward G-d granted four generations
      ofYehu and his descendents kingship over the ten tribes of Israel,"
      nevertheless, ultimately the blood he shed in killing the House of
      Achav was remembered and counted against him because Yehu
      himself was a blatant sinner.

      Be'er Mayim Chayim

      (KIO/3/1)-(13) 00 ifhe is a sinner just like him: This is a quote from
      Rabbeinu Yonah in the 3rd sha'ar of Shaare Teshuvah at the end of section
      #219. Even though he wrote this law in the context of someone who is
      outside the category of "your brother" because of the many sins committed
      between himself and G-d, it is obvious that this same rule also applies
      here in this subject. Rabbeinu Yonah writes that this person's remarks are
      forbidden because his entire motivation was to rejoice at someone else's
      pain and degradation. We have already explained this above at the end
      of the 1 Qth notation specifically from the words of Rabbeinu Yonah, that
      even in matters of interpersonal "crimes" if the speaker's motivation is to
      rejoice at someone else's suffering, then the remarks arc forbidden.






      Delete
    2. The C"C and BM"C you quote actually PROVE my point -

      Where a bystander gets involved, we need to judge his motivation. Certain things are a "giveaway" that the bystander is led to action by negative motivations.

      I'm not saying that the C"C doesn't care about motivation, but rather that we assume POSITIVE motivation unless we have a reason to assume otherwise. The person himself should "work on himself" to have positive motivation. We don't believe he's working on himself when we have good reason to believe that he's "faking it".

      When should we assume NEGATIVE motivation?

      1) The fact that the fellow intervening often does the same עבירה - if the עבירה bothers him, he wouldn't do it himself.

      2) If he didn't get involved כמה פעמים in other cases of the same עבירה - if the עבירה bothers him, why was he silent כמה פעמים.

      Delete
  6. Part 2)

    Also, see C”C הל' לשה"ר כלל י הל' י"א במ"ח ל"א where he says that someone wronged is prohibited to tell others. He clearly states – again and again – that the reason of the prohibition is because there is no actual benefit/תועלת, and NOT because of his EMOTION of anger. I’ve numbered the מקורות where the C”C PERMITS informing others לתועלת.

    ... עֵסֶק עִם פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי, וּגְזָלוֹ, אוֹ עֲשָׁקוֹ בְּזֶה וּבְזֶה הָאֹפֶן, אוֹ שֶׁחֵרְפוֹ, אוֹ צִעֲרוֹ וּבִיְּשׁוֹ וְכָל כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא (וכל כיוצא בזה), וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם הוּא יוֹדֵעַ בְּעַצְמוֹ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁקֵר בַּסִפּוּר הַזֶּה, (אִם לֹא, בּאֹפֶן שֶׁנּבָאֵר לקָּמָן בּסָעִיף י''ג), וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם יִצְטָרְפוּ לָזֶה כָּל שְׁאָר פְּרָטֵי הַהֶתֵּר הַנַּ''ל, דִּבְוַדַּאי אֵין כַּוָּנָתוֹ בְּעֵת הַסִפּוּר לְתוֹעֶלֶת, דְּהַיְנוּ, לְפַרְסֵם גְּנוּתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבוּזוּ עוֹשֵׂי רִשְׁעָה בְּעֵינִי בְּנֵי אָדָם, וְיִזָּהֲרוּ עַל יְדֵי זֶה מִלָּלֶכֶת בְּדַרְכֵיהֶם הָרָעִים, אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁהוּא יִרְאֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ שֶׁהַבְּרִיּוֹת מְגַנּוֹת אוֹתוֹ, אוּלַי עַל יְדֵי זֶה יָשׁוּב מִדְּרָכָיו הָרָעִים, רַק כַּוָּנָתוֹ כְּדֵי לְבַזּוֹתוֹ בְּעֵינִי בְּנֵי אָדָם, שֶׁיְּפֻרְסַם לִפְנֵיהֶם לְחֶרְפָּה וּלְקָלוֹן עֲבוּר זֶה שֶׁנָּגַע בְּמָמוֹנוֹ אוֹ בִּכְבוֹדוֹ


    ReplyDelete
  7. Part 3)

    (לא) שלא להתיר לעצמו וכו'. הטעם דבודאי חסר כאן פרט אחד והוא פרט החמישי הנכתב לעיל והוא מה שכתבתי בפנים דבודאי אין… וא''כ דבנידון דידן דאיירינן בסעיף זה שאין לו מזה תועלת על להבא ... לא יצא שום נפקא מינא לדינא, לשה''ר מיקרי, בין בבין אדם למקום .... ובין בבין אדם לחבירו אם יזדמן כהאי גוונא שמדברי העדות שלו לא יהיה שום נפקא מינא לדינא ג''כ אסור מן התורה ... (אם לא שיש תועלת מהסיפור שלו וכפי מה שמבואר הטעם לקמן)...
    1) ולא תקשה על דברינו ... במה דאמרינן בכתובות (ע''ט ע''א) דא''ל רב ענן למר עוקבא חזי מר נחמן חקלאה היכי מקרע שטרא דאינשי, ג''כ נראה דכוונתו היה בשביל שהיה אז מר עוקבא אב''ד ... וכונת רב ענן היה בשביל קנאת האמת כדי שמר עוקבא ימנעהו מזה על להבא או על השטר זה גופא יחזיר המעשה,
    2) וכענין שאמרו בערכין (ט''ז) א''ר יוחנן בן נורי הרבה פעמים לקה עקיבא על ידי לפני ר' שמעון וכו' והוספתי בו אהבה עי''ש, דעל זה לא שייך ענין לשה''ר כיון שכוונת המספר הוא כדי שיצמח מזה תועלת ולא לגנותו ח''ו ...
    3) וכן אין להקשות ... מהא דאיתא בקידושין (ל''ג ע''א) בר' חייא דהוה יתיב בי מסחותא וחליף ואזיל ר' שמעון ברבי קמיה ולא קם ר' חייא מקמיה, ואיקפד, ואתא א''ל לאבוה שני חומשים שניתי לו בספר תהלים ולא קם מקמי וכו', ... ואיך היה מותר לר' שמעון ברבי לספר דבר זה לפני רבי, די''ל דכונת ר' שמעון לא היה לגנותו רק שידע אביו מזה ויוכיחו עבור זה ודבריו יהיו נשמעין לו יותר משאם היה מוכיחו בעצמו *.
    4) וכן אין להקשות ממה דאיתא בבכורות (דף ל':) ר' יהודה ור' יוסי איסתפק להו מילתא בטהרות ... דהכא ג''כ י''ל שלא כיוונו בסיפורם לגנותו בזה רק לתועלת שר' יהודה ור' יוסי יוכיחוהו על להבא שלא יתנהג כן עם רבנן אחרים שלא להאמינם על הטהרות שבזה הוא מבזה אותם, ויותר נכון לומר שכל אחד מהרבנן היה כונתו בסיפורו רק לקנא עבור בזיון חבירו התלמיד חכם ועיין לעיל בבמ''ח ס''ק י''ד. וכן אין להקשות על ר' יהודה האיך היה מותר לו לקבל את דבריהם להאמינם בזה עד שעי''ז רתח עליו ואמר אביו וכו' הא אין מותר רק לחוש (דזה אין לתרץ משום דהיו שנים דעל פי דין אסור לקבל בהחלטה אפילו משנים וכמ''ש לעיל בכלל ז' ס''ד ולבד זה הלא הם היו נוגעים בזה) די''ל דהיו מהימני ליה כדברי שני עדים ועיין לעיל בכלל ז' ס''ז ובבמ''ח שם סק''ד או ע''פ דאיתא ביבמות (ע''ח ע''א) הא שמואל וב''ד קיים עי''ש. (הגהה)
    Another MAJOR mistake לפענ"ד: Even the סמ"ע who is מחמיר and prohibits hitting out of שנאה clearly ALLOWS hitting someone who is hitting a relative BECAUSE HIS MAIN MOTIVATION IS A POSITIVE ONE – to save his relative. Even the סמ"ע isn’t worried that there will be an emotion of שנאה mixed in – since the MAIN motivation is a positive one!!!!!

    Another caveats: The C”C often mentions how people assume benefit/Toeles when there is none and assume a transgression when there was none – that goes back to bias. THIS IS THE MAIN PROBLEM, & NOT MOTIVATION.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Another MAJOR mistake לפענ"ד: Even the סמ"ע who is מחמיר and prohibits hitting out of שנאה clearly ALLOWS hitting someone who is hitting a relative BECAUSE HIS MAIN MOTIVATION IS A POSITIVE ONE – to save his relative. Even the סמ"ע isn’t worried that there will be an emotion of שנאה mixed in – since the MAIN motivation is a positive one!!!!!
      ===============
      you are misreading the Sema (CM 421:28)
      The Sema is saying that for a relative we assume that he is beating the assailant because he wants to save him. In contrast if he generally doesn't typicaly rescue people then if one time he saves a non relative we can assume it because he is motivated for hatred of the assailant. He mentions nothing about mixed motivation but simply whether it can be assumed that his motivation is to save the victim

      Delete
    2. What would happen by a relative who doesn't typicaly rescue people? Why doesn't the Semah אסר because of mixed motivations, or even worse, why doesn't he assume that the relative is acting מחמת שנאה, which the Semah DOEs assume by a non-relative who doesn't typicaly rescue people???

      That's why I'm assuming that the Semah isn't bothered with mixed motivation - we assume the positive motivation is leading...

      Delete
  8. I also want to reiterate what I wrote earlier - that even the סמ"ע who is מחמיר by שנאה would allow "a person has been cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person" to inform others" EVEN IF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY FEELS שנאה (although it makes sense to try to set the שנאה aside.

    There are TWO reasons why: 1) He only prohibitions intervention when OTHERS HAVE REASON TO ASSUME that שנאה is what is motivating, but when we have no reason to assume שנאה we won’t prohibit, and 2) Even we others have reason to assume that שנאה is what is motivating intervention, he only prohibitions when שנאה is the MAIN motivation, however someone aggrieved who seeks Toeles for the future COULD intervene, since he has another MAIN motivator.

    A little background:

    First of all, the סמ"ע makes a חילוק between when a bystander tries to keep someone from hitting an innocent person who is the bystanders relative, to when the innocent person is a stranger, NOT related to the bystander. Even he would surely be מתיר for the aggrieved party alone to inform others.

    He ONLY prohibits שנאה in the latter case – because the MAIN motivation is probably שנאה, he ALLOWS the former case – where the main motivation is saving a relative from injustice.

    The סמ"ע only prohibits intervention where OTHERS HAVE REASON TO ASSUME that שנאה is what is motivating, but when we have no reason to assume שנאה we won’t prohibit:

    Here’s the relevant Loshon of the סמ"ע:
    סמ"ע סקכ"ח:.... דאם זה הבא להציל ולהכות המכה אינו בר הכי דרגיל לאפרושי מאיסרא דכמה פעמים רואה שמכה א' לחבירו ואינו חושש לאפרושי המכה מאיסורא אז אמרינן דאסור להכות לזה המכה דודאי מכח שנאה בא להכותו ולא בא להפרישו מהאיסור מה שאין כן ברואה מכה אביו ובנו ואחיו דמותר להציל קרובו בהכאה אף שאין מדרכו להפריש אחרים ..

    He clearly ALLOWS a relative to intervene, even if he doesn’t usually get involved – REGARDLESS OF the relatives understandable hatred to someone who hits his relative. Why? He explains things better in the פרישה סק"כ:
    הרואה שחבירו מכה אביו או אמו והכה המכה להציל קרובו ממנו פטור וזה אפילו אם אנו יודעין שאינו עושה זה כדי לאפרושי מאיסורא כגון דיודעין בי' שלפעמים רואה ראובן מכה שמעון ואינו מוחה אפילו הכי פטור כיון דקרובו הוא המוכה נתייחם לבבו בקרבו והכה הוא המכה כדי להציל קרובו.

    Also, note that he only prohibits a stranger where OTHERS HAVE REASON TO ASSUME that שנאה is what is motivating, as he writes in סמ"ע:
    דאם זה הבא להציל ולהכות המכה אינו בר הכי דרגיל לאפרושי מאיסרא דכמה פעמים רואה שמכה א' לחבירו ואינו חושש לאפרושי המכה מאיסורא אז אמרינן דאסור להכות לזה המכה דודאי מכח שנאה בא להכותו ולא בא להפרישו מהאיסור

    He clearly ONLY prohibits a stranger if we have reason to believe that וודאי מכח שנאה בא להכותו – if an aggrieved party wants redress; whether to keep an abuser from abusing (where there is reasonable reason to assume that he will continue to do so) or to recoup financial losses he surely CAN & SHOULD inform.

    The problem is that our judgment is clouded, a) as far as judging transgression, b) seeing Toeles.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The Sema is not dealing with the issue of mixed motivation. And he is not being machmir
      1) A person who typically avoids saving someone - if one time he beats the assailant we assume it is out of hatred for the assailant because he is not interested in saving people.
      2) In the case of a relative - even if he never saves other people relatives are different and we assume he is doing to save his relative.

      The Sema is requiring that a person not be rescued because of hatred for the assailant. This is not a chumra for the Sema.

      Bottom line the Chofetz Chaim is concerned about motivation not just accuracy. If he doesn't have the correct motivation he can't say lashon harah about the assailant! The Sema is also concerned about motivation and doesn't allow a beneficial act to be done if the motivation is not to be helpful.

      Delete
    2. In your case 1) A person who typically avoids saving someone - if one time he beats the assailant we assume it is out of hatred for the assailant because he is not interested in saving people".

      So? of course the Semah IS machmir. The Taz says EVEN though its out of hatred we don't care & its Muttar.

      In your case 2) In the case of a relative - even if he never saves other people relatives are different and we assume he is doing to save his relative....

      The Semah isn't bothered if the relative typically avoids saving someone. Why doesn't that bother him? Relatives have no hatred? It's only because we look at the LEAD emotion. So he DOES talk about mixed emotions, or more specifically "lead" emotions.

      I'm not saying the C"C doesn't care about motivation - I agree that he DOES. I'm only saying that in cases where the LEAD emotion is probably positive the C"C is Mattir - and even obligates - action.

      Delete
    3. The Sema does not discuss mixed emotions. He is simply deducing what "the" emotional motivation is. Either to save another human being or relative or out of hatred of the assailant.

      Regarding the Chofetz Chaim you are ignoring his words that the 7 conditions including proper motivation preclude speaking lashon harah even when it is beneficial. he doesn't talk about lead emotion

      In rechilus he says trying to have proper motivation is as good as having motivation. But even there if he doesn't try then he can't speak rechilus and if he doesn't succeed he can't speak lashon harah

      Delete
    4. I think you're leaving too many loose ends,

      ....by saying " Either to save another human being or relative or out of hatred of the assailant" - you're ignoring that by a relative the Semah isnt bothered by the fact that the relative DOES NOT usually intervene.

      Are you claiming that even in such cases the relative has no mixed motivation?

      If the relative cares about people abusing others why doesn't he USUALLY intervene?

      Delete
    5. "ou are ignoring his words that the 7 conditions including proper motivation"

      I'm not ignoring...

      By a person בנוגע to himself, or by a relative - the C"C is מתיר, since both the Semah & the Taz are מתיר, as I mentioned - because that's the lead motivation, which is all we care about. That's what the Poskim call motivation.

      In rechilus hes talking about bystanders with no prior record of negative motivation - so he says to try.

      I didn't see how you tie up the loose ends, otherwise.....

      Delete
    6. I tried to explain it to you - you are just reading to much into what they say.

      Delete
    7. The Sema does not mention mixed motivation. It seems that he simply is saying if a person doesn't typically intervene he doesn't like to save people in general. if he saves someone that means he doesn't care about the victim but only hates the assailant. Relatives are separate category. Thus he saving a relative is assumed to be because he wants to save the relative even though he never saves other people. No mixed motivation there at all.

      Delete
    8. It seems to me that the C"C's primary focus is on the speaker and the ill effects on the speaker of L"H. There are other aspects to the picture. A statement about another might be true or false, and might be with high motivations or otherwise.

      A false, negative statement is unlikely to be permissible regardless of the speaker's motive.

      What we're talking about here is true, negative reports, and the importance of motivation.

      A false report motivated by hatred of the subject is both harmful to the speaker and intended to harm the subject; if it fails to do so, that should not redound to the speaker's credit.

      A false and positive report might be harmful (though if made, say, to promote Shalom Bayit might be permissible or even desirable) but if Reuven makes a true report of Shimon's wrongdoing, it might save Levi's property, reputation or even his life from Shimon. This might be so regardless of Reuven's motivation.

      The questions before us: When doing the right thing for the wrong (or mixed) motive mutar? When is it assur? Could it ever be chayav?

      Delete
    9. Yoel:

      i hope DT will post how R' Karalitz explains the Chazon Ish's sevara on the matter חוט השני הל' שמירת הלשון פרק ו' ביאורים סק"ז:

      Yes, doing the right thing for the wrong (or mixed) motive IS muttar.

      We just have to be VERY careful to make sure it's the right thing.

      Delete
  9. One more point – insofar as it seems clear to me לפענ"ד that if an aggrieved party wants redress, he surely CAN inform….

    Pop psychology comes into play here. Popular media portrays due process as necessary for the victim’s “closure”. Effective cognitive therapy doesn’t require such “closure” – this therefore is NOT Toeles. It would therefore be אסור to inform for the purpose of closure. It would be מותר and probably a מצוה once we can ascertain a) that a transgression did indeed occur, and b) there is Toeles; whether to keep an abuser from abusing (where there is reasonable reason to assume that he will continue to do so) or to recoup financial losses … plus the other conditions of the C”C – in cases where it’s fair to believe that Toeles outweighs any שנאה.

    All of this לא להלכה ולא למעשה.

    I think that Rav Karelitz in Bnei Brak is possibly a good address for such שאלות. I'd love to know what an ehrliche Morah Horoah would say.....

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. but that was where we started . The Chofetz Chaim requires the 7 conditions. There is no free pass for the victim. The Mishne L'Melech does say that a victim does not have to stop a rodef with the minimum force necessary and so does the Shevus Yaakov. But I don't see where the Chofetz Chaim says that a victim does not need to fulfill the 7 conditions?

      Delete
    2. We're going in circles - The C"C DOES always require all of the conditions - he assumes that the person helping himself is no worse than a relative, which yourself understand is okay. Didn't you yourself just write:

      "Relatives are separate category. Thus he saving a relative is assumed to be because he wants to save the relative even though he never saves other people"

      A person saving HIMSELF is NOT assumed to want to save HIMSELF?????? Why is he worse than a relative.

      You're making a bunch of דיחוקים in order to make the C"C look "farfrumt". And while you're at it, you're left making him be סותר himself....Why??

      Just because the "culture" screams Chofets Chaim? It's NOT in his seforim.!!!!!!!!!!!

      Delete
    3. Why are you ascribing the reasoning of the Sema to the Chofetz Chaim. The Sema as well as the Taz make no mention of 7 conditions. The only commonality is the question of whether lashon harah is prohibited if it is said for reasons other than to'eles. The Chofetz Chaim makes the claim that the Taz would agree in the case of lashon harah that motivation is critical - but the Taz made no such assertion.


      Bottom line the Chofetz Chaim introduces some major chidushim into the prohibition of lashon harah. Don't see that they are accepted by the major poskim

      I don't understand why you are insisting the Chofetz Chaim doesn't have to make sense and doesn't mean what he says. I am reading what the Chofetz Chaim says and saying that presents a number of problems.

      Delete
    4. "I don't understand why you are insisting the Chofetz Chaim doesn't have to make sense and doesn't mean what he says"
      ----
      He make sense, and he says MANY things. Among the things he says in Hilchos loshon Horah:

      In לשון הרע כלל י' הל' י"ג the C”C CLEARLY ALLOWS someone who was “cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person” to inform other people.

      Do you see the C"C in לשון הרע כלל י' הל' י"ג differently?

      Delete
    5. Do you admit to the major problem of COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS & BIAS?

      If not, please see:

      The One Hundred Sixty Five cognitive biases @ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.

      Delete
    6. Ploni all your citations are examples of cases where the Chofetz Chaim requires that the 7 conditions exist. Please find poskim who understand that the insistence on the 7 conditions doesn't apply or that it is enough to "try" to comply with them but the are not required for lashon harah bedieved.

      My problem is not with cognitive bias - it is simply whether a person has the right or obligation to relate lashon harah when there is a to'eles - or that is only if the 7 conditions are met. That is the whole issue.

      Please show me sources that the Chofetz Chaim didn't mean what he said about the 7 conditions. Please show me sources that if the victim can't or won't try to be properly motivated the Chofetz Chaim permits him/her to say lashon harah about the assailant?

      Delete
    7. "Pop psychology requires due process..."

      Due process is properly a legal term of art.

      True, the pop psych notions of "closure" are generally flawed at best and a cognitive approach, which is often very helpful, does not require confrontation. But that again is focusing on the well being, spiritual or psychological, of the potential speaker, and is concerned lest the wrongdoer in turn be victimized by improper speech.

      We return again to the question: How likely does it need to be that potential victims will be spared by true speech even if made with incompletely pure motives according to the C"C? According to others?


      Delete
    8. DT:

      I'd say that a cognitive approach is more than "often very helpful".

      לפענ"ד The reason it sometimes doesn't work is not because of flaws in the main concepts, but because a lot of research shows that a minority of therapists claim to use it & even of those that do claim to do so very few use it properly. Also, it involves a lot of work for the client.

      The Rishonim's approach is based on the same concepts - except that לפענ"ד the Rishonim offer many enhancements that secular approaches can't.

      Delete
    9. Your point about the need for a skilled therapist who properly applies the method and a client willing to work is well taken.

      But part of the therapist's skill is in selecting appropriate clients to work with; that's what makes your "more than 'often very helpful'" statement possible.

      I'd be very interested to see what you say about the Rishonim and cognitive approaches to therapy.

      Delete
    10. Here are a few examples - taken from חובת הלבבות, ספר החינוך, רבינו יונה על משלי - about the concepts of self-monitoring and cognitive restructuring, Learning them would qualify as psycho-education. All of these concepts are important cornerstone of cognitive therapy..

      בענין הדגשת המחשבות, שהם מקור המעשים, ושצריכים התבוננות:

      ספר החינוך - מצוה שפ"ז, ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם: שנמנענו שלא ניחד מחשבותינו לחשב בדעות שהם הפך הדעת שהתורה בנויה עליו... אבל אם יעלה על לבו רוח לחשב באותן דעות הרעים יקצר מחשבתו בהם, וישנה לחשב בדרכי התורה האמתיים והטובים ... שורש מצוה זו נגלה, כי בזה ישמר האדם מחטא להשם יתברך כל ימיו, והמצוה הזאת באמת יסוד גדול בדת, כי המחשבות הרעות אבות הטמאות, והמעשים ילדיהן, ואם ימות האדם טרם יוליד אין זכר לבנים, נמצאת זאת המניעה שרש שכל הטובות יוצאות ממנה.

      חובת הלבבות שער יחוד המעשה פ"ו: ראוי לך שלא תתעלם לפקוד מחשבתך ורעיוניך ושרעפי לבך, כי רוב ההפסד והתיקון במעשים לא יהיה כי אם מחמתם כפי תיקונם והפסדם. כמו שאמר הכתוב (משלי ד) מכל משמר נצור לבך כי ממנו תוצאות חיים. ואמרה תורה (בראשית ח) כי יצר לב האדם רע מנעוריו. ואמר (דברים לא) כי ידעתי את יצרו. ואמר (ד"ה א כח) כי כל לבבות דורש ה' וכל יצר מחשבות מבין. ואמר (דברים ל) כי קרוב אליך הדבר מאוד בפיך ובלבבך לעשותו. ואמר (שם י) מה ה' אלוהיך שואל מעמך כי אם ליראה ... והיראה אינה אלא בלב, והרעיון והמחשבה..

      חובת הלבבות, פתיחה: וידעתי דעת ברורה, כי חובות האברים לא תשלמנה כי אם ברצון הלב וחפץ הנפש לעשותם, ותאוות לבנו לפעול אותם. ואם יעלה במחשבותינו שאין ליבותינו חייבים לבחור בעבודת השם ולחפוץ בה, יסתלק מעל אברינו חיוב המצוות שאנו חייבים בהם, מפני שאין מעשה נשלם מבלי חפץ הנפש בו. וכיון שנתברר כי הבורא חייב את אברינו במצוותיו, לא היה נכון להניח נפשנו ולבנו שהם מבחר חלקי עצמנו, שלא יחייבם בעבודתו כפי יכולתם, מפני שבהם גמר העבודה. ועל כן נתחייבנו בחובות גילויינו ומצפונינו, כדי שתהיה עבודתנו שלמה וגמורה וכוללת מצפונינו וגלויינו לבורא יתברך.

      רבינו יונה משלי ד-כ"ג "מכל משמר נצר לבך: מכל מדה רעה נצר לבך": מלחשוב באכזריות או דבר כעס או כילות כדי שתכלה המדה כי על ידי הלב תכלינה כל המדות הרעות שתמנע המחשבה מהם ותחשב בגנותם כי רב ותכסף בהפכם. ובפרק י"ט-ג "אולת אדם תסלף דרכו": ענוש יענש האדם כאשר לא יקדים מחשבה ובינה לפעולותיו לדקדק במעשיו ולשמר דרכיו מחטא. ובפרק כ-ה "מים עמקים עצה בלב איש": בא להודיע כי לא תמצא העצה הנכונה באדם ולא תגמר אליו הדעת הברורה זולתי במחשבה מתונה והשתונן הכליות ... והנה זה להרחיק מדרך הבוטחים על מחשבתם והעולה על רוחם בלא מתון ועיון מערכי לב כי לא ישיג האדם לראות הנכונה זולתי אחר עמק המחשבה וחקור הדעת. ובפרק ט"ז-כ "משכיל על דבר ימצא טוב": מי שישכיל על כל דבר שיבקש לעשות ויתבונן בטרם יעשנו אם טוב אם רע ועל איזה צד וענין יעלה על ידו "ימצא טוב" ותזדמן לו תועלת והצלחה.




      (Third wave cognitive therapies like Acceptance Commitment Therapy use diffusion or distancing, which I've seen in the של"ה הקדוש and תולדות יעקב יוסף.

      Delete
  10. Also, DT, you never resolved the problem לשיטתך of bringing a C"C in Hilchos Rechilus
    as proof to אסר intervention by Loshon Horah מחמת שנאה, while you yourself admit that by Rechilus it's Muttar. why would he write an איסור that effects Loshon Horah in Hilchos rechilus - בפרט if we go לשיטתך that theres a difference between Loshon Horah & rechilus???

    ReplyDelete
  11. you say that the sheim mishmuel is recognized by poskim over the sefer chofetz chaim. can you give a citation or two? As far as i know the mishna berurah is quite a recognized posek, considered by many (not all) to be the poseik acharon. furthermore, if you intend to argue psak, which may be your right, I can understand your sevara re motivation but don't see where you have support from the shem miShmuel. he doesn'mention exageration or first hand knowledge either. surely you aren't claiming that the sms disregarded all seven conditions just because he diesn't mention them!?

    ReplyDelete
  12. DT writes that his issue is…

    “whether a person has the right or obligation to relate lashon harah when there is a to'eles - or that is only if the 7 conditions are met.”

    According to the C”C – only when all conditions are met – but that does impede the proper application of justice in the least bit.

    Whether you learn that a positive “lead motivation” makes informing okay, or you learn that by relatives & by oneself we assume that there’s only a positive motivation, once we make sure that bias isn’t involved – the C”C would allow it - BECAUSE IT PASSES MUSTER WITH ALL THE CONDITIONS.

    The Teshuva from R’ Vineman you sent states the same, as he ends off:
    ועלה בידינו שהחפץ חיים פסק .... צריך לצאת הדין עם הט"ז ... במקום שהוא מחויב לספר ... במקום שיש לו זמן שהוא יכול להוציא מליבו השנאה מזה שכנגדו ראוי לעשות כן ... ואם הוא לא מצליח לעשות זאת או אין זמן לעשות את זה והוא התיעץ עם ת"ח בדיוק מה מותר לו לספר בלי להגזים כלל וברור שיש בזה חשש נזק, חייב לספר אף על פי שיש לו כוונה נוספת של שנאה.

    (R’ Vineman assumes the ת"ח will help sort out and remove biases. Here in the USA, I think that such ת"ח are hard to find, often because of fear).

    I think you’ve been “taken” by all those people that mistakenly think that any possibility of a מחשבה שלא לשמה makes intervention אסור. The C”C NEVER said such a thing. People make the mistake based on the Sefer C”C’s TONE, not its CONTENT.

    An analogy: An zealous fund-raiser passionately & eloquently describes his Tzedaka. A soft-hearted fellow is so touched that he writes him a check for every penny in his bank account. The fund-raiser (being ehrlich) returns the check & tells him; I wasn’t talking to you – I was talking to those with hearts of stone…..

    The C”C is worried about the biases that pervade human decision – and rightfully so. That’s why he has his conditions. He repeats this again & again & again. But he also mentions the חיוב not to stand by idly. People are taken by what pervades his Seforim & ignore the actual balance in his words….

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Ploni I agree with what you say should be done - it simply isn't in the Chofetz Chaim and that is what I am concerned about. The chumaras and hurdles he inserts all over the place clearly get in the way of doing something. See Benny Browns 86 page listing and analysis of this

      Rabbi Vineman asks good questions - I am not convinced by his answer however.

      Delete
    2. Can you post the Benny Brown?

      Delete
    3. http://daattorah.blogspot.co.il/2011/04/halachasizing-of-lashon-harah-mussar.html

      there is a link where you can down load the article

      Delete
  13. DT:

    did you get my comment with מראה מקומות about anger???

    ReplyDelete
  14. R' Nissin Karelitz Shlit"a also says that Loshon Horah לתועלת is not a דחוי in his חוט השני פרק ו':

    "אין זה כעין דחיה לאיסור לשון הרע או כעין מצוה הבאה בעבירה וכיוצ"ב, אלא הוא בגדר שבמקום תועלת לא אסרה תורה כלל איסור לשון הרע ואין זה ריכלות כלל כיון שבא להצליל מהיזק שעלול להגרם לו ויסוד איסור לשון הרע הוא הפגיעה בזולתו ממילא כשאין כונתו לפגוע בו אא אדרבה לסלק הנזקין מאחרים וזוהי כונתו אין כאן איסור כלל.

    Still, Rav Karelitz does NOT differentiate between לשון הרע and רכילות.

    ReplyDelete
  15. DT:

    Could i trouble you to read a private email with a copy of what Rav Karelitz writes about acting out of anger, and what he brings from the Chazon Ish concerning the same.

    Among other things, the C"I says:

    "שמותר לעורר את טבעת נקמה כדי לבצע את הדין"

    R' Karalettz says that this C"I does not contradict the C"C's Issur to act out of שנאה. Please read.

    Thank You!

    ReplyDelete
  16. You say, "The fact that the Rambam included it in hilchos de'os (perfection of personality) and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch did not mention it at all - indicates that Chazal conceptualization is mussar not halacha."

    What about Rambam's Hilchos Teshuva, perek 4, "There are 24 deeds that hold back teshuva ...... ומהן חמשה דברים העושה אותם ימשך אחריהם תמיד וקשים הם לפרוש מהן לפיכך צריך אדם להזהר מהן שמא ידבק בהן והן כולן דעות רעות עד מאד ואלו הן:

    ...רכילות ולשון הרע

    and perek 30 of the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch where these are described as tremendous sins?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Dr. Benny Brown says,

      page 190 We can summarize that musar includes two types of norms: binding
      norms to which one has the ‘‘duty to aspire,’’ and merely recommended
      norms, that are often presented as ‘‘pietistic virtue’’ (middat hasidut), or
      the like. Whereas both are ‘‘weak’’ in comparison to halakhic norms, the
      boundary between them is sometimes blurred. Rabbi Menahem Treivitsch,
      a 19th century musar author, rightly said about the authors of
      classical musar that they did not state ‘‘which [norm] is a biblical precept
      and which is a rabbinical one [...], which is legally binding and which is
      but a pietistic virtue.’’41Among those who ‘‘contributed’’ to the blurring of the differentiation
      between religious law and religious ethics, or halakhah and
      musar, was Maimonides, who in his great halakhic code, the Mishneh
      Torah, referred to all of the sections as ‘‘laws’’ even though some of
      them do not deal with laws in the accepted sense.42 But he, too,dedicated to the norms of musar a distinct section of the Mishneh Torah
      – Hilkhot De‘ot (‘‘the laws of virtues’’),43 and added musar norms and
      theological assertions at the end of some halakhic sections of this work.
      This structure shows that he was cognizant of the uniqueness of the
      musar sections, a uniqueness that he wished to preserve. Among other
      writers, the distinction between the two spheres was preserved more
      sharply, as they dedicated different books to halakhah and to musar.

      Delete
    2. I believe that the concept that the boundaries between "binding" norms & "duty to aspire" are sometimes blurred (I would amend that to say OFTEN blurred] is an extremely important one.

      The same can be found in certain places in Shulchan Aruch. See פסקי תשובות סימן ב' הערה 1 in regards to what the S"A brings about dressing under the covers, where he says the same.

      I humbly posit that in this generation it is CRUCIAL to clearly delineate the boundaries. Many see authentic Judaism in a negative light, because of ‘duty to aspire" issues that are meant to inspire passion, but not cause disgust, and which should be put "on the back burner" until proper priorities are first met.

      On the other hand, many others unfortunately minimize and even deride the importance of striving for constant spiritual & religious growth. This is equally dangerous.

      I believe that the fact that a discussion of the correct boundaries is rarely undertaken is one of the main causes of frum society's current ills.

      A case in point is our current discussion: Fear that the emotion of anger turns an otherwise laudable action into a transgression causes chronic evildoers to continue their nefarious ways, since they have no fear of social stigmatization, which would & should be a powerful deterrent.

      After all is said & done, I have no doubt that the C"C's conditions ARE binding" norms & NOT "duty to aspire".

      Why am I so sure? Because their purpose is to avoid bias and ascertain whether a transgression occurred & whether a benefit can be attained from intervention. Since bias is widespread, these "checks & balances" are most definitely MANDATORY.

      Delete
  17. I like this post because it does something that few others dare to do. It rolls back halacha. Many new innovations have come into halacha, and these are adding to the body of halacha that which never existed in the past. The Chatam Sofer was also opposed to new innovations, and this was not just from the Lo Tigra'u side (reform) but also the Lo Tosiphu (haredi) side.
    The reasons, parameters and where we should rollback to are a much bigger discussion. It seems to me that several posts on here about Chofetz Chaim have been prompted by the damage that adhering to these new halachot can do.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Eddie - Not really. The Chozen Ish and lhbc"l R' Karaletz aren't innovators. They're just clearing up misconceptions....

      Delete
    2. Chazon Ish was certainly an innovator, and his strict measures are not normative for all Israel.

      Delete
    3. Eddie: You got it wrong in this case. The C"I is actually being "lenient" and allowing speaking ill of another person even if that person's unjust action causes an emotional reaction of anger or rightful vengeance.

      Like all other true Gedolim, the C"I's priority was seeking TRUTH & JUSTICE, as he understood it. Gedolim often disagree in their understandings of truth & justice & hence the מחלוקת להלכה so common.

      No true Godol C"V tries to "roll back" Halacha by "adding to the body of halacha that which never existed in the past" -THAT relates to serious issues of Torah M'Sinai, etc. ALL of psak is dependent on careful analysis of precedent which INTEGRATES any nw psak with the old.

      Delete
    4. Eddie,
      The Chazon Ish was often machmir and his positions were not normative for Israel but he was NOT an innovator. He was traditional in his psak but not very innovative.

      Delete
    5. Ploni, I am not talking about the CI specifically about Loshon Hara - I mean in general. His machmir positions were "new" in that they didnt exist previously - eg his shiurim, measures.


      I think you misunderstood what i meant by "rollback". An example of rollback is ROY, in trying to restore the Crown , as it was previously.

      What I said about adding to the body of halacha, is essentially paraphrasing the argument brought in this post. The post is arguing that the specifics of loshon hara never existed prior to Chofetz Chaim, in halacha.
      There are many other areas where certain halachos didnt exist, eg defining the time for shacharit. Kiryas Shema etc.

      Delete
    6. Lashon Hara, as noted above, is purely an issue of personal morality. "Toeles" is a code word. In reality, whenever a situation involves politics, communal power, communal welfare, administration of justice etc etc etc, Lashon Hara is just not a consideration.

      And we have 3,000 of Jewish history to prove that, from Gedalia all the way to the recent invectives of R Chaim Kanievsky, and including the time honored practice of yeshiva bochurim reporting to mashgiach the goings-on in the oilam.

      Delete
    7. Sorry I misunderstood you, Eddie.

      Still, I don't think your clarification is correct, either.

      The C"I did NOT "create" machmir positions vis a vis his shiurim, measures - he followed the Psak of the צל"ח. The נודע ביהודה \ צ"ח wasn't a pushover. Still, most others didn't follow the N"B.

      From the C"I's perspective the Psak was "new" only beacuse the eggs changed & got smaller - נתקטנו הביצים, & not because HE changed anything.

      Same with the C"C's Hilchos Loshon Horah - from his perspective all he did was EXPLAIN normative Halocho that existed before him.

      Delete
    8. Mikey:

      Nothing could be further from the truth.

      The "3,000 of Jewish history" you note are all instances where no Isser of L"H applied, because each involved a transgression and had תועלת.

      Even then, Gedalia was supposed to be חושש and not believe.

      Delete
  18. @Ploni
    What transgression and what toeles are you talking about? Each situation involved politics and power, that's clear. Toeles is obviously just an excuse, but in reality there's no L''H as soon as any politics or power is at stake.

    By "3,000 years" I meant "2,000" years and by "Gedalia" I meant "the attitude of Chazal to the story of Gedalia".

    ReplyDelete

ANONYMOUS COMMENTS WILL NOT BE POSTED!
please use either your real name or a pseudonym.