One of the outcomes of the discussions [ I II III ] about Chazal and Science is that there are two disparate models being used here. Each side thinks it is obvious that their model is correct. On the one hand we have the insular chareidi model which says that the only relevant information is that which comes from seeing the text the way our godolim see it. On the other hand are those that argue that it is fine to use that approach for practical halacha but one needs to be and has the right to be concerned with objective truth.
This reminded me of the summary of Prof. Michael S. Berger's excellent book - Rabbinical Authority. He says that determining the source of Rabbinic authority in the traditional world is basically a description of what a particular community considers to be authoritative. On the other hand the more modern elements say that we need to identity objective sources of authority - which are independent of what people in a particular community do.
p154-155
"Interpreting legal texts led us in chapter 9 to introduce Stanley Fish's analysis of literary criticism, which situates all interpretation within the context of interpretive communities. Indeed, a "text" has no existence independent of such a community, for only a community, with its values, assumptions, principles, etc., may construe a text as a "text" in the first place. We teased out the implications of such a model for interpretation in legal traditions in general and in the Jewish legal tradition in particular, showing how the ways the Sages read the Torah became characteristic of that community and were subsequently (consequently?) applied to the Mishnah, the Talmud, and even medieval codes.
All three chapters of part III offered alternative understandings of authority that, to varying degrees, rejected the Enlightenment assessment of authority. The Enlightenmentent model demands that some justification be provided for forgoing one's own independent judgments and decisions in order to defer to another's view. But in part III I tried to show that authority is embedded in a form of life which, in the end, renders such rational justification beside the point. Applying a Wittgensteinian approach to the issue of Rabbinic authority, we saw that the issue could not truly be understood outside a set of circumstances that already situates it - and those subject to it - in a particular context. Description, rather than justification, was seen to be a helpful and productive way of analyzing authority. The question that came up in the nineteenth century and that continues to the present is not really about the authority of the talmudic Sages but is about the contemporary relevance or appropriateness of a form of life that makes the Sages of late antiquity central to one's entire outlook and set of concerns. Various interpretive communities, represented in part by the range of Jewish denominations today, have resolved this issue in a variety of ways, and each, in the end, construes the "text of the Talmud" and "Rabbinic authority" quite differently. The choices made by each community naturally bear consequences for its members, but it is only in terms of these interpretive communities that we can properly discuss the issue of the Talmud's, or Rabbinic, authority.
No simple solutions, therefore, await us as we inquire into the nature of Rabbinic authority. Sages, texts, and interpretive communities and forms of life mix inextricably in complex and subtle ways such that the effort to separate them and view one as antecedent or primary to the others fails to capture how authority is to be understood in Judaism. Rabbinic authority is necessarily conceived in the intricate interface of community and text, a fitting condition for "the people of the Book."
This reminded me of the summary of Prof. Michael S. Berger's excellent book - Rabbinical Authority. He says that determining the source of Rabbinic authority in the traditional world is basically a description of what a particular community considers to be authoritative. On the other hand the more modern elements say that we need to identity objective sources of authority - which are independent of what people in a particular community do.
p154-155
"Interpreting legal texts led us in chapter 9 to introduce Stanley Fish's analysis of literary criticism, which situates all interpretation within the context of interpretive communities. Indeed, a "text" has no existence independent of such a community, for only a community, with its values, assumptions, principles, etc., may construe a text as a "text" in the first place. We teased out the implications of such a model for interpretation in legal traditions in general and in the Jewish legal tradition in particular, showing how the ways the Sages read the Torah became characteristic of that community and were subsequently (consequently?) applied to the Mishnah, the Talmud, and even medieval codes.
All three chapters of part III offered alternative understandings of authority that, to varying degrees, rejected the Enlightenment assessment of authority. The Enlightenmentent model demands that some justification be provided for forgoing one's own independent judgments and decisions in order to defer to another's view. But in part III I tried to show that authority is embedded in a form of life which, in the end, renders such rational justification beside the point. Applying a Wittgensteinian approach to the issue of Rabbinic authority, we saw that the issue could not truly be understood outside a set of circumstances that already situates it - and those subject to it - in a particular context. Description, rather than justification, was seen to be a helpful and productive way of analyzing authority. The question that came up in the nineteenth century and that continues to the present is not really about the authority of the talmudic Sages but is about the contemporary relevance or appropriateness of a form of life that makes the Sages of late antiquity central to one's entire outlook and set of concerns. Various interpretive communities, represented in part by the range of Jewish denominations today, have resolved this issue in a variety of ways, and each, in the end, construes the "text of the Talmud" and "Rabbinic authority" quite differently. The choices made by each community naturally bear consequences for its members, but it is only in terms of these interpretive communities that we can properly discuss the issue of the Talmud's, or Rabbinic, authority.
No simple solutions, therefore, await us as we inquire into the nature of Rabbinic authority. Sages, texts, and interpretive communities and forms of life mix inextricably in complex and subtle ways such that the effort to separate them and view one as antecedent or primary to the others fails to capture how authority is to be understood in Judaism. Rabbinic authority is necessarily conceived in the intricate interface of community and text, a fitting condition for "the people of the Book."
I would say that the charedi model follows a legalistic definition of truth.
ReplyDeleteRefael: Professor Berger claims that all factions of Judaism use the liberal understanding of law.
ReplyDeleteI think P. Berger missed the point.
The issue regarding Rabbinic Authority is related to Torah authority. Those that view Torah as a guiding light that teaches as how to think, feel, assess priorites and every minute action is governed by the Torah will naturally look to Torah experts to provide the Torah view on the aforementioned subjects.
Conversely, those that view Torah as a general code of regulations + some moral lessons, IOW, they think the Torah, chalilah is limited, will riddicule Rabbinic Authority on matters outside halachah.
I also think that there is enough material in Chazal for anyone with an open and courageous mind to completely be absorbed into their world-view. The distance of centuries can be overcome with sufficient effort.
ReplyDeleteJews are not limited by any "Wittgensteinian paradigm" where only those who share a common temporal culture can communicate accurately to one another.
Hashem has guaranteed that Torah Learning is capable of transcending the natural cultural barriers of different times and different places for all Jews to speak a common Torah language.
I imagine this was the subject of these sessions at the last (40th) AJS conference:
http://www.ajsnet.org/2008prog/program.pdf
Session 7, Monday, December 22, 2008 11:15 AM – 1:00 PM
7.1JUDAISM OR JUDAISMS? THE POST-MODERN CHALLENGE
Sponsored by the American Academy for Jewish Research
Chair: Todd M. Endelman (University of Michigan)
Is Jewish History Really Jewish? Th e Boundaries of Minority History
David J. Biale (University of California, Davis)
Texts as Cultural Anchors: Talmud, Piyyut, Hekhalot
Ephraim Kanarfogel (Yeshiva University)
More specific quote on the problem with how "the typical academic" views Jewish History:
ReplyDeletehttp://64.112.226.77/one/ajs/ajs08/index.php?click_key=1&cmd=Multi+Search+Search+Load+Session&session_id=61452&PHPSESSID=66b91f28314f3c5337d6880fdb1bedd7
Abstract:
Post-modernism, broadly understood, raises a host of challenging questions for the study of Jewish history, culture, and society. Among them are questions linked to the frequently invoked conceptual polarity “essentialism versus constructivism.” Until recently, the conventional assumption was that Judaism was a religious civilization whose central core was more or less fixed and whose borders were well-defined and easily recognizable, whatever the time, whatever the place. Post-modern scholarship, on the other hand, which posits that meaning is contingent, unstable, and always in flux, disputes this. As Moshe Rosman writes in his recent book How Jewish Is Jewish History?, “If the word ‘Jewish,’ signifies no essential features continuous over time and place, if it can be – or if it has been – constructed in an infinite number of ways, if it is always and everywhere contingent, then, as a practical matter, how do we go about defining the subject which we seek to research and write about?” This session will explore how these issues impinge on contemporary scholarship about the Jewish past and present. The participants will also comment on why these issues have come to the fore with particular force at this time and how they might be linked to social, cultural, and religious tensions outside the walls of the academy.
[As if tension does not exist within the walls of the academy and all the academics are magically immune to any bias.]
It all boils down to whether you think Rambam was a Tzadik or a Heretic.
ReplyDeleteIf you think he was a Tzadik, then you must accept his view that the more we learn of nature and science, the more we appreciative of Hashem we become.
If you think he was a Heretic, then of course anything you learn of the natural world that might ask uncomfortable questions of Rabbeim is out of bounds.
The Torah are the words of Hashem. I think it can withstand the questions of science and curious minds.
HAL said...
ReplyDeleteIt all boils down to whether you think Rambam was a Tzadik or a Heretic.
If you think he was a Tzadik, then you must accept his view that the more we learn of nature and science, the more we appreciative of Hashem we become.
If you think he was a Heretic, then of course anything you learn of the natural world that might ask uncomfortable questions of Rabbeim is out of bounds.
===============
Why don't we try another dichotomy. If you think his belief that studying of science leads to a greater appreciation of G-d is applicable to all times and all places - than you would conclude that he made a major mistake. On the other hand if you view that he only wrote that for his generation then you would assume that he would have abandoned it in our age when we see being a scientist does not produce a better understanding of G-d than studying Torah.
"Why don't we try another dichotomy. If you think his belief that studying of science leads to a greater appreciation of G-d is applicable to all times and all places - than you would conclude that he made a major mistake. On the other hand if you view that he only wrote that for his generation then you would assume that he would have abandoned it in our age when we see being a scientist does not produce a better understanding of G-d than studying Torah."
ReplyDeleteI do not think that the Rambam would abandon his view. True, he would be shocked by Chilonim studying Science and not finding G-d. But his directives were for Torah Jews. I submit he would be appalled by the intellectual corruption in today's Yeshiva world, in no small part caused by the ignorance of Science, davka after it gave birth to insights into Creation that are without precedent.