Tuesday, May 12, 2009

Prohibitions - need to desire & yet avoid them


Shaloh (Asarah Mamaros 3-4:28): ... Chullin (109b): Yalsa said to her husband R’ Nachman: “We have a rule that whatever the Torah prohibits there is something similar to it which is permitted. Blood is prohibited while liver is permitted. A woman is prohibited as a nidah but is permitted when she is pure, of a domesticated animal is prohibited but is permitted from non‑domesticated beasts, pig is prohibited by the similar tasting shebuta is permitted, the girutha bird is prohibited but the similar tasting tongue of fish is permitted, a married woman is prohibited but a divorce is permitted even though her former husband is alive, one’s sister in law is prohibited but she is permitted when the brother dies, a non‑Jewish woman is prohibited but a yofas to’ar is permitted. I want to know what it is like to eat meat cooked in milk?” R’ Nachman told the cook to prepare fried udder for her. This seems problematic. Why was such a distinguished woman such as Yalsa discussing such an apparently trivial topic with her husband? It is doubly puzzling why our Sages saw fit to record this in the Talmud? My father explained that this is based on the principle that all that is prohibited is because G‑d wants it prohibited – not because it isn't pleasurable. Therefore the sole reason for not enjoying these pleasures is because G‑d prohibited them. This is similar to Toras Cohanim(Kedoshim): A person should not say that it is impossible to eat pig but he should say that it is possible but what can he do since G‑d has prohibited him from eating it. Yalsa wanted to know what she was missing by observing the prohibition of meat and milk. By knowing what pleasure she was prohibited she could have a genuine desire for the prohibited pleasure that she would refrain from solely because of G‑d's command. That is why the taste of the shebuta fish is like that of pork so that a person can no what pork tastes like and know that it is good and desire it but at the same time refrain from eating it solely because G‑d told him not to eat it. The Torah has forbidden us to eat meat and milk. She wanted to know what meat and milk tasted like so she could desire and then not eat it because G‑d said not to. Therefore her husband told her to eat fried udder which has the taste of meat and milk.

Rambam(Shemona Perakim 6): We find that to have a strong desire to sin is much better and perfect than not having any desire and not suffering from avoiding the sin. … In fact our Sages say that,“the greater the person is the greater is his yetzer harah.” Not only that but they say that the reward for self‑control is proportional to effort required for that self‑control, “According to the suffering is the reward.” Furthermore they caution a person from saying, “I naturally don’t have a desire for this sin even if the Torah hadn’t prohibited this.” That is expressed by R’ Shimon ben Gamliel:” A person should not say that it is impossible for me to eat meat and milk together or that it is impossible for me to wear shatnez or that it is impossible for me to have sexual relations with this woman who is prohibited by the Torah. But in fact it is possible but G‑d has decreed that it is prohibited.”… However those things that the philosophers say are bad and that it is much better that a person not have desire for them – that refers to things which are widely perceived by people to be bad - such as murder, robbery, stealing, fraud, harming an innocent person, harming someone who has helped you, ridiculing parents and other similar matters. These well known things are what our Sages said: “That even if they had not been prohibited by the Torah it would have been assumed that they were prohibited.”… These well known wrongs are called by some scholars as “rational mitzvos”. One who desires to violate a “rational mitzva” is obviously an imperfect being. That is because a perfected person has absolutely no desire to do this type of evil and is not upset by avoiding them. However those things which our Sages were saying that it is best to overcome a desire for them - are the religious mitzvos. Because if the Torah had not been given they would not be viewed as bad at all. For this type our Sage say that it is it is only the Torah which prevents a person from doing them.

14 comments:

  1. I haven't seen it recently, but I think Rav Dessler has another explantion in the Gemera of Yalsa.

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  2. The Rambam has a very interesting discussion of this idea in the sixth perek of his Shemoneh Perakim. He distinguishes between the מצוות השימעיות (e.g. kashrus, shatnez), where we are taught that it is praiseworthy to desire that which is forbidden, and the מצוות שכליות (e.g. murder, theft), where such desires indicate a spiritual inferiority.

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  3. LazerA said...

    The Rambam has a very interesting discussion of this idea in the sixth perek of his Shemoneh Perakim
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    Just added that to the post. It would seem then that one needs to have a desire to be a pedophile etc, but then refrain only because G-d commanded. That is very problematic.

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  4. R Yisrael Salanter(Ohr Yisrael) discusses the Rambam in Shemona Perakim. I only started to look at it quickly this past Shabbos, so if someone want to summarize it, I'd be interested.

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  5. Daas Torah said...
    "It would seem then that one needs to have a desire to be a pedophile etc, but then refrain only because G-d commanded."I assume that you are basing this on the fact that sexual sins are apparently included in the list of מצוות השימעיות. I will grant that this is surprising, for several reasons, and, among other things, inclines me to believe that the distinction between שימעיות and שכליות would vary from culture to culture.

    Regardless, I don't believe it is possible to apply the label of שימעיות to the sexual abuse of children. The primary moral problem with pedophilia is not the sexuality per se, but the fact that it is abusive. While it might be argued that restricting sexual acts between consenting adults is an apparently arbitrary restriction from God, this cannot possibly be applied to rape and sexual assault (even of adults and, all the more so, of children). Acts that cause direct harm or suffering to others are always שכליות. Given the immense pain and suffering caused the sexual abuse of children, it is inconceivable that the desire to perform such an act is praiseworthy.

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  6. "Given the immense pain and suffering caused the sexual abuse of children, it is inconceivable that the desire to perform such an act is praiseworthy."

    Perhaps one needs to know at exactly what level the Nekudas Habechirah of the molester is. If it's an illness, his struggle may not be like a criminal, whether to murder or not. What exactly it is, there may still be an element of "shicliyos", but a different kind.

    None of the above is to excuse the molester from punishment, I'm just wondering how his mindset factors in, if at all, to the discussion.

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  7. Baruch Horowitz said...
    "Perhaps one needs to know at exactly what level the Nekudas Habechirah of the molester is. If it's an illness, his struggle may not be like a criminal, whether to murder or not."I don't believe this is relevant to the Rambam's point. The Rambam is not discussing why a person might be subject to a given desire. He is giving us a criteria to distinguish between those desires that are spiritually healthy and those that are not.

    The concept of "nekudas habechira" helps us determine what changes a person can reasonably achieve at a given stage in his spiritual growth. Those improper desires that are currently outside of one's abilities to change are still improper.

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  8. Lazer A,

    The above translation of the Rambam says:

    "One who desires to violate a “rational mitzva” is obviously an imperfect being. That is because a perfected person has absolutely no desire to do this type of evil and is not upset by avoiding them."

    You are right about the Rambam's category of the *desire* being improper; I'm just saying that there can be an elevated spiritual exsistence, on a whole, despite any inherent "imperfection".

    Consider the phenomenon of an Observant person with homosexual tendencies, which I've seen discussed recently. Would you tell such a person that he is an "imperfect being", ie, in relation to anyone else?

    I would say that they may have numerous, spiritual opportunities through the day, indirectly caused by their condition, such as overcoming despair etc. Same with a theoretically, sincere (potential)molester, who say, struggles to participate in a therapeutic program.

    These individuals may be "imperfect beings" in the sense of the actual desire, but on a whole, if they are sucessful in structuring their life around such inherent imperfections, they be more spiritual than other "less- imperfect beings", in the Rambam's terms.

    Just a thought.

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  9. Baruch Horowitz said...
    "These individuals may be "imperfect beings" in the sense of the actual desire, but on a whole, if they are sucessful in structuring their life around such inherent imperfections, they be more spiritual than other "less- imperfect beings", in the Rambam's terms."I can't say what the Rambam would have said about the level of "spirituality" of any given person; I suspect he would not have recognized the term as meaningful.

    As for earning reward, I believe it is clear that the person with strong negative desires who successfully struggles to control these desires earns immense schar for his struggle. I believe it is clear that this is not what the Rambam is talking about.

    The Rambam is telling us which desires for the forbidden are to be seen as flaws that should be eliminated and which should be viewed as positive spiritual benefits.

    If a person desires to violate one of the mitzvos shimios, this desire is not a flaw and the person need not work to eliminate this desire from his personality.

    If, however, a person desires to violate one of the mitzvos sichlios, this desire is a flaw and the person must strive to eliminate the desire from his heart.

    As an obvious example, if a person desires to murder his neighbor, then he needs to work not only to control himself, but also to eliminate the desire itself. (Despite the fact that, while subject to the desire, he presumably earns greater reward for controlling himself.)

    In the case of homosexuality, we would need to first determine if this prohibition is sichli or shimii. (In our society, and in some ancient societies as well, this is not self-evident.) If the prohibition against homosexuality is sichli, then the urge is itself a problem and the person must strive to eliminate it. So, in that sense, one who has homosexual desires would indeed be considered an imperfect being just as one who desires to speak lashon hara is imperfect. Of course, Hashem creates us with these imperfections for a reason. As such, we are created exactly and perfectly as we are supposed to be at that point. These "imperfections" (which we are tasked to rectify) are, in many ways, our very reason for existence.

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  10. Lazer A,

    Very thoughtful; I would like to see the Rambam again, inside, to see his language.

    I would add :

    1) Kabbalistically, people refer to the concept of "higher neshamos" which require less tikkun. Be that as it may, the Gaon, in general, says the purpose of existence is tikkun middos.

    2)Even desire to murder which is clearly patholgical, there is apparently a concept of transforming/sublimating the desire, not elimanting it completely, "someone born in the mazal of blood", etc.

    3) Returning to the Rambam's "mitzvos shimios" there is also a partially related to the Michtav Meliyahu by Yalsa I referred to in the first comment("Shochad L'satan"--reducing conflict).

    I think the next volume of "Daas Torah" should discuss these topics :)

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  11. Baruch Horowitz wrote:

    think the next volume of "Daas Torah" should discuss these topics :)
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    actually I have a section about the yetzer harah in the upcoming volume on abuse - which is where the translations cited in the post are coming from

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  12. Baruch Horowitz said...
    "...the Gaon, in general, says the purpose of existence is tikkun middos."I assume you are referring to the Gra's statement quoted in Even Shelema 1:2:
    עקר חיות האדם הוא להתחזק תמיד בשבירת המדות. ואם לאו, למה לו חיים.

    There is a similar statement from the Baal Shem Tov in the name of R' Saadya Gaon (near the beginning of Sefer Keser Shem Tov):
    מהבעל שם טוב בשם רבי סעדיה גאון כי עיקר בריאת האדם בעולם הזה לשבר מדות רעות הטבעיות שלו

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  13. Lazar A,

    Thank you for the references.(I was referring to the Even Shelema which I've often heard quoted).

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  14. LazerA and Baruch Horowitz,

    How is it that שבירת המדות is understood as "tikkun" hamidos? Lichora, "Shvira" and "Tikkun" seem like two different things.

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